Neueste Publikationen https://www.idos-research.de/ Publikationen des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) de Neueste Publikationen https://www.idos-research.de/apple-touch-icon.png https://www.idos-research.de/ 180 180 Publikationen des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) TYPO3 - get.content.right http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss Tue, 21 Apr 2026 11:35:50 +0200 Climate futures require politics https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/climate-futures-require-politics/ Climate action is shaped as much by politics as by technology and economics. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), central to mitigation and adaptation assessments, do not yet include a quantitative representation of political development. We outline a research agenda to systematically integrate political dimensions into climate scenario modelling. Climate action is shaped as much by politics as by technology and economics. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), central to mitigation and adaptation assessments, do not yet include a quantitative representation of political development. We outline a research agenda to systematically integrate political dimensions into climate scenario modelling.

]]> External Publications Tue, 21 Apr 2026 11:35:50 +0200 Building social cohesion through livelihood support in climate-related internal displacement settings: evidence from Zimbabwe and Mozambique https://www.idos-research.de//en/policy-brief/article/building-social-cohesion-through-livelihood-support-in-climate-related-internal-displacement-settings/ This policy brief highlights the critical role of equitable, timely livelihood support delivered by national and international actors to both displaced persons and host communities in strengthening social cohesion in climate-related displacement contexts. Climate-related extreme weather events are increa-singly displacing communities across Southern Africa, with negative implications for social cohesion, livelihoods, and community resilience. Understanding how displacement erodes social cohesion is important for developing strategies for restoring it. Evidence shows that livelihood support interventions, for example, cash‑based assistance, in-kind transfers (agricultural inputs) up to skills development programmes, are a pathway for mending or strengthening social cohesion in displacement contexts. Yet, in some cases, they can further fragment it. This requires strategies under which such interventions can be deployed to positively shape social cohesion outcomes.
This Policy Brief synthesises insights from qualitative research conducted from 2023 to 2025 with displaced communities and host populations in Zimbabwe (Chimanimani and Tsholotsho districts) and Mozambique (Guara Guara, Grudja and Praia Nova). It examines how livelihood interventions can either rebuild or further fragment social cohesion, identifies critical factors driving cohesion outcomes, and provides evidence-based recommendations for national governments, humanitarian actors, and development co-operation actors working in climate-displacement contexts across Southern Africa.
In Zimbabwe, vertical social cohesion in displacement contexts is eroded by a lack of designated policies on displacement, leading to poor socioeconomic outcomes for displaced individuals; ad hoc recovery and reconstruction efforts that undermine durable solutions and long-term recovery; and a lack of accountability infrastructure that undermines trust in the government. In Mozambique, the slow implementation and unequal distribution of recovery interventions undermine cooperation between communities and the institutions involved in post-disaster recovery efforts. This has led to large-scale returns of people to high-risk areas.
Drawing insights from both case studies, we provide key recommendations and conditions for implementing livelihood support to achieve social cohesion in climate-related displacement contexts.
Key policy messages
• Livelihood interventions can lead to maladaptation if not supported by strong governance mechanisms including policy frameworks and institutional coordination in planning and implementation.
• People-centred, area-based approaches to livelihood programming that account for pre-displacement livelihoods and support post-displacement transitions, while benefiting both displaced populations and host communities, should be adopted. One-size-fits-all interventions risk undermining economic recovery and social cohesion.
• Horizontal and vertical social cohesion indicators should be embedded in livelihood programmes from the outset to assess the social impacts before and after implementation.
• Inclusive, participatory decision-making in the delivery of livelihood support programmes should be mandated to prevent exclusionary practices that erode trust in institutions.

Dr Tomy Ncube is a postdoctoral researcher affiliated with the Centre for International Development Innovation at the Ryan Institute, University of Galway, and the School of Geography, Archaeology and Irish Studies.

]]> Policy Brief Mon, 20 Apr 2026 10:05:23 +0200 Digital labour opportunities and (im)mobility: steps for making digital remote work a global possibility https://www.idos-research.de//en/policy-brief/article/digital-labour-opportunities-and-immobility-steps-for-making-digital-remote-work-a-global-possibility/ Digitalisation offers a variety of ways to make work available to migrants and refugees across borders, but employment, tax, and banking policies need to be reformed to make this solution viable in practice. This policy brief offers advice for making digital remote work a viable solution to fill labour gaps without requiring workers to physically relocate. From a technology standpoint, there is no reason someone who does computer-based work must physically relocate, assuming they have the required job skills and internet connectivity. The increased use of bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) between countries is evidence that there are major skills gaps and global competition for labour. Indeed, a BLA can serve as a “policy sandbox” where governments negotiate the legal and statutory terms of digital remote work. Digital remote work can be an especially useful solution when the country providing labour has a large pool of people who are willing to work and fill labour pool gaps in countries of employment, but for different legal or personal reasons cannot relocate across borders. This latter point is no small thing: there is a significant body of migration research showing that the majority of people are not interested in moving across borders – or in the case of many refugees are unable to do so. The reasons for this are myriad. Digital labour could be a workaround to meet basic labour demand and facilitate economic inclusion. The word “could” is critical because banking, social and health insurance, and taxation, all of which are components of legal employment, remain bordered. This policy brief will focus on a specific case from research on urban refugee livelihoods where the worker was able to work digitally in the U.S. from Malaysia, while being subject to social security, taxation and insurance in the U.S. The idiosyncrasies in this case help point to spaces for reforming social security, tax and insurance rules to reduce their “bordered-ness” and make digital work more systematically viable.
Key policy messages:
• To make digital remote work viable at scale, development cooperation agencies should play a key facilitator role, linking relevant authorities in the tax, social insurance and banking regulation sectors. This is especially important for refugees, who often cannot move and who fall outside the protection of host country labour laws. These reforms could, for example, be built into BLAs.
• Achieving inclusive economic development goals via digital employment would require that remote workers earned competitive salaries. Thus, there would need to be buy-in from the private sector regarding wage competitiveness for workers in different countries, as well as a role for unions and civil society in negotiating digital remote work policy.
• While digital work can enable greater economic and labour participation for workers who cannot relocate for jobs, there are still sectors that require physical presence. Thus, digital remote work is not a replacement for immigration policy that facilitates safe and flexible migration for those people who do have to move.

]]> Policy Brief Mon, 20 Apr 2026 10:00:00 +0200 Urban transitions need bio-based materials—here’s why https://www.idos-research.de//en/the-current-column/article/urban-transitions-need-bio-based-materials-heres-why/ Urban transitions need more than low-carbon cement. Bio-based materials can cut emissions while creating jobs and boosting local economies—yet remain largely overlooked. Bonn, 20 April 2026. Urban transitions need more than low-carbon cement. Bio-based materials can cut emissions while creating jobs and boosting local economies—yet remain largely overlooked.

This week, representatives from academia, government and industry seek to find solutions to decarbonise the built environment at the Sustainable Buildings and Construction Summit in Lausanne. The heat is on: the buildings sector emits more than a third of global CO2 annually and urbanisation in many low- and middle-income countries is soaring, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The key question is whether solutions will be fast, feasible and deliver economic co-benefits. Much of the international debate highlights low-carbon concrete such as LC3 as a quick fix requiring minimal adjustments to business as usual. Yet its development potential is limited, which might be different when adding bio-based materials to the construction mix.

Many countries in SSA face a triple challenge: First, providing adequate housing for a growing urban population, many with low incomes. Africa already faces a deficit of about 50 million housing units, expected to reach 130 million by 2030. Second, creating jobs and increasing firm productivity are key priorities for policymakers. In Kenya, for example, 1 million youth enter the job market every year. Third, pursuing economic development along a greener pathway than the carbon-intensive trajectories of today’s advanced economies. Infrastructure and buildings make this choice especially consequential, as carbon-intensive construction locks in emissions, raises urban heat and limits re-use of materials. As much of SSA’s built environment is yet to be built, there is a chance to avoid costly retrofits, which needs to go hand in hand with needed shifts in the construction sector in the Global North.

The switch to low-carbon concrete may meet only two of the three challenges in a fast and feasible way: providing housing and decarbonising construction LC3 requires minimal changes in cement factories and is applied the same by masons. Modelling shows it is particularly suitable for multi-storey buildings, where its carbon footprint is lower than for a mix of bio-based materials and fired clay bricks. For these buildings, LC3 makes sense. Yet, many homes in SSA are and will remain single-storey, where emissions depend heavily on material composition and transport distances.

Bio-based materials as a solution to SSA’s triple challenge have so far been largely neglected. This is significant, as improved adobe blocks, timber or bamboo offer not only lower-cost but also more labour-intensive alternatives to LC3, generating stronger local economic benefits and supporting firm development. Improved adobe or interlocking soil blocks can often be produced at or near the construction sites, reducing transportation needs and enabling local SMEs to participate. Both are well suited for affordable housing: research in Rwanda shows wall costs can fall by 60% or more, while improved production standards ensure comparable strength and durability. Our research also finds that bio-based materials can create greener, better-quality jobs in Kigali. However, wider adoption faces supply- and demand-side barriers, including limited awareness and perceptions of low quality that restrict financing. 

This points to a hybrid approach that must be clearly defined: LC3 for multi-storey buildings and structural uses, and bio-based materials for single-storey housing and non-load-bearing interior walls, where they are often more affordable and locally appropriate. In Rwanda, clear government direction is needed for business adoption. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, similar hybrid approaches are promising, but scaling bio-based materials requires locally grounded research. Suitable materials depend on a) type of soil and materials locally available, b) import dependence on cement, steel, etc. c) transport and other lifecycle costs. Sustainable timber and mycelium may suit Europe and bamboo Asia, while in SSA stabilised adobe blocks, soil-cement mixes and plants such as typha offer strong potential.

German development cooperation should bring the economic co-benefits and development potential for local firms working with bio-based more strongly to the international table. In its own development cooperation projects, greening the construction sector including bio-based material options for green job creation and firm upgrading should become an explicit goal. The exact type of bio-based material and its value chain to be supported needs to be analysed ex ante in the country regarding: Soil (availability and quality), import-export structure and tariffs of construction materials, market conditions and bottlenecks on supply and demand side. At the same time, scaling bio-based materials requires local political willingness to confront entrenched interests in the construction sector, alongside clear government regulations that set direction and create a level playing field for sustainable alternatives. This may be somewhat slower than other solutions, but just as feasible and it likely increases economic co-benefits for partner countries.

]]> The Current Column Mon, 20 Apr 2026 09:49:22 +0200 Towards an Urban Political Ecology of Coastal Land Reclamation https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/towards-an-urban-political-ecology-of-coastal-land-reclamation/ Coasts, deltas and estuaries have been reshaped for generations by land reclamation projects for the purposes of expanding settlements and agricultural lands as well as protecting coasts. Since the mid-twentieth century, technical progress has allowed for land reclamation to occur at an unprecedented speed and scale. Regardless of the key role that land reclamation has had in the past as well as in more recent coastal urbanisation efforts, the issue has received insufficient attention from human geographers, urban political ecologists and marine social scientists. In this paper, I aim to advance the land reclamation research by suggesting a new conceptual framework that combines concepts and empirical insights from urban political ecology (UPE), anthropology, political geography and political economy. This approach considers the representational, legal and material dimensions of urban coastal mega-projects and helps to identify those who benefit and those who lose due to land reclamation. I conclude that a focus on land reclamation can help to understand that ‘land’ is a fundamental requirement for urbanisation. Land in coastal cities is not ‘out there’; it has to be created. To investigate the making of land requires integrating the often-neglected coastal geomorphologies, marine sites of sediment extraction and understanding how they are discursively shaped and transformed by human interventions on urban coasts into UPE. Coasts, deltas and estuaries have been reshaped for generations by land reclamation projects for the purposes of expanding settlements and agricultural lands as well as protecting coasts. Since the mid-twentieth century, technical progress has allowed for land reclamation to occur at an unprecedented speed and scale. Regardless of the key role that land reclamation has had in the past as well as in more recent coastal urbanisation efforts, the issue has received insufficient attention from human geographers, urban political ecologists and marine social scientists. In this paper, I aim to advance the land reclamation research by suggesting a new conceptual framework that combines concepts and empirical insights from urban political ecology (UPE), anthropology, political geography and political economy. This approach considers the representational, legal and material dimensions of urban coastal mega-projects and helps to identify those who benefit and those who lose due to land reclamation. I conclude that a focus on land reclamation can help to understand that ‘land’ is a fundamental requirement for urbanisation. Land in coastal cities is not ‘out there’; it has to be created. To investigate the making of land requires integrating the often-neglected coastal geomorphologies, marine sites of sediment extraction and understanding how they are discursively shaped and transformed by human interventions on urban coasts into UPE.

]]> External Publications Mon, 20 Apr 2026 09:40:00 +0200 Zusammen ist man weniger allein: Mit Team Europe 2.0 die europäische Entwicklungspolitik stärken https://www.idos-research.de//en/policy-brief/article/zusammen-ist-man-weniger-allein-mit-team-europe-20-die-europaeische-entwicklungspolitik-staerken/ Die gegenwärtigen Umbrüche in der internationalen Ordnung erfordern ein geeinteres Vorgehen der EU in der Entwicklungspolitik. Eine stärkere informelle und themenspezifische Zusammenarbeit (Team Europe 2.0) ist nötig, um die strategische Debatte zu europäischer Enwicklungspolitik neu zu beleben. Die internationale Ordnung ist in einem tiefgreifenden Wandel, wobei Großmachtrivalitäten eine Neu-ordnung globaler Machtstrukturen vorantreiben. Dies hat auch Auswirkungen auf die europäische Entwicklungspolitik. In vielen EU-Mitgliedstaaten gehen die Mittel für öffentliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (ODA) zurück; gleichzeitig richten EU-Länder ihre verbleibenden Mittel stärker an Eigeninteressen aus. Bislang werden diese Reformen weitestgehend bilateral ausdefiniert, wohingegen eine politische Debatte über Rolle, Mehrwert und gemeinsame Ausgestaltung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik weitestgehend fehlt. Doch ohne eine Stärkung der europäischen Zusammenarbeit wird es Europa nicht gelingen, auf die aktuellen weltpolitischen Umbrüche eine adäquate Antwort zu geben.
In diesem Policy Brief argumentieren wir, dass Reformbestrebungen in der europäischen Entwick-lungspolitik die Zusammenarbeit und Komplementarität stärken müssen, um wirksam auf die veränderte geopolitische Lage reagieren zu können. Unsere Analyse zeigt vier inhaltliche Handlungsfelder, auf die sich laufende Reformprozesse europäischer Akteure konzentrieren und auf denen Entwicklungspolitik wichtige Beiträge leisten soll:
1. Wirtschaftsförderung und Einbindung des Privatsektors; 2. Sicherheitspolitik; 3. Steuerung und Gestaltung von Migration; 4. Menschliche Entwicklung und Armutsreduktion, insbesondere in LDCs (Least Developed Countries).
Eine gemeinsame strategische Ausrichtung Europas auf diesen Handlungsfeldern fehlt jedoch bisher. Diese gemeinsamen strategischen Prioritäten auszuhandeln erfordert eine Neubelebung des politischen Dialogs zwischen EU-Institutionen und Mit-gliedstaaten sowie eine Weiterentwicklung des „Team Europe“-Ansatzes. „Team Europe 2.0“ hätte dann zwei Funktionen: die inhaltliche Komplementarität „nach innen“ zu stärken durch eine Verständigung darauf, wie die unterschiedlichen Akteure jeweils zu gemeinsam festgelegten Zielsetzungen beitragen; und „nach außen“, um sichtbar zu machen, wofür Europa strategisch steht.
Kernelement von Team Europe 2.0 sollte ein verbesserter inhaltlicher Austausch in themenspezifi-schen, informellen Gruppen unter Führung einzelner Mitgliedstaaten und der Kommission sein. Solche „thematischen Champions“ könnten die Entwicklung gemeinsamer Strategien für größere, transformative Initiativen erleichtern. Ein verbesserter politischer Dialog und inhaltliche Abstimmung in Schlüsselbe-reichen der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik sind Voraussetzungen für ein geeintes und strategischeres Auftreten von „Team Europe“ nach außen, auch in multilateralen Kontexten.

]]> Policy Brief Mon, 20 Apr 2026 09:38:52 +0200 Strengthening European development policy: the case for Team Europe 2.0 https://www.idos-research.de//en/policy-brief/article/strengthening-european-development-policy-the-case-for-team-europe-20/ The current disruptions in the international system call for a more strategic and coordinated approach to European development policy. This requires a revitalisation of the political dialogue between EU institutions and member states and more informal and issue-specific cooperation (Team Europe 2.0). The international order is undergoing profound change as rivalry among major powers realigns the global balance. This is also having an impact on European development policy. In many European Union (EU) member states, funding for official development assistance (ODA) is declining. At the same time, EU countries are reforming their development policies and increasingly channelling their remaining resources towards priorities that serve primarily their own interests. So far, these reforms have largely been defined bilaterally, whereas a political debate on the role, added value and joint objectives of EU development policy is largely absent. Yet, without strengthening European cooperation in development policy, Europe will not succeed in providing an adequate response to the current upheavals in global politics.
In this policy brief, we argue that reform efforts in European development policy must strengthen co-operation and complementarity to respond effectively to the changed geopolitical landscape. Our analysis identifies four key policy areas where European actors are pursuing ongoing reforms and where development policy should make significant contributions: 
1) promoting economic cooperation and private-sector engagement, 2) security policy, 3) managing and shaping migration and 4) human development including poverty reduction, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs). So far, a joint European strategic direction in these areas has been lacking. Negotiating these shared priorities requires a revitalisation of the political dialogue between EU institutions and member states, as well as further development of the “Team Europe” approach. “Team Europe 2.0” would then have two functions: to strengthen substantive complementarity “internally” through an understanding of how the various actors individually contribute to jointly defined objectives; and “externally” by making visible what Europe stands for strategically.
A key element of Team Europe 2.0 should be an improved substantive dialogue among member states and within issue-specific, informal groups co-facilitated by individual member states and the European Commission. Such “thematic champions” could initiate the development of joint strategies for larger, transformative initiatives. Improved political dialogue and coordination on substance in key areas of European development policy are prerequisites for a united and more strategic external presence of “Team Europe”, including in multilateral contexts.

 

 

]]> Policy Brief Mon, 20 Apr 2026 08:55:39 +0200 Use the scope available! On overlooked levers in tax systems https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/use-the-scope-available-on-overlooked-levers-in-tax-systems/ More than a year ago US President Donald Trump effectively dissolved the national development agency USAID by executive order on his first day in office. Since then, other Western countries have also implemented significant cuts to their development budgets, albeit less drastically than the US. This includes Germany, whose budget for development cooperation (DC) has been shrinking since 2024. The budget of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) does not cover the entirety of DC, but it does reflect the general trend. It stands at just over 10 billion euros for the current year, 2026 – in 2024, it was still 11.1 billion euros. More than a year ago US President Donald Trump effectively dissolved the national development agency USAID by executive order on his first day in office. Since then, other Western countries have also implemented significant cuts to their development budgets, albeit less drastically than the US. This includes Germany, whose budget for development cooperation (DC) has been shrinking since 2024. The budget of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) does not cover the entirety of DC, but it does reflect the general trend. It stands at just over 10 billion euros for the current year, 2026 – in 2024, it was still 11.1 billion euros.

]]> External Publications Wed, 15 Apr 2026 11:36:31 +0200 Spielräume nutzen! Über vernachlässigte Hebel in Steuersystemen https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/spielraeume-nutzen-ueber-vernachlaessigte-hebel-in-steuersystemen/ Welche Möglichkeiten haben Regierungen in Ländern niedrigen oder mittleren Einkommens, den aktuellen Ausfall von Mittelzuflüssen aus der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu kompensieren? Der Artikel zeigt: Nachhaltig wirksame Steuerreformen sind schwierig, aber nicht unmöglich. Es gibt durchaus Möglichkeiten, Steuersysteme aufkommensstärker und gerechter zu gestalten. Häufig können bereits Investitionen in die Modernisierung der Steuerverwaltungen positive Resultate hervorbringen, etwa bei der Grundsteuer. In anderen Fällen sind steuerpolitische Maßnahmen erforderlich, zum Beispiel bei der Besteuerung digitaler Dienstleistungen (einschließlich von Finanzdienstleistungen). Auch über Steuervergünstigungen wäre zu reden. Sie werden z.B. für Investitionsförderung oder Armutsbekämpfung eingesetzt, verfehlen jedoch häufig ihre Ziele und verringern das Steueraufkommen erheblich. Für die Umsetzung von Reformen gilt: Mehr als Belehrungen von außen wirkt häufig der horizontale Austausch mit Nachbarländern auf regionaler Ebene. International wäre eine gerechtere Verteilung von Besteuerungsrechten wichtig, damit Staaten weltweit die Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Fiskalsysteme weiter erhöhen können. Darauf zu warten, macht aber keinen Sinn. Besser ist es, die Spielräume zu nutzen, die sich bereits heute bieten. Welche Möglichkeiten haben Regierungen in Ländern niedrigen oder mittleren Einkommens, den aktuellen Ausfall von Mittelzuflüssen aus der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu kompensieren? Der Artikel zeigt: Nachhaltig wirksame Steuerreformen sind schwierig, aber nicht unmöglich. Es gibt durchaus Möglichkeiten, Steuersysteme aufkommensstärker und gerechter zu gestalten. Häufig können bereits Investitionen in die Modernisierung der Steuerverwaltungen positive Resultate hervorbringen, etwa bei der Grundsteuer. In anderen Fällen sind steuerpolitische Maßnahmen erforderlich, zum Beispiel bei der Besteuerung digitaler Dienstleistungen (einschließlich von Finanzdienstleistungen). Auch über Steuervergünstigungen wäre zu reden. Sie werden z.B. für Investitionsförderung oder Armutsbekämpfung eingesetzt, verfehlen jedoch häufig ihre Ziele und verringern das Steueraufkommen erheblich. Für die Umsetzung von Reformen gilt: Mehr als Belehrungen von außen wirkt häufig der horizontale Austausch mit Nachbarländern auf regionaler Ebene. International wäre eine gerechtere Verteilung von Besteuerungsrechten wichtig, damit Staaten weltweit die Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Fiskalsysteme weiter erhöhen können. Darauf zu warten, macht aber keinen Sinn. Besser ist es, die Spielräume zu nutzen, die sich bereits heute bieten.

]]> External Publications Wed, 15 Apr 2026 11:32:00 +0200 Dataset development in earth system governance: learnings, stakes, and pathways for impact https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/dataset-development-in-earth-system-governance-learnings-stakes-and-pathways-for-impact/ The construction and use of datasets have become an important practice in Earth system governance research. By systematically cataloguing various outcomes, policy issues, actors, sites, and processes, datasets enhance the reliability, transparency, and replicability of research. Yet, despite growing interest, efforts to share data, integrate datasets, and develop common standards remain fragmented. This Perspective surveys various scholarly efforts to create datasets and provides a classification of the emerging dataset landscape in the field of Earth system governance. Drawing on examples from our own research and group discussions, we identify current best practices and lessons learned regarding data collection, management, and integration, as well as data usability and sharing. We argue that the design of datasets is not a neutral technical exercise, but has implications for how global environmental governance is theorized and studied. We also highlight how greater attention to data infrastructures can strengthen the relevance of research for policy practitioners and other stakeholders beyond academia. The construction and use of datasets have become an important practice in Earth system governance research. By systematically cataloguing various outcomes, policy issues, actors, sites, and processes, datasets enhance the reliability, transparency, and replicability of research. Yet, despite growing interest, efforts to share data, integrate datasets, and develop common standards remain fragmented. This Perspective surveys various scholarly efforts to create datasets and provides a classification of the emerging dataset landscape in the field of Earth system governance. Drawing on examples from our own research and group discussions, we identify current best practices and lessons learned regarding data collection, management, and integration, as well as data usability and sharing. We argue that the design of datasets is not a neutral technical exercise, but has implications for how global environmental governance is theorized and studied. We also highlight how greater attention to data infrastructures can strengthen the relevance of research for policy practitioners and other stakeholders beyond academia.

]]> External Publications Wed, 15 Apr 2026 11:29:05 +0200 How development policy can avert the fertiliser crisis https://www.idos-research.de//en/the-current-column/article/how-development-policy-can-avert-the-fertiliser-crisis/ The crisis calls for short-term measures – but also offers an opportunity for a long-overdue paradigm shift. Bonn, 13 April 2026. German development cooperation must act swiftly to address the fertiliser crisis. Multilateral coordination and the promotion of soil health are priorities.

The looming fertiliser crisis is a stress test for German development cooperation. Now German DC must also prove that the BMZ reform plan is more than just a piece of paper. The tools for this are ready. The crisis calls for short-term measures – but also offers an opportunity for a long-overdue paradigm shift: away from dependence on volatile fertiliser markets, and towards resilient, locally rooted strategies.

The looming fertiliser crisis and its consequences

The world is once again facing a fertiliser crisis. Since US and Israeli air strikes against Iran led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, trade has ground to a halt. Around a third of the world’s shipped nitrogen fertiliser passed through the Strait up to now. Now, prices for nitrogen fertiliser have risen by up to 50 per cent. For millions of smallholder farmers in the Global South, this will jeopardise their food security. The World Food Programme warns that the war could push 45 million more people into acute food insecurity – and food price rises are also expected in Germany.

In previous fertiliser crises, rising food prices have subsequently caused inflation to rise sharply. This has not only had a negative impact on food security, but has also led to uprisings and a further strengthening of populist movements. Fertiliser crises are also increasingly being politicised in the context of geoeconomic competition. Most recently, Russia has deliberately exploited fertiliser shortages to deepen dependencies and gain political influence. Anyone who weakens partnerships during the fertiliser crisis loses credibility and leaves the field open to others.

The tools are ready

With 3.5 billion euros (2023) in investment in rural development and food security, Germany is the largest bilateral donor – a responsibility that matters now.

Since its G7 presidency in 2022 at the latest, Germany has established itself as a multilateral actor in food crises – from the Global Alliance for Food Security (GAFS) to its support for the Africa Fertilizer and Soil Health Action Plan.

German development cooperation is also making important contributions to soil health in practice. Long-term initiatives, such as the GIZ project ‘Soil Protection and Rehabilitation for Food Security’ (ProSoil), have rehabilitated around one million hectares of agricultural land across several countries and achieved yield increases of 44 percent for smallholder farmers.

Four levers for the coming months

Building on the high level of trust at the multilateral level and its strong track record in implementation, Germany can now utilise four levers.

Strengthen G7 coordination: The G7 countries account for 73 percent of all donor investments in food systems. Germany should push for coordinated action and propose the reactivation of the G7 Expert Fertilizer Group. The expert group was already important following Russia’s 2022 attack in coordinating emergency aid and medium-term strategies for diversifying supply chains.

Review special funding; combine emergency aid with sustainable measures: During the crisis triggered by Russia in 2022, Germany already made €880 million available in special funds, thereby mobilising a further 4.5 billion US dollars via the G7. What is crucial now is the design of a comparable mechanism that ensures funds reach smallholder farmers directly and, ideally, are sustainably channelled into ongoing projects; rather than being squandered as windfall profits by the fertiliser industry.

Tapping into local fertilisation potential and increasing nutrient use efficiency: Dependence on imported fertiliser is a structural problem in many countries. Agroecological approaches such as composting, integrated soil fertility management and organic inputs are not only ecologically sound but also economically viable, as they increase the nutrient use efficiency of conventional fertilisers. This reduces the need for imported fertilisers. Germany should scale up these initiatives and involve further donors.

Driving forward the repurposing agenda: The reallocation of environmentally harmful agricultural subsidies can reduce dependencies in the long term. Germany knows the problem from its own experience: The nitrogen surpluses from German agriculture alone cause environmental damage amounting to 4.8 billion euros annually. Fossil fuel subsidies should be redirected towards sustainable soil practices and the development of decentralised fertiliser production.

The BMZ reform plan as an opportunity?

The BMZ reform plan provides the strategic framework for a response to the crisis. It consolidates the special initiative ‘Transformation of Agricultural and Food Systems’ and emphasises that food security must be focused on Africa – where the fertiliser crisis will hit hardest.

However, the plan has a weak spot: an overly narrow focus on the private sector. That is certainly justified. But if experience from the German soil health portfolio shows one thing, it is that effective solutions are often local and knowledge-intensive– but not necessarily profitable for (foreign) investors.

The response to the crisis should therefore continue to uphold development policy principles as a guideline and ensure that no one is left behind. The aim is a sustainable transformation of dependencies.

  • Katharina Molitor is a human geographer at IDOS and conducts research on food price changes and markets, food and nutrition security and smallholder farming.
  • Dr Gideon Tups is an economic geographer at the Centre for Development Research (ZEF) at the University of Bonn. His research focuses on agri-food systems, global supply chains, fertilisers and the bioeconomy. 
]]> The Current Column Mon, 13 Apr 2026 09:45:08 +0200 Formal and informal labor demand in Egyptian manufacturing firms https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/formal-and-informal-labor-demand-in-egyptian-manufacturing-firms/ This paper investigates the determinants and dynamics of labour demand and specifically informal labour in Egypt’s manufacturing sector, using nationally representative firm-level data from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey. Applying ordinary least squares and fractional logit models, we analyse total employment, the share of informal labour, and its average annual change over the firm life cycle. Three key findings emerge. First, employment is positively associated with capital, exporting, innovation, industrial zones, worker training, and managerial education, and negatively associated with sole proprietorships, wages, and total factor productivity. Second, informal employment is more common among private sector firms, sole proprietorships, and firms using more part-time workers, and less prevalent among firms adopting technology or led by more educated managers. Third, changes in informality over time are modest: most formal firms exhibit no change in the share of informal workers. Notably, formal firms that did not initially employ informal labour tend to increase their informal share, while firms that formalised continue to rely heavily on informal employment. Together, these findings underscore the persistence of informality and limited transitions toward full formalisation within Egypt’s formal manufacturing sector. This paper investigates the determinants and dynamics of labour demand and specifically informal labour in Egypt’s manufacturing sector, using nationally representative firm-level data from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey. Applying ordinary least squares and fractional logit models, we analyse total employment, the share of informal labour, and its average annual change over the firm life cycle. Three key findings emerge. First, employment is positively associated with capital, exporting, innovation, industrial zones, worker training, and managerial education, and negatively associated with sole proprietorships, wages, and total factor productivity. Second, informal employment is more common among private sector firms, sole proprietorships, and firms using more part-time workers, and less prevalent among firms adopting technology or led by more educated managers. Third, changes in informality over time are modest: most formal firms exhibit no change in the share of informal workers. Notably, formal firms that did not initially employ informal labour tend to increase their informal share, while firms that formalised continue to rely heavily on informal employment. Together, these findings underscore the persistence of informality and limited transitions toward full formalisation within Egypt’s formal manufacturing sector.

]]> External Publications Fri, 10 Apr 2026 12:35:30 +0200 Back to the future: the Pact for the Mediterranean and the mirage of Euro-Mediterranean integration https://www.idos-research.de//en/policy-brief/article/back-to-the-future-the-pact-for-the-mediterranean-and-the-mirage-of-euro-mediterranean-integration/ The Pact for the Mediterranean has some potential to strengthen sectoral, functional cooperation. Sufficient resources and mutual trust-building may create incentives for Euro-Mediterranean relations to move beyond transactionalism and foster integration where past approaches have failed. The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

]]> Policy Brief Thu, 09 Apr 2026 08:42:11 +0200 Bullshit urgency and washing machines: As the US scrambles for a plan for Iran, pitfalls loom large https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/bullshit-urgency-and-washing-machines-as-the-us-scrambles-for-a-plan-for-iran-pitfalls-loom-large/ Heiner Janus and Daniel Esser argue that the rush to devise a strategy for Iran is bound to run into bureaucratic pathologies that drive failures in intelligence and foreign aid alike: manufactured urgency and institutional whitewashing. Heiner Janus and Daniel Esser argue that the rush to devise a strategy for Iran is bound to run into bureaucratic pathologies that drive failures in intelligence and foreign aid alike: manufactured urgency and institutional whitewashing.

]]> External Publications Tue, 07 Apr 2026 10:48:05 +0200 Defending health as a global public good https://www.idos-research.de//en/the-current-column/article/defending-health-as-a-global-public-good/ Global health is not a bargaining chip, but a global public good that must be defended. Bonn, 07 April 2026. At a time of growing geopolitical fragmentation, the real test is whether governments uphold global health as a global public good, or reduce it to a bargaining chip.

On World Health Day 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) calls on people everywhere to come “Together for health. Stand with science”. In the WHO’s framing, standing with science means not only respecting evidence, but also sustaining the cooperation and trust needed for effective global health action. That is the right message. But in a more fragmented geopolitical landscape, the real question is whether governments are still willing to defend the cooperation, fairness, and institutions on which the application of global health science depends.

Global health research can save lives, strengthen resilience, and generate substantial social and economic returns. However, these gains depend on countries being willing to share knowledge, build trust, and turn evidence into collective action. This has become increasingly difficult, as global health is under pressure from geopolitical rivalry, donor fragmentation, and more transactional forms of cooperation. In such settings, science itself risks being subordinated to bargaining power: data-sharing becomes conditional, surveillance politically contested, and research partnerships more asymmetric.

The United States’ withdrawal from the WHO and the recent bilateral health deals pursued by the Trump Administration illustrate how far the transactional logic of cooperation has advanced: global health is being recast from a field of solidarity into an instrument of geopolitical leverage. The US government has signed transactional health agreements with 14 African countries, raising serious concerns about sovereignty, data control, and health security. Yet partner countries are not without agency: Zambia resisted a proposal tying health funding to access to copper and cobalt, while judicial scrutiny in Kenya stalled implementation of a health deal with the United States. Transactional deal-making not only complicates cooperation to protect global health, but also erodes the multilateral basis for effective prevention and response to pandemics, antimicrobial resistance and climate-related health risks.

This shift has direct consequences for Germany’s own global health policy. In a more transactional global health landscape, the question is no longer whether Germany supports global health, but whether it also protects the conditions under which science can function across borders: data-sharing, trusted surveillance, collaborative research, and institutions that turn evidence into action. Seen in that light, the recent review of the Federal Government’s Global Health Strategy is highly relevant. It confirms the continued importance of global health and places stronger emphasis on prevention, climate-resilient health systems, pandemic preparedness, and multilateral health governance up to 2030. At the same time, the new BMZ strategy foresees that global health will be addressed more strongly through reform of the global health architecture, division of labour with other donors, and multilateral approaches. In principle, this is the right response to an increasingly fragmented global health landscape. Germany is right to defend multilateralism at a time when trust in international cooperation is under strain, and to link health more closely to resilience, prevention, and governance. The real test, however, is one of coherence: whether this higher level of ambition is matched by credible implementation. In practice, this means three things:

First, it requires moving beyond a traditional donor role towards a more reform-oriented approach. This can be done by using Germany’s financial and political weight not simply to preserve existing institutions, but to make global health organisations that translate scientific evidence into action, such as Gavi and the Global Fund, more equitable and better coordinated. This includes stronger collaboration across these organisations in line with the Lusaka Agenda, with a clearer focus on reducing fragmentation for partner countries.

Second, it means taking scientific research on the interlinkages of environmental and human health seriously, by integrating a One Health logic into implementation that links prevention and response more consistently with climate, water, and environmental health. Otherwise, the wider ecological and social drivers of health risk, from deforestation and biodiversity loss to climate change and intensive farming, will insufficiently be addressed.

Third, there are strong reasons to preserve bilateral engagement alongside multilateral efforts, particularly in fragile contexts where local anchoring, flexibility, and political responsiveness often prove essential. This matters not only for effective implementation, but also for the trusted relationships on which data-sharing and scientific cooperation frequently depend. In this way, Germany could combine multilateral strength with local responsiveness, especially where multilateral institutions alone cannot always react quickly enough.

World Health Day 2026 carries an important political message. To stand with science means more than praising evidence. It means defending the trust, fairness, and institutions that allow science to serve the common good. At a time of growing geopolitical fragmentation, the real test is whether governments are willing to treat global health not as a bargaining chip, but as a global public good.

]]> The Current Column Tue, 07 Apr 2026 10:29:41 +0200