<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/">
	<channel>
		
		<title>Neueste Publikationen</title>
		<link>https://www.idos-research.de/</link>
		<description>Publikationen des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)</description>
		<language>de</language>
		
		<generator>TYPO3 - get.content.right</generator>
		<docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
		
		
		
		<lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Dec 2026 10:17:00 +0100</lastBuildDate>
		
		
		<item>
			<title>Aid for trade, political ties, and global value chains: a regime-dependent effect?</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/aid-for-trade-political-ties-and-global-value-chains-a-regime-dependent-effect/</link>
			<description>This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Wed, 30 Dec 2026 10:17:00 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Use the scope available! On overlooked levers in tax systems</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/use-the-scope-available-on-overlooked-levers-in-tax-systems/</link>
			<description>More than a year ago US President Donald Trump effectively dissolved the national development agency USAID by executive order on his first day in office. Since then, other Western countries have also implemented significant cuts to their development budgets, albeit less drastically than the US. This includes Germany, whose budget for development cooperation (DC) has been shrinking since 2024. The budget of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) does not cover the entirety of DC, but it does reflect the general trend. It stands at just over 10 billion euros for the current year, 2026 – in 2024, it was still 11.1 billion euros.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>More than a year ago US President Donald Trump effectively dissolved the national development agency USAID by executive order on his first day in office. Since then, other Western countries have also implemented significant cuts to their development budgets, albeit less drastically than the US. This includes Germany, whose budget for development cooperation (DC) has been shrinking since 2024. The budget of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) does not cover the entirety of DC, but it does reflect the general trend. It stands at just over 10 billion euros for the current year, 2026 – in 2024, it was still 11.1 billion euros.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 11:36:31 +0200</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Spielräume nutzen! Über vernachlässigte Hebel in Steuersystemen</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/spielraeume-nutzen-ueber-vernachlaessigte-hebel-in-steuersystemen/</link>
			<description>Welche Möglichkeiten haben Regierungen in Ländern niedrigen oder mittleren Einkommens, den aktuellen Ausfall von Mittelzuflüssen aus der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu kompensieren? Der Artikel zeigt: Nachhaltig wirksame Steuerreformen sind schwierig, aber nicht unmöglich. Es gibt durchaus Möglichkeiten, Steuersysteme aufkommensstärker und gerechter zu gestalten. Häufig können bereits Investitionen in die Modernisierung der Steuerverwaltungen positive Resultate hervorbringen, etwa bei der Grundsteuer. In anderen Fällen sind steuerpolitische Maßnahmen erforderlich, zum Beispiel bei der Besteuerung digitaler Dienstleistungen (einschließlich von Finanzdienstleistungen). Auch über Steuervergünstigungen wäre zu reden. Sie werden z.B. für Investitionsförderung oder Armutsbekämpfung eingesetzt, verfehlen jedoch häufig ihre Ziele und verringern das Steueraufkommen erheblich. Für die Umsetzung von Reformen gilt: Mehr als Belehrungen von außen wirkt häufig der horizontale Austausch mit Nachbarländern auf regionaler Ebene. International wäre eine gerechtere Verteilung von Besteuerungsrechten wichtig, damit Staaten weltweit die Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Fiskalsysteme weiter erhöhen können. Darauf zu warten, macht aber keinen Sinn. Besser ist es, die Spielräume zu nutzen, die sich bereits heute bieten.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Welche Möglichkeiten haben Regierungen in Ländern niedrigen oder mittleren Einkommens, den aktuellen Ausfall von Mittelzuflüssen aus der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu kompensieren? Der Artikel zeigt: Nachhaltig wirksame Steuerreformen sind schwierig, aber nicht unmöglich. Es gibt durchaus Möglichkeiten, Steuersysteme aufkommensstärker und gerechter zu gestalten. Häufig können bereits Investitionen in die Modernisierung der Steuerverwaltungen positive Resultate hervorbringen, etwa bei der Grundsteuer. In anderen Fällen sind steuerpolitische Maßnahmen erforderlich, zum Beispiel bei der Besteuerung digitaler Dienstleistungen (einschließlich von Finanzdienstleistungen). Auch über Steuervergünstigungen wäre zu reden. Sie werden z.B. für Investitionsförderung oder Armutsbekämpfung eingesetzt, verfehlen jedoch häufig ihre Ziele und verringern das Steueraufkommen erheblich. Für die Umsetzung von Reformen gilt: Mehr als Belehrungen von außen wirkt häufig der horizontale Austausch mit Nachbarländern auf regionaler Ebene. International wäre eine gerechtere Verteilung von Besteuerungsrechten wichtig, damit Staaten weltweit die Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Fiskalsysteme weiter erhöhen können. Darauf zu warten, macht aber keinen Sinn. Besser ist es, die Spielräume zu nutzen, die sich bereits heute bieten.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 11:32:00 +0200</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Dataset development in earth system governance: learnings, stakes, and pathways for impact</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/dataset-development-in-earth-system-governance-learnings-stakes-and-pathways-for-impact/</link>
			<description>The construction and use of datasets have become an important practice in Earth system governance research. By systematically cataloguing various outcomes, policy issues, actors, sites, and processes, datasets enhance the reliability, transparency, and replicability of research. Yet, despite growing interest, efforts to share data, integrate datasets, and develop common standards remain fragmented. This Perspective surveys various scholarly efforts to create datasets and provides a classification of the emerging dataset landscape in the field of Earth system governance. Drawing on examples from our own research and group discussions, we identify current best practices and lessons learned regarding data collection, management, and integration, as well as data usability and sharing. We argue that the design of datasets is not a neutral technical exercise, but has implications for how global environmental governance is theorized and studied. We also highlight how greater attention to data infrastructures can strengthen the relevance of research for policy practitioners and other stakeholders beyond academia.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The construction and use of datasets have become an important practice in Earth system governance research. By systematically cataloguing various outcomes, policy issues, actors, sites, and processes, datasets enhance the reliability, transparency, and replicability of research. Yet, despite growing interest, efforts to share data, integrate datasets, and develop common standards remain fragmented. This Perspective surveys various scholarly efforts to create datasets and provides a classification of the emerging dataset landscape in the field of Earth system governance. Drawing on examples from our own research and group discussions, we identify current best practices and lessons learned regarding data collection, management, and integration, as well as data usability and sharing. We argue that the design of datasets is not a neutral technical exercise, but has implications for how global environmental governance is theorized and studied. We also highlight how greater attention to data infrastructures can strengthen the relevance of research for policy practitioners and other stakeholders beyond academia.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 11:29:05 +0200</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>How development policy can avert the fertiliser crisis</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/the-current-column/article/how-development-policy-can-avert-the-fertiliser-crisis/</link>
			<description>The crisis calls for short-term measures – but also offers an opportunity for a long-overdue paradigm shift.</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Bonn, 13 April 2026. </em><strong>German development cooperation must act swiftly to address the fertiliser crisis. Multilateral coordination and the promotion of soil health are priorities.</strong></p>

<p>The looming fertiliser crisis is a stress test for German development cooperation. Now German DC must also prove that the BMZ reform plan is more than just a piece of paper. The tools for this are ready. The crisis calls for short-term measures – but also offers an opportunity for a long-overdue paradigm shift: away from dependence on volatile fertiliser markets, and towards resilient, locally rooted strategies.</p>

<h3><strong>The looming fertiliser crisis and its consequences</strong></h3>

<p>The world is once again facing a fertiliser crisis. Since US and Israeli air strikes against Iran led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, trade has ground to a halt. Around <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/the-iran-war-potential-food-security-impacts/">a third</a> of the world’s shipped nitrogen fertiliser passed through the Strait up to now. Now, prices for nitrogen fertiliser have risen by up to 50 per cent. For millions of smallholder farmers in the Global South, this will jeopardise their food security. The World Food Programme warns that the war could push <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-projects-food-insecurity-could-reach-record-levels-result-middle-east-escalation">45 million</a> more people into acute food insecurity – and food price rises are also expected in Germany.</p>

<p>In previous fertiliser crises, rising food prices have subsequently caused inflation to rise sharply. This has not only had a negative impact on food security, but has also led to uprisings and a further strengthening of populist movements. Fertiliser crises are also increasingly being politicised in the context of geoeconomic competition. Most recently, Russia has deliberately exploited fertiliser shortages to deepen dependencies and gain political influence. Anyone who weakens partnerships during the fertiliser crisis loses credibility and leaves the field open to others.</p>

<h3><strong>The tools are ready</strong></h3>

<p>With <a href="https://www.bmz.de/de/aktuelles/archiv-aktuelle-meldungen/oecd-bilanz-deutschland-verlaesslicher-partner-152308">3.5 billion euros</a> (2023) in investment in rural development and food security, Germany is the largest bilateral donor – a responsibility that matters now.</p>

<p>Since its G7 presidency in 2022 at the latest, Germany has established itself as a multilateral actor in food crises – from the Global Alliance for Food Security (GAFS) to its support for the Africa Fertilizer and Soil Health Action Plan.</p>

<p>German development cooperation is also making important contributions to soil health in practice. Long-term initiatives, such as the GIZ project ‘Soil Protection and Rehabilitation for Food Security’ (<a href="https://www.giz.de/de/projekte/bodenschutz-und-bodenrehabilitierung-fuer-ernaehrungssicherung">ProSoil</a>), have rehabilitated around one million hectares of agricultural land across several countries and achieved <a href="https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2025-en-rooted-in-soil-advancing-agricultural-and-food-system-transformation.pdf">yield increases of 44 percent</a> for smallholder farmers.</p>

<h3><strong>Four levers for the coming months</strong></h3>

<p>Building on the high level of trust at the multilateral level and its strong track record in implementation, Germany can now utilise four levers.</p>

<p>Strengthen G7 coordination: The G7 countries account for <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/g7/finacial-report-rapport-financier.aspx?lang=eng">73 percent</a> of all donor investments in food systems. Germany should push for coordinated action and propose the reactivation of the G7 Expert Fertilizer Group. The expert group was already important following Russia’s 2022 attack in coordinating emergency aid and medium-term strategies for diversifying supply chains.</p>

<p>Review special funding; combine emergency aid with sustainable measures: During the crisis triggered by Russia in 2022, Germany already made €880 million available in special funds, thereby mobilising a further <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/g7/finacial-report-rapport-financier.aspx?lang=eng">4.5 billion US dollars</a> via the G7. What is crucial now is the design of a comparable mechanism that ensures funds reach smallholder farmers directly and, ideally, are sustainably channelled into ongoing projects; rather than being squandered as windfall profits by the fertiliser industry.</p>

<p>Tapping into local fertilisation potential and increasing nutrient use efficiency: Dependence on imported fertiliser is a structural problem in many countries. Agroecological approaches such as composting, integrated soil fertility management and organic inputs are not only ecologically sound but also economically viable, as they increase the nutrient use efficiency of conventional fertilisers. This reduces the need for imported fertilisers. Germany should scale up these initiatives and involve further donors.</p>

<p>Driving forward the repurposing agenda: The reallocation of environmentally harmful agricultural subsidies can reduce dependencies in the long term. Germany knows the problem from its own experience: The nitrogen surpluses from German agriculture alone cause environmental damage amounting to <a href="https://www.eld-initiative.org/fileadmin/ELD_Filter_Tool/Case_Study_Germany_2024/Germany_2024_Agricultural_Subsidies_ELD_FOES_Case_Study_Report_01.pdf">4.8 billion euros</a> annually. Fossil fuel subsidies should be redirected towards sustainable soil practices and the development of decentralised fertiliser production.</p>

<h3><strong>The BMZ reform plan as an opportunity?</strong></h3>

<p>The BMZ reform plan provides the strategic framework for a response to the crisis. It consolidates the special initiative ‘Transformation of Agricultural and Food Systems’ and emphasises that food security must be focused on Africa – where the fertiliser crisis will hit hardest.</p>

<p>However, the plan has a weak spot: an overly narrow focus on the private sector. That is certainly justified. But if experience from the German soil health portfolio shows one thing, it is that effective solutions are often local and knowledge-intensive– but not necessarily profitable for (foreign) investors.</p>

<p>The response to the crisis should therefore continue to uphold development policy principles as a guideline and ensure that no one is left behind. The aim is a sustainable transformation of dependencies.</p>

<hr />
<ul>
	<li><strong>Katharina Molitor</strong> is a human geographer at IDOS and conducts research on food price changes and markets, food and nutrition security and smallholder farming.</li>
	<li><strong>Dr Gideon Tups </strong>is an economic geographer at the Centre for Development Research (ZEF) at the University of Bonn. His research focuses on agri-food systems, global supply chains, fertilisers and the bioeconomy.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>The Current Column</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2026 09:45:08 +0200</pubDate>
			<enclosure url="https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/aktuelle_kolumne/2026/German_Institute_of_Development_and_Sustainability_EN_Molitor_Tups_13.04.2026.pdf" length ="287852" type="application/pdf" />
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Formal and informal  labor demand in Egyptian manufacturing firms</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/formal-and-informal-labor-demand-in-egyptian-manufacturing-firms/</link>
			<description>This paper investigates the determinants and dynamics of labour demand and specifically informal labour in Egypt’s manufacturing sector, using nationally representative firm-level data from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey. Applying ordinary least squares and fractional logit models, we analyse total employment, the share of informal labour, and its average annual change over the firm life cycle. Three key findings emerge. First, employment is positively associated with capital, exporting, innovation, industrial zones, worker training, and managerial education, and negatively associated with sole proprietorships, wages, and total factor productivity. Second, informal employment is more common among private sector firms, sole proprietorships, and firms using more part-time workers, and less prevalent among firms adopting technology or led by more educated managers. Third, changes in informality over time are modest: most formal firms exhibit no change in the share of informal workers. Notably, formal firms that did not initially employ informal labour tend to increase their informal share, while firms that formalised continue to rely heavily on informal employment. Together, these findings underscore the persistence of informality and limited transitions toward full formalisation within Egypt’s formal manufacturing sector.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This paper investigates the determinants and dynamics of labour demand and specifically informal labour in Egypt’s manufacturing sector, using nationally representative firm-level data from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey. Applying ordinary least squares and fractional logit models, we analyse total employment, the share of informal labour, and its average annual change over the firm life cycle. Three key findings emerge. First, employment is positively associated with capital, exporting, innovation, industrial zones, worker training, and managerial education, and negatively associated with sole proprietorships, wages, and total factor productivity. Second, informal employment is more common among private sector firms, sole proprietorships, and firms using more part-time workers, and less prevalent among firms adopting technology or led by more educated managers. Third, changes in informality over time are modest: most formal firms exhibit no change in the share of informal workers. Notably, formal firms that did not initially employ informal labour tend to increase their informal share, while firms that formalised continue to rely heavily on informal employment. Together, these findings underscore the persistence of informality and limited transitions toward full formalisation within Egypt’s formal manufacturing sector.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 12:35:30 +0200</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Back to the future: the Pact for the Mediterranean and the mirage of Euro-Mediterranean integration </title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/policy-brief/article/back-to-the-future-the-pact-for-the-mediterranean-and-the-mirage-of-euro-mediterranean-integration/</link>
			<description>The Pact for the Mediterranean has some potential to strengthen sectoral, functional cooperation. Sufficient resources and mutual trust-building may create incentives for Euro-Mediterranean relations to move beyond transactionalism and foster integration where past approaches have failed.</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC &amp; HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:<br />
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.<br />
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.<br />
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.<br />
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.<br />
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>Policy Brief</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 08:42:11 +0200</pubDate>
			<enclosure url="https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/Policy_Brief/2026/PB_10.2026.pdf" length ="366517" type="application/pdf" />
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Bullshit urgency and washing machines: As the US scrambles for a plan for Iran, pitfalls loom large</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/bullshit-urgency-and-washing-machines-as-the-us-scrambles-for-a-plan-for-iran-pitfalls-loom-large/</link>
			<description>Heiner Janus and Daniel Esser argue that the rush to devise a strategy for Iran is bound to run into bureaucratic pathologies that drive failures in intelligence and foreign aid alike: manufactured urgency and institutional whitewashing. </description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Heiner Janus and Daniel Esser argue that the rush to devise a strategy for Iran is bound to run into bureaucratic pathologies that drive failures in intelligence and foreign aid alike: manufactured urgency and institutional whitewashing.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 10:48:05 +0200</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Defending health as a global public good</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/the-current-column/article/defending-health-as-a-global-public-good/</link>
			<description>Global health is not a bargaining chip, but a global public good that must be defended.</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bonn, 07 April 2026. <strong>At a time of growing geopolitical fragmentation, the real test is whether governments uphold global health as a global public good, or reduce it to a bargaining chip.</strong></p>

<p>On World Health Day 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) calls on people everywhere to come <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/events/detail/2026/04/07/default-calendar/world-health-day-2026-together-for-health-stand-with-science">“Together for health. Stand with science”</a>. In the WHO’s framing, standing with science means not only respecting evidence, but also sustaining the cooperation and trust needed for effective global health action. That is the right message. But in a more fragmented geopolitical landscape, the real question is whether governments are still willing to defend the cooperation, fairness, and institutions on which the application of global health science depends.</p>

<p><a href="https://www.globalhealth.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/Argumentationshilfe/GLOHRA_Positionpaper_5_reasons_for_investing_in_global_health_research.pdf">Global health research</a> can save lives, strengthen resilience, and generate substantial social and economic returns. However, these gains depend on countries being willing to share knowledge, build trust, and turn evidence into collective action. This has become increasingly difficult, as <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(26)00008-2/fulltext">global health is under pressure</a> from geopolitical rivalry, donor fragmentation, and more transactional forms of cooperation. In such settings, science itself risks being subordinated to bargaining power: data-sharing becomes conditional, surveillance politically contested, and research partnerships more asymmetric.</p>

<p>The United States’ withdrawal from the WHO and the recent bilateral health deals pursued by the Trump Administration illustrate how far the transactional logic of cooperation has advanced: global health is being recast from a field of solidarity into an instrument of <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2026/africa-cdc-head-cites-major-concerns-over-data-pathogen-sharing-in-us-health-deals">geopolitical leverage</a>. The US government has signed transactional health agreements with <a href="https://healthpolicy-watch.news/december-deals-us-signs-bilateral-health-agreements-with-14-african-countries/">14 African countries</a>, raising serious concerns about sovereignty, data control, and health security. Yet partner countries are not without agency: <a href="https://healthpolicy-watch.news/zambia-and-zimbabwe-back-away-from-prescriptive-us-health-deals/">Zambia</a> resisted a proposal tying health funding to access to copper and cobalt, while <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce91degnelko">judicial scrutiny in Kenya</a> stalled implementation of a health deal with the United States. Transactional deal-making not only <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(26)00016-1">complicates cooperation to protect global health</a>, but also erodes the multilateral basis for effective prevention and response to pandemics, antimicrobial resistance and climate-related health risks.</p>

<p>This shift has direct consequences for Germany’s own global health policy. In a more transactional global health landscape, the question is no longer whether Germany supports global health, but whether it also protects the conditions under which science can function across borders: data-sharing, trusted surveillance, collaborative research, and institutions that turn evidence into action. Seen in that light, the recent <a href="https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/service/publikationen/details/ergebnisbericht-zum-review-prozess-der-strategie-der-bundesregierung-zu-globaler-gesundheit">review of the Federal Government’s Global Health Strategy</a> is highly relevant. It confirms the continued importance of global health and places stronger emphasis on prevention, climate-resilient health systems, pandemic preparedness, and multilateral health governance up to 2030. At the same time, the new <a href="https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/292870/reform-plan-shaping-the-future-together-globally.pdf">BMZ strategy</a> foresees that global health will be addressed more strongly through reform of the global health architecture, division of labour with other donors, and multilateral approaches. In principle, this is the right response to an increasingly fragmented global health landscape. Germany is right to defend multilateralism at a time when trust in international cooperation is under strain, and to link health more closely to resilience, prevention, and governance. The real test, however, is one of coherence: whether this higher level of ambition is matched by credible implementation. In practice, this means three things:</p>

<p>First, it requires moving beyond a traditional donor role towards a more reform-oriented approach. This can be done by using Germany’s financial and political weight not simply to preserve existing institutions, but to make global health organisations that translate scientific evidence into action, such as <a href="https://www.gavi.org/">Gavi</a> and the <a href="https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/">Global Fund</a>, more equitable and better coordinated. This includes stronger collaboration across these organisations in line with the <a href="https://futureofghis.org/final-outputs/lusaka-agenda/">Lusaka Agenda</a>, with a clearer focus on reducing fragmentation for partner countries.</p>

<p>Second, it means taking scientific research on the <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plospathogens/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.ppat.1005731&amp;type=printable">interlinkages of environmental and human health</a> seriously, by integrating a <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/one-health#tab=tab_1">One Health logic</a> into implementation that links prevention and response more consistently with climate, water, and environmental health. Otherwise, the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-46151-9">wider ecological and social drivers of health risk</a>, from deforestation and biodiversity loss to climate change and intensive farming, will insufficiently be addressed.</p>

<p>Third, there are strong reasons to preserve bilateral engagement alongside multilateral efforts, <a href="https://www.deval.org/fileadmin/Redaktion/PDF/05-Publikationen/Berichte/2023_TSP_Fragilitaet/2023_DEval_Focus_Report_Fragility_EN.pdf">particularly in fragile contexts</a> where local anchoring, flexibility, and political responsiveness often prove essential. This matters not only for effective implementation, but also for the trusted relationships on which data-sharing and scientific cooperation frequently depend. In this way, Germany could combine multilateral strength with local responsiveness, especially where multilateral institutions alone cannot always react quickly enough.</p>

<p>World Health Day 2026 carries an important political message. To stand with science means more than praising evidence. It means defending the trust, fairness, and institutions that allow science to serve the common good. At a time of growing geopolitical fragmentation, the real test is whether governments are willing to treat global health not as a bargaining chip, but as a global public good.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>The Current Column</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 10:29:41 +0200</pubDate>
			<enclosure url="https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/aktuelle_kolumne/2026/German_Institute_of_Development_and_Sustainability_EN_Strupat_Srigiri_Von-Haaren_07.04.2026.pdf" length ="285131" type="application/pdf" />
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Energiekrise bedroht die Ernährung</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/energiekrise-bedroht-die-ernaehrung/</link>
			<description>in: General-Anzeiger, 04.04.2026</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Die Welthandelsorganisation ( WTO ) steht unter massivem Druck durch ausbleibende Reformen und geopolitische Konflikte. Axel Berger ist stellvertretender Direktor des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, ehemals Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) und hat die jüngste WTO -Ministerkonferenz beobachtet.&nbsp;Mit Berger sprach Ulla Thiede über Ergebnisse und Herausforderungen.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Sat, 04 Apr 2026 12:00:00 +0200</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>WTO-Gipfel in Kamerun endet im Desaster: Welthandel unter größtem Druck seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/wto-gipfel-in-kamerun-endet-im-desaster-welthandel-unter-groesstem-druck-seit-dem-zweiten-weltkrieg/</link>
			<description>Die WTO-Ministerkonferenz in Kameruns Hauptstadt endete ohne Beschlüsse. USA, China und Indien blockieren mit Machtpolitik das System.</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><br />
Ernüchtert blicken wir auf die 14. Ministerkonferenz der Welthandelsorganisation, die in Yaoundé, der Hauptstadt Kameruns, ohne Beschlüsse zu Ende ging. Nun sind pragmatische Lösungen und die Suche nach verlässlichen Allianzen für die Reform des multilateralen Handelssystems gefragt.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 12:10:00 +0200</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Sweden’s antithesis: China in United Nations development work</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/swedens-antithesis-china-in-united-nations-development-work/</link>
			<description>This chapter examines China’s engagement with the United Nations (UN) development work through a comparison with Sweden. Both countries are UN member states, but differ on most indicators, including development experiences and trajectories as development cooperation providers. The chapter provides an overview of China’s and Sweden’s general profiles and compares funding practices, strategic priorities and approaches to multilateral cooperation. From a Swedish perspective, the features of China’s approach relative to Sweden’s engagement point to areas of concern, particularly regarding China’s challenge to the relative autonomy of UN bureaucracies and the human rights agenda. At the same time, there might be potential opportunities for closer coordination – notably with regard to the two countries’ complementary funding practices – in a moment of extraordinary upheaval at the UN.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This chapter examines China’s engagement with the United Nations (UN) development work through a comparison with Sweden. Both countries are UN member states, but differ on most indicators, including development experiences and trajectories as development cooperation providers. The chapter provides an overview of China’s and Sweden’s general profiles and compares funding practices, strategic priorities and approaches to multilateral cooperation. From a Swedish perspective, the features of China’s approach relative to Sweden’s engagement point to areas of concern, particularly regarding China’s challenge to the relative autonomy of UN bureaucracies and the human rights agenda. At the same time, there might be potential opportunities for closer coordination – notably with regard to the two countries’ complementary funding practices – in a moment of extraordinary upheaval at the UN.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 10:07:46 +0200</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>After Yaoundé: sobering pragmatism</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/after-yaounde-sobering-pragmatism/</link>
			<description>The members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) gathered for the past few days in the capital of Cameroon for their biennial ministerial conference. Before the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), sober pragmatism seemed possible. After four days of tense but fruitless negotiations in Yaoundé, sobering pragmatism carried the day. And both assessments still sit at the positive end of the evaluative spectrum.</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) gathered for the past few days in the capital of Cameroon for their biennial ministerial conference. Before the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), sober pragmatism seemed possible. After four days of tense but fruitless negotiations in Yaoundé, sobering pragmatism carried the day. And both assessments still sit at the positive end of the evaluative spectrum.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 14:18:00 +0200</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Electrolysis-based nitrogen fertilisers as a promising innovation in Africa</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/the-current-column/article/electrolysis-based-nitrogen-fertilisers-as-a-promising-innovation-in-africa/</link>
			<description>A way forward: decentralised, climate-neutral ammonia production based on electrified HBP fed by renewable energies</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bonn, 30 March 2026. <strong>The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz highlights the vulnerability of global fertiliser supply chains. Hydrogen technologies allow the local production with renewable energy.</strong></p>

<p>In March 2026, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in response to attacks by Israel and the USA. If this closure persists, serious consequences for the global economy are inevitable, given the strait’s importance for oil and gas transport and resulting price hikes. Less attention has been paid to date to implications for food production and food security in the Global South, especially Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, but also Brazil. The looming problem is linked to fertiliser supply, particularly nitrogen. Nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and potassium (K) are essential macronutrients, with N fertilisers being most important, both globally and in Africa. Global supply chains for P and K rely on deposits in Morocco and Canada, respectively, but nitrogen fertilisers do not originate in natural deposits. Before the 20th century, sources like manure, compost, guano and Chilean saltpetre were utilised for supplying crops with nitrogen. However, these sources were limited and insufficient to cater to the needs of a growing world population.</p>

<p>A crucial innovation was the Haber-Bosch process (HBP), developed in the early 20th century. Today, 98% of ammonia is produced this way, which allowed for huge increases in yields. The process synthesises ammonia (NH₃) from hydrogen (H₂) and nitrogen (N₂). Whereas nitrogen is easily obtained via Direct Separation of Air, this is not feasible for hydrogen, as atmospheric concentration of H<sub>2</sub> is very low. Instead, steam methane reforming (SMR) dominates, processing natural gas with steam under high pressure and temperature to yield H₂ and releasing CO₂. While effective for decades, this fossil-based pathway is no longer future-proof.</p>

<p>Nearly all ammonia production depends on natural gas and the traditional HBP, creating two problems. First, greenhouse gas emissions from conventional N-fertiliser production have to be lowered as part of industrial decarbonisation strategies. Second, very long supply chains go from only around 500 NH<sub>3</sub> plants in the world, tied to gas fields or pipelines to import ports and from there to the farm gate. How vulnerable these supply chains are, can currently be observed. In addition, price fluctuations for natural gas directly affect fertiliser affordability, as seen in the early 2020s and again today.</p>

<h3><strong>Africa as an under-fertilised region</strong></h3>

<p>Global fertiliser use rose from 55 kg/ha in 1972 to 134 kg/ha in 2022, but regional differences are stark. In 2022, East Asia applied on average 321 kg/ha, Latin America 187, and the EU 124. Application rates in Sub-Saharan Africa remained extremely low at an average of 18 kg/ha, up from 10 in 1972. Data from the FAO show that Africa has the lowest food security of any world region. Causes include conflicts, disasters, climate change, and COVID-19, but low fertiliser use may add to long-term food insecurity. Poor plant nutrition reduces yields, nutritional content, and biomass for soil health. In addition, declining soil fertility may drive land expansion and deforestation.</p>

<p>Two African Union (AU) declarations addressed this: the Abuja Declaration (2006) set a target of 50 kg/ha by 2015, which was clearly missed. The Draft <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/44056-doc-AFSHS_Decl_4_II_Rev_2_E.pdf">Nairobi Declaration (2024)</a> reiterated the goal, embedding it in broader soil health strategies and referring to both mineral and organic fertilisers.</p>

<h3><strong>Technological innovations which may lead to local ammonia production and reduce dependency of farmers from international supply chains</strong></h3>

<p>A way forward may be <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/5ca20e0e-a1c2-420b-8880-6f5455909128/content">decentralised, climate-neutral ammonia production</a> based on electrified HBP fed by renewable energies. These solutions have achieved high technological readiness, and a first plant of this type has been implemented on an <a href="https://farmersreviewafrica.com/kenya-nut-company-installs-first-commercial-on-site-green-ammonia-system-for-carbon-free-fertilizer-production/#:~:text=Kenya%20Nut%20Company%2C%20a%20multi-national%20agricultural%20business%20based,and%20reduces%20emissions%20that%20contribute%20to%20climate%20change.">export-oriented large farm in Kenya</a>. Research implies that these solutions may <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-024-00979-y">become cost competitive</a> in a few years and contribute significantly to food security, especially in “under-fertilised” African countries.</p>

<p>Another technology currently being developed, though still at an early stage of readiness, is the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41545-026-00558-7">recovery of ammonia from wastewater</a>. This approach holds promise not only for generating ammonia but also for mitigating a growing challenge in many African countries: the eutrophication of water bodies caused by excessive nitrogen inputs into surface and groundwater, a problem exacerbated by rapid population growth.</p>

<p>Small-scale ammonia projects, for instance in the mode of public private partnerships, may be linked to e.g. cooperatives or rural villages. Development programmes could integrate these innovations with agricultural development and soil health initiatives, as proposed in the Nairobi Declaration. In addition, electrolysis-based ammonia is a nearly climate-neutral product, but remains difficult and potentially hazardous to handle, transport and store. This should be addressed through related programmes of capacity building, standardisation, and quality assurance.</p>

<hr />
<p><strong>Dr Andreas Stamm</strong> is a <em>geographer</em> and senior researcher in the research department “Transformation of Economic and Social Systems” of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).</p>

<p><strong>Dr Christine Bosch</strong> is an agricultural economist and is currently a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Social and Institutional Change in Agricultural Development at the Hans-Ruthenberg-Institute of the University of Hohenheim.</p>

<p><strong>Fernanda Nan</strong> is an International Business Professional with specialisations in Law, Sustainability, Compliance -Auditing Standards, Circular Economy Agribusiness and Energy. She is guest lecturer for the seminar “Accountability, Ethics, and Governance” at Hochschule Osnabrück, Germany, and teaches “Global Sustainability Business” at the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Montevideo (UM).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>The Current Column</category>
			
			<author>presse@idos-research.de</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 12:05:19 +0200</pubDate>
			<enclosure url="https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/aktuelle_kolumne/2026/German_Institute_of_Development_and_Sustainability_EN_Stamm_Bosch_Nan_30.03.2026.pdf" length ="305540" type="application/pdf" />
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Institutional layering as (counter-)hegemonic strategy: unpacking China’s Global Development Initiative</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/institutional-layering-as-counter-hegemonic-strategy-unpacking-chinas-global-development-initiative/</link>
			<description>The People’s Republic of China has recently announced several global governance initiatives, with the Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the forefront. Launched in 2021, the GDI is simultaneously embedded within United Nations (UN) frameworks surrounding the Sustainable Development Goals and supposed to advance ‘true multilateralism’ aligned with China’s broader vision for world order. In doing so, the GDI complicates both ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionist’ interpretations of China’s engagement with global governance, alongside efforts to refine this binary. Bridging historical institutionalism and Neo-Gramscian political economy, we argue that the GDI constitutes a form of ‘institutional layering’ that serves as a component of a broader counter-hegemonic strategy: Rather than displacing existing frameworks, China seeks to embed new practices, principles, and alliances within them to advance its material, ideational, and organizational interests. We demonstrate how the GDI functions as a low-cost, low-risk component of a ‘war of position’ that leverages UN legitimacy while incrementally contesting liberal norms and assess its transformative potential for altering the nature of global (development) governance.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The People’s Republic of China has recently announced several global governance initiatives, with the Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the forefront. Launched in 2021, the GDI is simultaneously embedded within United Nations (UN) frameworks surrounding the Sustainable Development Goals and supposed to advance ‘true multilateralism’ aligned with China’s broader vision for world order. In doing so, the GDI complicates both ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionist’ interpretations of China’s engagement with global governance, alongside efforts to refine this binary. Bridging historical institutionalism and Neo-Gramscian political economy, we argue that the GDI constitutes a form of ‘institutional layering’ that serves as a component of a broader counter-hegemonic strategy: Rather than displacing existing frameworks, China seeks to embed new practices, principles, and alliances within them to advance its material, ideational, and organizational interests. We demonstrate how the GDI functions as a low-cost, low-risk component of a ‘war of position’ that leverages UN legitimacy while incrementally contesting liberal norms and assess its transformative potential for altering the nature of global (development) governance.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 15:47:40 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
	</channel>
</rss>