For World Food Day, FAO calls on us to “innovate today. Nourish tomorrow”—pairing forward-looking solutions with traditional knowledge to secure diverse, safe and nutritious diets within planetary boundaries. The timing is telling: weeks earlier, the UN’s 2026 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) report showed why that pairing matters. Global hunger has declined for a third consecutive year, yet roughly one in three people still cannot afford a healthy diet. We are not failing to produce enough food. We are failing to design systems that make a nutritious, sustainable diet the affordable, default option rather than a privilege.

This is not new. In December 2025, this column argued that agricultural policy should move beyond production incentives and place greater emphasis on making sustainable diets accessible. This year’s SOFI report speaks directly to that argument, with evidence of how far current policy sits from that goal—and why reverse engineering offers an answer.

The central challenge is not only how much food is produced, but whether production translates into diets people can afford and want to eat. That calls for a different starting point, namely instead of beginning with a technology and hoping diets adjust, reverse engineering begins with the desired outcome: a diet that is healthy, sustainable, affordable and culturally appropriate. Then it works backward across products, value chains, geographies.

At the product level, food must be both nutrient-dense and affordable. The SOFI report identifies a central constraint: animal-source foods, fruits and vegetables account for nearly 70% of the cost of a healthy diet, while starchy staples provide calories cheaply but are insufficient for a diverse diet. Reverse engineering here starts from that gap and works backward. Many cultures and cuisines already rely on fungi, insect and algae sources as well as fermented foods that are cheaper and more sustainable than manufactured or animal-sourced proteins. Biofortified orange-fleshed sweet potato applies the same logic to micronutrients: bred backward from documented vitamin-A deficiency, it could now cut related disease burden by up to 41% across Sub-Saharan Africa.

The value chain level exacerbates the problem of affordability further. Post-farmgate activities (processing, storage, transport, wholesale) account for 70 to 75% of what consumers pay for food, meaning affordability is decided less on the farm than downstream. Reverse engineering here means tracing how each stage of the value chain affects consumer prices and who bears costs that those prices do not reflect. A 2026 study of East African coffee value chains found hidden costs—chiefly the income smallholders are denied—equal to 70-125% of the farm-gate price. True cost accounting can make these costs visible, showing they are often paid for elsewhere, e.g. by public health systems or the environment. The response then depends on where the cost arises: living-income gap calls for producer remuneration; environmental harms require different interventions.

At the geographic level, the goal shifts from affordability, to resilience: absorbing a shock without prices spiking. Reverse engineering here starts from local ecological capacity and climate risk, then designing backward to climate-resilient crops, circular-economy infrastructure, and trade integration that keep supply—and prices—stable when shocks hit. That is what the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE-FSN)—the UN’s science-policy body on food security— calls “bouncing forward” rather than “bouncing back”: redesigning the structure so that shocks no longer result in price spikes. Belo Horizonte, Brazil, built exactly this in launching a food security programme in 1993 after a national economic crisis sent food prices soaring, replacing crisis response with a structural right-to-food policy with price ceilings and direct farmer-to-consumer sales.

None of this works if the diet at the starting point is defined for people rather than with them. Diets are shaped by food environments—by what is grown, sold, affordable and visible nearby—and by the fact that, in most of the world, the households targeted as “consumers” of healthier diets are simultaneously the producers within the same system.

“Innovate today, nourish tomorrow” only delivers if innovation means redesigning the system across all levels together. Reverse engineering food systems—from the diet we actually need, backward through value chains, embedded in unique and specific localities—is slower and less photogenic than announcing a breakthrough. But it is what closes the gap between what we produce and the sustainable, diverse diet that people can afford to eat.

Goran Dominioni is Assistant Professor in Climate Change Law and Policy at the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University

The debate about what should succeed the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is only just beginning. Formal discussions at the UN on a post-2030 Agenda will begin at the 2027 SDG Summit. This comes at a difficult time: the SDGs are badly off track, while geopolitical rivalry, wars, and economic instability are weakening international cooperation. Traditional donor governments increasingly prioritise narrowly defined national interests, cut development budgets and chase short-term growth at the expense of global solidarity and climate action. 

Is it indeed the right moment to negotiate a new global framework for sustainable development? Yes. If done right, it can offer an alternative to current trends, protect international cooperation, equality and wellbeing, as well as respecting planetary boundaries.

Two recent landmark reports offer relevant contributions to this debate: the Global Justice Report, by the World Inequality Lab under Thomas Piketty and colleagues, and the Roadmap for Eradicating Poverty Beyond Growth, which was developed under former UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Olivier De Schutter through a broad-based international participatory process. 

Changing the Rules of the Global Economy 

Both reports share a fundamental diagnosis: the current global development trajectory is failing to improve well-being while remaining within planetary boundaries. Both call for transitions towards economies centred on well-being, poverty eradication and equality (beyond monetary metrics), which respect planetary boundaries. The reports also explore and question economic growth as a central objective of development. 

The Global Justice Report identifies three essential shifts: rapid decarbonisation; greater sufficiency (reduction in labour hours and material footprint, especially in richer countries, and large changes in consumption patterns); and a substantial reduction in inequalities of income, wealth and power both between and within countries. It provides a quantitative framework for these transitions. 

The Roadmap reaches a similar conclusion, providing a broad toolkit of concrete policies to tackle poverty and inequality, which are not reliant on economic growth. In contrast to the usual redistribution through “grow, tax and transfer”, it emphasises predistribution, meaning changing the rules governing economic power and opportunities in the first place.

Although the political feasibility of the recommendations set out in the reports is subject to some controversy, their proposals are by no means isolated: these proposals build on existing initiatives, including Barbados’ Bridgetown Initiative on monetary reform, climate finance and global wealth taxation; the Sevilla Commitment on development finance; the UN Tax Convention process; and G20 initiatives led by Brazil and South Africa especially on global inequality. 

What can we learn for the post-2030 Agenda?

A sustainable and equitable global economy requires international cooperation and political will. The reports provide empirical evidence as well as concrete policy options for such a global change and therewith, challenge dominant narratives on growth and power. The post-2030 discussions should carry these ideas forward and provide space for broader societal and political debate to foster consensus and support.  

Moving beyond a growth-centred development model, but not beyond development. For many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), growth remains important for poverty reduction, employment and fiscal capacity. The question is not whether growth is “good” or “bad”, rather what kind of growth contributes to well-being within national and global planetary boundaries. All countries, especially LMICs, need space to define their own development pathways, reflecting different needs and priorities. 

New partnerships for making global inequalities central. We need to ask who benefits from growth, who bears its environmental costs, and how resources and opportunities are distributed. Redistribution, international taxation, finance, debt and access to technology should therefore be central to international cooperation. The geopolitical situation may create opportunities for new coalitions to jointly put it on the global agenda: The newly established South-North Commission should make inequality its key mandate.The proposed International Panel on Inequality (IPI) aims at establishing a permanent body similar to the IPCC, to assess, track, and tackle global inequality.

Strengthening the socio-ecological dimension of development. Climate change, biodiversity loss and resource constraints increasingly determine development prospects. Climate, social protection, poverty reduction and economic transformation should be addressed together. Climate finance and international transfers can support this transition, but volumes and frameworks need to improve. The negotiations at the Triple COPs this year are critical.  

There is no time to waste until 2030. We need to build on ongoing initiatives, evidence and coalitions now. The key challenge is moving beyond the growth-centred development paradigm while building coalitions for ambitious socio-ecological transitions.

This Current Column was developed in cooperation between IDOS and Misereor.

Jana Kuhnt is development economist, senior researcher in the Research department "Transformation of political (dis-)order" and co-lead of the project on migration and forced displacement at IDOS.

Daniele Malerba is an economist and senior researcher in the research department “Transformation of Economic and Social Systems” at IDOS.

Benjamin Rosenthal is a policy officer at Misereor. His work focuses primarily on a globally equitable economy, sustainable financial systems and development finance.

Leitautor:innen: Jörg E. Drewes, Anna-Katharina Hornidge, Aletta Bonn, Kai Maaz, Karen Pittel,Hans-Otto Pörtner, Sabine Schlacke, Claudia Traidl-Hoffmann, Joscha Wullweber
Mitautor:innen: Julia Behrens, Mareike Blum, Kerstin Burghaus, Catharina Caspari, Astrid Dähn, Verena Engelhardt, Tallulah Gundelach, Paula Haufe, Magdalena Knabl, Katharina Michael, Alexander Mitranescu, Katharina Molitor, Jürgen Orasche, Marion Schulte zu Berge, Astrid Schulz, Jan Siegmeier, Nikola Tietze

Table of Contents: 

Introduction: Sustainable Futures at Stake? The Case for Politics of Cooperation and Perseverance (Hornidge, Anna-Katharina / Axel Berger)

1) Geopolitics, Partnerships, and a New Global Order

From Crisis to Change: The Future of Global Peace and Security (Fiedler, Charlotte / Jasmin Lorch / Karina Mross)

Reforming the WTO in an Age of Power-Based Trade (Brandi, Clara)

Europe’s International Cooperation as a Key Component of a Stable World Order (Keijzer, Niels / Mark Furness)

2) Multilateralism in a Multipolar World

A bold post-UN80 reform agenda for the next UN Secretary-General (Novoselova Anna / Ronny Patz)

The Geopolitics of a Global Sustainability Framework Beyond 2030 (Leininger, Julia)

Environmental Multilateralism in 2026: more robust than disruption narratives suggest (Bauer, Steffen / Niklas Wagner / Ines Dombrowsky)

3) Sustainable Transformation Architectures

Development Finance: Proposals to Make Blended Finance (Finally) Deliver (Berensmann, Kathrin / Bao-We-Wal Bambe)

Domestic Revenue Mobilisation, the Financing Gap and why Tax Expenditures Matter (Sen, Kunal / Christian von Haldenwang

Global Health Beyond 2030: Protecting Ambition in a Fragmented World (von Haaren, Paula)

4) (Social) Innovation and Transformative Capabilities

AI’s Potential to Facilitate More Agile Development Cooperation (Sinanoglu, Semuhi / Michael Roll)

Resilience in Knowledge Infrastructures: Science at a Juncture (Effert, Sarah-Lea / Anna-Katharina Hornidge)

Training Competencies to Navigate Tectonic Shifts and Shape Change (Domingues, Joãao Vitor / Sven Grimm / Zahrina Tamimi)

Futuring Politics of Cooperation and Perseverance: A Possible World in 2040 (Effert, Sarah-Lea / Sven Grimm / Christopher Wingens)

In April 2025, India put the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) “in abeyance”, following a deadly militant attack in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir. On 31 August 2026, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague unanimously held that India’s suspension or termination was impermissible under the Treaty and international law.  However, India immediately rejected the ruling, disputed the court’s jurisdiction over its sovereign decisions and declared that it would maintain the IWT in abeyance. Keeping the IWT in abeyance may not only have severe consequences for Pakistan’s water security and India-Pakistan security relations, but may also contribute to a broader erosion of international law.

The Indus Waters Treaty

The Indus River Basin sustains over 200 million people in Pakistan (over 80 percent of its population) and about 100 million people in northwestern India. Negotiated under the mediation by the World Bank in 1960, the IWT allocates exclusive use of the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, subject to certain uses permitted to India in upstream Kashmir, including run-of-river hydropower within certain limits. The treaty mandates data-sharing on all rivers flowing into Pakistan. It provides a three-tier dispute resolution mechanism, through i) the Permanent Indus Commission, ii) Neutral Expert proceedings and iii) arbitration by an ad-hoc Court of Arbitration. The decision to suspend the IWT is unprecedented for a treaty often cited as a rare success in transboundary water cooperation, having survived over six decades of hostility between the treaty countries, including the wars of 1965, 1971 and 1999. 

Pakistan’s Water Security

India’s move poses hydrological risks to Pakistan by disrupting established arrangements for sharing hydrological and technical information, which is critical for downstream flood forecasting and disaster preparedness. The 2025 floods demonstrated the risks of weakened institutional communication, when warnings were reportedly transmitted through diplomatic channels rather than the Permanent Indus Commission. Since suspending the IWT, India has fast-tracked hydropower development and other water-management measures on the Western Rivers, which Pakistan fears could increase India’s ability to regulate and divert flows currently reaching Pakistan.

India-Pakistan Security Relations

India’s April 2025 decision did not emerge in a political vacuum. Following a deadly militant attack in Uri, Indian-administered Kashmir in September 2016, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that “blood and water cannot flow together”, explicitly connecting the management of the Indus with India’s security relationship with Pakistan. The language became more explicit after the 2025 abeyance. India’s Minister for Water C.R. Patil said in June 2026 that the government was working to ensure that “not a single drop” of water would flow to Pakistan in the coming years.

Such rhetoric invited counter-rhetoric further intensifying tensions. Following the suspension, Pakistan’s National Security Committee warned that any attempt to divert or stop water allocated to Pakistan under the IWT would constitute an “act of war”. Former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari even warned of a possible “nuclear Armageddon scenario”. This demonstrates an intensifying process of securitisation around water between two nuclear-armed neighbours.

Erosion of international law?

The Permanent Court of Arbitration has issued four rulings since India placed the Treaty in abeyance in April 2025. These arose from proceedings initiated by Pakistan in 2016 over the Kishanganga and Ratle Hydroelectric Projects in Indian-administered Kashmir. Pakistan invoked arbitration under Article IX and Annexure G of the IWT, arguing that the dispute involved broader questions of Treaty interpretation, while India later sought a Neutral Expert under Article IX and Annexure F, arguing that the issues were primarily technical. The World Bank paused both processes in 2016, encouraging India and Pakistan to resolve the dispute bilaterally, but resumed them in 2022, after concluding that the stalemate itself posed a risk to the Treaty. On 31 August 2026, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ordered restrictions in the construction of the Ratle Hydroelectric Plant until 90 days after the Neutral Expert’s decision, expected in July 2027. For now, the Neutral Expert’s decision should be awaited before creating further facts at the Ratle site. A continued suspension of the Treaty, however, could weaken confidence in international water law and contribute to a broader erosion of international law. 

In summary, abiding by the rules of the Indus Waters Treaty is important for Pakistan’s water security and for avoiding military escalation between India and Pakistan. By doing so, India would also send a strong signal for its respect for international law.

Lisa Bossenbroek is a senior researcher at the Centre de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (CRESC-Rabat/ Morocco). Her work focuses on gender, water governance, and agrarian change in North Africa.