<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/">
	<channel>
		
		<title>Neueste Publikationen</title>
		<link>https://www.idos-research.de/</link>
		<description>Publikationen des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)</description>
		<language>de</language>
		
		<generator>TYPO3 - get.content.right</generator>
		<docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
		
		
		
		<lastBuildDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 12:48:20 +0100</lastBuildDate>
		
		
		<item>
			<title>International democracy promotion across two waves: from support to protection</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/international-democracy-promotion-across-two-waves-from-support-to-protection/</link>
			<description>The Third Wave of Democratization's international dimension connects domestic democratization processes with the global spread of democracy after 1989. How has democracy promotion, a specific international source, contributed to the Wave of Democratization? And is scholarship well equipped to study the fundamental shifts in democracy promotion caused by the Third Wave of Autocratization? This article answers these questions from two perspectives. First, it assesses the relevance, patterns and effects of international democracy promotion between 1995 and 2024. Second, it takes a meta-perspective and identifies the main characteristics and blind spots of the study of international democracy promotion. Based on these insights, the article makes a conceptual contribution by distinguishing between democracy support and democracy protection. Furthermore, it defines the international scope conditions necessary for effectively promoting democracy during periods of autocratization. Finally, it proposes a new agenda for the study of international democracy promotion after the Third Wave of Democratization.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Third Wave of Democratization's international dimension connects domestic democratization processes with the global spread of democracy after 1989. How has democracy promotion, a specific international source, contributed to the Wave of Democratization? And is scholarship well equipped to study the fundamental shifts in democracy promotion caused by the Third Wave of Autocratization? This article answers these questions from two perspectives. First, it assesses the relevance, patterns and effects of international democracy promotion between 1995 and 2024. Second, it takes a meta-perspective and identifies the main characteristics and blind spots of the study of international democracy promotion. Based on these insights, the article makes a conceptual contribution by distinguishing between democracy support and democracy protection. Furthermore, it defines the international scope conditions necessary for effectively promoting democracy during periods of autocratization. Finally, it proposes a new agenda for the study of international democracy promotion after the Third Wave of Democratization.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 12:48:20 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Systemic acceleration capacity in net-zero transitions: electrifying transportation in California</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/systemic-acceleration-capacity-in-net-zero-transitions-electrifying-transportation-in-california/</link>
			<description>Accelerating net-zero transitions requires deliberate governance. We examine the deliberate acceleration of net-zero transitions through a case study of California’s governance of private vehicle electrification. Our analysis integrates the literatures on policy mixes and political institutions to offer a novel explanation for how California has effectively expedited its net-zero transition to electric cars. We base our inductive analysis on evidence from 47 expert interviews conducted in 2022–23. We argue that California’s systemic acceleration capacity has two core components: first, an effective policy mix that harnesses the accelerating forces of creative destruction, and second, specific path-dependent political institutions that have enabled this respective policy mix. Together, these two components have contributed to California’s state capacity to accelerate its technology substitution pathway away from internal combustion engines. California’s climate technocracy offers critical lessons for other jurisdictions seeking to speed up similar net-zero transitions.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Accelerating net-zero transitions requires deliberate governance. We examine the deliberate acceleration of net-zero transitions through a case study of California’s governance of private vehicle electrification. Our analysis integrates the literatures on policy mixes and political institutions to offer a novel explanation for how California has effectively expedited its net-zero transition to electric cars. We base our inductive analysis on evidence from 47 expert interviews conducted in 2022–23. We argue that California’s systemic acceleration capacity has two core components: first, an effective policy mix that harnesses the accelerating forces of creative destruction, and second, specific path-dependent political institutions that have enabled this respective policy mix. Together, these two components have contributed to California’s state capacity to accelerate its technology substitution pathway away from internal combustion engines. California’s climate technocracy offers critical lessons for other jurisdictions seeking to speed up similar net-zero transitions.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 10:28:22 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Competencies to help shape a changing world: tracer study and future focus of the IDOS Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/policy-brief/article/competencies-to-help-shape-a-changing-world-tracer-study-and-future-focus-of-the-idos-postgraduate-programme-for-sustainability-cooperation/</link>
			<description>Based on a tracer study of the Postgraduate Programme, this Policy Brief provides recommendations on the further development of training in the field of international cooperation, which is currently undergoing drastic change.</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation (PGP) at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, formerly DIE) has been training young professionals for German and European international cooperation since 1965. How successful is the programme in supporting its graduates in starting their career and in developing their competencies? And what direction should Germany take in future in its training for professionals in the field of international cooperation? To mark its 60th anniversary, IDOS conducted a tracer study to systematically analyse how the programme has benefited its some 1,000 graduates and to find some pointers on how it could be developed further.<br />
The study very clearly demonstrates the relevance of the postgraduate programme and identification with the programme over the past 60 years. The feedback confirms that the PGP considerably benefits participants’ professional and personal development and that they would definitely recommend it for future generations.<br />
At the same time, the world is undergoing a period of radical upheaval. Fundamental changes can be seen above all in the general conditions for partnerships, the demands made of staff working in this sector and training for future experts and managers. Training programmes such as the PGP must adapt to address these drastic changes. The quality of a training programme is ultimately reflected in how well it promotes basic competencies that will still be&nbsp;<br />
useful under different conditions and that can help shape these changes.&nbsp;<br />
IDOS graduates were also asked about their views on changes in working in the international cooperation sector. The survey thus allows conclusions to be drawn on how training can be developed further:<br />
1. Training should promote various competencies that can shape cooperation for sustainable development. Taking a partner-oriented approach to initiating and implementing changes in an increasingly complex world requires both specialist and systemic knowledge along with personal, social, networking and cooperation skills.<br />
2. Training institutions should promote the capacity for cooperation through joint learning with international partners. This will foster understanding for other perspectives and will support the ongoing development of partnerships.<br />
3. Post-colonial perspectives and a critical examination of power should already be taken into account during training and should be put into practice in concrete cooperation between organisations. IDOS graduates also believe that these aspects are becoming more important in international cooperation.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>Policy Brief</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 09:23:00 +0100</pubDate>
			<enclosure url="https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/Policy_Brief/2026/PB_7.2026.pdf" length ="1068870" type="application/pdf" />
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Kompetenzen für die Mitgestaltung einer Welt im Umbruch: Verbleibstudie und Zukunftsorientierung der IDOS Postgraduierten-Ausbildung</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/policy-brief/article/kompetenzen-fuer-die-mitgestaltung-einer-welt-im-umbruch-verbleibstudie-und-zukunftsorientierung-der-idos-postgraduierten-ausbildung/</link>
			<description>Basierend auf einer Verbleibstudie des Postgraduierten-Programms, gibt dieser Policy Brief Hinweise zur Weiterentwicklung der Ausbildung im Berufsfeld der internationalen Zusammenarbeit, das sich aktuell drastisch verändert.</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Das Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals DIE) bildet seit 1965 Nachwuchs für die deutsche und europäische internationale Zusammenarbeit aus. Wie erfolgreich ist das Programm in der Förderung des Berufseinstiegs und der Kompetenzen seiner Absolvent:innen? Und wie sollte sich die deutsche Ausbildung für internationale Kooperation weiterentwickeln? Anlässlich seines 60-jährigen Jubiläums führte das IDOS eine Verbleibstudie durch, um systematisch den Nutzen des Programms für die rund 1000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren und Anregungen für seine Weiterentwicklung zu erhalten.&nbsp;<br />
Die Studie belegt eindrucksvoll die Relevanz des Postgraduierten-Programms und die Identifikation mit ihm über die letzten 60 Jahre hinweg. Dem Programm wird ein hoher Nutzen für die berufliche und persönliche Entwicklung attestiert, und es wird nachfolgenden Generationen klar weiterempfohlen.&nbsp;<br />
Zugleich befindet sich die Welt in einem Epochenumbruch. Grundlegend ändern sich v. a. die Rahmenbedingungen für Kooperationen, die Anforderungen an Personal im Berufsfeld und die Ausbildung von zukünftigen Fach- und Führungskräften. Ausbildungsprogramme wie auch das PGP müssen sich auf diese drastischen Veränderungen einstellen. Letztlich zeigt sich die Qualität eines Ausbildungsprogramms auch daran, wie gut es grundlegende Kompetenzen fördert, die noch unter veränderten Bedingungen nützlich sind und die helfen, diese Veränderungen mitzugestalten.<br />
Die IDOS-Absolvent:innen wurden auch nach ihren Perspektiven auf Veränderungen im Berufsfeld internationale Zusammenarbeit befragt. Damit ermöglicht es die Befragung, Schlussfolgerungen zur Weiterentwicklung der Ausbildung zu ziehen:&nbsp;<br />
1. Die Aus- und Fortbildung sollte verschiedene Kompetenzen fördern, die eine Kooperation für nachhaltige Entwicklung gestalten können. Damit in einer zunehmend komplexer werdenden Welt Veränderungen partnerorientiert angestoßen und umgesetzt werden, sind sowohl fachliches und systemisches Wissen wie auch persönliche, soziale, Netzwerk- und Kooperationskompetenzen erforderlich.&nbsp;<br />
2. Institutionen in der Aus- und Weiterbildung sollten Kooperationskompetenzen durch gemeinsames Lernen mit internationalen Partnern stärken. Dies fördert das Verständnis für jeweils andere Perspektiven und unterstützt die Weiterentwicklung von Partnerschaften.<br />
3. Schon in der Ausbildung sollten postkoloniale und machtkritische Perspektiven berücksichtigt und in der konkreten Zusammenarbeit zwischen Organisationen gelebt werden. Diese Aspekte gewinnen auch nach Einschätzung der IDOS-Absolvent:innen in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit an Bedeutung.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>Policy Brief</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 09:16:00 +0100</pubDate>
			<enclosure url="https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/Policy_Brief/2026/PB_6.2026.pdf" length ="1597840" type="application/pdf" />
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Judging one’s own credit: risks and promises of an African credit rating agency</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/judging-ones-own-credit-risks-and-promises-of-an-african-credit-rating-agency/</link>
			<description>Faced with high borrowing costs, African leaders and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) have selected Mauritius to host a continental credit rating agency to reduce dependence on the “Big Three” and counter perceived bias. But will investors trust it?
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Faced with high borrowing costs, African leaders and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) have selected Mauritius to host a continental credit rating agency to reduce dependence on the “Big Three” and counter perceived bias. But will investors trust it?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 20:59:12 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Enjust-Netzwerk für Umweltgerechtigkeit </title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/enjust-netzwerk-fuer-umweltgerechtigkeit/</link>
			<description>Bericht über die 6. internationale Konferenz des Netzwerks Enjust zum Thema &quot;Offsetting Justice? Environmental Justice in the age of market and militarized conservation&quot; in Bonn.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bericht über die 6. internationale Konferenz des Netzwerks Enjust zum Thema "Offsetting Justice? Environmental Justice in the age of market and militarized conservation" in Bonn.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 11:49:19 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Colonial nostalgia, neo-colonial extraction, or domestic protectionism? three hypotheses on Rubio’s Munich address and the Global South</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/colonial-nostalgia-neo-colonial-extraction-or-domestic-protectionism-three-hypotheses-on-rubios-munich-address-and-the-global-south/</link>
			<description>Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel lay out the contours of the new ‘nationalist conditionality regime’: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s address to the 2026 Munich Security Conference marked a striking departure from post-Cold War diplomatic norms. The speech was not a routine restatement of transatlantic solidarity. It was an assertive articulation of civilisational protectionism, framed around Western re-industrialisation, the acquisition of critical minerals, and the subordination of multilateral development frameworks. For scholars of international development and global inequality, the implications are significant and warrant careful scrutiny.</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Marco Rubio's address confirms that the normative foundations of international cooperation are now openly contested not only from outside the West but from within the West itself. The question is no longer whether what is called the ‘post-1945 consensus’ will hold. The question is what replaces it, and on whose terms.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 09:30:16 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Revitalising the narrative for international development policy: the case of Germany</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/revitalising-the-narrative-for-international-development-policy-the-case-of-germany/</link>
			<description>This contribution to the Korean Development </description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This contribution to the Korean Development Institute's Knowledge Brief series contextualises and analyses the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-Operation and Development's reform plan, as published in January 2026.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2026 09:28:49 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>From mines to markets: Gravity model insights on critical raw material trade</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/from-mines-to-markets-gravity-model-insights-on-critical-raw-material-trade-1/</link>
			<description>Access to critical raw materials (CRMs) is increasingly shaped by geopolitical dynamics, sparking a global competition for supply security. Using the gravity model of trade, we examine how OECD countries leverage Aid for Trade (AfT), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) to influence CRM imports from developing countries. Panel data from 1995–2023 show that while intensive-margin effects of North-South PTAs appear economically negligible in the global trade equilibrium, these agreements play a strategic role in facilitating market entry and shaping supply-chain geography. Our results underscore that a coordinated mix of trade diplomacy, investment frameworks, and targeted aid is key to resilient and diversified CRM access for OECD countries.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Access to critical raw materials (CRMs) is increasingly shaped by geopolitical dynamics, sparking a global competition for supply security. Using the gravity model of trade, we examine how OECD countries leverage Aid for Trade (AfT), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) to influence CRM imports from developing countries. Panel data from 1995–2023 show that while intensive-margin effects of North-South PTAs appear economically negligible in the global trade equilibrium, these agreements play a strategic role in facilitating market entry and shaping supply-chain geography. Our results underscore that a coordinated mix of trade diplomacy, investment frameworks, and targeted aid is key to resilient and diversified CRM access for OECD countries.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2026 07:43:00 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>The evolution of bus rapid transit: Origins, impacts, and policy lessons</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/the-evolution-of-bus-rapid-transit-origins-impacts-and-policy-lessons/</link>
			<description>This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 16:01:38 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>(UN)Ordnungsmacht? BRICS bei den Vereinten Nationen </title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/unordnungsmacht-brics-bei-den-vereinten-nationen/</link>
			<description>Seit ihrer Gründung verweist die BRICS-Gruppe immer wieder auf die Vereinten Nationen als zentralen Rahmen der internationalen Ordnung. Trotz des Gewichts einzelner BRICS-Mitglieder gelingt es BRICS als Gruppe aufgrund interner Diskrepanzen aber bisher nicht, etablierte Ordnungselemente zu unterminieren oder alternative Ordnungsvorschläge zu lancieren.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Seit ihrer Gründung verweist die BRICS-Gruppe immer wieder auf die Vereinten Nationen als zentralen Rahmen der internationalen Ordnung. Trotz des Gewichts einzelner BRICS-Mitglieder gelingt es BRICS als Gruppe aufgrund interner Diskrepanzen aber bisher nicht, etablierte Ordnungselemente zu unterminieren oder alternative Ordnungsvorschläge zu lancieren.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 10:21:44 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Mobilising and scaling local climate action</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/policy-brief/article/mobilising-and-scaling-local-climate-action/</link>
			<description>As the world approaches global warming tipping points, local climate engagement ensures that climate actions are equitable, effective, and aligned with local needs. This policy brief explores options to mobilise and scale up local climate action.  </description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the world approaches global warming tipping points, local climate engagement aims at climate actions that are equitable, effective and aligned with local needs. Strengthening and scaling up these initiatives can amplify impact, though efforts are often fragmented and require strengthened coordination. This policy brief identifies barriers and enablers of local climate action, how it is best scaled up, and how international actors – donors, policymakers, city and research networks, businesses and others – can support this process.&nbsp;<br />
Building on these insights, the following points outline key conditions for strengthening, scaling up and sustaining locally led climate action:<br />
•&nbsp; &nbsp; community-centred co-creation – investing in participatory, culturally grounded processes that map local needs, integrate diverse knowledge, and establish a common language;<br />
•&nbsp; &nbsp; predictable, flexible funding – providing long-term resources for locally led climate action, and planning additional finance to scale up solutions, including those involving knowledge sharing platforms and coordi-nation capacity;<br />
•&nbsp; &nbsp; private-sector engagement – creating incentives aligned with climate and community priorities, such as collaboration in the development of green products, in facilitating their market access and assisting with certification and value-chain regulations.<br />
•&nbsp; &nbsp; multilevel coordination and data sharing – establishing clear institutional pathways, monitoring mechanisms and interoperable data platforms to connect local action with national and international policies, leveraging synergies, and increasing accountability; and<br />
•&nbsp; &nbsp; just international partnerships – supporting local and Southern priorities through green development opportunities, ensuring fairness and co-benefits for the partners involved.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>Policy Brief</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 09:06:18 +0100</pubDate>
			<enclosure url="https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/Policy_Brief/2026/PB_5.2026.pdf" length ="403634" type="application/pdf" />
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Surveying just transition pathways in global climate policy</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/surveying-just-transition-pathways-in-global-climate-policy/</link>
			<description>Just Transitions (JT) toward sustainable, equitable, and low-carbon futures have become a central focus of global climate policy, exemplified by initiatives such as Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JET-Ps) and the UNFCCC Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP). For some actors, JT is understood in sectoral terms, focusing on energy transitions. Others emphasise more transformative approaches grounded in global structural reform and climate justice. Although existing scholarship has mapped JT framings in the literature, across national climate policy and non-academic frameworks, no study has yet examined how individuals shaping global climate policy themselves understand and prioritise JT. Approximately 130 Blue Zone-accredited attendees (i.e. those with access to the formal negotiations) were surveyed at COP28 in Dubai, including party delegates, policy-makers, civil society representatives and others. The survey was structured around five JT typologies – from least to most transformative – drawn from existing literature, as well two novel typologies: one centered on energy, another on sustainable development. Results indicate a strong preference for approaches extending beyond energy to encompass broader sustainable development concerns, with policy coherence identified as a crucial governance principle. Respondents also favour more transformative policies around global structural reform and climate finance for lower-income countries, while the most prioritized justice dimension is accountability and responsibility for climate change. The results also show differences in preferences between participants from high- and lower-income countries, with the latter favouring more transformative notions of JT. However, overall, JT preferences straddle multiple typologies, suggesting that policy mixes delivering broader sustainable development outcomes could provide an effective and politically viable way to reconcile competing views. By exploring the perspectives of those shaping global climate policy, the paper enriches scholarly discussions on JT framings, while offering guidance and directions for the ongoing JTWP negotiations amidst the latest COP30 decision to establish a global just transition mechanism.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just Transitions (JT) toward sustainable, equitable, and low-carbon futures have become a central focus of global climate policy, exemplified by initiatives such as Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JET-Ps) and the UNFCCC Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP). For some actors, JT is understood in sectoral terms, focusing on energy transitions. Others emphasise more transformative approaches grounded in global structural reform and climate justice. Although existing scholarship has mapped JT framings in the literature, across national climate policy and non-academic frameworks, no study has yet examined how individuals shaping global climate policy themselves understand and prioritise JT. Approximately 130 Blue Zone-accredited attendees (i.e. those with access to the formal negotiations) were surveyed at COP28 in Dubai, including party delegates, policy-makers, civil society representatives and others. The survey was structured around five JT typologies – from least to most transformative – drawn from existing literature, as well two novel typologies: one centered on energy, another on sustainable development. Results indicate a strong preference for approaches extending beyond energy to encompass broader sustainable development concerns, with policy coherence identified as a crucial governance principle. Respondents also favour more transformative policies around global structural reform and climate finance for lower-income countries, while the most prioritized justice dimension is accountability and responsibility for climate change. The results also show differences in preferences between participants from high- and lower-income countries, with the latter favouring more transformative notions of JT. However, overall, JT preferences straddle multiple typologies, suggesting that policy mixes delivering broader sustainable development outcomes could provide an effective and politically viable way to reconcile competing views. By exploring the perspectives of those shaping global climate policy, the paper enriches scholarly discussions on JT framings, while offering guidance and directions for the ongoing JTWP negotiations amidst the latest COP30 decision to establish a global just transition mechanism.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 08:46:45 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Pressure on civil society spaces</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/the-current-column/article/pressure-on-civil-society-spaces/</link>
			<description>The questioning of the political neutrality of certain CSOs are increasingly being instrumentalised to delegitimise unwanted criticism.</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bonn, 2 March 2026.<strong> The space for civil society action is shrinking in Europe as well. This development must be opposed with determination.</strong></p>

<p>“Shrinking space”, the shrinking of spaces and opportunities for civil society to exert influence, has been an ongoing topic in foreign and development policy for years. Data from the <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/">Varieties of Democracy Initiative</a> (V-Dem) shows that the repression of civil society organisations (CSOs) has also gradually increased in Europe since 2010, albeit at a rather low level so far. As early as 2022, the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729269/EPRS_ATA(2022)729269_EN.pdf">EU Parliament</a> discussed the shrinking of civil society spaces in the EU.</p>

<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2014/02/closing-space-democracy-and-human-rights-support-under-fire">Research</a> on “shrinking space” in non-OECD countries has long emphasised the efforts of governments to restrict and delegitimise the “political activities” of CSOs. While CSOs often fulfil the task of highlighting social and political grievances, their political neutrality is the subject of increasingly heated debate – including in Europe. In principle, the political neutrality requirement for CSOs in a democracy is primarily intended to ensure that CSOs recognised as non-profit organisations do not act in a party-political manner. Among other things, this is intended to ensure fairness in the distribution of state funds. However, both the targeted questioning of the political neutrality of certain CSOs and the use of mechanisms for creating transparency are increasingly being instrumentalised to delegitimise unwanted criticism. For example, after years of state interference, the Fidesz government in Hungary introduced another restrictive <a href="https://de.euronews.com/2025/05/15/ungarn-gesetz-uber-auslandische-agenten-nach-russischem-vorbild">bill</a> in 2025, which addressed the alleged threat to national sovereignty and the alleged “influencing of the democratic debate” by CSOs.</p>

<p>However, criticism of CSOs’ alleged lack of political neutrality and transparency is not limited to countries such as Hungary. It also comes not only from governments, but also from non-governmental actors, above all from right-wing populist parties. In Germany, there was a massive increase in critical <a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afd-anfragen-ngo-finanzierung-probleme-li.3392576?reduced=true">parliamentary inquiries about CSOs</a> in 2024 and 2025. The majority came from the AfD parliamentary group (Alternative for Germany), which uses democratic procedures to weaken democratic institutions. In January 2026, the AfD parliamentary group set up a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/26/CLEANDoc_NGO-Aufklarung-AG-NGO.pdf">working group</a> on “NGO investigation” and advertised a position for a <a href="https://stellen.afdbundestag.de/wissenschaftlicher-referent-im-bereich-ngo-aufklaerung">policy officer</a> to, among other things, build up a database on CSOs and their funding in order to develop further parliamentary inquiries on this basis.</p>

<p>However, an initiative from the democratic spectrum, which was launched one year ago, on 24 February 2025, also made headlines. In its <a href="https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/150/2015035.pdf">brief inquiry</a> “Political neutrality of state-funded organisations”, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group called on the Federal Government of the time to examine whether 15 CSOs met the criterion of political neutrality. It argued that “some voices” viewed the CSOs as a “shadow structure that indirectly pursues politics with state funds”, referring to polarising reporting in the newspaper “Welt”. The CSOs named in the brief inquiry had demonstrated against the CDU/CSU parliamentary group’s decision to vote with the AfD on migration-related issues in the German parliament. In November 2025, “Die Linke” countered by asking for information about any state funding of the right-wing conservative think tank “R21” in a brief <a href="https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-1125938">inquiry</a>. On both occasions, the respective government rejected far-reaching requests for information regarding the non-profit status and finances of specific CSOs, also invoking the separation of powers.</p>

<p>A <a href="https://euractiv.de/news/eu-abgeordnete-im-schlagabtausch-streit-um-ngo-finanzierung/">debate</a> on CSO funding was initiated in the EU Parliament in January 2025 under the leadership of CSU MEP Monika Hohlmeier. The occasion for this was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/04/rightwing-meps-threaten-huge-funding-freeze-for-environmental-ngos">criticism</a> of CSOs’ alleged “lobbying” in an EU-funded project on climate issues. The EU Commission was accused of paying CSOs to convince the EU Parliament to adopt a more ambitious climate policy. Although the <a href="https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications?ref=SR-2025-11">European Court of Auditors</a> found no waste of taxpayers’ money, a <a href="https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/parliament-starts-scrutiny-of-the-commission-s-funding-of-ngos">working group</a> was set up to scrutinise the funding of CSOs by the EU. In the vote on the establishment of the working group, the European People’s Party allied itself with the right-wing populist Patriots for Europe, among others.</p>

<p>Such initiatives not only have an impact on public perception, but also create uncertainty for politically active CSOs. Research on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/1369183X.2022.2099363?needAccess=true">Europe</a> as well as on <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/sustaining-civic-space-in-times-of-covid-19-global-trends">other parts of the world</a> in this connection refers to a “chilling effect”, whereby CSOs limit their political activities or adapt their communication in anticipation of future repression. In order to preserve civic space in Europe, initiatives to delegitimise CSOs and restrict political freedoms must be opposed at an early stage.</p>

<p>In times of increasing autocratisation, German and European policy should recognise and promote the important role of a politically active democratic civil society. In addition to a <a href="https://freiheitsrechte.org/uploads/publications/Demokratie/Rechtsgutachten_Gemeinnuetzigkeit-Gesellschaft_fuer_Freiheitsrechte-2020-Gemeinnuetzigkeit_politisches_Engagement.pdf">reform of non-profit law</a>, this requires an open debate between all democratic camps on the role of civil society. In times of increasing polarisation, governments, political parties, CSOs and citizens need to be ready to expose themselves to opposing views and – if necessary – to argue about them. Red lines exist where the democratic system and fundamental values such as human dignity are violated.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>The Current Column</category>
			
			<author>presse@idos-research.de</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 10:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
			<enclosure url="https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/aktuelle_kolumne/2026/German_Institute_of_Development_and_Sustainability_EN_Gutheil_Lorch_02.03.2026.pdf" length ="345494" type="application/pdf" />
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title>Entwicklungszusammenarbeit</title>
			<link>https://www.idos-research.de//en/others-publications/article/entwicklungszusammenarbeit-1/</link>
			<description>Die europäische Entwicklungspolitik hat sich parallel zum europäischen Integrationsprozess stetig weiterentwickelt. Während der Politikbereich ursprünglich auf die überseeischen Länder und Gebiete (ULG) in Afrika beschränkt war, kamen mit jeder Erweiterungsrunde der Europäischen Union (EU) neue Zielregionen dazu. Heute arbeitet die EU in diesem Bereich mit nahezu allen Weltregionen zusammen. Damit hat die EU in ihrer Entwicklungszusammenarbeit eine deutlich breitere geografische Orientierung als die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten. Ein dichtes Netzwerk von EU-Delegationen vor Ort ermöglicht die Kooperation in allen Weltregionen. Auch finanziell ist die EU ein Schwergewicht in der Entwicklungspolitik: 2023 brachten die EU und ihre 27 Mitgliedstaaten zusammen 42 % der gesamten öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe weltweit auf, insgesamt 95,9 Mrd. €.
</description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Die europäische Entwicklungspolitik hat sich parallel zum europäischen Integrationsprozess stetig weiterentwickelt. Während der Politikbereich ursprünglich auf die überseeischen Länder und Gebiete (ULG) in Afrika beschränkt war, kamen mit jeder Erweiterungsrunde der Europäischen Union (EU) neue Zielregionen dazu. Heute arbeitet die EU in diesem Bereich mit nahezu allen Weltregionen zusammen. Damit hat die EU in ihrer Entwicklungszusammenarbeit eine deutlich breitere geografische Orientierung als die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten. Ein dichtes Netzwerk von EU-Delegationen vor Ort ermöglicht die Kooperation in allen Weltregionen. Auch finanziell ist die EU ein Schwergewicht in der Entwicklungspolitik: 2023 brachten die EU und ihre 27 Mitgliedstaaten zusammen 42 % der gesamten öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe weltweit auf, insgesamt 95,9 Mrd. €.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<category>External Publications</category>
			
			
			<pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 09:15:25 +0100</pubDate>
			
		</item>
		
	</channel>
</rss>