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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Neueste Publikationen – IDOS</title><link>https://www.idos-research.de/</link><description>Publikationen des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)</description><language>de</language><generator>TYPO3 EXT:news</generator><lastBuildDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 10:05:37 +0200</lastBuildDate><item><title>Social cohesion and climate-driven planned relocation in urban settlements: evidence from Suva, Fiji</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/social-cohesion-and-climate-driven-planned-relocation-in-urban-settlements-evidence-from-suva-fiji/</link><description>Planned relocation, the process of moving a community from one area of residence to a new one in response to an environmental risk or threat. Fiji has become a regional leader in planned relocation policy, taking on the challenge of doing planned relocation in urban settings.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Planned relocation, the process of moving a community from one area of residence to a new one in response to an environmental risk or threat, is an important option for climate change adaptation. Given the acute climate and environmental risks facing them, small island developing states (SIDS) have taken a leading role in developing policies and processes for planned relocation in response to these risks. This policy brief will look at how planned relocation works as an adaptation strategy in informal urban settlements and will examine the role of social cohesion in planned relocation processes. Fiji has become a regional leader in planned relocation policy, with the Human Mobility in Climate Change Contexts (HMCCC) project serving as a magnifier of Fiji’s existing expertise in planned relocation. Since 2017, the Fijian government and civil society in cooperation with the German and New Zealand governments have developed planned relocation standard operating procedures (SOPs) for helping villages in high-risk areas navigate the physical, cultural, social and economic costs of relocating to higher ground or a safer location. These SOPs have become a “gold standard” for other countries to learn from and emulate in their own planned relocation policies.&nbsp;<br>The next step that the government is starting to undertake involves adapting the SOPs to informal urban settle­ments that are facing climate and environ­mental risks. Fiji’s informal urban settlements have faced a number of social, political and eco­nomic challenges over the years. These include serious issues with crime, land insecurity and historical political exclusion. Thus, along with the threats that come with climate change, particularly sea-level rise and flooding, any planned relocation policy for informal urban settlements has to simultaneously address trust in institutions, cooperation for the common good, and inclusive identity. The historical case of the Bainiose being relocated from central Suva to a suburb of Suva in the late 1990s offers guidance on how this can be done.&nbsp;</p><p><i>Key policy messages</i></p><ul style="margin-left:-21px;"><li data-list-item-id="e3c3001e548b55ad5b6a69c726939cb99"><span>Planned relocation for communities in urban settings requires long-term planning for services such as new public transportation connections, schools, secure land tenure and health facilities.</span></li><li data-list-item-id="edbd4872ca6d274990867b0e5795be770"><span>Measures should be taken to build institutional trust with urban com­munities, who may lack the traditional mechanisms of chiefly or customary representa­tion that is present in rural settings.</span></li><li data-list-item-id="eddf477f665d1718fd2d6f27d23749350"><span>Community identity is often strong and can be a starting point for policy-makers and communities to identify sustainable options for relocation.</span></li></ul><p><strong>Dr Anawaite Matadradra </strong>is a Lecturer at the University of the South Pacific.<br><strong>Dr Sevanaia Sakai </strong>is a Senior Lecturer at the University of the South Pacific.<br><strong>Unaisi Raileqe</strong> is a Project Officer at the Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding.<br><strong>Dr Timothy Fadgen</strong> is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Auckland.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Martin-Shields, Charles / Anawaite Matadradra / Sevanaia Sakai / Unaisa Raileqe / Timothy Fadgen</author><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 10:05:37 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/social-cohesion-and-climate-driven-planned-relocation-in-urban-settlements-evidence-from-suva-fiji/</guid></item><item><title>Chasing the trillions: what MDB lending can - and cannot - mobilise</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/chasing-the-trillions-what-mdb-lending-can-and-cannot-mobilise/</link><description>Multilateral development banks face increasing pressure to leverage their limited resources as development budgets shrink. Our paper examines the mobilisation potential of their financing instruments—and why higher leverage does not necessarily mean greater development impact.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This paper examines how additional private financial resources can be mobilised through the use of multilateral development bank (MDB) funds. It focuses on identifying the leverage potential of different financing instruments, improving their mobilisation efficiency, and examining how greater leverage can promote development outcomes while safeguarding the financial sustainability of MDBs. Its contribution is a comparative synthesis that brings together mobilisation mechanisms, differences in the public resources and risks underlying leverage ratios, and development impact. The analysis covers six categories: debt instruments, equity instruments, risk-transfer instruments, guarantees, advisory services and policy-based lending. It compares their characteristics, including the level of intervention, mobilisation mechanisms, constraints addressed and time horizons. It also distinguishes transaction-level private direct and indirect mobilisation from broader catalytic effects arising through market development, institutional strengthening and policy reforms.<br>The comparison shows why instruments cannot be assessed by a single leverage ratio. MDB lending, guarantee exposure and expenditure on advisory services represent different commitments of public resources and risk. Similarly, private finance linked to a transaction cannot be measured in the same way as subsequent investment enabled by policy reform. Available evidence therefore indicates differences in mobilisation potential rather than an established empirical ranking of instruments. The paper argues that leveraging efficiency can be increased by moving to more powerful approaches and by better targeting instruments to binding investment constraints. It examines how this can enhance the development impact and financial viability of MDB/DFI portfolios through two channels: a financial/portfolio efficiency channel and a development/catalytic channel. However, a high leverage ratio does not necessarily indicate superior performance. It may reflect investment in easier markets, weak additionality or an understatement of public risk. Conversely, a lower ratio may be consistent with greater additionality in a fragile market or pioneering sector. These findings highlight the importance of assessing leverage alongside additionality, development impact and financial sustainability. Using concessional funds through blended finance instruments can be costly and can reduce the resources available for other development priorities.<br>Therefore, the development finance institutions (DFIs) must strictly apply the additionality principle and further operationalise the principle of using minimum concessionality. If interpreted too generously, there is a risk of creating leverage without sufficient development impact. The paper provides specific recommendations for refining the use of financing instruments and integrating transaction-level support into a broader market-shaping approach that draws on the strengths of policy-based lending and technical assistance. Higher leverage should not be pursued as an end in itself; its value depends on its contribution to additional development impact.</p><p><strong>Dr Jürgen Karl Zattler</strong> is a distinguished non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC and a non-resident research fellow at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn. Until October 2023, he was Director General at the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Prior to that, he served as the Executive Director representing Germany at the World Bank.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Discussion Paper</category><author>Zattler, Jürgen K. / Kathrin Berensmann / Yabibal Walle</author><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 16:20:19 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/chasing-the-trillions-what-mdb-lending-can-and-cannot-mobilise/</guid></item><item><title>What can development partners do to help national development banks? </title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/what-can-development-partners-do-to-help-national-development-banks/</link><description>Successful partnerships should be measured by both the banks’ financial and institutional capacity to invest in sustainable development at scale</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bonn, 12 October 2026. <i><strong>As official development assistance declines, development partners must boost financing and capacity building for national development banks, while strengthening independence.</strong></i></p><p>The Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank open in Bangkok today, at a time when financing sustainable development faces mounting pressure from geopolitical tensions, worsening debt crises, and declining official development assistance. With&nbsp;developing countries facing an&nbsp;<a href="https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/02/global-outlook-on-financing-for-sustainable-development-2025_6748f647/753d5368-en.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">estimated annual financing gap of $4 trillion to achieve&nbsp;the Sustainable Development Goals</a>,&nbsp;stronger cooperation between multilateral and national development banks is more critical than ever.</p><p>The&nbsp;<a href="https://wfdfi.org/en/sevilla-commitment-fourth-international-conference-on-financing-for-development/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Compromiso de Sevilla</a>, adopted at the 4<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Financing for Development in Sevilla in 2025, underscored the importance of national development banks (banks) in promoting sustainable development, for example by channelling long-term and affordable financing to renewable energy, high-value priority sectors or small and medium enterprises, and called on development partners (partners) to increase their support for the banks. The question is then how partners, including multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, can best respond to that call.&nbsp;</p><p>Our recent research takes up that question by looking at the Development Bank Ghana (DBG) and the Development Bank of Nigeria (DBN), two relatively new African development banks established with substantial support from partners, including the World Bank, KfW, the European Investment Bank, Agence Française de Développement, and&nbsp;the African Development Bank. We found that partners can reinforce the banks’ capacity by providing financing and technical assistance while strengthening institutional independence (the ability to pursue operations and their mandate free from political interference) and respecting national ownership (locally determined development priorities). We would like to highlight three main findings that stand out. &nbsp; &nbsp;</p><p>First, partners provide the banks with long-term, affordable capital, allowing them to invest in national sustainable development. Just as important, reputable international partners can also lend credibility, giving other stakeholders the confidence to invest in or lend to the banks. Partners can also support domestic resource mobilisation efforts, such as bond issuance, through guarantees and technical assistance, reducing the banks’ reliance on external financing. In this way,&nbsp;partners help the banks diversify their funding sources and strengthen their financial autonomy. &nbsp;</p><p>Second, engagement with partners can also improve the banks’ institutional independence. For DBG and DBN, partners helped embed mandates for wholesale lending and provisions for institutional independence from the start. Channelling funds to final beneficiaries through local commercial financial institutions, so-called participating financial institutions, shields lending decisions from political interference, safeguarding the banks’ institutional independence. The experience of both banks also highlights the importance of selective alignment, where engagement with partners is based on their ability to advance nationally owned development priorities. This approach serves as a safeguard against subservience, which&nbsp;<a href="https://shs.cairn.info/realizing-the-potential-of-national-development-banks-to-boost-sustainable-development-financing-with-mdb-support--1000025620871-page-1?lang=en" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">previous research</a> has flagged as a risk to collaboration between multilateral and national development banks.&nbsp;</p><p>Third, technical assistance and capacity building are core elements of an impactful partnership. &nbsp;Both banks have received technical support in areas including risk management,&nbsp;environmental, social, and governance practices, green finance, and lending that advances gender equality. &nbsp;This support is particularly valuable for relatively new institutions that draw staff from commercial banks, as it helps them adapt to a development banking mandate and build the institutional mindset and capacity needed to balance financial sustainability with development impact.</p><p>These lessons – investing in institutional capacity building alongside financing, while aligning assistance with national priorities – offer practical ways for partners to respond to the call to support national development banks in reaching their full potential. Partners need to do more than provide financing to effectively support the banks in advancing the Sustainable Development Goals. They also need to provide support that builds strong and independent national institutions that can mobilise additional funds from capital markets (including domestic savings) to scale up their activities. Our findings suggest that successful partnerships should be measured by both the financial and institutional capacity of the banks to invest in sustainable development at scale. This week’s Annual Meetings should explore ways to advance international cooperation that ensures national development banks are better capitalised and capable of implementing nationally owned development priorities with greater independence and at a larger scale.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>The Current Column</category><author>Sommer, Christoph / Priscilla Toto / Yabibal M. Walle</author><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 09:51:04 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/what-can-development-partners-do-to-help-national-development-banks/</guid></item><item><title> The 0.7% ODA target: a norm in retreat </title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-07-oda-target-a-norm-in-retreat/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The 0.7 per cent official development assistance/gross national income (ODA/GNI) target, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, is best understood as a partially successful norm that is now in active retreat. In this paper we discuss the history of the target using Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle framework. We compare the 0.7 to analogous targets in defence, climate, education, health, and biodiversity. We argue that systematic underperformance is a structural feature of politically negotiated international input targets. The rise and retreat of the 0.7 is then not a distinct feature of development finance. The NATO 2 per cent/5 per cent case demonstrates that cascade is achievable under conditions of salience and enforcement. However, these are conditions that the 0.7 has not had. We propose ways forward based on the 0.7 target’s original rationale.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Klingebiel, Stephan / Andy Sumner</author><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 15:18:07 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-07-oda-target-a-norm-in-retreat/</guid></item><item><title>The OECD Development Assistance Committee at 70: who defines ‘Mutual Interest’?</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-oecd-development-assistance-committee-at-70-who-defines-mutual-interest/</link><description>The OECD’s aid committee turns 70 in 2031, as record aid cuts and a shift from solidarity to self-interest reshape why countries give. Where this leads is still open. Aid could become a genuine partnership, a deal between elites, a tool of geopolitical bargaining or a purely commercial transaction. Each path would change the committee’s role, and with it the future of the 0.7% aid target.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The OECD’s aid committee turns 70 in 2031, as record aid cuts and a shift from solidarity to self-interest reshape why countries give. Where this leads is still open. Aid could become a genuine partnership, a deal between elites, a tool of geopolitical bargaining or a purely commercial transaction. Each path would change the committee’s role, and with it the future of the 0.7% aid target.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Sumner, Andy / Stephan Klingebiel</author><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 13:40:00 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-oecd-development-assistance-committee-at-70-who-defines-mutual-interest/</guid></item><item><title>The next generation of national development banks: early lessons from Ghana and Nigeria</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/the-next-generation-of-national-development-banks-early-lessons-from-ghana-and-nigeria/</link><description>How can the new wave of national development banks in low- and middle-income countries grow into independent, impactful institutions for sustainable development? Evidence from Ghana and Nigeria sheds light on independence, funding, partnerships, green finance – and what it takes to scale their impact.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The discussion paper assesses whether and how newly established national development banks (NDBs), specifically the Development Bank Ghana (DBG) and the Development Bank of Nigeria (DBN), are growing into independent and impactful institutions capable of fostering sustainable development. It focuses on five analytical dimensions: (1) institutional independence, (2) the diversification of funding sources and the scaling up of operations, (3) the relationship between NDBs and participating financial institutions (PFIs), (4) collaboration between NDBs and development partners (DPs), namely multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilateral development finance institutions and (5) sustainability and green finance. The research adopts a qualitative comparative case study methodology, drawing on 55 semi-structured interviews conducted across Ghana and Nigeria with representatives from NDBs, PFIs, DPs, civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders such as finance ministries, central banks and providers of technical assistance. The data are analysed using qualitative content analysis and triangulation. The discussion paper aims to provide insights for policymakers, central banks and DPs, and inform the design of future NDBs regarding how they can become strong institutions that support long-term development objectives.&nbsp;<br>Our results show that DBG and DBN have emerged as relevant actors within the Ghanaian and Nigerian development finance landscapes, particularly through their role in facilitating access to long-term and often concessional funding, which helps PFIs expanding lending to MSMEs and underserved sectors. Furthermore, the study finds that both institutions have established governance and accountability structures that, together with their wholesale lending models, provide substantial protection against political interference. In particular, strong support from DPs proved central to the establishment, growth and operationalisation of both NDBs. Beyond financial resources, DPs provided technical assistance, institutional capacity building, governance support and sustainability expertise. Another notable finding of the study is that DBG and DBN foster sustainability by embedding environmental and social principles into their strategies and operations, and making sustainability a core institutional priority, especially through wholesale lending, technical assistance and the integration of sustainability. At the same time, the study identifies several constraints related to limited funding volumes, high pricing, limited risk-sharing mechanisms, administrative burdens associated with DP engagement and challenges in adapting international sustainability standards to local contexts. Overall, the findings suggest that although DBG and DBN have generated substantial development value, established strong governance structures and demonstrated institutional independence, increasing their impact will require the mobilisation of additional funding to scale up their operations and activities.<br>&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Discussion Paper</category><author>Sommer, Christoph / Yabibal M. Walle / Joshua Yindenaba Abor / Daniel Ofori-Sasu / Ama Asante / Robel Ghebrehanes / Benedicta Mawuena / John Kwaku Darko Okrah / Muna Osman / Paul Saupe / Anna-Lena Sprenger / Priscilla Toto</author><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 13:34:34 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/the-next-generation-of-national-development-banks-early-lessons-from-ghana-and-nigeria/</guid></item><item><title>Developing competences for Sustainable Futures: a competence model and design recommendations for learning environments</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/developing-competences-for-sustainable-futures-a-competence-model-and-design-recommendations-for-learning-environments/</link><description>How can learning formats prepare future change-makers for sustainability transformations? Drawing on nearly 20 years of experience with the MGG Academy, this paper presents a practice-informed competence model and six recommendations for designing transformative learning environments. </description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Preparing individuals to contribute to sustainability transformations has become an increasingly important challenge for higher education, professional training and leadership development. While research has identified a wide range of sustainability competences, comparatively less attention has been paid to how these competences can be fostered through purposefully designed learning environments. Drawing on nearly 20 years of experience with the Managing Global Governance (MGG) Academy of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), this paper offers a practice-informed perspective on competence development for future changemakers.<br>The paper addresses two questions: what competences are particularly relevant for individuals seeking to contribute to sustainability transformations and global cooperation, and how can learning environments be designed to strengthen these competences? Building on experience from the MGG Academy and relating it to literature on sustainability competences, transformative learning and adult education, the paper develops a competence model organised around three complementary dimensions – sense-making, cooperation and transformation – and operationalises 11 competences by distinguishing the knowledge, skills and attitudinal components associated with them. The paper further derives six recommendations for learning design: intentionally curating diversity, fostering trust and psychological safety, enabling mutual learning, aligning learning activities with the intended competence development, creating structured opportunities for reflection, and designing learning for transfer to professional practice.<br>Rather than proposing a universal blueprint, the paper demonstrates how competence models can provide orientation for coherent programme design and how learning theory can be translated into practical educational approaches. It concludes that competence development constitutes an important contribution to sustainability transformations, while recognising that impact also depends on supportive organisational environments, professional networks and broader institutional conditions. By connecting theoretical insights with nearly two decades of practical experience, the paper contributes to the growing discussion on how learning and dialogue programmes can strengthen the people and relationships through which transformative change becomes possible.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Discussion Paper</category><author>Reiber, Tatjana</author><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 13:26:27 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/developing-competences-for-sustainable-futures-a-competence-model-and-design-recommendations-for-learning-environments/</guid></item><item><title>Tax expenditures country report: Germany</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/tax-expenditures-country-report-germany/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Tax expenditures (TEs) in Germany represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2026. Over the last decade, revenue forgone reported by the German federal government has remained consistently below 2.0 percent of GDP. This is below the global average of 4.0 percent of GDP (see Redonda, von Haldenwang, &amp; Aliu, 2026), and less than most of Germany’s neighbours. However, it is important to note that official TE reporting is incomplete, as acknowledged by the German Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) itself. Recent changes in TE use have been motivated above all by three rationales: First, TEs have been employed as primary crisis response measures, mainly in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian war on Ukraine and the US-Iran war. Second, they are used to promote the transition towards zero carbon of the German energy system, including housing, transportation and manufacturing. Third, TEs are granted to promote growth or compensate high energy costs. Since 1967, Germany reports on tax expenditures (TEs) and direct subsidies under the Act to Promote Economic Stability and Growth (“Stability and Growth Act”). Reporting covers all provisions that have an economic objective. The “Subsidy Report” is submitted to parliament every second year, with the most recent one (number 30) published in September 2025 (BMF, 2025). By law, the report should be submitted to parliament “together” with the government draft for the federal budget of the coming year, but usually the report trails the draft budget for several weeks, sometimes even months. As previous editions, the 30th Subsidy Report contains two lists of TEs. One (“Annex 2”) presents 107 TEs that fall under the reporting mandate of the Stability and Growth Act. The other one (“Annex 3”) lists 52 provisions that result in revenue forgone, but do not fall under the mandate of the subsidy report as such, though the distinction between both lists is not fully consistent. Also, just 72 out of the 107 TEs presented in Annex 2 and only 18 of the 52 provisions listed in Annex 3 come with revenue forgone estimates. Based on the federal government’s budget draft for 2027, the quantified TEs of Annexes 2 and 3 amount to 76.5 billion Euro in 2026 (after 74.3 billion Euro in 2025). Annex 2 provisions are presented in great detail, each with its own data sheet. This reporting practice has earned Germany a relatively high score on the Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index, where it ranks 6th out of 116 assessed countries (Redonda et al., 2026). In contrast, Annex 3 provisions are presented in one single list with much less information. In addition, multiple provisions that would technically qualify as TEs are not reported at all. As a result, it is almost impossible for political decision-makers and the public in general to gain a complete overview of all the TEs in use, their fiscal cost and the impacts they have. Inconsistent reporting is partly due to the lack of a well-defined tax benchmark system, complicating the identification of TEs and estimations of revenue forgone. The criteria applied to decide whether a specific provision is a TE or part of the benchmark tax system are not always clear. For instance, lower value added tax (VAT) rates for food are part of Germany’s benchmark system and not reported, while lower VAT rates for cultural activities are considered a TE. The federal subsidy guidelines, issued in 2006 and amended in 2015, ask for a regular evaluation of all subsidies in use. Against this backdrop, two major rounds of evaluations have been commissioned by the BMF. The first round in 2007-2009 covered roughly the biggest 20 TEs listed in the subsidy report. Together, these TEs resulted in revenue forgone of 18.1 billion Euro per year (Thöne et al., 2009). To the best of our knowledge, at the time this was the biggest evaluation of tax expenditures ever conducted worldwide. Ten years later, 2017-2019, a second round of evaluations was commissioned, which was meant to cover the next twenty largest TEs plus several closely related smaller TEs, increasing the total coverage of this evaluation round to 33 measures with revenue forgone of 7.4 billion Euro per year (Thöne &amp; Gerhards, 2019). Even with these two rounds of evaluations, however, the federal government has not fully lived up to the principles it is supposed to follow. 50 out of the 107 TEs listed in Annex 2 of the 30th Subsidy Report, representing over a third (34 percent) of the revenue forgone, have never been evaluated. The figure rises to 66 percent when the provisions listed in Annex 3 of the report are included, as these are not subject to regular evaluations. As an additional point, only 17 out of 107 TEs come with a time limit and only two TEs are granted with decreasing benefits over time. TEs play an important role in German environmental and climate policy. On the one hand, they are used as environmental TEs (ETEs) to advance environmental protection and climate policy, above all in mobility, energy and heating. Revenue forgone from ETEs in 2026 amounted to 5.8 billion Euro. On the other hand, TEs are the dominant form of environmentally harmful subsidies. According to a report published by the German Federal Environment Agency (UBA), they resulted in 48.4 billion Euro of revenue forgone in 2018 (Burger &amp; Bretschneider, 2022). A new report published bei the Bertelsmann Foundation focuses specifically on subsidies that are harmful to the climate (Fiedler et al., 2026). It shows that TEs falling under this category generated revenue forgone in the range of 47.3 billion Euro in 2024, including 18,2 billion Euro classified as only “partially harmful”. Sustainability was introduced as an aspect of TE reporting in 2015, understood as a broad concept that combines economic performance, the preservation of natural resources and social cohesion from a long-term development perspective. This is in line with the common worldwide understanding of sustainability and implies that the evaluation score obtained by each TE in this category may reflect very different properties, not only environmental or climate-related ones. In fact, the 30th Subsidy Report lists 15 cases where TEs are meant to support the preservation of natural resources, against 36 cases where the aim is social cohesion and 93 cases that point at economic sustainability. All in all, Germany has been slow in reforming its TE regime. As a recurrent observation, the Federal Court of Auditors highlights that the government has done too little to follow up on the recommendations that came out of the various evaluations since 2009. Against this background, three actions seem to be particularly relevant. To start, the federal government needs to address the lack of clarity regarding the German benchmark tax system. A comprehensive stock-taking review could help to determine which provisions should be classified as “structural” parts of the benchmark system, and which are “non-structural” and thus to be considered TEs and reported in future subsidy reports. In the medium term, this initiative could result in TEs no longer being viewed exclusively within the context of economic objectives, but encompassing social and other policy goals as well. This would be in line with international good practice in TE reporting. Consistent with these standards, TE reports should also be submitted to and adopted by parliament as an integral part of the annual budget. In addition, a clear evaluation framework with regular intervals and broad coverage should be implemented.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Book Publications</category><author>Thöne, Michael / Christian von Haldenwang</author><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 10:09:07 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/tax-expenditures-country-report-germany/</guid></item><item><title>Länderbericht zu Steuervergünstigungen: Deutschland</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/laenderbericht-zu-steuerverguenstigungen-deutschland/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Steuervergünstigungen (englisch: tax expenditures) machen in Deutschland einen erheblichen Teil der Staatsausgaben aus und beliefen sich im Jahr 2026 auf 1,7 Prozent des BIP. In den letzten zehn Jahren lagen die von der Bundesregierung berichteten Mindereinnahmen durchweg unter 2 Prozent des BIP und damit unter dem globalen Durchschnitt von 4,0 Prozent (vgl. Redonda, von Haldenwang &amp; Aliu, 2026). Die meisten Nachbarländer Deutschlands verzeichnen höhere Mindereinnahmen aufgrund von Steuervergünstigungen. Dabei ist jedoch zu beachten, dass die offizielle Berichterstattung über Steuervergünstigungen in Deutschland unvollständig ist, wie das Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF) selbst regelmäßig feststellt. In jüngerer Zeit lassen sich Veränderungen bei der Nutzung von Steuervergünstigungen vor allem auf drei Gründe zurückführen: Erstens werden sie als kurzfristig wirksame Maßnahmen zur Krisenbewältigung eingesetzt, hauptsächlich im Zusammenhang mit der Covid-19-Pandemie, dem russischen Krieg gegen die Ukraine und dem Krieg zwischen den USA und dem Iran. Zweitens dienen sie der Förderung des Übergangs zu einem CO₂-neutralen Energiesystem, einschließlich der Bereiche Wohnen, Verkehr und verarbeitendes Gewerbe. Drittens werden sie gewährt, um Wachstum zu fördern bzw. hohe Energiekosten auszugleichen. Seit 1967 berichtet Deutschland über Steuervergünstigungen und direkte Subventionen auf der Grundlage des Gesetzes zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft („Stabilitäts- und Wachstumsgesetz“). Die Berichterstattung umfasst alle Bestimmungen, die ein wirtschaftliches Ziel verfolgen. Der „Subventionsbericht“ wird dem Bundestag alle zwei Jahre vorgelegt; der jüngste Bericht (Nr. 30) wurde im September 2025 ver-öffentlicht (BMF, 2025). Laut Gesetz soll der Bericht dem Bundestag „zusammen“ mit dem Regierungsentwurf für den Bundeshaushalt für das kommende Jahr vorgelegt werden, doch in der Regel folgt der Bericht dem Haus-haltsentwurf um mehrere Wochen, manchmal auch Monate. Wie in den Jahren zuvor enthält der 30. Subventionsbericht zwei Listen von Steuervergünstigungen. Die eine („Anlage 2“) umfasst 107 steuerliche Sonderregelungen, die unter die Berichtspflicht nach dem Stabilitäts- und Wachstumsgesetz fallen. Die andere („Anlage 3“) listet 52 „subventionsähnliche Tatbestände“ auf, die zu Minder-einnahmen führen, jedoch als solche nicht unter die Berichtspflicht des Subventionsberichts fallen. Die Unterscheidung zwischen diesen beiden Listen ist nicht durchgängig konsistent. Zudem werden die Einnahmenverluste nicht vollständig ausgewiesen. Nur für 72 der 107 in Anlage 2 und 18 der 52 in Anlage 3 aufgeführten Regelungen liegen Schätzungen zu den damit einhergehenden Mindereinnahmen vor. Auf der Grundlage des Haushaltsentwurfs der Bundesregierung für 2027 belaufen sich die quantifizierten Steuervergünstigungen der Anlagen 2 und 3 im Jahr 2026 auf insgesamt 76,5 Milliarden Euro, nach 74,3 Milliarden Euro im Jahr 2025. Die Maßnahmen in Anlage 2 werden sehr detailliert dargestellt, jede mit einem eigenen Datenblatt. Diese Berichtspraxis hat Deutschland eine relativ hohe Punktzahl im Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index eingebracht. Dort nimmt es Platz 6 von 116 bewerteten Ländern ein (Redonda et al., 2026). Im Gegensatz dazu werden die Regelungen der Anlage 3 in einer einzigen Liste mit deutlich weniger Informationen dargestellt. Zudem werden zahlreiche Regelungen, die faktisch steuerliche Vergünstigungen sind, überhaupt nicht ausgewiesen. Infolgedessen ist es für politische Entscheidungsträger und die breite Öffentlichkeit nahezu unmöglich, sich einen vollständigen Überblick über alle bestehenden Steuervergünstigungen, ihre fiskalischen Kosten und ihre Wirkungen zu verschaffen. Die uneinheitliche Berichterstattung ist zum Teil auf das Fehlen eines klar definierten steuerlichen Referenzsys-tems zurückzuführen, was die Identifizierung von Steuervergünstigungen und die Schätzung der entgangenen Einnahmen erschwert. Die Kriterien, anhand derer entschieden wird, ob eine bestimmte Regelung eine Steuervergünstigung oder Teil des steuerlichen Referenzsystems ist, sind nicht immer klar. So sind beispielsweise niedrigere Umsatzsteuersätze für Lebensmittel Teil des deutschen Referenzsystems und werden nicht ausgewiesen, während niedrigere Umsatzsteuersätze für kulturelle Aktivitäten als Steuervergünstigung gelten. Die 2006 beschlossenen und 2015 geänderten subventionspolitischen Leitlinien der Bundesregierung verlangen eine regelmäßige Evaluierung aller Subventionen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurden für Steuervergünstigungen vom BMF zwei große Evaluierungsrunden in Auftrag gegeben. Die erste Runde in den Jahren 2007–2009 orientierte sich an den 20 größten im Subventionsbericht aufgeführten Steuervergünstigungen. Insgesamt führten diese Vergünstigungen zu Mindereinnahmen in Höhe von 18,1 Milliarden Euro im Jahr (Thöne et al., 2009). Nach unserem Kenntnisstand handelte es sich damals um die größte Evaluierung von Steuervergünstigungen, die weltweit jemals durchgeführt wurde. Zehn Jahre später, von 2017 bis 2019, wurde eine zweite Evaluierungsrunde durchgeführt, die die zwanzig nächstgrößten Steuervergünstigungen sowie mehrere eng damit verbundene, kleinere Tatbestände abdeckte. Insgesamt wurden in dieser Runde 33 Maßnahmen mit Mindereinnahmen von zusammen 7,4 Milliarden Euro im Jahr überprüft (Thöne &amp; Gerhards, 2019). Doch selbst mit diesen beiden großen Evaluierungsrunden hat die Bundesregierung die Grundsätze, auf die sie sich verpflichtet hat, nicht vollständig erfüllt. So wurden 50 der 107 in Anlage 2 des 30. Subventionsberichts aufgeführten Steuervergünstigungen noch nie evaluiert. Sie machen mehr als ein Drittel (35,5 Prozent) der entgan-genen Einnahmen aus. Dieser Anteil steigt auf 65,4 Prozent, wenn die in Anlage 3 des Berichts aufgeführten Steu-erregeln einbezogen werden, da diese Vergünstigungen keiner Evaluierungsvorgabe unterliegen. Hinzu kommt, dass nur 17 von 107 Steuervergünstigungen befristet sind und nur bei zwei Maßnahmen die Unterstützung de-gressiv gewährt wird, also im Laufe der Zeit abnimmt. Steuervergünstigungen spielen eine wichtige Rolle in der deutschen Umwelt- und Klimapolitik. Einerseits werden sie als ökologische Fördermaßnahmen (environmental tax expenditures, ETEs) eingesetzt, um Umweltschutz und Klimapolitik voranzutreiben, vor allem in den Bereichen Mobilität, Energie und Wärmeversorgung. Die Einnahmeausfälle durch ETEs belaufen sich im Jahr 2026 auf 5,8 Milliarden Euro. Andererseits sind Steuervergünstigungen die vorherrschende Form umweltschädlicher Subventionen. Laut einem vom Umweltbundesamt (UBA) veröffentlichten Bericht führten diese im Jahr 2018 zu Mindereinnahmen in Höhe von 48,4 Milliarden Euro (Burger &amp; Bretschneider, 2021). Ein neuer, von der Bertelsmann Stiftung veröffentlichter Bericht konzentriert sich gezielt auf klimaschädliche Subventionen (Fiedler et al., 2026). Er zeigt, dass die in diese Kategorie fallenden Steuervergünstigungen im Jahr 2024 zu Mindereinnahmen in Höhe von 47,3 Milliarden Euro geführt haben, darunter 18,2 Milliarden Euro, die als lediglich „teilweise klimaschädlich“ eingestuft werden. Nachhaltigkeit wurde im Jahr 2015 als zusätzliche Dimension in die Subventionsberichterstattung aufgenommen und im Einklang mit dem gängigen Verständnis der globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele als breites Konzept definiert, das wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit, die Erhaltung natürlicher Ressourcen und den sozialen Zusammenhalt aus einer langfristigen Entwicklungsperspektive umfasst. Dies bedeutet aber auch, dass die Bewertungsergebnisse sehr unterschiedliche Aspekte widerspiegeln können, nicht nur umwelt- oder klimabezogene. Tatsächlich listet der 30. Subventionsbericht 15 Fälle auf, in denen Steuervergünstigungen den Erhalt natürlicher Ressourcen unterstützen sollen, gegenüber 36 Fällen, in denen der soziale Zusammenhalt im Vordergrund steht, und 93 Maßnahmen, die auf wirtschaftliche Nachhaltigkeit abzielen (BMF, 2025, S. 52). Insgesamt hat Deutschland die Reform seiner Steuervergünstigungen nur zögerlich vorangetrieben. Als wiederkehrende Feststellung hebt der Bundesrechnungshof hervor, dass die Regierung zu wenig unternommen hat, um die Empfehlungen aus den verschiedenen Evaluierungen seit 2009 umzusetzen. Vor diesem Hintergrund erschei-nen drei Maßnahmen besonders relevant. Erstens muss die Bundesregierung bestehende Unklarheiten hinsicht-lich des Referenzsteuersystems beseitigen. Eine umfassende Bestandsaufnahme würde es erlauben, festzustellen, welche Bestimmungen als „strukturelle“ Bestandteile des Referenzsystems einzustufen sind und welche „nicht-strukturell“ sind, somit als Steuervergünstigungen gelten und in künftigen Berichten ausgewiesen werden müssen. Mittelfristig könnte dies dazu führen, dass die Berichterstattung über Steuervergünstigungen nicht mehr ausschließlich im Kontext wirtschaftlicher Zielsetzungen erfolgt, sondern auch soziale und andere politische Ziele einbezieht. Im Einklang mit internationalen Standards der Berichterstattung sollte die Bundesregierung – zweitens – auch vorsehen, dass Berichte über Steuervergünstigungen als fester Bestandteil des jährlichen Haushaltsplans dem Parlament vorgelegt und von diesem verabschiedet werden. Darüber hinaus sollten – drittens – klare Evaluierungsvorgaben mit regelmäßigen Intervallen und breiter Abdeckung formuliert und dann auch tatsächlich umgesetzt werden.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Book Publications</category><author>Thöne, Michael / Christian von Haldenwang</author><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 10:01:34 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/laenderbericht-zu-steuerverguenstigungen-deutschland/</guid></item><item><title>Nourishing tomorrow: engineering food systems backward from the plate</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/nourishing-tomorrow-engineering-food-systems-backward-from-the-plate/</link><description>Food systems must deliver healthy, affordable diets. But how? The answer lies in reverse engineering—from the plate back through products, value chains and across geographies.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bonn, 5 October 2026. <i><strong>Food systems must deliver healthy, affordable diets. But how? The answer lies in reverse engineering—from the plate back through products, value chains and across geographies.</strong></i></p><p>For World Food Day, FAO calls on us to “<a href="https://www.fao.org/world-food-day/about/en" target="_blank" class="Hyperlink SCXW77486855 BCX8" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>innovate today. Nourish tomorrow</u></a>”—pairing forward-looking solutions with traditional knowledge to secure diverse, safe and nutritious diets within planetary boundaries. The timing is telling: weeks earlier, the UN’s 2026 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) <a href="https://doi.org/10.4060/cd8306en" target="_blank" class="Hyperlink SCXW77486855 BCX8" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>report</u></a> showed why that pairing matters. Global hunger has <a href="https://doi.org/10.4060/cd8306en" target="_blank" class="Hyperlink SCXW77486855 BCX8" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>declined for a third consecutive year</u></a>, yet roughly <a href="https://doi.org/10.4060/cd8306en" target="_blank" class="Hyperlink SCXW77486855 BCX8" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>one in three people</u></a> still cannot afford a healthy diet. We are not failing to produce enough food. We are failing to design systems that make a nutritious, sustainable diet the affordable, default option rather than a privilege.</p><p>This is not new. In December 2025, this <a href="https://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/the-relevance-of-food-systems-for-sustainability-transformations/" target="_blank" class="Hyperlink SCXW77486855 BCX8" title="To the Column" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>column</u></a> argued that agricultural policy should move beyond production incentives and place greater emphasis on making sustainable diets accessible. This year’s SOFI report speaks directly to that argument, with evidence of how far current policy sits from that goal—and why reverse engineering offers an answer.</p><p>The central challenge is not only how much food is produced, but whether production translates into diets people can afford and want to eat. That calls for a different starting point, namely instead of beginning with a technology and hoping diets adjust, reverse engineering begins with the desired outcome: a diet that is healthy, sustainable, affordable and culturally appropriate. Then it works backward across products, value chains, geographies.</p><p>At the product level, food must be both nutrient-dense and affordable. The SOFI report identifies a central constraint: animal-source foods, fruits and vegetables account for nearly 70% of the cost of a healthy diet, while starchy staples provide calories cheaply but are insufficient for a diverse diet. Reverse engineering here starts from that gap and works backward. Many cultures and cuisines already rely on <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fnut.2024.1461621" target="_blank" class="Hyperlink SCXW77486855 BCX8" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>fungi, insect and algae sources</u></a> as well as fermented foods that are cheaper and more sustainable than manufactured or animal-sourced proteins. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cdnut.2024.102300" target="_blank" class="Hyperlink SCXW77486855 BCX8" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>Biofortified orange-fleshed sweet potato</u></a> applies the same logic to micronutrients: bred backward from documented vitamin-A deficiency, it could now cut related disease burden by up to 41% across Sub-Saharan Africa.</p><p>The value chain level exacerbates the problem of affordability further. Post-farmgate activities (processing, storage, transport, wholesale) account for 70 to 75% of what consumers pay for food, meaning affordability is decided less on the farm than downstream. Reverse engineering here means tracing how each stage of the value chain affects consumer prices and who bears costs that those prices do not reflect. A<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.70658" target="_blank" class="Hyperlink SCXW77486855 BCX8" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u> 2026 study of East African coffee value chains</u></a> found hidden costs—chiefly the income smallholders are denied—equal to 70-125% of the farm-gate price. True cost accounting can make these costs visible, showing they are often paid for elsewhere, e.g. by public health systems or the environment. The response then depends on where the cost arises: living-income gap calls for producer remuneration; environmental harms require different interventions.</p><p>At the geographic level, the goal shifts from affordability, to resilience: absorbing a shock without prices spiking. Reverse engineering here starts from local ecological capacity and climate risk, then designing backward to climate-resilient crops, circular-economy infrastructure, and trade integration that keep supply—and prices—stable when shocks hit. That is what the <a href="https://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe/publications/hlpe-20" target="_blank" class="Hyperlink SCXW77486855 BCX8" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition</u></a> (HLPE-FSN)—the UN’s science-policy body on food security— calls “bouncing forward” rather than “bouncing back”: redesigning the structure so that shocks no longer result in price spikes. Belo Horizonte, Brazil, built exactly this in launching a <a href="https://www.futurepolicy.org/food-and-water/belo-horizontes-food-security-policy/" target="_blank" class="Hyperlink SCXW77486855 BCX8" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>food security programme</u></a> in 1993 after a national economic crisis sent food prices soaring, replacing crisis response with a structural right-to-food policy with price ceilings and direct farmer-to-consumer sales.</p><p>None of this works if the diet at the starting point is defined for people rather than with them. Diets are shaped by food environments—by what is grown, sold, affordable and visible nearby—and by the fact that, in most of the world, the households targeted as “consumers” of healthier diets are simultaneously the producers within the same system.</p><p>“Innovate today, nourish tomorrow” only delivers if innovation means redesigning the system across all levels together. Reverse engineering food systems—from the diet we actually need, backward through value chains, embedded in unique and specific localities—is slower and less photogenic than announcing a breakthrough. But it is what closes the gap between what we produce and the sustainable, diverse diet that people can afford to eat.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>The Current Column</category><author>Reich, Charlotte / Aiveen Donnelly</author><pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 10:00:00 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/nourishing-tomorrow-engineering-food-systems-backward-from-the-plate/</guid></item><item><title>GenZ Movements and CSOs in Kenya and Madagascar: Friends or Foes?</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/genz-movements-and-csos-in-kenya-and-madagascar-friends-or-foes/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Amid democratic backsliding, Generation Z (GenZ1) protests have emerged as major regime challengers. Yet, social movements do not mobilize in isolation. They draw from and collaborate with a larger ecosystem of civil society organizations (CSOs). This policy brief looks at the cases of Kenya and Madagascar, where GenZ movements and CSOs initially played complementary roles. Yet, in Madagascar, the movement parted ways with CSOs quickly after the protests ended. In Kenya, collaboration prevailed, even though frictions appeared in GenZ groups. The brief concludes that social movements draw their legitimacy from acting autonomously from CSOs, the state and donors. Donor support should focus on pro-democratic CSOs who work complementarily and can translate demands into concrete reform proposals.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Gutheil, Lena</author><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 16:01:54 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/genz-movements-and-csos-in-kenya-and-madagascar-friends-or-foes/</guid></item><item><title>How do governments set the carbon tax rate? A comparative analysis </title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/how-do-governments-set-the-carbon-tax-rate-a-comparative-analysis/</link><description>The paper outlines a taxonomy of criteria that governments can use in setting the tax rate. It provides a comparative analysis of the criteria used in 13 jurisdictions. Empirically driven criteria, i.e. the marginal abatement cost curves (MACC) and the social cost of carbon (SCC), are rarely used.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over 30 national jurisdictions around the world have adopted a carbon tax. The tax rate is one of the key aspects of the design of carbon taxes, determining environmental effectiveness,<br>competitiveness, carbon leakage risks and revenue raised. This article sheds new light on the criteria countries use to set the tax rate in their domestic instruments. To do so, we first outline a taxonomy of criteria that governments can use in setting the tax rate and then provide a comparative analysis of the criteria actually used by 13 jurisdictions to set this rate.<br>We find that empirically driven criteria, such as marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) and the social cost of carbon (SCC), are rarely used to determine the tax rate. Few countries use<br>MACCs to set their carbon tax rate and such use is always combined with other criteria. Overall, carbon tax rates are mostly set based on evaluations that transcend purely empirical estimates. In addition, the Nobel Prize-winning idea of the SCC is not used in any documents published by the countries analysed, despite the fact that it can be adapted to suit political preferences. The common description of carbon taxes as instruments that primarily aim to internalise externalities does not reflect their implementation in practice. A corollary of this finding is that scholarship that criticises carbon taxes for embedding a cost-benefit analysis approach to climate policy simply condemns these instruments for being something they are not. Our analysis also indicates that emulation and competition play an important role in setting the tax rate, as governments copy price levels implemented in other jurisdictions or supranational carbon pricing instruments. This has implications for the design of carbon taxes in the current geopolitical situation, as changes in the tax rate in one jurisdiction may spill over into others.</p><p><strong>Goran Dominioni</strong> is Assistant Professor in Climate Change Law and Policy at the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Discussion Paper</category><author>Dominioni, Goran / Daniele Malerba</author><pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:17:13 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/how-do-governments-set-the-carbon-tax-rate-a-comparative-analysis/</guid></item><item><title>Institutionalization of citizen participation in Africa</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/institutionalization-of-citizen-participation-in-africa/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Citizen participation, in various forms, has long played a part in African societies, with mixed results. In line with recent constitutional/decentralization reforms, Morocco and Kenya have shown political will and institutional commitment to invest more in participation. The chapter analyzes the two countries’ participatory approaches as a political agenda that is closely tied to decentralization politics and therewith to power plays between different stakeholders, including donors. Based on a comparison of the two cases, the chapter examines how the newly introduced spaces enable or disenable citizens to challenge power structures. The chapter finds that, despite positive effects in terms of citizen mobilization and partial accountability, the limited scope and scale of participatory institutions means that the outcomes of the approach are procedural rather than politically transformative. At the same time, the different trajectories of the two countries illustrate the importance of embedding the assessment of each case in the history of participatory practices and local political economy.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Gutheil, Lena / Annabelle Houdret / Sanae Aljem</author><pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 13:08:32 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/institutionalization-of-citizen-participation-in-africa/</guid></item><item><title>The basis, progress, and future of food and bioprocess with artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) techniques</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-basis-progress-and-future-of-food-and-bioprocess-with-artificial-intelligence-ai-and-machine-learning-ml-techniques/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This chapter is an overview of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in food science and bioprocesses. This comprehensive work introduces the subject of AI to new readers, focusing on the important applications and progress of this technology in food science and related areas such as bioprocess. Food science involves examining the biological, chemical, and physical makeup of food, understanding what leads to food spoilage, and grasping the principles behind food processing Bioprocessing on the other hand, is loosely defined as the production of value-added materials to industrial scale from a living source such as living cells. AI has revolutionized many industries, altering operational frameworks to offer innovative solutions to longstanding challenges. This book chapter first provides an overview of the food science and bioprocess industries and comprehensively describes the various AI and ML applications in food science and also emerging applications in the bioprocess development. Limitations of AI are then discussed before concluding with the final section of the chapter, which emphasizes the futuristic perspective of AI and ML in food science and bioprocess development.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Ndondo, Joseph Tendeukai Kunashe / Gamuchirai Trever, Musunda / Faith Angelline Manditsera / Saymore Ngonidzashe Kativu / Philemon Kwaramba</author><pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 10:08:00 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-basis-progress-and-future-of-food-and-bioprocess-with-artificial-intelligence-ai-and-machine-learning-ml-techniques/</guid></item><item><title>African–European Relations (Vol. 22)</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/african-european-relations-6/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After two years of limited high-level exchanges during which Europe and Africa found themselves on different sides of principal geopolitical fault-lines, 2025 brought about a partial reset in EU–Africa relations, centred on pragmatism and investment rather than political convergence. The year carried symbolic weight: it marked a quarter-century since the inaugural Africa–EU summit in Cairo in April 2000. This anniversary added impetus to the convening of the seventh summit between the AU and the EU in Luanda, Angola, on 24 and 25 November. This is not to say that this year strengthened political convergence between the two groupings on the divisive issues of Gaza and Ukraine, or a clear course of action on the ongoing civil war and ethnic cleansing in Sudan. Nor did it see a breakthrough in ongoing disputes on EU policy frameworks such as its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. Yet at the summit, continuing the pattern started at the previous Brussels summit of 2022, signs were visible of a more pragmatic approach to partnering. The preceding AU–EU Business Forum underlined that even though a rights-based agenda and commitments to peace and security still mattered to the partnership, the primary focus was now on promoting investment and economic development. This was in line with the global trend of further aid cuts and an increased focus on business relations. The same dynamics could be seen in the latest Africa strategies and guidelines adopted in Germany and Spain, which, just like the prominent Mattei Plan of Italy, stressed the promotion of mutual (economic) benefits and investment. The abrupt cutting of the USAID budget was in part justified by similar logics, referring to a corrupt and inefficient aid sector and the strength of business partnerships in fostering economic development. Another important highlight concerned the European Commission’s publication of its legislative proposals for the next EU budget covering the period 2028–34. As part of this package, the Commission proposed a budget of € 200 bn for an overarching Global Europe Instrument. The Commission proposed that out of this total budget for the Instrument, there should be € 60.5 bn for cooperation with sub-Saharan Africa, as well as € 42.9 bn for the Middle East and North Africa region, which includes the North African states. However, unlike in the current budget, the funding reserved for Africa is listed as indicative, without legal text guaranteeing them as minimum spend, leaving it more vulnerable to changes in priorities and unforeseen challenges.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Erforth, Benedikt / Niels Keijzer</author><pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 13:44:31 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/african-european-relations-6/</guid></item></channel></rss>
