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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Neueste Publikationen – IDOS</title><link>https://www.idos-research.de/</link><description>Publikationen des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)</description><language>de</language><generator>TYPO3 EXT:news</generator><lastBuildDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2026 09:56:43 +0200</lastBuildDate><item><title>Länderbericht zu Steuervergünstigungen: Schweiz</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/laenderbericht-zu-steuerverguenstigungen-schweiz/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Steuervergünstigungen sind ein zentrales Instrument der Schweizer Steuerpolitik. Obwohl sie sowohl auf Bundes- als auch auf Kantonsebene in breitem Umfang zur Verfolgung wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und ökologischer Ziele eingesetzt werden, sind ihre fiskalischen Kosten, ihre Wirksamkeit und ihre Verteilungsfolgen bislang nur teilweise dokumentiert. Der vorliegende Bericht gibt einen Überblick über den aktuellen Stand der Berichterstattung, Quantifizierung, Evaluierung und Reform von Steuervergünstigungen in der Schweiz.<br>Gemäss den verfügbaren Daten liegen die jährlichen Mindereinnahmen aufgrund von Steuervergünstigungen des Bundes bei mehr als 24 Milliarden Franken. Diese Zahl ist allerdings mit grosser Vorsicht zu interpretieren. Sie beruht auf veralteten und unvollständigen Informationen und dürfte eine Untergrenze der tatsächlichen fiskalischen Kosten der Steuervergünstigungen des Bundes darstellen. Der letzte umfassende Bericht des Bundes zu Steuervergünstigungen wurde 2011 von der Eidgenössischen Steuerverwaltung (ESTV) veröffentlicht, wobei viele der damaligen Schätzungen der Mindereinnahmen ihrerseits aus einer noch älteren Studie der ESTV von 2009 stammten, die auf Steuerdaten des Kantons Bern beruhte und auf die übrige Schweiz hochgerechnet wurde. Das Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft hat in seinem Bericht «Staatlicher Fussabdruck» von 2021 eine Kombination aus aggregierten Schätzungen und Zahlen für einzelne Vergünstigungen für das Jahr 2019 publiziert. Die Zahlen enthalten neue Angaben für einige Steuervergünstigungen, namentlich im Bereich der Mineralölsteuer und weiterer Verbrauchssteuern sowie der Automobilsteuer und der Nationalstrassenabgabe. Der grösste Teil der Daten beruht jedoch auf den 2011 veröffentlichten Angaben. Der Bericht beziffert die gesamten jährlichen Mindereinnahmen aufgrund von Steuervergünstigungen auf über 24 Milliarden Franken.<br>Die Studie von 2011 beinhaltet eine detaillierte Erörterung des Referenzsystems, das der Klassierung von Steuervergünstigungen in der Schweiz zugrunde liegt. Die Definition dieser Benchmark ist in Bezug auf Steuervergünstigungen von zentraler Bedeutung, da diese als Abweichung von einem Referenzsystem definiert sind. Interessanterweise – und im Gegensatz zu den meisten Ländern weltweit, die sich in erster Linie auf bestehende Rechtsvorschriften stützen – wird das Referenzsystem für direkte Steuern in der Schweiz auf der Grundlage von zwei theoretisch fundierten Benchmarks definiert: einem einkommensbasierten und einem alternativen konsumorientierten Referenzsystem.<br>Der Mangel an verlässlichen und aktuellen Informationen ist angesichts des rechtlichen Rahmens für direkte Subventionen und Steuervergünstigungen besonders problematisch. Artikel 7 des Bundesgesetzes über Finanzhilfen und Abgeltungen (Subventionsgesetz, SuG) hält fest, dass auf Finanzhilfen in Form von steuerlichen Vergünstigungen in der Regel verzichtet werden sollte. In seiner Botschaft von 1986 warnte der Bundesrat ausdrücklich davor, dass Steuervergünstigungen die Steuergerechtigkeit untergraben, die demokratische Kontrolle einschränken und sich einer systematischen Überprüfung entziehen können, weil ihre finanziellen Auswirkungen oft schwer zu quantifizieren sind. In diesem Kontext verpflichtet Artikel 5 SuG den Bund, im Rahmen der periodischen Prüfungen von Subventionen alle sechs Jahre über Steuervergünstigungen zu berichten. Diese Vorgabe bleibt unerfüllt. Der Bundesrat, das Parlament und die Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle (EFK) haben wiederholt auf diese Problematik hingewiesen. Dessen ungeachtet wurde bislang kein Rahmen für eine regelmässige und institutionalisierte Berichterstattung geschaffen.<br>Die aktuelle Schätzung von über 24 Milliarden Franken erfasst nur die Steuervergünstigungen auf Bundesebene, nicht aber die fiskalischen Kosten der kantonalen Steuervergünstigungen. Auf subnationaler Ebene ist die Berichterstattung noch begrenzter als beim Bund: Es liegen nur zwei nennenswerte Schätzungen vor – eine Studie der ESTV von 2011 zu einkommensteuerbezogenen Steuervergünstigungen im Kanton Zug sowie eine 2025 vom Kanton Zürich veröffentlichte Untersuchung der Steuervergünstigungen, ebenfalls mit Fokus auf die Einkommensteuer. Kein Kanton verfügt über einen institutionellen Rahmen für eine regelmässige Berichterstattung zu Steuervergünstigungen. Darüber hinaus liegen weder auf Bundes- noch auf Kantonsebene Schätzungen zu Steuervergünstigungen bei der Gewinnsteuer vor, obwohl steuerliche Anreize in diesem Bereich immer wichtiger werden.<br>Die begrenzten verfügbaren Daten von 2011 deuten darauf hin, dass die Steuervergünstigungen des Bundes stark konzentriert sind. 16,1 Milliarden Franken – rund 63 Prozent der insgesamt ausgewiesenen Mindereinnahmen des Bundes – entfallen auf die zehn grössten Vergünstigungen. Die grösste Einzelvergünstigung ist der Einkommensteuerabzug für die obligatorischen Beiträge an die zweite Säule der Alterssicherung (Pensionskasse), der auf jährlich 3,5 Milliarden Franken geschätzt wird. Weitere bedeutende Vergünstigungen sind der reduzierte Mehrwertsteuersatz auf Nahrungsmittel, Pflanzen und Druckerzeugnisse (2,2 Milliarden Franken), die Mehrwertsteuerbefreiung für Verkauf und Vermietung von Immobilien (2,0 Milliarden Franken) sowie die Mehrwertsteuerbefreiung für Dienstleistungen im Gesundheits- und Sozialwesen (1,9 Milliarden Franken).<br>Der Mangel an belastbaren Informationen beeinträchtigt nicht nur die Transparenz, sondern auch die Evaluierung der Wirksamkeit von Steuervergünstigungen. Die Schweiz liegt in diesem Bereich deutlich hinter internationalen Standards zurück. Es gibt derzeit keinen formellen Rahmen für die Evaluierung von Steuervergünstigungen mit Leitlinien für Ex-ante-Beurteilungen, Ex-post-Evaluierungen, Governance und Datenaustausch. Für politische Entscheidungen fehlt damit häufig die nötige Evidenz, um zu beurteilen, ob Steuervergünstigungen ein angemessenes Kosten-Nutzen-Verhältnis aufweisen und die angestrebten Ziele erreichen – oder ob sie unwirksam bzw. zu teuer sind und unbeabsichtigte verteilungspolitische und wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen mit sich bringen. Die Kombination aus schwacher Berichterstattungspraxis und beschränktem Zugang zu administrativen Steuerdaten hat zu einem bemerkenswerten Mangel an offiziellen Ex-post-Evaluierungen beigetragen.<br>Etwas ermutigender ist die Situation bei den Ex-ante-Beurteilungen. Bundesbehörden erstellen regelmässig Ad-hoc-Analysen zur Beantwortung parlamentarischer Anfragen und im Hinblick auf Gesetzesinitiativen. Diese Analysen liefern wertvolle Informationen über die erwarteten fiskalischen und wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen vorgeschlagener Reformen der Steuervergünstigungen und spielen eine wichtige Rolle für die politische Debatte.<br>Steuervergünstigungen stehen in der politischen Debatte und auf der Reformagenda weiterhin weit oben. In den vergangenen Jahren gab es zahlreiche Gesetzesinitiativen zu reduzierten Mehrwertsteuersätzen, Abzügen bei der Einkommensteuer, Befreiungen von der Erbschafts- und Schenkungssteuer sowie Anreizen bei der Gewinnsteuer. Beispiele sind die Verlängerung des Sondersatzes der Mehrwertsteuer für Beherbergungsleistungen bis 2035 (vom Nationalrat soeben abgelehnt, nun beim Ständerat), wiederholte Debatten über die Abzugsfähigkeit von Kinderbetreuungskosten und Beiträgen an die Säule 3a sowie Diskussionen über kantonale Befreiungen von der Erbschafts- und Schenkungssteuer. Im Bereich der Gewinnsteuer veranschaulicht die Einführung von Patent-boxen und Sonderabzügen für Forschung und Entwicklung auf Kantonsebene die Dynamik zu Steuervergünstigungen über verschiedene Staatsebenen hinweg – in diesem Fall ausgelöst durch das Bundesgesetz über die Steuerreform und die AHV-Finanzierung (STAF).</p><p><strong>Peter Hongler</strong> ist Professor für Steuerrecht an der Universität St. Gallen.&nbsp;<br><strong>Agustin Redonda </strong>ist Senior Fellow beim Council on Economic Policies (CEP). Er ist Mitbegründer und Co-Direktor des Tax Expenditures Lab, das die Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED) und den Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index (GTETI) publiziert.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Book Publications</category><author>Hongler, Peter / Agustin Redonda</author><pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2026 09:56:43 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/laenderbericht-zu-steuerverguenstigungen-schweiz/</guid></item><item><title>Tax expenditures country report: Switzerland</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/tax-expenditures-country-report-switzerland/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Tax expenditures (TEs) constitute a key instrument in Swiss fiscal policy. Although they are widely used at both the federal and cantonal levels to pursue economic, social, and environmental objectives, their fiscal cost, effectiveness, and distributional consequences remain only partially documented. This report reviews the current state of TE reporting, estimation, evaluation, and reform in Switzerland.<br>The available evidence suggests that annual revenue forgone from federal TEs amounts to more than CHF 24 billion. However, this figure should be interpreted with great caution. It is based on outdated and incomplete information and likely represents a lower-bound estimate of the true fiscal cost of federal TEs. The latest comprehensive federal TE report was published by the Federal Tax Administration (FTA) in 2011, while many of the underlying revenue forgone estimates were themselves derived from an even older study conducted by the FTA in 2009 using tax return data from the canton of Bern and extrapolated to the rest of the country. More recently, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) published a combination of aggregate and provision-level estimates for 2019 in its 2021 report on the “State Footprint”. The figures included new estimates for some TE provisions, namely for TE granted through the mineral oil tax and further excise taxes as well as the vehicle tax and the national road tax. Yet, most of the data was based on the estimates published in 2011. The report estimated the overall yearly revenue forgone stemming from the use of TEs at more than CHF 24 billion.<br>The 2011 report provides a detailed discussion of the benchmark classification of TE provisions used in Switzerland. The definition of the benchmark tax system is key for TE policy-making as TEs are defined as deviations from the reference or benchmark tax system. Interestingly, and unlike most of the countries worldwide that rely primarily on existing legislation, the benchmark tax system (BTS) for direct taxes in Switzerland is defined based on two theoretically grounded benchmarks: one based on income and an alternative one based consumption.<br>The lack of reliable and up-to-date information is particularly concerning given the legal framework governing subsidies and TEs. Article 7(g) of the Federal Act on Financial Aids and Compensation Payments (Subsidies Act, SubA) establishes that, in principle, the use of TEs should be avoided. In its 1986 dispatch, the Federal Council explicitly warned that TEs can undermine tax equity, reduce democratic oversight, and escape systematic scrutiny because their fiscal implications are often difficult to quantify. On this note, Article 5 of the SubA requires the federal government to report on TEs every six years as part of its broader subsidy reporting obligations. This requirement has not been fulfilled. The issue has been repeatedly noted by the Federal Council, Parliament, and the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) and yet, a regular and institutionalized reporting framework has still not been established.<br>The current estimate of more than CHF 24 billion in TEs on the federal level does not account for the fiscal cost of cantonal TEs. Indeed, at the subnational level, reporting is even more limited with only two significant estimation exercises: a 2011 study conducted by the FTA on personal income-related TEs in the canton of Zug, and a 2025 review of personal income tax (PIT) related TEs published by the canton of Zürich. No canton has established a recurring TE reporting framework. Furthermore, no federal or cantonal estimation exercise currently provides estimates of TEs granted through corporate income tax (CIT), despite the growing importance of tax incentives in the CIT system.<br>Based on the limited available data from 2011, one can observe that the composition of Swiss TEs is highly concentrated. The ten largest federal provisions account for approximately CHF 16.1 billion, or roughly 63 percent of total reported federal revenue forgone. The largest single provision is the deduction for mandatory second-pillar pension contributions under PIT, estimated at CHF 3.5 billion annually. Other major provisions include the reduced VAT rate on food, plants, and printed products (CHF 2.2 billion), VAT exemptions for real estate transactions and rentals (CHF 2.0 billion), and VAT exemptions for social and health services (CHF 1.9 billion).&nbsp;<br>Beyond transparency concerns, the absence of robust information undermines the evaluation of TE effectiveness. Switzerland lags significantly behind international standards in this area. There is currently no formal TE evaluation framework providing guidance on ex-ante assessments, ex post evaluations, governance arrangements, or data-sharing procedures. As a result, policymakers often lack the evidence necessary to determine whether TEs represent value for money and achieve their intended objectives; or are ineffective, too costly or generate unintended distributional and economic effects. The combination of weak reporting practices and limited access to administrative tax data has contributed to a striking lack of official ex-post evaluations.<br>The situation is somewhat more encouraging regarding ex ante assessments. Federal institutions regularly prepare ad hoc analyses in response to parliamentary requests and legislative initiatives. These assessments frequently provide valuable information on the expected fiscal and economic effects of proposed TE reforms and play an important role in informing political debate.&nbsp;<br>TEs remain high-up in the political debate and reform agendas. Recent years have seen numerous legislative initiatives involving reduced VAT rates, PIT deductions, inheritance and gift tax exemptions, and CIT incentives. Examples include the extension of the lower VAT rate for accommodation services until 2035 (just voted down by the National Council and now with the Council of States), repeated debates on the deductibility of childcare expenses and Pillar 3a contributions, and discussions surrounding cantonal inheritance and gift tax exemptions. In the CIT field, the introduction of patent boxes and research and development (R&amp;D) super-deductions at the cantonal level illustrates the dynamics of TE policy-making involving different tiers of government as this has been triggered by the Federal Act on Tax Reform and AHV Financing (TRAF).</p><p><strong>Peter Hongler</strong> is a professor of tax law at the University of St. Gallen.&nbsp;<br><strong>Agustin Redonda</strong> is a Senior Fellow with the Council on Economic Policies (CEP), where he leads CEP’s work on<br>tax expenditures and tax incentives. He is also the co-founder and co-director of the Tax Expenditures Lab, which<br>hosts the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED) and the Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index (GTETI).<br>&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Book Publications</category><author>Hongler, Peter / Agustin Redonda</author><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 11:15:24 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/tax-expenditures-country-report-switzerland/</guid></item><item><title>Women’s employment and the green transition in Rwanda’s urban construction sector: insights from firm-level data</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/womens-employment-and-the-green-transition-in-rwandas-urban-construction-sector-insights-from-firm-level-data/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This study examines the relationship between the green transition and female employment in Rwanda’s construction sector, influenced by sustainability policies such as the Green Building Code. Using a firm-level survey conducted in Kigali in 2024, we analyze data from 545 firms across the construction value chain, employing a Green Index to quantify firms’ sustainability practices. The empirical analysis relies on OLS IV estimation to address potential endogeneity concerns. Our findings indicate a positive association between green practices and female employment shares, particularly in permanent roles, suggesting that sustainability-driven transformations can contribute to more equitable labor market outcomes. The study further highlights sectoral heterogeneity, with supplier and construction firms showing the strongest employment gains for women. Government initiatives enhance these effects, highlighting the importance of coherent policy frameworks. However, the role of managerial attitudes remains unclear, indicating a need for further research on organizational dynamics. The analysis also highlights disparities in access to green training, with female-managed firms less likely to receive training, potentially limiting their ability to benefit from green transitions. These findings provide insights for policymakers aiming to align green transition policies with gender-inclusive economic development in Rwanda and the broader context of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Stöcker, Alexander / Babette Never / Aime Tsinda / Eric Mujanama / Roger Mugisha</author><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 09:42:33 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/womens-employment-and-the-green-transition-in-rwandas-urban-construction-sector-insights-from-firm-level-data/</guid></item><item><title>Three implications of the oil shock for the turbulent political economy of development cooperation</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/three-implications-of-the-oil-shock-for-the-turbulent-political-economy-of-development-cooperation-1/</link><description>The 2026 US–Israel–Iran war has produced what the International Energy Agency describes as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Brent crude rose from around $70 at the end of February to a peak of about $140 in early April before settling around $100 as of early June 2026. In a new Brief Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel argue that the significance of the oil shock lies not only in the price increase itself but in its timing. </description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The 2026 US–Israel–Iran war has produced what the International Energy Agency describes as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Brent crude rose from around $70 at the end of February to a peak of about $140 in early April before settling around $100 as of early June 2026. In a new Brief Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel argue that the significance of the oil shock lies not only in the price increase itself but in its timing.&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Sumner, Andy / Stephan Klingebiel</author><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 13:40:36 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/three-implications-of-the-oil-shock-for-the-turbulent-political-economy-of-development-cooperation-1/</guid></item><item><title>Three implications of the oil shock for the turbulent political economy of development cooperation</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/three-implications-of-the-oil-shock-for-the-turbulent-political-economy-of-development-cooperation/</link><description>The 2026 US–Israel–Iran war has produced what the International Energy Agency describes as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Brent crude rose from around $70 at the end of February to a peak of about $140 in early April before settling around $100 as of early June 2026. In a new Brief we argue that the significance of the oil shock lies not only in the price increase itself but in its timing.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The 2026 US–Israel–Iran war has produced what the International Energy Agency describes as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Brent crude rose from around $70 at the end of February to a peak of about $140 in early April before settling around $100 as of early June 2026. In a new Brief we argue that the significance of the oil shock lies not only in the price increase itself but in its timing.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Sumner, Andy / Stephan Klingebiel</author><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 09:17:34 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/three-implications-of-the-oil-shock-for-the-turbulent-political-economy-of-development-cooperation/</guid></item><item><title>Social contracts and environmental change: conceptualizing interdependencies</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/social-contracts-and-environmental-change-conceptualizing-interdependencies/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Environmental change can affect social contracts, which are the relationships between societal groups and between such groups and the state. Droughts, river pollution and rising sea levels often change the distribution of resources within countries or harm some societal groups more than others, raising questions about compensation. Social contracts can also trigger environmental change, mainly because the environment and future generations cannot themselves participate in social contract negotiations. Many social contracts allow influential elites to overuse or pollute natural resources, harming the environment, other societal groups and future generations. Drawing on existing social contract and environmental governance research, this introductory article develops a conceptual approach for analyzing the bidirectional effects between the environment and the relations between different parts of society and the state. It presents different types of interaction using multiple examples. This approach helps to identify starting points for the negotiation of more sustainable and inclusive social contracts.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Dombrowsky, Ines / Annabelle Houdret / Markus Loewe / Tobias Zumbraegel</author><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 09:23:35 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/social-contracts-and-environmental-change-conceptualizing-interdependencies/</guid></item><item><title>Operationalizing social contracts: a new measurement of government deliverables</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/operationalizing-social-contracts-a-new-measurement-of-government-deliverables/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The international development debate is increasingly referring to the notion of the “social contract”. In this paper, we measure what governments give societies, a core element of social contracts. To enable social contract comparison across countries and over time, we develop indices to capture the three “Ps”: <i>protection</i> against internal and external threats, <i>provision</i> of social and economic services, and political <i>participation</i>. These indices are composed of indicators, which are mainly input variables to gauge the willingness of governments to deliver the three Ps. Subsequently, we calculate the values of 154 countries for the three indices around the year 2019. The results show that the indices are useful and valid. They highly correlate with each other and with other indicators such as per capita income and the Human Development Index. Yet, these correlations are not perfect, meaning that the indices are not another redundant development index. They add information and value. Finally, we make a first step in identifying patterns in the results. Countries in Latin America were doing comparatively well on average in terms of political <i>participation</i> in 2019. When controlling for per capita income, governments in sub-Saharan Africa, were delivering disproportionately more on average in terms of <i>protection</i> and political <i>participation</i>, but less so in terms of <i>provision</i>. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa fail mainly with regard to political <i>participation</i>.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Loewe, Markus / Amirah El-Haddad / Tina Zintl</author><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 13:46:06 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/operationalizing-social-contracts-a-new-measurement-of-government-deliverables/</guid></item><item><title>Pastoralism for Sustainable Development: Recognise, Respect, Restore</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/pastoralism-for-sustainable-development-recognise-respect-restore/</link><description>Given its contributions to food security, biodiversity conservation, climate protection, and rural development, this recognition is overdue.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Bonn, 15 June 2026.</strong> This year’s annual World Desertification and Drought Day on June 17 falls within the International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists. This is a good occasion to draw attention to the crucial role of pastoral management of rangelands for sustainable (rural) development.</p><p>The annually celebrated World Desertification and Drought Day on 17 June 2026 falls into the International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists. This is an occasion to remind that pastoralism is an important element of global land use and that sustainable pastoralism must be promoted to enhance global (rural) sustainable development. Pastoralism means that livestock is not (only) kept on a permanent farm but part of the year and/or part of the herds roams in the landscape in search of fodder (grass).</p><p>The International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists is guided by the motto “Recognize, Respect, and Restore.” The first step – recognize – is to make the importance of pastoralism more visible. Given its contributions to food security, biodiversity conservation, climate protection, and rural development, this recognition is long overdue. In fact, permanent natural grasslands (grass is the typical vegetation cover of rangelands), covering more than 3.2 billion hectares, are the second-largest vegetation type on Earth after forests and occupy roughly twice as much land as cropland. Globally, between 200 and 500 million people, depending on the definition used, rely on pastoralism for their livelihoods. Pastoralists make a substantial contribution to global meat production; in addition, they provide milk, hides, manure, and other products. In some African countries, such as Somalia, pastoralism even forms the backbone of the economy. In many regions, rangelands also provide the foundation for tourism and recreation.</p><p>However, the importance of rangelands extends far beyond their economic function. Natural grasslands store large amounts of carbon, protect soils from erosion, regulate water cycles, and support high levels of biodiversity. Depending on the way they are used, these functions can be maintained and even enhanced or seriously deteriorated. Sustainable pastoralism follows the available vegetation in the landscape, avoids overgrazing, allowing vegetation, including the scarce trees, to recover. Animals trample grass into the soil, thereby increasing soil organic carbon. In contrast, unsustainable pastoralism exists if herds are overstocked, overgrazing leading to vegetation degeneration up to bare soils. This makes the land prone to wind and water erosion, sand and dust storms and losing its carbon storage function.</p><p>The second step - respect - aims to preserve the achievements and potential of pastoralism. This, however, should also clearly see the challenges. In traditional pastoralist systems vegetation availability and herd density roughly corresponded, including through losses of (parts of) the herds in times of droughts. In modern times, this balance can be challenged in multiple ways. For instance, loss of parts of the grazing/ecosystem e.g. to agriculture can deprive pastoralists of important sources of permanent, seasonal or reserve grazing areas. Infrastructure and border controls may cut the movement of herds. Creation of fenced ranches and compartmentalisation of rangelands for more intensive grazing can increase the carrying capacity in the short run but also deteriorate or change the ecosystems, depending on rainfall patterns, vegetation and management system.</p><p>The third step - restoration - focuses on correcting developments that have weakened rangelands and pastoralist livelihoods. Important measures include greater tolerance and active support for the mobility of livestock herds, effective protection of animals, and the restoration of floodplains or peatlands that can be used for variable grazing. Livestock migration corridors must be maintained, restored, and legally protected. The expansion of irrigated agriculture or large-scale ranching operations must be regulated in a way to respect the interests of pastoralists. Improvements in animal health, marketing systems, and infrastructure can increase incomes and can be combined with measures to prevent overgrazing. Investments in animal health can also reduce both the risk and fear of disease transmission and epidemics, thereby facilitating herd mobility.&nbsp;</p><p>Nevertheless, the long-term trend toward sedentarisation is unlikely to be completely stopped or even reversed. Many pastoralists themselves choose settled lifestyles because these offer better access to education, healthcare, and additional sources of income. Population growth and climate change also place limits on pastoral systems. These moving factors make balanced and location-specific consideration of competing interests all the more important.</p><p>Despite its importance, pastoralism often receives little attention in politics. A prerequisite for more attention is the stronger involvement of pastoralists in decision-making processes. Their representative organisations must be strengthened, and their participation rights institutionally embedded. If this can be achieved, many of the goals embodied in “Recognize, Respect, and Restore” will follow. Developed countries can do more in their own countries in (some of) these regards, as well as encourage and support their partner countries to do the same. According to the broad spectrum of issues, potential entry points are numerous: In policy dialogue and project planning on rural areas, human rights of indigenous people, environmental protection, economic development, peace and security, poverty and food security.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>The Current Column</category><author>Brüntrup, Michael</author><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 10:51:27 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/pastoralism-for-sustainable-development-recognise-respect-restore/</guid></item><item><title>National policy coherence counts for reducing inequality in Global climate and development agendas</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/national-policy-coherence-counts-for-reducing-inequality-in-global-climate-and-development-agendas/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>International institutions promote policy coherence as crucial to the effective and fair implementation of global sustainability agendas, though the evidence for its benefits is slim. We present here the first systematic cross-country dataset on the consequences of national government efforts to promote policy coherence for vulnerable groups in society. We confirm that coherence is perceived to be beneficial for most groups. However, we find vulnerable groups are largely perceived to bear the brunt of incoherence, while traditionally powerful groups benefit from it in some cases. Based on these findings, we argue that coherence can play an important role in reducing inequality and ensuring countries “Leave No One Behind” in implementing climate and development goals.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Browne, Katherine / Adis Dzebo / Zoha Shawoo / Mario Cardenas / Pierrick Chalaye / Alexia Faus Onbargi / Cassilde Muhoza / Patricia Nicdao / Nokwethaba Makhanya / Navam Niles / Priyatma Singh</author><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 10:03:15 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/national-policy-coherence-counts-for-reducing-inequality-in-global-climate-and-development-agendas/</guid></item><item><title>A 12-target global framework for measuring drought resilience: insights from a multi-country review</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/a-12-target-global-framework-for-measuring-drought-resilience-insights-from-a-multi-country-review/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Droughts are slow-onset disasters with severe environmental, economic, and social consequences, disproportionately affecting regions with limited resources and institutional capacity, which is further exacerbated by climate change and land use change. Key challenges to effective drought resilience include socioeconomic disparities, fragmented policies, financial constraints, and governance weaknesses. To address these gaps, this study develops indicators for assessing drought preparedness and resilience across different economic contexts. A review of 16 national drought and water policies produced a framework comprising 12 global targets, 45 sub-targets, and 129 indicators aligned with existing international frameworks. Indicators are organized into four thematic focus areas: (i) Fundamental Needs &amp; Agricultural Resilience, (ii) Proactive Monitoring &amp; Crisis Response, (iii) Ecosystem &amp; Resource Sustainability, and (iv) Institutional Strengthening &amp; Financial Resilience. The framework is designed to standardize best practices, improve cooperation, and guide resilience-building across diverse contexts while distilling shared dimensions of preparedness and resilience. The analysis emphasizes the role of SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound) indicators in proactive drought management, where governance, leadership, and evidence-based policymaking are as critical as financial and technological resources. It recommends flexible measurement tools and institutionalized assessment mechanisms to track progress and refine strategies, enabling a shift from reactive crisis response to long-term resilience, strengthening accountability and enhancing global drought preparedness.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Sarma, Monalicha / Michael Brüntrup</author><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 09:14:40 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/a-12-target-global-framework-for-measuring-drought-resilience-insights-from-a-multi-country-review/</guid></item><item><title>Understanding loss and damage in West African climate policies: a comparative analysis of national approaches in five countries</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/understanding-loss-and-damage-in-west-african-climate-policies-a-comparative-analysis-of-national-approaches-in-five-countries/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Climate-induced Loss and Damage (L&amp;D) is becoming a defining challenge for global climate governance, especially in West Africa, where adaptation limits are increasingly surpassed. Yet, the literature has largely overlooked how national governments in Africa conceptualize, operationalize, and govern L&amp;D. Existing studies tend to focus on international finance debates or localized impacts, leaving a gap in understanding the national policy frameworks shaping L&amp;D responses. This paper addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of five West African countries, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, structured around four thematic dimensions: conceptual clarity, scope and depth of losses, policy integration, and institutional readiness.<br>Drawing on more than 60 official policy documents, including National Adaptation Plans, disaster frameworks, and climate legislation, the study applies an interpretive scoring framework and proposes a three-stage typology of L&amp;D policy engagement (Nascent, Emerging, Integrated). The results show that Senegal and Ghana fall into the Emerging category, with partial recognition of L&amp;D concepts but limited institutionalization in formal policy architecture. Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone remain Nascent, where L&amp;D is either subsumed under adaptation and humanitarian action or only referenced anecdotally. No country has yet reached the Integrated stage. Across all five cases, economic losses in agriculture and infrastructure are frequently reported, while non-economic losses such as displacement, cultural erosion, and psychological harm remain weakly specified. Institutional arrangements for L&amp;D are fragmented in national frameworks, suggesting uneven preparedness for engagement with emerging international L&amp;D governance mechanisms, including the Santiago Network and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage.<br>The findings suggest that the absence of formal L&amp;D strategies in many national policy documents may limit the visibility of irreversible climate impacts and complicate future claims-making in international arenas. By advancing a systematic baseline of how L&amp;D is framed in national policies and introducing a heuristic typology for cross-country comparison, this study contributes conceptually, empirically, and policy-relevantly to debates on climate justice and the evolving governance of L&amp;D in the Global South.<br>Key policy insights:<br>- Non-economic losses remain under-recognized in national climate policies, limiting justice-oriented approaches to L&amp;D governance.<br>- Stronger integration of L&amp;D across adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and development planning is needed to improve policy coherence and institutional coordination.<br>- Establishing dedicated L&amp;D focal points, clearer institutional mandates, and links to existing risk-financing instruments could strengthen national engagement with emerging global L&amp;D mechanisms.<br>- Embedding L&amp;D more explicitly within NDCs, NAPs, and related reporting frameworks could improve strategic positioning within the FRLD and Santiago Network processes.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Okunola, Olasunkanmi Habeeb / Susan S. Ekoh</author><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 12:46:16 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/understanding-loss-and-damage-in-west-african-climate-policies-a-comparative-analysis-of-national-approaches-in-five-countries/</guid></item><item><title>The risks of climate-nature silos: why we need alignment and integration between environmental agendas</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-risks-of-climate-nature-silos-why-we-need-alignment-and-integration-between-environmental-agendas/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This report makes a simple case: because the environmental crises we face are intertwined, our responses to them must be integrated. The predominant policy framing of these crises through the lenses of a suite of climate, biodiversity and land or ocean metrics currently obscures the reality of a single nature-climate system that critically determines human wellbeing; the challenge for humanity is to manage this complex system in ways that reduce overall risks. Addressing one crisis within that system (be it climate change,<br>biodiversity loss or land degradation) won’t stop the others, while addressing them in isolation is both perilous and inefficient.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Pettoreli, Nathalie et al. </author><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 14:08:04 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-risks-of-climate-nature-silos-why-we-need-alignment-and-integration-between-environmental-agendas/</guid></item><item><title>Who gets a seat at the table? Bonn&#039;s climate talks have a visa problem</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/who-gets-a-seat-at-the-table-bonns-climate-talks-have-a-visa-problem/</link><description>Germany&#039;s consulates must not become the first barrier to legitimate global governance</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bonn, 08 June 2026. <strong>Every year, the world's climate negotiators gather in Bonn. Every year, visa barriers exclude Global South delegates — undermining Germany's commitment to inclusive multilateralism.</strong></p><p>Today, the 64th session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) opens at Bonn's World Conference Center. Over 5,000 delegates, government negotiators, and civil society representatives gather here to prepare COP31, taking place later this year in Turkey. The Subsidiary Bodies are the engine room of global climate diplomacy, where technical groundwork is laid, positions are negotiated, and coalitions are built. Both, party delegates and non-party stakeholders are formally welcome – but participants from the Global South face a range of obstacles to participation: accreditation, travel costs, accommodation, and visas. The latter is distinct as it could be addressed directly by Germany as permanent UNFCCC host.</p><p>Visa barriers to Global South participation in climate meetings are neither new nor unique to Germany. As far back as 2008,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.iied.org/european-visa-obstacles-exclude-many-un-climate-talks" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">IIED raised concerns</a> about the exclusion of delegates from least developed countries from UN climate negotiations in Europe due to visa delays. For the Bonn sessions SB60 in 2024, 223 delegates from Africa and Asia&nbsp;<a href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2024/06/14/visa-chaos-for-developing-country-delegates-mars-bonn-climate-talks/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">were documented</a> to experience difficulties of getting visas in time or at all: 25&nbsp;<a href="https://www.fr.de/politik/klimakonferenz-in-bonn-aktive-aus-globalem-sueden-erhalten-oft-kein-visum-93778022.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">were&nbsp;denied outright</a>, 167 applications were left unprocessed and 37 receiving visas delayed – leaving countries including Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Morocco, and Rwanda&nbsp;<a href="https://www.africanewsanalysis.com/africanewsanalysis-exclusive-interview-with-proscovier-vikman-uganda-country-envoy-at-the-climate-change-conference-in-bonn-germany/28/07/31/09/06/2024/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">without a single representative</a> in the opening days. In 2025,&nbsp;<a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1d4q2gS_UT5pL62AFsh3MsYld6zXdHFJno5u_c9KWo-I/edit?tab=t.0" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">reported cases</a> had risen to 298. The recurring reasons include refused appointments, requirements to apply in distant third countries, and denials citing alleged doubts about return intentions. Frustration about this has been voiced frequently, by delegates in the closing plenary of the Bonn sessions or, in a less diplomatic tone by the civil society network&nbsp;<a href="https://climatenetwork.org/resource/eco-6-sb60/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">CAN, calling on Germany to “end its visa war on African Delegates”</a>.&nbsp;</p><p>Behind these figures are people with formal accreditation, a concrete work plan, and often full funding, who are still unable to attend. As a young delegate from Asia described: "Definitely visa challenges are one of the biggest barriers I have. Coming from the Global South, we have to spend like two to three months just running to the embassy for a visa, requesting it, appealing again and again. Many of my colleagues didn't get the visa, even they had full funding, even a complete plan on how we were going to work together — <a href="https://www.snis.ch/projects-details/2024-de-pryck/r/A5oa5zt7DKhtuR" target="_blank" title="Opens a" rel="noreferrer">they were not able to be here</a>." This is not an individual misfortune. It is a structural barrier that excludes precisely those voices, negotiators from the least developed countries, young activists, and frontline community representatives, whose presence is critical to the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2019.1596023" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">legitimacy of the multilateral climate process</a>.</p><p>The argument that visa barriers are administratively unavoidable does not hold. Host countries of recent COPs in the UAE, Azerbaijan, and Brazil all introduced dedicated fast-track procedures for accredited UNFCCC participants. Crucially, so have Schengen member states.&nbsp;<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/810/oj/eng" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Article 25(1) of the Schengen Visa Code</a> explicitly permits member states to issue visas where "international obligations" require it.&nbsp;<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20151102073237/http:/www.cop21.gouv.fr/fr/espace-medias/salle-de-presse/visas-un-dispositif-mis-en-place-chaque-cop" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">For COP21 in Paris</a>, France used this provision to grant accredited participants short-stay visas upon presenting their accreditation letter alone, exempt from standard supporting documents.&nbsp;<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220808080838/https:/www.miteco.gob.es/en/cop25/delegados/visados.aspx" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">For COP25,</a> within barely four weeks of notice, Spain issued centralised instructions to all 182 of its consulates worldwide to guarantee a speedy procedure and negotiated agreements with other Schengen states for countries without Spanish representation.</p><p>Before the 2026 SB64, over 80 signatories, ranging from Amnesty International to the Zimbabwe People's Land Rights Movement, reminded Germany as home to the Bonn sessions in an&nbsp;<a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1d4q2gS_UT5pL62AFsh3MsYld6zXdHFJno5u_c9KWo-I/edit?tab=t.0" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">open letter</a> that the&nbsp;credibility of multilateral processes rests on who is in the room. Inclusive multilateralism is not only a matter of what is negotiated — it is a matter of who gets to negotiate. Germany, as host of the UNFCCC Secretariat, UNDP and UN Women and as an aspiring UN Security Council member, carries a particular responsibility to ensure that its consulates do not become the first barrier to legitimate global governance - and to the trust of the partners it depends on. The solutions exist. The precedents exist. What seems to be missing is the political will to act.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>The Current Column</category><author>Wagner, Niklas</author><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 10:00:00 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/who-gets-a-seat-at-the-table-bonns-climate-talks-have-a-visa-problem/</guid></item><item><title>Social protection is essential to tackle poverty, hunger and inequality</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/social-protection-is-essential-to-tackle-poverty-hunger-and-inequality/</link><description>Development cooperation should continue supporting all low-income countries in establishing reliable social protection schemes.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bonn, 3 June 2026. <strong>Poverty and inequality are increasing in many countries. Investing in social protection may be the only way out.</strong></p><p>Over the last decades, the share of world population living in <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/september-2025-global-poverty-update-from-the-world-bank--new-da" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">extreme poverty has been declining</a>, except in the period just after the Covid-19 pandemic. However, in recent years <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/end-progress-extreme-poverty" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">the absolute number of people in poverty has slightly increased and is expected to rise</a> even more after 2030. This is due to various factors, including the increased number of conflicts and extreme weather events and the stagnation of economies. At the same time, <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/income-growth-of-the-poor-matters-for-reducing-global-income-ine" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">inequality</a> and the <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-projects-food-insecurity-could-reach-record-levels-result-middle-east-escalation" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">number of people suffering from hunger</a> remain high at the global level and are even increasing in many countries.</p><p>These worrisome predictions call for renewed efforts in the fight against poverty, hunger and inequality. It is therefore very welcome that Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation (BMZ) has maintained the eradication of poverty, hunger and inequality as the first of four goals in its recent reform plan. It is less clear, though, what instruments will be used to achieve this goal. This will be impossible without social protection, which includes contributory schemes like social insurance and non-contributory programmes like cash transfers or cash-for-work. The experience of countries around the world shows that social protection systems are crucial for combating poverty, hunger and inequality. It is no coincidence that social protection is the first policy area mentioned in the first Sustainable Development Goal, which deals with poverty eradication. BMZ, however, plans to fade out its commitment to social protection in most partner countries.</p><p>Scholars from <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/11/edited_volume/chapter/2184061" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Tulane University</a> provide evidence that most low- and middle-income countries have reduced poverty and inequality primarily through non-contributory social protection, health and education programmes. This result has previously been detected also <a href="https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2019/02/income-redistribution-across-oecd-countries_f2d12a2b/3b63e61c-en.pdf#:~:text=Taxes%20and%20transfers%20reduce%20the%20Gini%20index,to%20around%205%20per%20cent%20in%20Chile." target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">in high income countries</a>. Even China could not have achieved its remarkable poverty reduction without combining a major economic transformation with <a href="https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/bdadc16a4f5c1c88a839c0f905cde802-0070012022/original/Poverty-Synthesis-Report-final.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">redistributive policies, such as land reform and social protection schemes targeting the poor</a>. <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstreams/8f505de6-d365-4f10-aa5a-353c39616895/download" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">World Bank reports</a> indicate that the world will not be able to reduce the share of people living in extreme poverty to under 3% over the next 20 years if countries do not significantly intensify income redistribution by raising taxes and strengthening social protection.</p><p>Just promoting economic growth will not solve the problem, as this year’s <a href="https://www.neep-poverty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/SRPoverty_The-Roadmap-for-Eradicating-Poverty-Beyond-Growth_draft.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights</a> emphasises. Especially when accompanied by high levels of inequality and driven by resource extraction or capital-intensive modes of production, growth has only limited effects on poverty. Such patterns are particularly widespread <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X24002298#:~:text=The%20lower%20growth%20elasticity%20of,percent%20of%20households%20in%20SSA." target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">in Sub-Saharan Africa</a>, for example in <a href="https://journal.uinmataram.ac.id/index.php/jed/article/view/5506" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jae/article/33/Supplement_1/i30/7919223?login=true" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">South Africa</a>.</p><p>The observation holds even more for <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/roiw.12578" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">multidimensional poverty</a>, which has declined much less than income poverty during the last decades, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X22003096?via%3Dihub" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">economic growth has hardly any effect</a> on non-monetary dimensions of poverty in low- and middle-income countries.</p><p>In order to make a lasting contribution to the fight against poverty and hunger, economic growth should be labour-intensive and complemented – or even preceded – by investments in social protection, education and health. Especially non-contributory social protection programmes such as cash transfers are essential to address pockets of poverty, i.e. to reach out to those who do not benefit from economic growth. These pockets include people living in remote areas, people with limited education and training, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_946" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">people with health impairments or disability</a>, and older adults. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, these social protection schemes <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/are-cash-transfers-good-for-jobs/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">do not discourage people from working</a>.</p><p>German development cooperation should therefore support crisis-affected countries, but also other low-income countries, in establishing and expanding <a href="https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839109119.00011" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">reliable and well-targeted non-contributory social protection schemes</a> and not end its commitment to social protection in large parts of the world. Other instruments, like social insurance, are also useful but do not help low-income people who cannot afford to pay their social contributions, especially if they make their living from informal, unstable employment.</p><p>Investing in social protection does not necessarily mean that donors like Germany should pay the cash transfers themselves. Through technical cooperation, they could support partner countries build up stable social protection systems, ideally incorporated in national constitutions or other legislative frameworks. People must know what kinds of benefits they are entitled to, and when. Only if they can rely on the long-term existence of social protection schemes, they can invest in human capital and in more remunerative economic activities, which could substantially improve their wellbeing. This is a prerequisite for the full unfolding of social protection's potential to promote social, economic and political development in all parts of the world.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>The Current Column</category><author>Burchi, Francesco / Markus Loewe</author><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 09:08:57 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/social-protection-is-essential-to-tackle-poverty-hunger-and-inequality/</guid></item><item><title>Social protection for better health in Arab countries</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/social-protection-for-better-health-in-arab-countries/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After World War II, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started from low levels of socioeconomic development. Especially health indicators were worse than in most other world regions. This changed drastically when MENA countries became independent and started to invest into the social protection of citizens against health risks. They built up powerful social health insurance schemes, and today, many of their health indicators are almost on the same level as in Europe or North America. During the 1980s and 1990, however, most MENA governments reduced healthcare spending again as an element of structural adjustment programs, and focused increasingly on health services that are particularly important for the urban upper and middle classes, their main allies in society, but not so much for the poor. Therefore, MENA health systems suffer again from significant deficits regarding fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Financial, legal, and geographical obstacles restrict access for large parts of the population. The coexistence of multiple social protection schemes for different population groups reflects and intensifies already existing social inequalities. Deficits in quality and tidiness and the prevalence of informal fees charged for “good” treatment reduce further the value of public health services. Efficiency suffers from irrational prioritizations in fund allocation and from a lack of customer orientation. And the effects of MENA health systems, although not really bad, could still be better, which has become more than obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Loewe, Markus</author><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 09:41:11 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/social-protection-for-better-health-in-arab-countries/</guid></item></channel></rss>
