The discussion on “what next” after 2030 has only just begun. With a bit more than four years to go, there is little official positioning on a possible successor to the 2030 Agenda right now. At the High-Level Political Forum, the central UN format for implementing the Sustainability Goals, which is taking place these days in New York, this discussion also tends to be conducted on the margins. Even the process leading to a new agenda is still unclear, as the UN Summit on the Sustainable Development Goals that is likely to sketch the way is scheduled for September 2027 under the auspices of a new UN Secretary-General. And yet, the build-up for the negotiation of a renewed or revised agenda is short. What is realistic, what is desirable for “beyond 2030”?

IDOS’ conference on “Sustainability Cooperation Beyond 2030 – Ways forward in a messy world” on 25 and 26 June in Bonn and a roundtable discussion at the Hamburg Sustainability Conference on 30 June took a leap. Both events brought together academics, senior think tank staff as well as current and former negotiators from all continents to look at what we have learnt from sustainability cooperation and the pathways towards a desired future. 

Where we are now

We can argue that the 2030 Agenda has created more momentum than was deemed possible at its inception. We have seen progress in numerous areas and countries that is not sufficiently appreciated when just observing the global average indicators. And we do have sustainability strategies in many countries, in pioneering companies and at the subnational or local level, irrespective of the national government or “political colour” of the day. There is a good track-record of reaching decision-makers at the level of sub-national entities and municipalities, where action is taken, for instance on transport, energy, or spatial planning. 

Currently, we see backsliding on the declared sustainability goals and new vulnerabilities. This is cause for concern and requires attention. National plans are not sufficient to fully implement the 2030 Agenda, as various trackers, e.g. on climate, show us. Wars have multiplied and prevent progress. Finance for development has become scarcer as countries increasingly divert resources towards military spending rather than investing in a broader understanding of security, including human, social and economic security. Additionally, demographic change in many industrialised countries results in increasing pressure on social security systems. And we are facing more extreme weather events as a result of the climate crisis. Brief: we are going through polycrises, despite a global agenda for sustainability. 

And yet, there’s value in a global agenda. One participant in Bonn invoked the unlikely reference to the Prussian military theorist Clausewitz: No strategy should be expected to be implemented as conceptualised; it always has to adapt to dynamic real-life situations. Still, strategies help to think ahead and translate aspirations into actions – and identify gaps. 

Where’s the discussion on “beyond 2030”?

It is unlikely that there is large appetite for a fully new design of the Agenda and its goals. For starters, the current agenda is already comprehensive. Moreover, renegotiating the agenda in its entirety will be challenging due to geopolitical shifts and risk assessments of supporters of a new agenda. While Europe seems much in favour of having global goals, China emphasises its orientation towards system “stability” (while likely to work on its influence), and the USA are actively advocating against the current and likely any new agenda (while sub-national entities see the need for global benchmarks). 

Participants of our recent events discussed elements for an update, e.g. the role and relevance of AI, and a circular economy, as well as renewed discussions about how to better measure wealth beyond the GDP figure. Widely shared was also that we should not only look at the “what” (the goals and indicators) but also the “how” (often referred to as the means of implementation). Yet, it sounded like broad agreement in the wish to have a vision: an agenda we should have.

What next?

The conversation on a new agenda will go through numerous rounds of exchanges of perspectives and discussions in the coming months – on substance and on how to continue. As often is the case in multilateral settings, process is likely to influence outcomes, and who to involve beyond state actors – and how – is important.

The tasks related to the 2030 Agenda obviously do not end on 31 December 2030. It is explicitly a long-term vision, “for this and future generations”. Yet, the Agenda’s legitimacy is under pressure and to simply put a new date on it won’t be sufficient. The narrative is as important as the substance. We need to come up with a positive narrative on the global commons and the global common good – and we need to tell a good story on gains through cooperation. Imaging and planning for sustainable futures is a deeply human endeavour.

The June Climate Meetings (SB64), the annual mid-year climate negotiations, delivered limited progress on several key agenda items, including the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). The GGA is a collective commitment by all countries under the Paris Agreement to guide adaptation efforts, strengthen accountability, and mobilise finance for vulnerable countries. While countries were expected to finalise their operational framework, longstanding political issues remained unresolved. Developing countries criticised developed countries for failing to commit to a text that would at least triple adaptation finance, as envisaged under COP 30’s Global Mutirão outcome. Without agreement on finance, negotiations made little progress.

The deadlock extends far beyond the negotiation rooms in Bonn. For climate-vulnerable countries, inadequate adaptation finance widens the gap between climate commitments and implementation. National adaptation budgets are often insufficient and must compete with other pressing development priorities. As a result, millions remain exposed to climate risks, while hard-won development gains are placed at risk. Although many developing countries already devote significant public resources to addressing climate impacts, these investments remain far below what is needed and further constrain fiscal space for other development priorities.

Recent national budget allocations in Bangladesh, one of the world’s most climate-change-vulnerable countries, help illustrate the implications of stalled progress on GGA within the national context. Bangladesh’s National Adaptation Plan of 2023 estimates that approximately USD 8.5 billion will be needed annually between 2023 and 2050 to address adaptation challenges. By contrast, Bangladesh’s national budget for 2026-2027 allocated around USD 3.19 billion for climate change adaptation. Distributed across 25 ministries, this funding supports disaster risk reduction, climate-resilient agriculture, food security, and social protection programmes. While substantial, it covers less than half of the country's estimated annual adaptation needs, underscoring that domestic resources alone are insufficient to meet adaptation goals.

The adaptation allocation, equivalent to around 4.15% of the national budget, represents an increase from previous years but also highlights fiscal trade-offs. Public investment in climate mitigation remains limited, with the FY2026–27 budget allocating only USD 814 million to renewable energy, energy efficiency, low-carbon transport, and afforestation. This falls well short of the estimated USD 1.78 billion required annually to meet Bangladesh’s renewable energy targets by 2030, including USD 553 million in public investment, while the current allocation of USD 31.1 million covers only 2.2% of this need. As a result, inadequate public financing continues to slow renewable energy deployment, while dependence on imported fossil fuels is reinforced by tax exemptions for importing them.

For countries like Bangladesh, grant-based adaptation finance is therefore essential. Without it, climate ambitions risk remaining largely rhetorical. Persistent underfunding can weaken adaptation institutions and undermine implementation efforts built over years. Yet national governments alone cannot be blamed. The war in Ukraine and the US-Iran war have heightened concerns over energy security, inflation, and economic stability, diverting fiscal resources and political attention away from climate action.

Similarly, many climate-vulnerable countries now face a dual challenge: managing escalating climate risks while navigating an increasingly uncertain geopolitical landscape. Energy insecurity, supply-chain disruptions, and economic volatility have been added to an already long list of climate-related threats, including sea-level rise, floods, droughts, salinity intrusion, food insecurity, displacement, and ecosystem degradation.

The lack of progress on the GGA at SB64 is therefore deeply concerning. Climate-vulnerable countries need continuous and adequate finance to implement adaptation measures and meet their climate commitments. Yet the political and fiscal space for adaptation is shrinking, not because climate risks have diminished, but because competing crises increasingly dominate national and international agendas. COP31 must restore momentum by agreeing on an operational GGA that is measurable, finance-responsive, and implementation-oriented. This requires agreed adaptation indicators, stronger accountability, and predictable grant-based finance that enables vulnerable countries to implement their adaptation priorities.

A B M Hasanuzzaman is a 2025 Alexander von Humboldt International Climate Protection Fellow hosted by IDOS.

Dr Aparajita Banerjee is a sociologist and Senior Researcher in the research department “Environmental Governance” at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).