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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Neueste Publikationen – IDOS</title><link>https://www.idos-research.de/</link><description>Publikationen des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)</description><language>de</language><generator>TYPO3 EXT:news</generator><lastBuildDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 12:48:02 +0200</lastBuildDate><item><title>Reviewing the implementation design of energy subsidy reforms: insights from novel cross-country data</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/reviewing-the-implementation-design-of-energy-subsidy-reforms-insights-from-novel-cross-country-data/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over the past two decades, energy subsidy reforms have increasingly gained importance as mitigation measures to fight climate change. Still, many countries subsidize fossil energy consumption, and reforms are often short-lived. This paper presents harmonized cross-country data on the design of energy subsidy reforms, obtained from a structured literature review of both implemented and failed consumption subsidy reforms between 1978 and 2021. This standardized data enables the identification and validation of key design characteristics, including the motivation for reform, the use of gradual approaches, communication strategies, pricing mechanisms, and social protection measures, as well as their use in implementing reforms. The data highlight significant regional heterogeneity and emphasize the importance of context-specificity in shaping reform designs. The study also demonstrates the connection between key aspects of reform design and reform implementation, as well as associations with subsidy levels. It offers lessons for middle-income countries, especially those planning to implement carbon pricing policies. Lastly, this paper lays the groundwork for future research to explore these factors in greater detail; one avenue is to link design characteristics and political economy factors.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Böhl Gutierrez, Mauricio / Daniele Malerba</author><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 12:48:02 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/reviewing-the-implementation-design-of-energy-subsidy-reforms-insights-from-novel-cross-country-data/</guid></item><item><title>A (re)newed case for the UN: Europe and the future of UN leadership</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/a-renewed-case-for-the-un-europe-and-the-future-of-un-leadership/</link><description>What does Europe need from the next UN Secretary-General, and how can they keep Europe engaged? The new policy brief identifies key trends in Europe&#039;s engagemet with the UN and sets out the priorities and recommendations the incoming SG can draw on.   </description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The transition to a new United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) comes at a challenging moment, both for the organisation and its member states. It raises questions about how the next SG can guide the UN through volatile times and what they should prioritise amid mounting agendas and tightening budgets. It also gives member states an opportunity to reassess what they need from the UN and how they engage with it. Drawing on dis¬cussions at a convening of thinkers from across Europe, part of the Guidance and Regional Intelli¬gence for the Transition of UN Leadership project, this brief identifies key trends in Europe’s engage¬ment with the UN and lays out how the next SG can set priorities that matter to Europe and use the tools of their office to keep Europe engaged.</p><p>The challenge:<br>• Despite Europe’s significant financial contribu-tion, there is a perception that its influence at the UN is declining as global power shifts. Ear-marked funding still gives it consi¬der¬able say over the UN system, but its influence in formal settings is weakened by its own inconsistencies and by limited outreach to other regions.<br>• Europe’s interest in the UN may also be fading. Domestic pressures and competing crises push the organisation down the political agenda, as priori¬ties shift towards security, defence and competitiveness.<br><br>Priorities for the next SG, as seen from Europe:<br>• Among numerous agendas, two criteria for prioritisation emerged: (i) relevance to member states’ concerns; (ii) whether the UN can play a distinctive and valuable role.<br>• For Europe, this points to three areas: (i) peace and security, with the UN contributing to a future peace process and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine; (ii) migration, for which the UN offers a multilateral framework to tackle root causes such as conflict, climate change and global inequality over the long term; (iii) AI governance, where the UN can bring fragmented initiatives together and ensure they complement rather than compete with or duplicate one another.<br>Recommendations:<br>• Delivering on these priorities depends not on new mandates or processes – these should be avoided – but on the SG making better use of existing tools, such as their good offices function, their convening power and agenda-setting and their willingness to take political risks. It also depends on adequate financing by member states and on their political support.<br>• For Europe, the SG should lead with a strategy linked to issues salient to European audiences, act as a bridge-builder between Europe and other regions, and work with Europe’s interests at the UN, including demonstrating how sharing power and supporting a more equitable UN could serve both Europe and other regions in the long term.<br>&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Novoselova, Anna</author><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 15:22:43 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/a-renewed-case-for-the-un-europe-and-the-future-of-un-leadership/</guid></item><item><title>Regulating and mobilising the private sector for democracy protection in the European Union’s trade policy</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/regulating-and-mobilising-the-private-sector-for-democracy-protection-in-the-european-unions-trade-policy/</link><description>Democracies face threats from both within and outside. In this brief, we explore a key area of the EU’s external action in terms of its potential to safeguard democracy, namely its trade policy.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The European Union (EU) conditions access to its market on compliance with human rights, labour standards, and environmental policy and regulation. Its trade-related legislation falls into two categories: measures addressing partner governments and measures targeting the private sector. Within these two groups, only the first includes an instrument that specifically mentions democracy, namely the essential elements clause, which appears frequently in EU trade agreements yet has been invoked only once since 2014.<br>The EU is under domestic political pressure to deregulate in order to strengthen its competitiveness. The competitiveness agenda is cutting into the instruments the EU already has, especially amid geopolitical competition with China, making suspensionled conditionality against partner governments harder to enact. Our recommendations are as follows:</p><p>• Democracy protection stakeholders should shift their attention from suspension-led demo¬cracy support and conditionality aimed at partner governments towards the rules and incentives that run through the private sector. Even after the Omnibus reform’s narrowing scope, firm-facing rules remain in place. They are default-on and run through existing regulatory arrangements, and their potential geopolitical repercussions are smaller in comparison.<br>• Tender processes are one particular set of firm-facing rules. With the momentum behind the European Commission’s legislative proposal to revise the public procurement directive, corruption-based exclusion rules should be applied against operators linked to state capture in partner countries, as democratic backsliders often use public procurement to consolidate patronage networks.<br>• Firm-facing regulations also permit a different case to be made: stronger due diligence carries no measurable competitiveness penalty. Companies are not just subjects of regulation. They are also stakeholders with their own interest in transparent procurement and predictable rules. To bolster such a narrative, development cooperation should invest in developing compliance capacity, especially in autocratising states.<br>&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Sinanoglu, Semuhi / Niels Keijzer</author><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 11:03:33 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/regulating-and-mobilising-the-private-sector-for-democracy-protection-in-the-european-unions-trade-policy/</guid></item><item><title>Beyond markets: how to achieve just and transformative biodiversity conservation</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/beyond-markets-how-to-achieve-just-and-transformative-biodiversity-conservation/</link><description>Conservation needs reform, as current approaches towards biodiversity conservation have not been able to halt biodiversity loss. This policy brief provides a number of suggestions on how to make biodiversity conservation more just, equitable and more effective. </description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Conservation needs reform as current approaches have failed to halt biodiversity loss. Increasingly, environ¬mentalists are questioning whether market-based approaches and conventional policy instruments, particu¬larly protected areas, can make a substantial contribution towards mitigating the bio¬diversity crisis. Moreover, serious concerns about their equity and justice implications have been voiced by indigenous rights organisations, peasant movements and scholars.<br>In light of these concerns, this policy brief provides a number of suggestions on how to make biodiversity conservation more just, equitable and effective. It builds on discussions held during the sixth Enjust Conference “Offsetting Justice? Environmental justice in the age of market and militarized con¬servation”, which took place in Bonn from 3 to 5 December 2025. The conference brought together environmental justice scholars, political ecologists, activists as well as development and conservation practitioners from around the globe.&nbsp;<br>Our reflections and proposals support policymakers, members of parliament, conservation practitioners, and Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IP&amp;LCs) at the local and regional levels in initiating reforms of the protected area system and other conservation mechanisms for more effective, trans¬parent and fair protection.</p><p>Key messages:<br>• Just conservation: Conservation policies that contribute to environmental justice have the greatest potential to achieve long-term, sustainable and legitimate conservation outcomes for people and the planet.<br>• Land rights-based conservation: Land rights reconfigure power relations and are a key pre¬requisite for environmental justice. Collective land titles such as Colombia’s Peasant Reserve Zones (ZRCs) are a promising instrument.<br>• Towards distributive justice by reforming conservation finance: IP&amp;LCs should benefit more directly from forest, climate and biodiversity funding and should have a say in how money is spent in their communities. IP&amp;LC-led funds and designated funding windows for IP&amp;LCs are promising options.<br>• Basic Income for Nature and Climate (BINC): We suggest BINC as a promising measure to improve the livelihoods of IP&amp;LCs and to overcome the transactional logic of market-based instruments. BINC compensates for past environmental injustices and enables recipients to make land-use decisions that are less influenced by precarity and market forces.<br> <br><strong>Professor Dr Fernanda Figueroa</strong> currently works at the Facultad de Ciencias, Departamento de Ecología y Recursos Naturales, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.<br><strong>Dr Lasse Loft</strong> is a senior scientist at the Leibniz Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research (ZALF) in Müncheberg, Germany.<br><strong>Professor Dr Maano Ramutsindela</strong> is Professor of Human Geography at the University of Cape Town and the UP-UCT Future Africa Research Chair in Sustainability Transformations at the University of Pretoria and the University of Cape Town, South Africa.&nbsp;<br><strong>Georg Buchholz</strong> is team leader of the International Forest Policy sectoral project at GIZ, Germany.<br><strong>Dr Juan Sebastián Vélez Triana</strong> is a postdoctoral researcher with the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique – FNRS / UCLouvain, Belgium, and a research associate at the Centre for Alternatives to Development (CEALDES), Colombia.&nbsp;<br><strong>Professor Dr Florian Dünckmann</strong> heads the Cultural Geography Research Group in the Department of Geography at Kiel University, Germany.<br><strong>Dr Ina Lehmann</strong> is assistant professor of Governance of Global Biodiversity at the Environmental Policy Analysis section at the Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands.<br><strong>Professor Dr Silja Klepp</strong> is professor of Human Geography at Kiel University, Germany.<br><strong>Dennis Schüpf</strong> is a PhD student in the Department of Geography, University of Bonn, Germany.<br><strong>Anne Rose Atkins</strong> is a doctoral candidate in the Social Geography of Coastal and Marine Areas working group at the Geography Department of Kiel University, Germany.<br><strong>Dumisani Chirambo</strong> is the founder of Seeds of Opportunity in Malawi.&nbsp;<br><strong>Felice Diekel</strong> is a PhD candidate at the Department of Civil Engineering &amp; Management at the University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands.<br><strong>Salome Gikonyo</strong> is part of the coordination team of the EnJust Network for Environmental Justice, Germany.&nbsp;<br><strong>Dr Rina Mardiana</strong> is a lecturer in the Human Geography Study Program, Faculty of Social Sciences and Human Ecology, at IPB University in Bogor, Indonesia.<br><strong>Dr Adnan Mirhanoğlu</strong> is an F.R.S.-FNRS postdoctoral researcher at the Centre d’Études de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (CECID), Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. &nbsp;<br><strong>Kim Nierobisch</strong> is part of the coordination team of the EnJust Network for Environmental Justice, Germany.&nbsp;<br><strong>Kelly Peña</strong> is a PhD student at the Institute of Geography, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany.<br><strong>Professor Dr Prakash C. Tiwari </strong>works at the Centre for Ecology Development and Research in Dehradun, India.<br>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Hein, Jonas et al.</author><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 10:14:53 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/beyond-markets-how-to-achieve-just-and-transformative-biodiversity-conservation/</guid></item><item><title>From negotiations to implementation: the EU’s strategic repositioning ahead of COP31</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/from-negotiations-to-implementation-the-eus-strategic-repositioning-ahead-of-cop31/</link><description>This blog draws on discussions at a closed-door roundtable titled “EU Climate Diplomacy: Promoting EU and Global Climate Goals in the Evolving Climate Regime,” held in Brussels on 3 September 2026 and co-organised by ETTG, IDDRI and IDOS (more on the event here). The session convened senior officials from DG CLIMA, EU member states and experts. Views expressed reflect the range of positions raised in the discussion and are not attributed to individual participants or institutions; they do not necessarily represent the position of ETTG or its member institutes.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>This blog draws on discussions at a closed-door roundtable titled “EU Climate Diplomacy: Promoting EU and Global Climate Goals in the Evolving Climate Regime,” held in Brussels on 3 September 2026 and co-organised by ETTG, IDDRI and IDOS. The session convened senior officials from DG CLIMA, EU member states and experts. Views expressed reflect the range of positions raised in the discussion and are not attributed to individual participants or institutions; they do not necessarily represent the position of ETTG or its member institutes.</i></p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Perez-Catala, Anna / Hanne Knaepen / Mariana Camelo / Marta Torres Gunfaus / Steffen Bauer / Niels Keijzer</author><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 09:31:21 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/from-negotiations-to-implementation-the-eus-strategic-repositioning-ahead-of-cop31/</guid></item><item><title>Social and environmental trade-offs and safeguards in Hydrogen production in the Middle East and North Africa region: insights from Morocco and Oman</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/social-and-environmental-trade-offs-and-safeguards-in-hydrogen-production-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-region-insights-from-morocco-and-oman/</link><description>Low-carbon  hydrogen in Oman and Morocco is still being planned. The study compares how both countries govern resource demands, environmental risks and local participation while promised jobs and economic development remain uncertain. It identifies safeguards that can shape projects before build-out.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have launched initiatives to produce green hydrogen for their own use and for export, raising the question of what environmental and social effects such initiatives may generate, and how these can be anticipated and mitigated. Oman and Morocco are among the region’s frontrunners. Because all projects in these countries are still in the preparatory phase and no large-scale facility is yet in commercial operation, they offer the unusual opportunity to observe how safeguards, stakeholder participation and risk management are being configured before build-out, that is, before conditions are created that may not be easily reversed, thereby creating path dependencies.<br>Drawing on desk-based analysis, a comparative media review, and stakeholder interviews conducted in both countries, this study examines the environmental and social impacts of hydrogen projects in the two countries through the lens of four inter-related dimensions: (i) resource endowments, (ii) environmental risks, (iii) decision-making and governance arrangements, and (iv) social equity dynamics. It finds that the two states have developed different institutional settlements.<br>While environmental and social safeguards are increasingly integrated into hydrogen development, often drawing on international standards, their practical implementation often remains shaped by complex and fragmented institutional arrangements. This raises questions about the allocation of mandates, the distribution of responsibilities, the consistency of procedures and the capacity for long-term monitoring and traceability. The study therefore argues that institutional design is central to sustainable hydrogen development, as environmental and social risks may otherwise evolve faster than regulatory capacities, highlighting the need for robust impact assessment, monitoring frameworks and transparent reporting mechanisms.</p><p><strong>Dr Tobias Zumbraegel</strong> is a senior researcher at the University of Heidelberg and sustainability consultant at Momentum Novum GmbH.&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Discussion Paper</category><author>Zumbraegel, Tobias</author><pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 10:19:49 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/social-and-environmental-trade-offs-and-safeguards-in-hydrogen-production-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-region-insights-from-morocco-and-oman/</guid></item><item><title>Social cohesion and climate-driven planned relocation in urban settlements: evidence from Suva, Fiji</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/social-cohesion-and-climate-driven-planned-relocation-in-urban-settlements-evidence-from-suva-fiji/</link><description>Planned relocation, the process of moving a community from one area of residence to a new one in response to an environmental risk or threat. Fiji has become a regional leader in planned relocation policy, taking on the challenge of doing planned relocation in urban settings.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Planned relocation, the process of moving a community from one area of residence to a new one in response to an environmental risk or threat, is an important option for climate change adaptation. Given the acute climate and environmental risks facing them, small island developing states (SIDS) have taken a leading role in developing policies and processes for planned relocation in response to these risks. This policy brief will look at how planned relocation works as an adaptation strategy in informal urban settlements and will examine the role of social cohesion in planned relocation processes. Fiji has become a regional leader in planned relocation policy, with the Human Mobility in Climate Change Contexts (HMCCC) project serving as a magnifier of Fiji’s existing expertise in planned relocation. Since 2017, the Fijian government and civil society in cooperation with the German and New Zealand governments have developed planned relocation standard operating procedures (SOPs) for helping villages in high-risk areas navigate the physical, cultural, social and economic costs of relocating to higher ground or a safer location. These SOPs have become a “gold standard” for other countries to learn from and emulate in their own planned relocation policies.&nbsp;<br>The next step that the government is starting to undertake involves adapting the SOPs to informal urban settle­ments that are facing climate and environ­mental risks. Fiji’s informal urban settlements have faced a number of social, political and eco­nomic challenges over the years. These include serious issues with crime, land insecurity and historical political exclusion. Thus, along with the threats that come with climate change, particularly sea-level rise and flooding, any planned relocation policy for informal urban settlements has to simultaneously address trust in institutions, cooperation for the common good, and inclusive identity. The historical case of the Bainiose being relocated from central Suva to a suburb of Suva in the late 1990s offers guidance on how this can be done.&nbsp;</p><p><i>Key policy messages</i></p><ul style="margin-left:-21px;"><li data-list-item-id="e3c3001e548b55ad5b6a69c726939cb99"><span>Planned relocation for communities in urban settings requires long-term planning for services such as new public transportation connections, schools, secure land tenure and health facilities.</span></li><li data-list-item-id="edbd4872ca6d274990867b0e5795be770"><span>Measures should be taken to build institutional trust with urban com­munities, who may lack the traditional mechanisms of chiefly or customary representa­tion that is present in rural settings.</span></li><li data-list-item-id="eddf477f665d1718fd2d6f27d23749350"><span>Community identity is often strong and can be a starting point for policy-makers and communities to identify sustainable options for relocation.</span></li></ul><p><strong>Dr Anawaite Matadradra </strong>is a Lecturer at the University of the South Pacific.<br><strong>Dr Sevanaia Sakai </strong>is a Senior Lecturer at the University of the South Pacific.<br><strong>Unaisi Raileqe</strong> is a Project Officer at the Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding.<br><strong>Dr Timothy Fadgen</strong> is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Auckland.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Martin-Shields, Charles / Anawaite Matadradra / Sevanaia Sakai / Unaisa Raileqe / Timothy Fadgen</author><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 10:05:37 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/social-cohesion-and-climate-driven-planned-relocation-in-urban-settlements-evidence-from-suva-fiji/</guid></item><item><title>Chasing the trillions: what MDB lending can - and cannot - mobilise</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/chasing-the-trillions-what-mdb-lending-can-and-cannot-mobilise/</link><description>Multilateral development banks face increasing pressure to leverage their limited resources as development budgets shrink. Our paper examines the mobilisation potential of their financing instruments—and why higher leverage does not necessarily mean greater development impact.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This paper examines how additional private financial resources can be mobilised through the use of multilateral development bank (MDB) funds. It focuses on identifying the leverage potential of different financing instruments, improving their mobilisation efficiency, and examining how greater leverage can promote development outcomes while safeguarding the financial sustainability of MDBs. Its contribution is a comparative synthesis that brings together mobilisation mechanisms, differences in the public resources and risks underlying leverage ratios, and development impact. The analysis covers six categories: debt instruments, equity instruments, risk-transfer instruments, guarantees, advisory services and policy-based lending. It compares their characteristics, including the level of intervention, mobilisation mechanisms, constraints addressed and time horizons. It also distinguishes transaction-level private direct and indirect mobilisation from broader catalytic effects arising through market development, institutional strengthening and policy reforms.<br>The comparison shows why instruments cannot be assessed by a single leverage ratio. MDB lending, guarantee exposure and expenditure on advisory services represent different commitments of public resources and risk. Similarly, private finance linked to a transaction cannot be measured in the same way as subsequent investment enabled by policy reform. Available evidence therefore indicates differences in mobilisation potential rather than an established empirical ranking of instruments. The paper argues that leveraging efficiency can be increased by moving to more powerful approaches and by better targeting instruments to binding investment constraints. It examines how this can enhance the development impact and financial viability of MDB/DFI portfolios through two channels: a financial/portfolio efficiency channel and a development/catalytic channel. However, a high leverage ratio does not necessarily indicate superior performance. It may reflect investment in easier markets, weak additionality or an understatement of public risk. Conversely, a lower ratio may be consistent with greater additionality in a fragile market or pioneering sector. These findings highlight the importance of assessing leverage alongside additionality, development impact and financial sustainability. Using concessional funds through blended finance instruments can be costly and can reduce the resources available for other development priorities.<br>Therefore, the development finance institutions (DFIs) must strictly apply the additionality principle and further operationalise the principle of using minimum concessionality. If interpreted too generously, there is a risk of creating leverage without sufficient development impact. The paper provides specific recommendations for refining the use of financing instruments and integrating transaction-level support into a broader market-shaping approach that draws on the strengths of policy-based lending and technical assistance. Higher leverage should not be pursued as an end in itself; its value depends on its contribution to additional development impact.</p><p><strong>Dr Jürgen Karl Zattler</strong> is a distinguished non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC and a non-resident research fellow at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn. Until October 2023, he was Director General at the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Prior to that, he served as the Executive Director representing Germany at the World Bank.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Discussion Paper</category><author>Zattler, Jürgen K. / Kathrin Berensmann / Yabibal Walle</author><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 16:20:19 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/chasing-the-trillions-what-mdb-lending-can-and-cannot-mobilise/</guid></item><item><title>What can development partners do to help national development banks? </title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/what-can-development-partners-do-to-help-national-development-banks/</link><description>Successful partnerships should be measured by both the banks’ financial and institutional capacity to invest in sustainable development at scale</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bonn, 12 October 2026. <i><strong>As official development assistance declines, development partners must boost financing and capacity building for national development banks, while strengthening independence.</strong></i></p><p>The Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank open in Bangkok today, at a time when financing sustainable development faces mounting pressure from geopolitical tensions, worsening debt crises, and declining official development assistance. With&nbsp;developing countries facing an&nbsp;<a href="https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/02/global-outlook-on-financing-for-sustainable-development-2025_6748f647/753d5368-en.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">estimated annual financing gap of $4 trillion to achieve&nbsp;the Sustainable Development Goals</a>,&nbsp;stronger cooperation between multilateral and national development banks is more critical than ever.</p><p>The&nbsp;<a href="https://wfdfi.org/en/sevilla-commitment-fourth-international-conference-on-financing-for-development/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Compromiso de Sevilla</a>, adopted at the 4<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Financing for Development in Sevilla in 2025, underscored the importance of national development banks (banks) in promoting sustainable development, for example by channelling long-term and affordable financing to renewable energy, high-value priority sectors or small and medium enterprises, and called on development partners (partners) to increase their support for the banks. The question is then how partners, including multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, can best respond to that call.&nbsp;</p><p>Our recent research takes up that question by looking at the Development Bank Ghana (DBG) and the Development Bank of Nigeria (DBN), two relatively new African development banks established with substantial support from partners, including the World Bank, KfW, the European Investment Bank, Agence Française de Développement, and&nbsp;the African Development Bank. We found that partners can reinforce the banks’ capacity by providing financing and technical assistance while strengthening institutional independence (the ability to pursue operations and their mandate free from political interference) and respecting national ownership (locally determined development priorities). We would like to highlight three main findings that stand out. &nbsp; &nbsp;</p><p>First, partners provide the banks with long-term, affordable capital, allowing them to invest in national sustainable development. Just as important, reputable international partners can also lend credibility, giving other stakeholders the confidence to invest in or lend to the banks. Partners can also support domestic resource mobilisation efforts, such as bond issuance, through guarantees and technical assistance, reducing the banks’ reliance on external financing. In this way,&nbsp;partners help the banks diversify their funding sources and strengthen their financial autonomy. &nbsp;</p><p>Second, engagement with partners can also improve the banks’ institutional independence. For DBG and DBN, partners helped embed mandates for wholesale lending and provisions for institutional independence from the start. Channelling funds to final beneficiaries through local commercial financial institutions, so-called participating financial institutions, shields lending decisions from political interference, safeguarding the banks’ institutional independence. The experience of both banks also highlights the importance of selective alignment, where engagement with partners is based on their ability to advance nationally owned development priorities. This approach serves as a safeguard against subservience, which&nbsp;<a href="https://shs.cairn.info/realizing-the-potential-of-national-development-banks-to-boost-sustainable-development-financing-with-mdb-support--1000025620871-page-1?lang=en" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">previous research</a> has flagged as a risk to collaboration between multilateral and national development banks.&nbsp;</p><p>Third, technical assistance and capacity building are core elements of an impactful partnership. &nbsp;Both banks have received technical support in areas including risk management,&nbsp;environmental, social, and governance practices, green finance, and lending that advances gender equality. &nbsp;This support is particularly valuable for relatively new institutions that draw staff from commercial banks, as it helps them adapt to a development banking mandate and build the institutional mindset and capacity needed to balance financial sustainability with development impact.</p><p>These lessons – investing in institutional capacity building alongside financing, while aligning assistance with national priorities – offer practical ways for partners to respond to the call to support national development banks in reaching their full potential. Partners need to do more than provide financing to effectively support the banks in advancing the Sustainable Development Goals. They also need to provide support that builds strong and independent national institutions that can mobilise additional funds from capital markets (including domestic savings) to scale up their activities. Our findings suggest that successful partnerships should be measured by both the financial and institutional capacity of the banks to invest in sustainable development at scale. This week’s Annual Meetings should explore ways to advance international cooperation that ensures national development banks are better capitalised and capable of implementing nationally owned development priorities with greater independence and at a larger scale.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>The Current Column</category><author>Sommer, Christoph / Priscilla Toto / Yabibal M. Walle</author><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 09:51:04 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/what-can-development-partners-do-to-help-national-development-banks/</guid></item><item><title> The 0.7% ODA target: a norm in retreat </title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-07-oda-target-a-norm-in-retreat/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The 0.7 per cent official development assistance/gross national income (ODA/GNI) target, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, is best understood as a partially successful norm that is now in active retreat. In this paper we discuss the history of the target using Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle framework. We compare the 0.7 to analogous targets in defence, climate, education, health, and biodiversity. We argue that systematic underperformance is a structural feature of politically negotiated international input targets. The rise and retreat of the 0.7 is then not a distinct feature of development finance. The NATO 2 per cent/5 per cent case demonstrates that cascade is achievable under conditions of salience and enforcement. However, these are conditions that the 0.7 has not had. We propose ways forward based on the 0.7 target’s original rationale.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Klingebiel, Stephan / Andy Sumner</author><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 15:18:07 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-07-oda-target-a-norm-in-retreat/</guid></item><item><title>The OECD Development Assistance Committee at 70: who defines ‘Mutual Interest’?</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-oecd-development-assistance-committee-at-70-who-defines-mutual-interest/</link><description>The OECD’s aid committee turns 70 in 2031, as record aid cuts and a shift from solidarity to self-interest reshape why countries give. Where this leads is still open. Aid could become a genuine partnership, a deal between elites, a tool of geopolitical bargaining or a purely commercial transaction. Each path would change the committee’s role, and with it the future of the 0.7% aid target.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The OECD’s aid committee turns 70 in 2031, as record aid cuts and a shift from solidarity to self-interest reshape why countries give. Where this leads is still open. Aid could become a genuine partnership, a deal between elites, a tool of geopolitical bargaining or a purely commercial transaction. Each path would change the committee’s role, and with it the future of the 0.7% aid target.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Sumner, Andy / Stephan Klingebiel</author><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 13:40:00 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-oecd-development-assistance-committee-at-70-who-defines-mutual-interest/</guid></item><item><title>The next generation of national development banks: early lessons from Ghana and Nigeria</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/the-next-generation-of-national-development-banks-early-lessons-from-ghana-and-nigeria/</link><description>How can the new wave of national development banks in low- and middle-income countries grow into independent, impactful institutions for sustainable development? Evidence from Ghana and Nigeria sheds light on independence, funding, partnerships, green finance – and what it takes to scale their impact.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The discussion paper assesses whether and how newly established national development banks (NDBs), specifically the Development Bank Ghana (DBG) and the Development Bank of Nigeria (DBN), are growing into independent and impactful institutions capable of fostering sustainable development. It focuses on five analytical dimensions: (1) institutional independence, (2) the diversification of funding sources and the scaling up of operations, (3) the relationship between NDBs and participating financial institutions (PFIs), (4) collaboration between NDBs and development partners (DPs), namely multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilateral development finance institutions and (5) sustainability and green finance. The research adopts a qualitative comparative case study methodology, drawing on 55 semi-structured interviews conducted across Ghana and Nigeria with representatives from NDBs, PFIs, DPs, civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders such as finance ministries, central banks and providers of technical assistance. The data are analysed using qualitative content analysis and triangulation. The discussion paper aims to provide insights for policymakers, central banks and DPs, and inform the design of future NDBs regarding how they can become strong institutions that support long-term development objectives.&nbsp;<br>Our results show that DBG and DBN have emerged as relevant actors within the Ghanaian and Nigerian development finance landscapes, particularly through their role in facilitating access to long-term and often concessional funding, which helps PFIs expanding lending to MSMEs and underserved sectors. Furthermore, the study finds that both institutions have established governance and accountability structures that, together with their wholesale lending models, provide substantial protection against political interference. In particular, strong support from DPs proved central to the establishment, growth and operationalisation of both NDBs. Beyond financial resources, DPs provided technical assistance, institutional capacity building, governance support and sustainability expertise. Another notable finding of the study is that DBG and DBN foster sustainability by embedding environmental and social principles into their strategies and operations, and making sustainability a core institutional priority, especially through wholesale lending, technical assistance and the integration of sustainability. At the same time, the study identifies several constraints related to limited funding volumes, high pricing, limited risk-sharing mechanisms, administrative burdens associated with DP engagement and challenges in adapting international sustainability standards to local contexts. Overall, the findings suggest that although DBG and DBN have generated substantial development value, established strong governance structures and demonstrated institutional independence, increasing their impact will require the mobilisation of additional funding to scale up their operations and activities.<br>&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Discussion Paper</category><author>Sommer, Christoph / Yabibal M. Walle / Joshua Yindenaba Abor / Daniel Ofori-Sasu / Ama Asante / Robel Ghebrehanes / Benedicta Mawuena / John Kwaku Darko Okrah / Muna Osman / Paul Saupe / Anna-Lena Sprenger / Priscilla Toto</author><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 13:34:34 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/the-next-generation-of-national-development-banks-early-lessons-from-ghana-and-nigeria/</guid></item><item><title>Developing competences for Sustainable Futures: a competence model and design recommendations for learning environments</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/developing-competences-for-sustainable-futures-a-competence-model-and-design-recommendations-for-learning-environments/</link><description>How can learning formats prepare future change-makers for sustainability transformations? Drawing on nearly 20 years of experience with the MGG Academy, this paper presents a practice-informed competence model and six recommendations for designing transformative learning environments. </description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Preparing individuals to contribute to sustainability transformations has become an increasingly important challenge for higher education, professional training and leadership development. While research has identified a wide range of sustainability competences, comparatively less attention has been paid to how these competences can be fostered through purposefully designed learning environments. Drawing on nearly 20 years of experience with the Managing Global Governance (MGG) Academy of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), this paper offers a practice-informed perspective on competence development for future changemakers.<br>The paper addresses two questions: what competences are particularly relevant for individuals seeking to contribute to sustainability transformations and global cooperation, and how can learning environments be designed to strengthen these competences? Building on experience from the MGG Academy and relating it to literature on sustainability competences, transformative learning and adult education, the paper develops a competence model organised around three complementary dimensions – sense-making, cooperation and transformation – and operationalises 11 competences by distinguishing the knowledge, skills and attitudinal components associated with them. The paper further derives six recommendations for learning design: intentionally curating diversity, fostering trust and psychological safety, enabling mutual learning, aligning learning activities with the intended competence development, creating structured opportunities for reflection, and designing learning for transfer to professional practice.<br>Rather than proposing a universal blueprint, the paper demonstrates how competence models can provide orientation for coherent programme design and how learning theory can be translated into practical educational approaches. It concludes that competence development constitutes an important contribution to sustainability transformations, while recognising that impact also depends on supportive organisational environments, professional networks and broader institutional conditions. By connecting theoretical insights with nearly two decades of practical experience, the paper contributes to the growing discussion on how learning and dialogue programmes can strengthen the people and relationships through which transformative change becomes possible.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Discussion Paper</category><author>Reiber, Tatjana</author><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 13:26:27 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/developing-competences-for-sustainable-futures-a-competence-model-and-design-recommendations-for-learning-environments/</guid></item><item><title>Tax expenditures country report: Germany</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/tax-expenditures-country-report-germany/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Tax expenditures (TEs) in Germany represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2026. Over the last decade, revenue forgone reported by the German federal government has remained consistently below 2.0 percent of GDP. This is below the global average of 4.0 percent of GDP (see Redonda, von Haldenwang, &amp; Aliu, 2026), and less than most of Germany’s neighbours. However, it is important to note that official TE reporting is incomplete, as acknowledged by the German Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) itself. Recent changes in TE use have been motivated above all by three rationales: First, TEs have been employed as primary crisis response measures, mainly in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian war on Ukraine and the US-Iran war. Second, they are used to promote the transition towards zero carbon of the German energy system, including housing, transportation and manufacturing. Third, TEs are granted to promote growth or compensate high energy costs. Since 1967, Germany reports on tax expenditures (TEs) and direct subsidies under the Act to Promote Economic Stability and Growth (“Stability and Growth Act”). Reporting covers all provisions that have an economic objective. The “Subsidy Report” is submitted to parliament every second year, with the most recent one (number 30) published in September 2025 (BMF, 2025). By law, the report should be submitted to parliament “together” with the government draft for the federal budget of the coming year, but usually the report trails the draft budget for several weeks, sometimes even months. As previous editions, the 30th Subsidy Report contains two lists of TEs. One (“Annex 2”) presents 107 TEs that fall under the reporting mandate of the Stability and Growth Act. The other one (“Annex 3”) lists 52 provisions that result in revenue forgone, but do not fall under the mandate of the subsidy report as such, though the distinction between both lists is not fully consistent. Also, just 72 out of the 107 TEs presented in Annex 2 and only 18 of the 52 provisions listed in Annex 3 come with revenue forgone estimates. Based on the federal government’s budget draft for 2027, the quantified TEs of Annexes 2 and 3 amount to 76.5 billion Euro in 2026 (after 74.3 billion Euro in 2025). Annex 2 provisions are presented in great detail, each with its own data sheet. This reporting practice has earned Germany a relatively high score on the Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index, where it ranks 6th out of 116 assessed countries (Redonda et al., 2026). In contrast, Annex 3 provisions are presented in one single list with much less information. In addition, multiple provisions that would technically qualify as TEs are not reported at all. As a result, it is almost impossible for political decision-makers and the public in general to gain a complete overview of all the TEs in use, their fiscal cost and the impacts they have. Inconsistent reporting is partly due to the lack of a well-defined tax benchmark system, complicating the identification of TEs and estimations of revenue forgone. The criteria applied to decide whether a specific provision is a TE or part of the benchmark tax system are not always clear. For instance, lower value added tax (VAT) rates for food are part of Germany’s benchmark system and not reported, while lower VAT rates for cultural activities are considered a TE. The federal subsidy guidelines, issued in 2006 and amended in 2015, ask for a regular evaluation of all subsidies in use. Against this backdrop, two major rounds of evaluations have been commissioned by the BMF. The first round in 2007-2009 covered roughly the biggest 20 TEs listed in the subsidy report. Together, these TEs resulted in revenue forgone of 18.1 billion Euro per year (Thöne et al., 2009). To the best of our knowledge, at the time this was the biggest evaluation of tax expenditures ever conducted worldwide. Ten years later, 2017-2019, a second round of evaluations was commissioned, which was meant to cover the next twenty largest TEs plus several closely related smaller TEs, increasing the total coverage of this evaluation round to 33 measures with revenue forgone of 7.4 billion Euro per year (Thöne &amp; Gerhards, 2019). Even with these two rounds of evaluations, however, the federal government has not fully lived up to the principles it is supposed to follow. 50 out of the 107 TEs listed in Annex 2 of the 30th Subsidy Report, representing over a third (34 percent) of the revenue forgone, have never been evaluated. The figure rises to 66 percent when the provisions listed in Annex 3 of the report are included, as these are not subject to regular evaluations. As an additional point, only 17 out of 107 TEs come with a time limit and only two TEs are granted with decreasing benefits over time. TEs play an important role in German environmental and climate policy. On the one hand, they are used as environmental TEs (ETEs) to advance environmental protection and climate policy, above all in mobility, energy and heating. Revenue forgone from ETEs in 2026 amounted to 5.8 billion Euro. On the other hand, TEs are the dominant form of environmentally harmful subsidies. According to a report published by the German Federal Environment Agency (UBA), they resulted in 48.4 billion Euro of revenue forgone in 2018 (Burger &amp; Bretschneider, 2022). A new report published bei the Bertelsmann Foundation focuses specifically on subsidies that are harmful to the climate (Fiedler et al., 2026). It shows that TEs falling under this category generated revenue forgone in the range of 47.3 billion Euro in 2024, including 18,2 billion Euro classified as only “partially harmful”. Sustainability was introduced as an aspect of TE reporting in 2015, understood as a broad concept that combines economic performance, the preservation of natural resources and social cohesion from a long-term development perspective. This is in line with the common worldwide understanding of sustainability and implies that the evaluation score obtained by each TE in this category may reflect very different properties, not only environmental or climate-related ones. In fact, the 30th Subsidy Report lists 15 cases where TEs are meant to support the preservation of natural resources, against 36 cases where the aim is social cohesion and 93 cases that point at economic sustainability. All in all, Germany has been slow in reforming its TE regime. As a recurrent observation, the Federal Court of Auditors highlights that the government has done too little to follow up on the recommendations that came out of the various evaluations since 2009. Against this background, three actions seem to be particularly relevant. To start, the federal government needs to address the lack of clarity regarding the German benchmark tax system. A comprehensive stock-taking review could help to determine which provisions should be classified as “structural” parts of the benchmark system, and which are “non-structural” and thus to be considered TEs and reported in future subsidy reports. In the medium term, this initiative could result in TEs no longer being viewed exclusively within the context of economic objectives, but encompassing social and other policy goals as well. This would be in line with international good practice in TE reporting. Consistent with these standards, TE reports should also be submitted to and adopted by parliament as an integral part of the annual budget. In addition, a clear evaluation framework with regular intervals and broad coverage should be implemented.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Book Publications</category><author>Thöne, Michael / Christian von Haldenwang</author><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 10:09:07 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/tax-expenditures-country-report-germany/</guid></item><item><title>Länderbericht zu Steuervergünstigungen: Deutschland</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/laenderbericht-zu-steuerverguenstigungen-deutschland/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Steuervergünstigungen (englisch: tax expenditures) machen in Deutschland einen erheblichen Teil der Staatsausgaben aus und beliefen sich im Jahr 2026 auf 1,7 Prozent des BIP. In den letzten zehn Jahren lagen die von der Bundesregierung berichteten Mindereinnahmen durchweg unter 2 Prozent des BIP und damit unter dem globalen Durchschnitt von 4,0 Prozent (vgl. Redonda, von Haldenwang &amp; Aliu, 2026). Die meisten Nachbarländer Deutschlands verzeichnen höhere Mindereinnahmen aufgrund von Steuervergünstigungen. Dabei ist jedoch zu beachten, dass die offizielle Berichterstattung über Steuervergünstigungen in Deutschland unvollständig ist, wie das Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF) selbst regelmäßig feststellt. In jüngerer Zeit lassen sich Veränderungen bei der Nutzung von Steuervergünstigungen vor allem auf drei Gründe zurückführen: Erstens werden sie als kurzfristig wirksame Maßnahmen zur Krisenbewältigung eingesetzt, hauptsächlich im Zusammenhang mit der Covid-19-Pandemie, dem russischen Krieg gegen die Ukraine und dem Krieg zwischen den USA und dem Iran. Zweitens dienen sie der Förderung des Übergangs zu einem CO₂-neutralen Energiesystem, einschließlich der Bereiche Wohnen, Verkehr und verarbeitendes Gewerbe. Drittens werden sie gewährt, um Wachstum zu fördern bzw. hohe Energiekosten auszugleichen. Seit 1967 berichtet Deutschland über Steuervergünstigungen und direkte Subventionen auf der Grundlage des Gesetzes zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft („Stabilitäts- und Wachstumsgesetz“). Die Berichterstattung umfasst alle Bestimmungen, die ein wirtschaftliches Ziel verfolgen. Der „Subventionsbericht“ wird dem Bundestag alle zwei Jahre vorgelegt; der jüngste Bericht (Nr. 30) wurde im September 2025 ver-öffentlicht (BMF, 2025). Laut Gesetz soll der Bericht dem Bundestag „zusammen“ mit dem Regierungsentwurf für den Bundeshaushalt für das kommende Jahr vorgelegt werden, doch in der Regel folgt der Bericht dem Haus-haltsentwurf um mehrere Wochen, manchmal auch Monate. Wie in den Jahren zuvor enthält der 30. Subventionsbericht zwei Listen von Steuervergünstigungen. Die eine („Anlage 2“) umfasst 107 steuerliche Sonderregelungen, die unter die Berichtspflicht nach dem Stabilitäts- und Wachstumsgesetz fallen. Die andere („Anlage 3“) listet 52 „subventionsähnliche Tatbestände“ auf, die zu Minder-einnahmen führen, jedoch als solche nicht unter die Berichtspflicht des Subventionsberichts fallen. Die Unterscheidung zwischen diesen beiden Listen ist nicht durchgängig konsistent. Zudem werden die Einnahmenverluste nicht vollständig ausgewiesen. Nur für 72 der 107 in Anlage 2 und 18 der 52 in Anlage 3 aufgeführten Regelungen liegen Schätzungen zu den damit einhergehenden Mindereinnahmen vor. Auf der Grundlage des Haushaltsentwurfs der Bundesregierung für 2027 belaufen sich die quantifizierten Steuervergünstigungen der Anlagen 2 und 3 im Jahr 2026 auf insgesamt 76,5 Milliarden Euro, nach 74,3 Milliarden Euro im Jahr 2025. Die Maßnahmen in Anlage 2 werden sehr detailliert dargestellt, jede mit einem eigenen Datenblatt. Diese Berichtspraxis hat Deutschland eine relativ hohe Punktzahl im Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index eingebracht. Dort nimmt es Platz 6 von 116 bewerteten Ländern ein (Redonda et al., 2026). Im Gegensatz dazu werden die Regelungen der Anlage 3 in einer einzigen Liste mit deutlich weniger Informationen dargestellt. Zudem werden zahlreiche Regelungen, die faktisch steuerliche Vergünstigungen sind, überhaupt nicht ausgewiesen. Infolgedessen ist es für politische Entscheidungsträger und die breite Öffentlichkeit nahezu unmöglich, sich einen vollständigen Überblick über alle bestehenden Steuervergünstigungen, ihre fiskalischen Kosten und ihre Wirkungen zu verschaffen. Die uneinheitliche Berichterstattung ist zum Teil auf das Fehlen eines klar definierten steuerlichen Referenzsys-tems zurückzuführen, was die Identifizierung von Steuervergünstigungen und die Schätzung der entgangenen Einnahmen erschwert. Die Kriterien, anhand derer entschieden wird, ob eine bestimmte Regelung eine Steuervergünstigung oder Teil des steuerlichen Referenzsystems ist, sind nicht immer klar. So sind beispielsweise niedrigere Umsatzsteuersätze für Lebensmittel Teil des deutschen Referenzsystems und werden nicht ausgewiesen, während niedrigere Umsatzsteuersätze für kulturelle Aktivitäten als Steuervergünstigung gelten. Die 2006 beschlossenen und 2015 geänderten subventionspolitischen Leitlinien der Bundesregierung verlangen eine regelmäßige Evaluierung aller Subventionen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurden für Steuervergünstigungen vom BMF zwei große Evaluierungsrunden in Auftrag gegeben. Die erste Runde in den Jahren 2007–2009 orientierte sich an den 20 größten im Subventionsbericht aufgeführten Steuervergünstigungen. Insgesamt führten diese Vergünstigungen zu Mindereinnahmen in Höhe von 18,1 Milliarden Euro im Jahr (Thöne et al., 2009). Nach unserem Kenntnisstand handelte es sich damals um die größte Evaluierung von Steuervergünstigungen, die weltweit jemals durchgeführt wurde. Zehn Jahre später, von 2017 bis 2019, wurde eine zweite Evaluierungsrunde durchgeführt, die die zwanzig nächstgrößten Steuervergünstigungen sowie mehrere eng damit verbundene, kleinere Tatbestände abdeckte. Insgesamt wurden in dieser Runde 33 Maßnahmen mit Mindereinnahmen von zusammen 7,4 Milliarden Euro im Jahr überprüft (Thöne &amp; Gerhards, 2019). Doch selbst mit diesen beiden großen Evaluierungsrunden hat die Bundesregierung die Grundsätze, auf die sie sich verpflichtet hat, nicht vollständig erfüllt. So wurden 50 der 107 in Anlage 2 des 30. Subventionsberichts aufgeführten Steuervergünstigungen noch nie evaluiert. Sie machen mehr als ein Drittel (35,5 Prozent) der entgan-genen Einnahmen aus. Dieser Anteil steigt auf 65,4 Prozent, wenn die in Anlage 3 des Berichts aufgeführten Steu-erregeln einbezogen werden, da diese Vergünstigungen keiner Evaluierungsvorgabe unterliegen. Hinzu kommt, dass nur 17 von 107 Steuervergünstigungen befristet sind und nur bei zwei Maßnahmen die Unterstützung de-gressiv gewährt wird, also im Laufe der Zeit abnimmt. Steuervergünstigungen spielen eine wichtige Rolle in der deutschen Umwelt- und Klimapolitik. Einerseits werden sie als ökologische Fördermaßnahmen (environmental tax expenditures, ETEs) eingesetzt, um Umweltschutz und Klimapolitik voranzutreiben, vor allem in den Bereichen Mobilität, Energie und Wärmeversorgung. Die Einnahmeausfälle durch ETEs belaufen sich im Jahr 2026 auf 5,8 Milliarden Euro. Andererseits sind Steuervergünstigungen die vorherrschende Form umweltschädlicher Subventionen. Laut einem vom Umweltbundesamt (UBA) veröffentlichten Bericht führten diese im Jahr 2018 zu Mindereinnahmen in Höhe von 48,4 Milliarden Euro (Burger &amp; Bretschneider, 2021). Ein neuer, von der Bertelsmann Stiftung veröffentlichter Bericht konzentriert sich gezielt auf klimaschädliche Subventionen (Fiedler et al., 2026). Er zeigt, dass die in diese Kategorie fallenden Steuervergünstigungen im Jahr 2024 zu Mindereinnahmen in Höhe von 47,3 Milliarden Euro geführt haben, darunter 18,2 Milliarden Euro, die als lediglich „teilweise klimaschädlich“ eingestuft werden. Nachhaltigkeit wurde im Jahr 2015 als zusätzliche Dimension in die Subventionsberichterstattung aufgenommen und im Einklang mit dem gängigen Verständnis der globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele als breites Konzept definiert, das wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit, die Erhaltung natürlicher Ressourcen und den sozialen Zusammenhalt aus einer langfristigen Entwicklungsperspektive umfasst. Dies bedeutet aber auch, dass die Bewertungsergebnisse sehr unterschiedliche Aspekte widerspiegeln können, nicht nur umwelt- oder klimabezogene. Tatsächlich listet der 30. Subventionsbericht 15 Fälle auf, in denen Steuervergünstigungen den Erhalt natürlicher Ressourcen unterstützen sollen, gegenüber 36 Fällen, in denen der soziale Zusammenhalt im Vordergrund steht, und 93 Maßnahmen, die auf wirtschaftliche Nachhaltigkeit abzielen (BMF, 2025, S. 52). Insgesamt hat Deutschland die Reform seiner Steuervergünstigungen nur zögerlich vorangetrieben. Als wiederkehrende Feststellung hebt der Bundesrechnungshof hervor, dass die Regierung zu wenig unternommen hat, um die Empfehlungen aus den verschiedenen Evaluierungen seit 2009 umzusetzen. Vor diesem Hintergrund erschei-nen drei Maßnahmen besonders relevant. Erstens muss die Bundesregierung bestehende Unklarheiten hinsicht-lich des Referenzsteuersystems beseitigen. Eine umfassende Bestandsaufnahme würde es erlauben, festzustellen, welche Bestimmungen als „strukturelle“ Bestandteile des Referenzsystems einzustufen sind und welche „nicht-strukturell“ sind, somit als Steuervergünstigungen gelten und in künftigen Berichten ausgewiesen werden müssen. Mittelfristig könnte dies dazu führen, dass die Berichterstattung über Steuervergünstigungen nicht mehr ausschließlich im Kontext wirtschaftlicher Zielsetzungen erfolgt, sondern auch soziale und andere politische Ziele einbezieht. Im Einklang mit internationalen Standards der Berichterstattung sollte die Bundesregierung – zweitens – auch vorsehen, dass Berichte über Steuervergünstigungen als fester Bestandteil des jährlichen Haushaltsplans dem Parlament vorgelegt und von diesem verabschiedet werden. Darüber hinaus sollten – drittens – klare Evaluierungsvorgaben mit regelmäßigen Intervallen und breiter Abdeckung formuliert und dann auch tatsächlich umgesetzt werden.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Book Publications</category><author>Thöne, Michael / Christian von Haldenwang</author><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 10:01:34 +0200</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/books/article/laenderbericht-zu-steuerverguenstigungen-deutschland/</guid></item></channel></rss>
