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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Neueste Publikationen – IDOS</title><link>https://www.idos-research.de/</link><description>Publikationen des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)</description><language>de</language><generator>TYPO3 EXT:news</generator><lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 12:25:27 +0100</lastBuildDate><item><title>When adaptation reaches its limits, social protection must be ready</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/when-adaptation-reaches-its-limits-social-protection-must-be-ready/</link><description>Social protection systems do not yet systematically account for adaptation limits, long-term climate projections or broader dynamics</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>Social protection is gaining ground in climate policy. But beyond cushioning shocks, it must help people adapt for the long term – and support them where adaptation hits its limits.</i></p><p>With COP31 underway in Antalya, Türkiye, all eyes are on the climate negotiations. They inevitably focus on critical issues such as climate finance. Delegates also seek progress on the ‘global goal on adaptation’ (GGA), through efforts to operationalise the 59 ‘indicators’ agreed at COP30 in Belém. Less prominent, but critical nonetheless, is the growing role of social protection, which encompasses measures such as cash transfers and public works programmes.</p><p>This role has become more visible at each successive COP. At COP30, the <a href="https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/documents/cop30-belem_declaration_eng-final.pdf/@@download/file" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Belém Declaration on Hunger, Poverty and Human-Centred Climate Action</a> committed to make social protection the ‘foundation of resilience’. Two out of the three GGA indicators on poverty and livelihoods also focus on social protection. And through the Taskforce on Adaptive Social Protection and Climate Financing – convened by BMZ and supported by GIZ – the multilateral climate funds published a joint report on ‘<a href="https://www.adaptationcommunity.net/publications/scaling-social-protection-for-climate-action-insights-from-and-for-multilateral-climate-funds/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Scaling social protection for climate action’</a>.</p><p>Social protection is thus increasingly considered in climate policy, programming and financing at the global level. Equally, at the national level there is progress. Analysis of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) backs this up – with an <a href="https://www.ilo.org/publications/mapping-just-transition-ndc-30-global-trends-across-123-countries" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">initial review of NDCs 3.0</a> finding that references to social protection had surged from 15% to 64% since the last round of NDCs was submitted.</p><h2><span><strong>Changing role of social protection and the limits to adaptation</strong></span></h2><p>Recent workshops by <a href="https://www.idos-research.de/veranstaltungen/details/how-does-social-protection-promote-climate-change-mitigation-and-adaptation/" target="_blank">IDOS</a> and <a href="https://www.fao.org/social-protection/news-and-events/news/news-detail/african-countries-advance-to-integrate-social-protection-into-climate-action/en" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">FAO</a> brought together policy makers and researchers to strengthen the integration of social protection into national climate policies (including adaptation, mitigation, and loss and damage). At both events, the high degree of engagement clearly demonstrated the demand for action on this agenda across countries.&nbsp;</p><p>Core to this integrative approach is that social protection should not be restricted to addressing climate shocks, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2024.100660" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">where initial energies were often focused at the country level</a>. It should instead encompass longer-term climate resilience and adaptive capacity, while also cushioning poor and vulnerable populations from the negative impacts of climate mitigation policies and supporting a just transition. This needs more than a few design tweaks. Instead, it requires systematic integration and coordination of policies and programmes. Social protection should also play a central role in the emerging policy and financing landscape addressing climate-related losses and damages, including longer-term recovery and rehabilitation.</p><p>However, this longer-term role brings new challenges. <a href="https://openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/cd9601en" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">A recent FAO review</a> explored the evidence on social protection and how it can address the limits to climate adaptation. This includes the increased focus on this issue in the <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar6/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">IPCC</a> and in negotiations around loss and damage. While social protection systems can play a critical role in supporting inclusive and resilient climate adaptation, there are limits to what adaptation can achieve, as global warming intensifies. Social protection systems do not yet systematically account for adaptation limits, long-term climate projections or broader social-ecological dynamics. This risks reinforcing dependence on livelihoods that may become increasingly unsafe, unproductive or even maladaptive.</p><h2><span><strong>Way forward</strong></span></h2><p>The first challenge is to keep this agenda from being crowded out by seemingly more urgent topics at COP31 and beyond. The intensifying effects of El Niño on food security and rural livelihoods reinforce the importance of preparedness and early-warning systems alongside coordinated long-term adaptation actions that go well beyond shock response.&nbsp;</p><p>In addition, taking the long view also means better discussing and incorporating limits to adaptation into national plans and international agreements; it is in fact crucial to prepare for a time when adaptation can no longer sustain existing livelihoods, especially as the 1.5 degree target is exceeded. Social protection must anticipate climate risks and effects, supporting people to move towards viable livelihoods rather than locking them into increasingly unsafe or unproductive activities or places. As a case in point, migration should be better considered as an adaptation strategy: social protection must support safe and dignified migration and planned relocation, assist migrants and host communities, and protect those who stay, whether by choice or because they lack the means to move. This is also linked to loss and damage, as it aims at ensuring long-term income security and supporting people facing lasting losses and fundamental changes in where and how they live and work.&nbsp;</p><p>Finally, the outcomes from COP31, with an explicit focus on implementation and action, will hopefully move us in the right direction. The aim is to transform countries’ climate commitments into concrete, financeable projects that deliver real-world results. This is exactly where the conversation needs to be: shifting policy recognition on the role of social protection into programming, financing and delivery that reaches the poorest. This can be achieved through concerted action by Parties, multilateral climate funds and development banks, and the wide range of actors under the Global Climate Action Agenda. Ultimately, and beyond any single COP, social protection systems must be strengthened to assist people to weather today’s shocks while preparing for tomorrow’s realities.</p><hr><p><strong>Daniele Malerba</strong> is an economist and senior researcher in the research department “Transformation of Economic and Social Systems” at IDOS.</p><p><strong>Matthew Walsham</strong> is a Social Protection and Climate Specialist at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and co-chair of the Universal Social Protection 2030 (USP2030) Working Group on Social Protection and Climate Change.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>The Current Column</category><author>Malerba, Daniele / Matthew Walsham </author><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 12:25:27 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/when-adaptation-reaches-its-limits-social-protection-must-be-ready/</guid></item><item><title>The case for protecting democraciesthrough the EU’s trade policy</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-case-for-protecting-democraciesthrough-the-eus-trade-policy/</link><description>Stakeholders working to protect democracy should shift their focus from democratic conditionality in bilateral trade agreements to rules governing the private sector. Private-sector regulations are more politically viable than withdrawing preferential status from a partner government and are likely to have less geopolitical impact on the EU’s relations with the country concerned.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Amid geopolitical competition, the EU should not abandon its commitment to democracy in its trade policy. It may shift from democratic conditionality suspensions that target partner governments to private-sector regulations.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Sinanoglu, Semuhi / Niels Keijzer</author><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 11:57:32 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-case-for-protecting-democraciesthrough-the-eus-trade-policy/</guid></item><item><title>Scientific policy advice: tasks, requirements and tensions</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/scientific-policy-advice-tasks-requirements-and-tension/</link><description>This policy brief examines the interplay between science, politics, and the public, in which actors from different (target) systems have mutual expectations. The paper reflects on the context and requirements of scientific policy advice as well as the tensions involved.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Science, politics and the public engage in dialogue on agenda-setting and problem-solving. This poses particular challenges for everyone involved, including scientific advisers. They are confronted with expectations and different role models and operate in different systems. In addition to this inherently tense relationship, there have been further challenges in recent years, with increasing hostility to science and disregard for evidence. Times of upheaval, in which uncertainties and complexities increase, on the one hand require scientific assessment and contextualisation, but on the other hand also necessitate reflection on the roles, demands and tensions involved in providing scientific advice.&nbsp;<br>The reciprocal relationship between science and politics is frequently viewed critically by the public and also by decision-makers themselves. It is, of course, also the subject of discussion in science itself. This policy brief considers policy advice in the context of political decision-making processes from the perspective of international political and social research as an applied science, based not least on the experience of the German Institute of Develop¬ment and Sustainability (IDOS), which closely integrates research, advice and training. Key statements are:</p><ul><li data-list-item-id="e89ab593fd92f7db5413b2ab5e4353876">Maintaining critical distance, despite the necessary degree of proximity, requires agreement on the role and purpose of policy advice.</li><li data-list-item-id="e712ca7affa5ffce1e97e8d1ddd11a884">For science, the principles of critical questioning and non-partisanship apply. However, researchers are never “neutral”, but represent positions based, among other things, on internal scientific discussions on the weighting of findings.</li><li data-list-item-id="e3731c83900f62c1fdc19a22fc3c32e4a">There are areas of tension between science and politics with regard to complex issues and scientific uncertainties, not least with regard to future-oriented questions, which are faced with expectations for simple, quickly implementable solutions. In addition, science and politics have very different time horizons.</li><li data-list-item-id="ec1ab53ea5b23dfabb2229cdb9c95c96d">Advisory institutions specialise in particular areas of expertise. Their expertise must be grounded in sound scientific research (beyond institutional knowledge) in order to create confidence in their reliability.</li><li data-list-item-id="eb05c2c620f820e0bd42fce2622d4287e">Ultimately, scientific knowledge must also be communicated to the society that supports it financially and as “knowledge as a common good”, as a form of public advice that con-tributes to society's ongoing process of reflection and self-understanding.</li></ul>]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Grimm, Grimm</author><pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 10:21:59 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/scientific-policy-advice-tasks-requirements-and-tension/</guid></item><item><title>Entwicklungspolitik: (K)ein Thema in Zeiten der Rückkehr der Geopolitik?</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/entwicklungspolitik-kein-thema-in-zeiten-der-rueckkehr-der-geopolitik/</link><description>Geopolitik ist als dominantes Muster in den internationalen Beziehungen zurückgekehrt, angetrieben durch Chinas Aufstieg, Russlands Angriff auf die Ukraine und die multilateralismusfeindliche Politik insbesondere der zweiten Trump-Administration.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Geopolitik ist als dominantes Muster in den internationalen Beziehungen zurückgekehrt, angetrieben durch Chinas Aufstieg, Russlands Angriff auf die Ukraine und die multilateralismusfeindliche Politik insbesondere der zweiten Trump-Administration. Der Beitrag argumentiert, dass sich diese Rückkehr der Geopolitik und die Entwicklungspolitik wechselseitig bedingen und diskutiert dazu sechs Thesen, u. a. von der geopolitischen Genese des Politikfelds. Akteure des Globalen Südens, allen voran China, Indien, Brasilien und Südafrika, treten zunehmend als Mitgestalter internationaler Normen auf, statt wie in früheren Phasen primär Objekt geopolitischer Auseinandersetzungen zu sein. Während europäische Akteure die gegenwärtigen Verschiebungen überwiegend als Krise wahrnehmen, deutet der Globale Süden sie oft als Chance zur Reform unfairer global governanceStrukturen. Für die Entwicklungspolitik bedeutet dies einen Bruch: Die klassische Legitimation über Wirksamkeit für Partnerländer weicht zunehmend einem Narrativ des gegenseitigen Nutzens.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Klingebiel, Stephan / Andy Sumner</author><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 10:56:28 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/entwicklungspolitik-kein-thema-in-zeiten-der-rueckkehr-der-geopolitik/</guid></item><item><title>International aid in transitional Syria: traps donors must avoid</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/international-aid-in-transitional-syria-traps-donors-must-avoid/</link><description>The end of the Assad regime removed the political and territorial barriers that fragmented the international response to Syria&#039;s crisis. This policy brief identifies traps awaiting donors, and outlines lessons learned in northwest Syria that can provide a foundation for the country&#039;s recovery. </description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 transformed the operating environment for international aid in Syria. Frontlines disappeared, previously in­access­ible areas became accessible and donors began shifting from humanitarian relief towards early recovery, reconstruction and support for refugee return. Yet greater access has not produced a corresponding increase in aid volume. Instead, the transition has co­incided with shrinking humanitarian funding, per­sistent banking constraints, institutional re-central­isa­tion and pressure to redirect resources across the country. The experience of north-west Syria (NWS) offers lessons for navigating this transition. This policy brief connects that experience to national challenges rela­ting to funding, the geographical redistribution of aid and institutional capacity. For more than a decade, the UN- and NGO-led humanitarian response across the Türkiye–Syria border developed localised systems for service delivery, procure­ment, financial transfers and remote account­ability under exceptionally difficult conditions, operating alongside de facto governance structures dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its Syrian Salvation Government. The rapid integration of this system into a Damascus-centred “Whole of Syria” response risks dismantling capacities that remain essential to effective aid delivery. This policy brief identifies four traps that donors should avoid in Syria:</p><ul style="margin-left:-21px;"><li data-list-item-id="ea67cc0d5c5d11d5d48ee32cfae41b15a"><span><strong>A premature transition</strong> that combines shrinking humanitarian funding with a rapid shift towards early&nbsp;recovery, reconstruction and support for refugee return before basic needs are met and essential services have improved.</span></li><li data-list-item-id="edc28030f44e16ad536cbb4345e5f066e"><span><strong>Sanctions relief on paper without functioning financial channels</strong>: removing formal restrictions while the correspondent banking system and the domestic financial system remain unable to transmit aid and investment reliably.</span></li><li data-list-item-id="e5fa2a25f7b30d63cbc224806b15903af"><span><strong>Zero-sum geographical redistribution</strong>: extend­ing aid to newly accessible areas by reducing support to still-vulnerable communities, particularly in NWS.</span></li><li data-list-item-id="ed33f3538ae9d49dc20a34f75ef6fc5ef"><span><strong>Re-centralisation and de-localisation</strong>: relocating international operations to Damascus while weak­en­ing Syrian non-governmental organisa­tions (NGOs) and subnational institutions and eroding the expertise developed through the cross-border response.</span></li></ul><p>Donors should support humanitarian relief, early re­covery and reconstruction simultaneously according to conditions on the ground. Donors and their partners should protect essential humanitarian services; estab­lish functional financial channels; strengthen local and subnational delivery capacity; allocate scarce resources transparently according to need across all governorates; and support the return of refugees and internally displaced people only where independent protection and technical assessments confirm that conditions are suitable for return. The central challenge is to ensure that international engagement strengthens rather than dismantles the institutions and operational capacities on which effective recovery depends.</p><p><strong>Fateh Shaban&nbsp;</strong>is a Research Fellow in the Geopolitics of the Middle East at the School of Economics, Politics and Inter­national Relations, University of Kent, United Kingdom.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Shaban, Fateh</author><pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 09:37:36 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/international-aid-in-transitional-syria-traps-donors-must-avoid/</guid></item><item><title>Democracy promotion with ‘Chinese Characteristics’: how the Chinese Communist Party diffuses narratives on democracy</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/democracy-promotion-with-chinese-characteristics-how-the-chinese-communist-party-diffuses-narratives-on-democracy/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since around 2020, China has increasingly promoted strategic narratives that frame its political system as a distinct form of democracy and position its visions for global politics as an alternative to the western-led liberal international order. This article analyses one institutional mechanism through which China diffuses these narratives internationally: the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party. We show how this body has become more assertive in contesting and diffusing China's narratives on democracy and how it strategically adapts its approach to different audiences, targeting particularly actors in the global South. The article bridges comparative politics, International Relations and China studies by conceptualizing China's democracy narratives as a form of narrative contestation. More broadly, the article demonstrates how struggles over democracy in world politics have become battles over legitimacy and narrative authority.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Bader, Julia / Christine Hackenesch </author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 14:19:00 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/democracy-promotion-with-chinese-characteristics-how-the-chinese-communist-party-diffuses-narratives-on-democracy/</guid></item><item><title>New trends in international investment agreements: tracing the emergence of investment facilitation</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/new-trends-in-international-investment-agreements-tracing-the-emergence-of-investment-facilitation/</link><description>Only 102 of 4,037 international investment agreements explicitly address investment facilitation. While momentum is growing, legal enforceability still lags behind. Our new study maps provisions, compares frameworks, and examines legalisation levels. </description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The focus of investment treaty-making has shifted from protecting foreign investors towards investment facilitation. Investment facilitation refers to policies that ease investment without granting investors special rights or legal protection. This study provides a comprehensive mapping and comparison of investment facilitation provisions across international investment agreements (IIAs), and evaluates their level of legalisation using the Investment Facilitation Index (IFI). Of the 4,037 IIAs with available texts as of August 2026, 102 explicitly reference “investment facilitation”. A few agreements, such as the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA), the EU–Angola Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement (SIFA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Common Investment Code (CIC), the Brazilian cooperation and facilitation investment agreements (CFIAs) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Investment Protocol, stand out due to the breadth of measures they incorporate; these could serve as blueprints for future treaties. The data also suggest that although “normative” commitments are relatively well reflected in IIAs, notably on transparency and responsible business conduct, “functional” dimensions such as electronic governance and streamlined application processes remain under-represented. There is also a trade-off between breadth and bindingness: while, on average, almost 57 per cent of covered provisions are framed in mandatory terms, the most comprehensive treaties rely heavily on hortatory language, whereas narrower agreements often achieve higher levels of legalisation. Geopolitical tensions and rising economic security screening, however, limit multilateral buy-in and may constrain the effectiveness of investment facilitation. These findings could be helpful to policymakers and investment promotion agencies, who can gain an overview of existing investment facilitation measures and their bindingness in order to design treaties and reforms of national investment frameworks that turn commitments into effective outcomes.</p><p><strong>Dr Rodrigo Polanco</strong> is a Titular Professor at the World Trade Institute (WTI), University of Bern and a legal adviser at the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Discussion Paper</category><author>Polanco, Rodrigo / Zoryana Olekseyuk / Axel Berger</author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 12:30:04 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/new-trends-in-international-investment-agreements-tracing-the-emergence-of-investment-facilitation/</guid></item><item><title>The EU’s budget talks raise serious questions for the UN</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-eus-budget-talks-raise-serious-questions-for-the-un/</link><description>Europe’s current geopolitical agenda and calls for increasing the use of European organizations in delivering its international cooperation agenda suggest that the UN needs to prepare for a potentially major drop in its funding from the continent after 2027, so the UN’s time to react is now.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Europe’s current geopolitical agenda and calls for increasing the use of European organizations in delivering its international cooperation agenda suggest that the UN needs to prepare for a potentially major drop in its funding from the continent after 2027, so the UN’s time to react is now.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Keijzer, Niels / Ronny Patz</author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 12:26:00 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/the-eus-budget-talks-raise-serious-questions-for-the-un/</guid></item><item><title>Scaling a cost-efficient green building industry in Rwanda</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/scaling-a-cost-efficient-green-building-industry-in-rwanda/</link><description>This policy brief provides research results and seven key recommendations how to scale cost-efficient green buildings in Rwanda.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rwanda needs about 150,000 new housing units every year through 2050. At the same time, the country has committed to carbon neutrality by 2050 and, under its Nationally Determined Contribution 3.0, to cutting greenhouse gas emissions by up to 53% below business as usual by 2035. Construction sits at the centre of both goals. It also has to create decent jobs for a young and growing workforce.A new policy brief by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), the University of Rwanda and Equilibria Ltd looks at how construction firms in Rwanda can become both greener and more productive. It draws on surveys of 546 firms in Kigali (2023 to 2025) and 308 firms in Kicukiro and Kamonyi (2026), 88 interviews, and focus group discussions with masons and electricians. The brief sets out seven recommendations for government, the private sector and development partners. They are to align green criteria across instruments, set clear steps for applying them, open green finance to small firms, invest in testing and demonstration of local materials, use public procurement to create steady demand, link large contractors with smaller firms, and close priority skills gaps as part of a wider support package.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Dutta, Mala / Peter Katanisa / Babette Never / Alexander Stoecker / Aime Tsinda / Mycline Umuhoza</author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 09:48:15 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/scaling-a-cost-efficient-green-building-industry-in-rwanda/</guid></item><item><title>Das 0,7-Prozent-ODA-Ziel: eine internationale Norm auf dem Rückzug</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/das-07-prozent-oda-ziel-eine-internationale-norm-auf-dem-rueckzug/</link><description>Seit über 50 Jahren verfehlen die meisten Geber das 0,7-Prozent-Ziel der ODA und bekräftigen es dennoch. Heute verfällt die Norm, ohne formal aufgegeben zu werden. Der Policy Brief erklärt ihre Entstehung, den Verfall und vier Schritte für ihre künftige Rolle.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Das 0,7-Prozent-Ziel für die öffentliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Official Development Assistance, ODA) gilt seit der UN-Generalversammlung von 1970 als zentrale quantitative Norm. Die Mehrheit der Geberländer bekräftigt es regelmäßig und verfehlt es dennoch seit über 50 Jahren. Dieser Policy Brief zeichnet nach, wie die Norm entstand, warum sie derzeit verfällt und welche Rolle sie künftig spielen könnte. Das 0,7-Prozent-Ziel – also 0,7 % des Bruttonationaleinkommens (BNE) für ODA auszugeben – hat als Zahl keine eigenständige analytische Grundlage. Schätzungen der frühen 1960er Jahre zum Kapitalbedarf armer Länder ergaben rund ein Prozent des Einkommens reicher Staaten für alle Kapitalflüsse. Die Pearson-Kommission (1969) machte daraus ein Ziel allein für öffentliche Hilfe, und die entsprechende UN-Resolution löste es von seiner Herleitung. Gestützt wurde die Norm von drei Begründungen: (i) einer Finanzierungslücke, (ii) der Lastenteilung nach Wirtschaftskraft und (iii) dem Nutzen einer einfachen Zahl für entwicklungspolitische Lobbyarbeit. Der Höhepunkt der Norm lag 2005 beim G8-Gipfel in Gleneagles. Seither verschwindet das Ziel aus den G7/G8-Dokumenten: 2023 in Hiroshima wurde es nur noch abgeschwächt erwähnt, 2024 und 2025 gar nicht mehr. Der Gipfel von Évian 2026 verschob die Agenda auf private Mittel und „gegenseitig vorteilhafte Partnerschaften“. Die Norm wurde verdrängt, ohne formal aufgegeben zu werden. Das Vereinigte Königreich fiel von 0,7 auf 0,5 Prozent und kündigte 0,3 Prozent bis 2027 an. Frankreich erreichte 2025 nur 0,42 Prozent, Deutschland immerhin noch 0,56 Prozent. Im Development Assistance Committee (DAC) der OECD liegt der Durchschnitt derzeit bei etwa 0,26 Prozent. Der Vergleich mit Zielwerten in den Politikfeldern Verteidigung, Klima, Bildung, Gesundheit und Biodiversität zeigt ein gemeinsames Muster. Die Finanzierungsziele messen überwiegend Inputs statt Ergebnisse. Sie sind politisch ausgehandelt und meist rechtlich nicht bindend. Nach dem Goodhartschen Gesetz verlieren quantitative Zielgrößen an Aussagekraft, sobald sie zum Steuerungsinstrument werden, weil Anreize bestehen, die Zielerreichung nur rechnerisch zu verbessern. Beispiele gibt es dazu auch bei der ODA. Die Norm hat inzwischen in mehreren Geberländern einen negativen Anreiz geschaffen: Einige Regierungen streben an, den Anteil ihres ODA/BNE (Bruttonationaleinkommens) zu senken. Deutschland zeigt diesen Widerspruch besonders deutlich. Der Koalitionsvertrag 2025 nennt eine „angemessene Absenkung“ der ODA-Quote als fiskalisch begründetes Ziel. Im August 2025 billigte Deutschland jedoch in der UN-Generalversammlung die Sevilla-Verpflichtung, die das Ziel von 0,7 Prozent bekräftigt – im Inland gilt die ODA als nachrangig, multilateral wird die Verpflichtung jedoch erneuert. &nbsp;Wir empfehlen vier Schritte. Erstens eine neue Schätzung der Finanzierungslücke auf nationaler Ebene nach Umfang und Modalität, etwa Zuschüsse für Niedrigeinkommensländer und konzessionäre Kredite für Länder mittleren Einkommens. Zweitens die Lastenteilung neu zu fassen: zwischen DAC-Gebern, OECD-Ländern außerhalb des DAC (wie der Türkei) und Ländern außerhalb der OECD, allen voran China. Drittens die ODA/BNE-Quote aus Transparenzgründen weiter durchgängig zu messen, die ODA aber enger zu fassen, unabhängig zu prüfen und methodisch von anderen Finanzflüssen zu trennen. Viertens das 0,7-Prozent-Ziel für die entwicklungspolitische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit beizubehalten, solange kein Ersatz eine vergleichbare Bekanntheit erzielt.&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Klingebiel, Stephan / Andy Sumner</author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 09:28:14 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/das-07-prozent-oda-ziel-eine-internationale-norm-auf-dem-rueckzug/</guid></item><item><title>Will Nepal’s flood be a wake-up call for global climate solidarity?</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/will-nepals-flood-be-a-wake-up-call-for-global-climate-solidarity/</link><description>119 developing countries submitted grant requests totalling USD 2.8 billion, highlighting the significant funding gap of FRLD</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The recent flood in Nepal highlights the devastating costs of climate change. As similar events could become more frequent, COP31 should deliver higher climate finance ambition.</strong></p><p>Bonn, 9 November 2026. On 26th August 2026, a massive torrent of rock, ice and water swept down the Bhotekoshi–Trishuli River valley in Nepal. Within minutes, it destroyed entire villages, houses and infrastructure. Over&nbsp;<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/10/1168651" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">1,500 people</a> lost their lives and 5,600 are still missing. The country estimates recovery and reconstruction costs at USD 4.8 billion, almost 10% of its nominal GDP. The disaster is central to upcoming COP31 debates on climate action.</p><p>A recent&nbsp;<a href="https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/rapid-warming-in-the-himalaya-exacerbates-geohazard-cascades-beyond-adaptation-limits/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">World Weather Attribution report</a> argues that climate change played a key role in compounding conditions and shaping this disaster. Rising temperatures, thinning glaciers, and thawing permafrost have catastrophic implications for the Himalaya. Nepal’s people will continue to bear the consequences of a warming world, despite emitting only 0.1% of the global greenhouse gases. High reconstruction and recovery costs will jeopardise Nepal’s future fiscal health. Fear that similar events could become routine and affect the local tourism sector, an important employer for youth, is also potent.</p><p>Nepalese Prime Minister Balendra Shah brought his anguish to the&nbsp;<a href="https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/nepal" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">United Nations General Assembly debates</a> this year, urging strong commitments to multilateralism where small countries’ voices on the grave local impacts of global emissions are heard, and solutions are found through cooperation. He further called for an expansion of grant-based climate finance which countries affected by climate disasters can access more quickly.</p><h2><span><strong>The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage: a test case of global solidarity?</strong></span></h2><p>The Nepal incident offers a test case for the effectiveness of the UN Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) in providing accessible finance to countries facing catastrophic climate change consequences. Established in 2022, FRLD is a grant-based and country-driven mechanism mandated to support developing countries to recover from climate-related extreme events, and to address losses resulting from slow onset climate changes. 27 donor partners have pledged a total of USD 822 million to FRLD. However, only USD 516 million in paid-in contributions have been received. Germany has shown leadership by pledging and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.germanclimatefinance.de/overview-climate-finance/channels-german-climate-finance/fund-for-responding-to-loss-damage-frld/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">delivering USD 100 million from the BMZ’s budget for the FRLD start-up phase.&nbsp;</a>An <a href="https://www.germanclimatefinance.de/overview-climate-finance/channels-german-climate-finance/fund-for-responding-to-loss-damage-frld/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">additional 150 million euros</a> is pledged for the replenishment phase to be launched in 2027. Yet, demands within the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.frld.org/nodebim" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">first funding cycle</a> make clear that FRLD cannot hold up to actual finance needs. 119 developing countries submitted grant requests totalling USD 2.8 billion, highlighting the significant funding gap of FRLD.</p><p>Nepal’s government formally requested emergency climate compensation worth USD 20 million from FRLD on 31st August, outside the official submission window. Although this amount is negligible compared with the huge costs, it tested the practical accessibility of the FRLD mechanism, which was created precisely for cases like Nepal's. In a landmark decision, the FRLD secretariat&nbsp;<a href="https://www.frld.org/sites/default/files/FRLD_Press_Release_Nepal_22Oct2026-2.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">accepted the request</a> on 22nd October, thereby first ever responding to an urgent request beyond the yearly cycle of grant application.</p><h2><span><strong>Strong multilateral climate governance is a lifeline for many regions</strong></span></h2><p>The Nepal case sparks hope on how multilateral climate finance mechanisms can adjust to respond to the urgent needs of countries devastated by climate disasters. Yet, UN climate funds like the FRLD have limited ability to tackle the scale and pace of the negative impacts of climate change, despite being essential for advancing equity and justice under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. As COP31 opens in Türkiye on 9<sup>th</sup> November, the conference should deliver higher climate finance ambition, where the performance and first replenishment of the FRLD will be discussed. The issue is pressing, as the FRLD risks to run out of funds if international commitment stagnates, which would leave developing countries severely affected by climate disasters behind.</p><p>Importantly, amid declining ODA and mounting climate crisis costs, a critical political priority should be improved predictability and access especially to adaptation and loss and damage funding - as emphasised in the&nbsp;<a href="https://unfccc.int/documents/661118" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Taku Pakasoa Declaration</a> of Leaders adopted at the Pre-COP31 meetings in Fiji and Tuvalu. Moreover, the disastrous climate event in Nepal highlights the urgent need for world leaders to demonstrate global responsibility to cut emissions and reach a collective decision to phase out fossil fuels. As we witness melting mountains and the immense human cost of climate change, the climate injustice evident in Nepal's recent floods should indeed serve as a wake-up call for renewed global solidarity on climate action.</p><hr><p><strong>Johanna Lucks</strong> is a participant of the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.idos-research.de/en/training/postgraduate-programme-for-sustainability-cooperation-pgp/62-postgraduate-course/" title="To the PGP">62nd Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation (PGP)</a> and member of the <a href="https://www.idos-research.de/en/research/description/details/pgp-research-team-blended-finance-for-climate-resilient-development-in-morocco-evidence-from-the-africagrow-fund-of-funds/" title="To the PGP Research Team">research group on blended finance</a>.</p><p><a href="https://www.idos-research.de/en/aparajita-banerjee/" title="To the profile"><strong>Aparajita Banerjee</strong></a> is a senior researcher in the research department “Environmental Governance” at IDOS.</p><p><a href="https://www.idos-research.de/en/mariya-aleksandrova/" title="To the profile"><strong>Mariya Aleksandrova</strong></a> is a senior researcher in the research department “Environmental Governance” at IDOS.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>The Current Column</category><author>Lucks, Johanna / Aparajita Banerjee / Mariya Aleksandrova</author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 08:49:36 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/will-nepals-flood-be-a-wake-up-call-for-global-climate-solidarity/</guid></item><item><title>Wissenschaftliche Politikberatung: Aufgaben, Anforderungen und Spannungsfelder</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/wissenschaftliche-politikberatung-aufgaben-anforderungen-und-spannungsfelder/</link><description>Dieses Policy Brief betrachtet das Zusammenspiel von Wissenschaft, Politik und Öffentlichkeit, in dem Akteure aus unterschiedlichen (Ziel)Systemen gegenseitige Erwartungshaltungen haben. Das Papier reflektiert Anforderungen wissenschaftlicher Politikberatung und ihre Spannungsfelder. </description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wissenschaft, Politik und Öffentlichkeit stehen in einem Austausch zu Themensetzungen und Problemlösungen. Dies stellt alle Akteur*innen, auch Beratende aus der Wissenschaft, vor besondere Herausforderungen. Sie sehen sich mit Erwartun-gen und verschiedenen Rollenbildern konfrontiert und agieren in unterschiedlichen Systemen. Zu dieser inhärent spannungsgeladenen Beziehung kommen in den letzten Jahren weitere Herausforderungen mit zunehmender Wissenschaftsfeindlichkeit und Missachtung der Faktenbasis hinzu. Umbruchzeiten, in denen Unsicherheiten und Komplexitäten zunehmen, bedürfen einerseits der wissenschaftlichen Einordnung, andererseits aber auch einer Reflexion der Aufgaben, Anforderungen und Spannungsfelder, denen sich Wissenschaftler*innen in der Beratung gegenübersehen.&nbsp;<br>Die Frage der Rückkoppelungen zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik wird immer wieder in der Öffentlichkeit und auch von Entscheider*innen selbst kritisch betrachtet. Sie ist selbstverständlich auch Gegenstand der Diskussion in der Wissenschaft selbst. Dieses Policy Brief betrachtet Beratung im Kontext politischer Entscheidungsprozesse aus der Perspektive von internationaler Politik- und Gesellschaftsforschung als angewandte Wissenschaft, basierend nicht zuletzt auf Erfahrungen des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), das Forschung, Beratung und Ausbildung in enger Verzahnung betreibt. Zentrale Aussagen sind:&nbsp;</p><ul><li data-list-item-id="e52915eb13d18e555444ee1ec8677e25e">Kritische Distanz bei notweniger Nähe bedarf der Verständigung über die Rolle sowie des Ziels der Beratung.</li><li data-list-item-id="ee3826d713954dd22820d7133ac60345e">Für Wissenschaft gilt das Gebot der kritischen Hinterfragung und der Nicht-Parteilichkeit. Forschende sind dabei jedoch nie „neutral“, sondern vertreten Positionen, die unter anderem auf wissenschaftsinternen Auseinandersetzungen zur Gewichtung von Erkenntnissen beruhen.&nbsp;</li><li data-list-item-id="e8f18bc79817f5e952b9559f4ab0f0a1a">Spannungsfelder zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik bestehen mit Blick auf komplexe Sachverhalte und wissenschaftliche Unsicherheiten, nicht zuletzt bei zukunftsorientierten Fragen, denen Erwartungen nach einfachen, schnell umsetzbaren Lösungen gegenüberstehen. Darüber hinaus haben Wissenschaft und Politik sehr unterschiedliche Zeithorizonte.</li><li data-list-item-id="e0801f6513e7b8e885b2797a9484f3683">Beratungsinstitutionen haben Expertise-Schwerpunkte. Ihre Fachkompetenz muss (jenseits der Institutionen-Kenntnisse) wissenschaftlich begründet sein, um Vertrauen in ihre Verlässlichkeit zu schaffen.</li><li data-list-item-id="eb341530ce9db2e0a7db34ceb50c1f9b3">Letztlich muss Wissenschaft auch in die sie finanziell tragende Gesellschaft und als „Gemeingut Wissen“ kommuniziert werden, als öffentliche Beratung für einen Prozess der gesellschaftlichen (Selbst-)Versicherung. &nbsp;<br>&nbsp;</li></ul>]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Grimm, Sven</author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 08:44:35 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/wissenschaftliche-politikberatung-aufgaben-anforderungen-und-spannungsfelder/</guid></item><item><title>COP 31: West Africa’s climate plans put a price on ruined roads and crops – how to add invisible losses</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/cop-31-west-africas-climate-plans-put-a-price-on-ruined-roads-and-crops-how-to-add-invisible-losses/</link><description>When a flood destroys a road, government officials can estimate the cost of rebuilding it. When drought ruins a harvest, lost income can be calculated. But how should a country record or measure the loss of a sacred place? Or the emotional strain that people experience when they are displaced from their homes by a climate-related disaster, the breakdown of community bonds, or a child’s lost sense of safety?</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When a flood destroys a road, government officials can estimate the cost of rebuilding it. When drought ruins a harvest, lost income can be calculated. But how should a country record or measure the loss of a sacred place? Or the emotional strain that people experience when they are displaced from their homes by a climate-related disaster, the breakdown of community bonds, or a child’s lost sense of safety?</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Okunola, Olasunkanmi Habeeb / Susan S. Ekoh</author><pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 14:53:00 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/cop-31-west-africas-climate-plans-put-a-price-on-ruined-roads-and-crops-how-to-add-invisible-losses/</guid></item><item><title>African youth and the future of democracy: how social media and cohort size shape political participation</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/african-youth-and-the-future-of-democracy-how-social-media-and-cohort-size-shape-political-participation/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Despite their demographic size and growing political influence, African youth remain understudied in research on political participation. This article examines how two structural shifts, youth cohort size and social media use, independently and jointly shape electoral and protest behaviour across 40 African countries. Using Afrobarometer data (2016–2023) and complementary contextual datasets, we find that individual socio-economic factors remain the strongest predictors of participation, but demographic structure and digital engagement also matter. Larger youth cohorts are associated with a greater likelihood of voting. Social media use is connected with increases in protest participation while reducing the likelihood of voting, and its interaction with youth cohort size shapes both behaviours in important, non-linear ways. These findings challenge assumptions that youthful populations inherently drive unrest and show that digital mobilisation is strongly conditioned by the demographic context. Our study has significant implications for democratic legitimacy and youth inclusion in Africa’s rapidly changing political environments.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Bonnah-Nkansah, Godfred / Christine Hackenesch</author><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 14:27:00 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/african-youth-and-the-future-of-democracy-how-social-media-and-cohort-size-shape-political-participation/</guid></item><item><title>Mauritius’s miracle has a leak: protests reveal need for reform</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/mauritiuss-miracle-has-a-leak-protests-reveal-need-for-reform/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mauritius recently experienced a wave of protests sparked by severe water shortages, inflation, and high cost of living. Benedikt Erforth argues that this reveals deeper structural problems and outlines how the economy can return to growth by innovating and adapting.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>External Publications</category><author>Erforth, Benedikt</author><pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 14:59:37 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/mauritiuss-miracle-has-a-leak-protests-reveal-need-for-reform/</guid></item></channel></rss>
