



# Global Rebalancing with Financial Stability: Possible, Feasible, or Unlikely?

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Dealing with Global Liquidity”

School of Finance, CUFU and GIZ

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


# Three Questions and the Policy Implications

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- What are the prospects for global rebalancing
- The two speed global recovery
- The implications for current account adjustment
- Capital flow developments
- Policy implications
- Summing up

# Imbalances Past, Present and Possible Future



Source: IMF, *WEO*, Sep. 2011



# On the Origins of Current Account Imbalances

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Five categories

- Saving-investment balance
- Intertemporal approach
- Mercantilism
- Global saving glut
- Distortions in (domestic) financial markets

# Projections from an Empirical Model (Chinn, Eichengreen, Ito, 2011)

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- Budget balances matter for certain countries (US, UK)
- Saving glut variables (financial development, openness, and institutional development) matter, but have done so persistently
- Ignorance reigns (large, unexplained country-specific component)
- Imbalances will resume and persist with current policies in place

# More Conclusions, and Three Caveats

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- Fiscal consolidation in the US is not enough
- Financial development in China is not enough
- Lots of 2006-08 is unexplained
- Reversion to pre-boom norms might drive most of rebalancing
- These are medium term predictions




# The Two Speed Recovery

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- The CEI approach abstracts from cyclical factors
- Faster growth in the emerging markets than in high income countries constrains current account imbalances
- But slow growth in high income countries hinders structural and policy adjustment


# The Two Speed Recovery Illustrated



Source: IMF, WEO, Sep. 2011




# Is Becoming More Pronounced




Source: IMF, WEO, Sep. 2011 and Apr. 2011

# Growth Prospects in the BRICs



Source: IMF, WEO, Sep. 2011 and Apr 2011


# A Big Shock in Europe?



Source: IMF, WEO, Sep. 2011 and Apr 2011, Deutsche Bank

# Decoupling or Recoupling: Trend and Cycle

**Chart 5. Cyclical coupling has risen over past decade**



\*cyclical growth is defined as the deviation of the real GDP

Source: IMF, Haver Analytics, DB CIB Research

Source: Deutsche Bank, *World Outlook 2011Q4*, Oct. 3, 2011.


# A Framework for Analysis

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
$$(1) \quad Y^{AS} = Y^{AD} = \alpha_1 G + \alpha_2 (M/P)$$

$$(2) \quad 0 = TB = \beta_1 G + \beta_2 (M/P)$$

# A Framework: Output Gaps and Current Account Balances




# US, Euro Area, Japan Current Account Balances



Source: IMF, *WEO*, Sep. 2011


# US, Euro Area, Japan Output Gaps



Source: IMF, WEO, Sep. 2011



# BRIC Current Accounts




Source: IMF, WEO, Sep. 2011

# High income vs. Developing Country Output Gaps


**Figure S1.8 Industrial spare capacity and economy wide capacity utilization across regions**

Industrial & whole-economy output gaps, percent of potential



Source: World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*, Jan. 2011

# China: The RMB and the Trade Balance




Source: Cheung, Chinn, and Qian (2011)


# China Medium Term Rebalancing: Saving Behavior

As a percentage of GDP

China's gross national saving



2005–07 average, by market



CN = China; DE = Germany; FR = France; IN = India; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; PH = Philippines; TW = Chinese Taipei; US = United States.


Sources: ADB; OECD; national data; authors' own estimates.

Source: Ma and Yi, *BIS Working Paper* No. 312 (June 2010)

# Gross Capital Flows: Brazil, China, the U.S.

## Gross flows for selected countries

Cumulative flows since end-2001,<sup>1</sup> in trillions of US dollars



<sup>1</sup> Changes in assets (outflows) and liabilities (inflows) over the period. <sup>2</sup> Foreign direct investment.

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

Graph III.4

Source: BIS, *Annual Report*, June 2011

# Policy Implications for Capital Surges

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- The first line of defense against capital inflows is macroeconomic
- Countercyclical fiscal policy (IMF, *WEO* Oct. 2007)
- Appropriate macroeconomic responses include appreciation, adjustment of monetary policy



# Complications

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- Tightening monetary policy can exacerbate problems if it spurs greater inflows
- The last line of defense is capital controls and repression of the financial sector



# Capital Controls

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- The IMF has modified its stance on capital controls
- Empirical work suggests that controls can alter the composition of inflows, and mitigate the effect of negative shocks on growth
- The empirical work is vague on what types of capital controls work (inflows on types, etc.)



# Capital Controls Re-reconsidered

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- Capital controls can internalize externalities
- But other measures also can – prudential measures, e.g., capital standards, regulation
- Capital controls can also have spillover effects
- What if many countries impose controls? RoW interest rates fall



# Summing Up

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- An accentuated two speed world recovery
- Rebalancing is in abeyance, unless larger effects from deleveraging
- The emerging markets are not immune (cyclical recoupling)
- Capital flows to emerging markets likely to continue
- So the policy challenges will remain