

Hitting the target?

Evaluating the effectiveness of results-based approaches to aid





Presentation structure

- 1. Why this report? Why now?
- 2. Research approach and methodology
- 3. Four key research questions and knowledge gaps
- 4. Conclusions

Brussels, November 30th 2012



1. Why this report? Why now?

Pressure on budgets + Need to improve aid effectiveness

Results – monitoring agenda

Challenges:

- Measuring impact
- Attribution

Solution?

- Linking aid disbursements to results


But, linking aid disbursements to results \iff Aid Effectiveness ?






2. Research approach

- Results-based approaches: "transfer of ODA conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target"
- Select initiatives and compare against four key aid effectiveness principles (theoretical framework)






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2. Research approach

Narrow and broad approaches




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2. Research approach

• Narrow and broad approaches





Question 1. Ownership

• Proxy: How RBA are designed.

Other relevant findings:

• Strong eligibility criteria can undermine ownership

| Ownership: | | |
|------------------|--|--|
| EC MDG C | Responsibility for designing the programs is directly transferred to the partner country government. Eligibility criteria | |
| GAVI | Responsibility for designing the programs is directly transferred to the partner country government. Some guidelines apply | |
| мсс | External team together with government. Strict eligibility criteria | |
| GFATM | A country coordination mechanism (parallel public private partnership) is responsible for the design | |
| GPOBA | No clear guidelines exist | |
| good average low | | |





Question 2. Accountability

- Results-based approaches tend to reinforce accountability to donors and in doing so, undermine mutual accountability
- Proxy: mechanisms to hold donors to account, transparency and multistakeholder dialogue

Mutual accountability:

| EC MDG C | Performance assessed through donor PAFs, fair transparency, multi-stakeholder mechanisms | |
|------------------|---|--|
| GAVI | Country performance assessed through IHP+, fair trans- parency, multi-stakeholder mechanisms | |
| мсс | No mutual accountability mechanisms, fair transparency, insufficient multi-stakeholder dialogue | |
| GFATM | Country performance assessed through IHP+, fair transparency, insufficient multi-stakeholder dialogue | |
| GPOBA | There are no mutual accountability mechanisms, trans- parency difficult to assess, poor dialogue | |
| good average low | | |





Question 3. Harmonisation

 Proxy: donor coordination structures and common monitoring mechanisms

General use of **parallel** structures

| Harmonisation | | |
|------------------|--|--|
| EC MDG C | High levels of harmonisation and integration in government processes and systems | |
| GAVI | Some progress, but still tends to use its own channels to provide funding and independent monitoring mecha- nisms | |
| мсс | It has its own channels for disbursement and independently agreed monitoring mechanisms | |
| GFATM | Some progress, but still relies on parallel mechanisms | |
| GPOBA | Its restricted and experimental nature means that not many efforts are made to harmonise existing projects | |
| good average low | | |





Question 4. Use of country systems

 Proxy: use of developing countries' procurement systems

Other findings:

 Several approaches used stringent procurement guidelines that strongly restrict the capacity of developing countries to use procurement systems as a developmental tool.

Use of country systems

| EC MDG C | Use country procurement systems | |
|------------------|---|--|
| GAVI | Use country procurement systems. Nevertheless, vac- cinations are expected to be procured through UNICEF | |
| мсс | Follow MCC procurement guidelines. No preferences are allowed | |
| GFATM | Can use systems of principal recipient under strict conditions. No preferences allowed | |
| GPOBA | Follows World Bank procurement guidelines | |
| good average low | | |





Knowledge gaps:

- Vulnerability, predictability and long term sustainability many design options
- **Perverse incentives** and **high costs linked to gaming which** lead to heavy monitoring and verification requirements (particularly in narrow approaches).
 - Costs of administration RBF 15%-30% / OECD average 7%. Why donors do not release more information about this?
- It is difficult to create good indicators. Qualitative ones are only applied to narrow approaches, even when some broader ones have objectives such as measuring progress on corruption
- Results indicators tend to focus on short/medium terms outcomes or results, instead of long term impact





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4. Conclusions

- Results-based approaches are not particularly good at supporting aid effectiveness principles, with the exception of the MDG-C. <u>Broader</u> <u>approaches tend to be better aligned</u> (the more similar to budget support the better)
 - **Ownership** tends to <u>be better when the responsibility for designing programmes falls</u> <u>on recipient governments</u>
 - Results-based approaches tend to reinforce **accountability** to donors and in doing so, <u>undermine mutual accountability</u>. No compensation mechanisms in place
 - The level of **harmonisation** of results-based approaches is generally <u>low because of the</u> <u>general use of parallel structures</u>
 - Only two of the approaches examined in this report use **country systems** to a significant extent: MDG-C and GAVI
- Important **knowledge gaps** in areas such as: form, type and timing of reward, costs and indicators

"It seems reasonable to use results-based approaches, but to do so cautiously. The aid effectiveness agenda should play a more important role in this regard by serving as a theoretical and reference framework"



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