


#### RESULTS BASED MANAGEMENT





#### **Overview of Results-Based Approaches**

Stephan Klingebiel and Heiner Janus Tunis, 16 April 2013

# Results-based approaches to development




#### **Outline**

- 1) Definitions
- 2) Results Landscape
- 3) Advantages & Challenges
- 4) Incentives
- 5) Partner Country Views
- 6) Conclusions

# 1) Definitions – The "Results Agenda"





# 1) Definitions – Common criteria for RBApp?



- Approach based on contract between funder and partner government, where partner takes responsibility for results.
- 2. Contract between funder and partner government has to be **transparent**.
- 3. Results have to be agreed on in advance.
- 4. Results should be
  - Quantifiable,
  - Achievable in incremental steps (e.g. unit price),
  - Verified regularly (e.g. annually).
- 5. Independent verification of results.
- 6. Payments only upon achievement of goal. No payments, if results are not achieved.

# 1) Definitions – Common features of RBApp



#### Contract

- Contract between funder and partner government
- Setting the baseline
- Determining "price per unit of progress"

- Partner government undertakes efforts to achieve agreed goals
- Measures can be varied: increasing funds to a sector, provision of qualified personnel, "political pressure", etc.
- Implementation Either pre-financing by partner government or start-up finance by funder

#### Verification

- Preferable: Independent third party regularly (e.g. annually) assesses achievement of results
- No progress means no payment
- In case of progress: Payment of agreed support according to progress made

#### 2) Landscape of RBA – Different Levels



## Selectivity / Allocation

Millennium Challenge Corporation

#### Macro RBA

Performance tranches in budget support

#### Sector-specific RBA


Performance tranches in sector budget support

#### "One result"-specific RBA

COD in education

# 2) Landscape of RBA





## 3) Potential & Challenges



#### Possible advantages:

- Actions of all actors are focussed on results
- Direct use of incentives
- Strengthened domestic accountability
- Improved verification of aid results

## 3) Potential & Challenges



#### **Challenges:**

- Misincentives, unintended consequences & non-systemic strategies
- ➤ Ambitious requirements → responsiveness of partners to incentives and sufficient capacity
- > Tension with Aid Effectiveness Agenda
- > Focus on quantifiable sectors
- > Delinking of results-approaches and political context

## 4) Incentives



#### How do incentives work in the context of resultsapproaches (intended incentives)? How do donors manage the use of incentives?

- Risk for recipients not to get the full amount of aid
- RBA covering ex-post investment needs or hardly any link to investment needs?
- Financial vs. non-financial incentives
- Short-term & long-term incentives (does eligibility-incentive for aid programmes work? ...)
- ➤ Pre-investment as a bottleneck / bridging pre-investment gaps → impact on incentive structure

# 5) Partner Country Views



#### Some important aspects:

- Overall aid volume: RBA part of the country envelope or additional money?
- Do partner countries have a choice: traditional projects / investments, budget support arrangements ....
- ➤ Risks for partner countries: (a) Risk assessment to (partly) fail? (b) Risk management: Can partner countries significantly manage the risks?
- Will results approaches lead to more performance orientation in the course of implementation?
- Political economy of main actors: Who is gaining from aid rewards? Who is losing? (MoF, line ministry, Head of State / PM, central/subnational level ...)
- > Impact of results-approaches on accountability lines

## 6) Conclusions



- Broad range of results-based concepts
- Several donors agencies in the process of setting up pilots
- A lot of potential for innovation; however, several risks attached