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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Neueste Publikationen – IDOS</title><link>https://www.idos-research.de/</link><description>Publikationen des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)</description><language>de</language><generator>TYPO3 EXT:news</generator><lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 13:02:00 +0100</lastBuildDate><item><title>Skatteutgifter i Norge</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/buchveroeffentlichungen/article/skatteutgifter-i-norge/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Skatteutgifter er offentlig forbruk utenfor budsjettets utgiftsside: Skatteutgifter er tapte skatteinntekter som følge av at enkelte grupper, aktiviteter eller varer skattlegges mer lempelig enn det som følger av skatte-systemets ordinære regler. De kan oppstå gjennom fritak, fradrag, lavere satser eller andre særordninger. Hvor stor en skatteutgift er, og hva som regnes som en skatteutgift, avhenger derfor av hvilket referansesystem man sammenligner med. Dette er i praksis «skjulte» tildelinger over statsbudsjettet, siden skatteutgiftene ikke vedtas eller prioriteres på nytt hvert år på samme måte som ordinære budsjettutgifter.<br>Hvorfor denne rapporten: Skatteforsk har utarbeidet denne rapporten som del av et større internasjonalt samarbeid for å bidra til større åpenhet, mer kunnskap og en bredere diskusjon om norske skatteutgifter. Vi kartlegger omfanget og fordelingen av norske skatteutgifter, samt hvordan de rapporteres og evalueres.<br>Et betydelig omfang: Norske skatteutgifter utgjør nesten 350 milliarder kroner i 2026, tilsvarende om lag 15 prosent av samlede skatte- og avgiftsinntekter. Lav boligbeskatning, merverdiavgift og rabatt i formuesskatten står samlet for om lag to tredjedeler av skatteutgiftene.<br>Et norsk transparensparadoks: Norge har høy grad av åpenhet og demokratisk kontroll med offentlige midler. Statsbudsjettet legges hvert år fram i stor detalj, og både offentlige utgifter og skatteinntekter følges tett. Skatteutgiftene får derimot langt mindre oppmerksomhet.<br>De fleste skatteutgifter blir ikke evaluert: Vår systematiske gjennomgang av tilgjengelig informasjon viser at ordninger som har vært evaluert minst én gang de siste 15 årene, kun står for 23 prosent av brutto skatteutgifter i 2026. Det innebærer at 77 prosent (tilsvarende 267 milliarder kroner i 2026) kommer fra ordninger som ikke har vært evaluert i denne perioden. Selv dette gir nok et for positivt bilde: 14 ordninger ble evaluert gjennom én samlet gjennomgang av merverdiavgiftssystemet. Ser vi bort fra denne, er bare 9 prosent av ordningene evaluert.<br>Nye resultater om hvem som får skattefordelene: Vi bruker norske mikrodata til å analysere hvordan utvalgte skattefordeler fordeler seg langs formuesfordelingen. Vi tar utgangspunkt i bruttoformue, ettersom nettoformue også reflekterer forskjeller i gjeldsnivå. Analysene viser store forskjeller mellom ordningene. Skattefordelen fra reisefradraget er størst blant dem med lavest bruttoformue, mens skjermingsfradraget er beskjedent for de nederste 90 prosentene og øker kraftig blant de mest formuende. Analysen av rentefradraget (som ikke klassifiseres som en skatteutgift i det norske referansesystemet) viser et annet mønster. Det er derfor ikke nok å kjenne kostnaden ved en skatteutgift.<br>Skatteutgifter kan være gode virkemidler, men vi må vite om de virker: Uten klart definerte mål og evalueringer vet vi i mange tilfeller ikke om ordningene faktisk oppnår det de er ment å oppnå, hvem som får fordelene, eller om de samme ressursene kunne gitt større effekt på andre måter.<br>Konklusjon og anbefalinger: Norske skatteutgifter utgjør betydelige summer, men er ikke underlagt de samme årlige budsjettprioriteringene som ordinære utgifter over statsbudsjettet. Dette bør endres. Eksisterende skatteutgifter bør evalueres mer systematisk, med tydelige mål og analyser av kostnader, virkninger og fordelingskonsekvenser. Norges omfattende registerdata gir et særlig godt grunnlag for slike evalueringer. Nye skatteutgifter bør som hovedregel være tidsbegrensede («sunset clauses») og ha en klar plan for evaluering før de eventuelt videreføres. Samtidig bør rapporteringen om skatteutgifter styrkes og gjøres mer tilgjengelig.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Buchveröffentlichungen</category><author>Alstadsæter, Annette / Eivind Bjørkås / Raysa Lizarraga / Hector Ulloa</author><pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 13:02:00 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/buchveroeffentlichungen/article/skatteutgifter-i-norge/</guid></item><item><title>COP31: the Pacific and climate finance illustrate what’s at stake in the EU’s budget 2028–2034 talks</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/cop31-the-pacific-and-climate-finance-illustrate-whats-at-stake-in-the-eus-budget-2028-2034-talks/</link><description>In the second week of the UN climate conference – COP31 – in Antalya, Pacific delegates continue to demonstrate their leadership in global climate policy, pushing for ambitious outcomes. Meanwhile, the EU’s current high-level political focus seems adrift from the urgency of the climate crisis affecting the Pacific region. This has implications for the EU’s global role, both directly in the Pacific region and beyond, and links to the ongoing EU budget discussions.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the second week of the UN climate conference – COP31 – in Antalya, Pacific delegates continue to demonstrate their leadership in global climate policy, pushing for ambitious outcomes. Meanwhile, the EU’s current high-level political focus seems adrift from the urgency of the climate crisis affecting the Pacific region. This has implications for the EU’s global role, both directly in the Pacific region and beyond, and links to the ongoing EU budget discussions.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Externe Publikationen</category><author>Aleksandrowa, Mariya</author><pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 14:42:06 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/cop31-the-pacific-and-climate-finance-illustrate-whats-at-stake-in-the-eus-budget-2028-2034-talks/</guid></item><item><title>Information integrity and digital information pollution in Indonesia: implications for democratic governance and polarization</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/information-integrity-and-digital-information-pollution-in-indonesia-implications-for-democratic-governance-and-polarization/</link><description>How do digital political communication, information pollution and institutional change interact in democratic erosion? Based on more than 30 expert interviews, this article traces Indonesia’s trajectory since 2014, from weakened accountability institutions to coordinated influence operations and the AI-supported rebranding of candidates in the 2024 election.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This article examines how digital political communication, information pollution, and institutional change interact in processes of democratic erosion and polarization. Drawing on the case of Indonesia since 2014, it analyzes two interconnected dynamics: the weakening of institutions central to transparency, accountability, and access to information, and the increasing pollution of the digital information environment through coordinated influence operations and manipulated online content. The study further highlights the growing role of generative artificial intelligence in political communication, including the AI-supported image rebranding of candidates during the 2024 presidential election campaign, which raised concerns regarding electoral integrity and democratic discourse. Based on over 30 expert interviews, this article contributes to theory building by connecting debates in public administration and governance research on information integrity, transparency, and accountability with political science research on disinformation, polarization, and democratic change. It further argues that digitally mediated depolarization strategies may also serve to normalize elite collusion and reshape polarization dynamics in ways that affect social cohesion and democratic quality.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Externe Publikationen</category><author>Breuer, Anita</author><pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 14:41:14 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/information-integrity-and-digital-information-pollution-in-indonesia-implications-for-democratic-governance-and-polarization/</guid></item><item><title>Low-emission hydrogen in Uruguay and Argentina: policy making under conditions of high technological and systemic uncertainty - Final Report</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/studies/article/low-emission-hydrogen-in-uruguay-and-argentina-policy-making-under-conditions-of-high-technological-and-systemic-uncertainty/</link><description>Argentina and Uruguay hoped to export low-emission hydrogen, but the global ramp-up has stalled. Based on 75 expert interviews, this study analyses how stakeholders perceive the uncertainties and recommends no-regret strategies: research cooperation, pilot projects and early community engagement.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This report analyses how Argentina and Uruguay are navigating the early stages of developing a low-emission hydrogen (LEH2) economy under conditions of high technological, economic and political uncertainty. Based on extensive fieldwork conducted in early 2024 – including 75 expert interviews and a focus group – the study examines stakeholder perceptions, national strategies, governance challenges and opportunities for value creation in both countries. The research “focuses on the question of how the main actors and stakeholders in the hydrogen economy perceive the uncertainties related to it” and how policy and international cooperation can support constructive action. As the landscape for the international roll-out of hydrogen has changed significantly – with support measures also being adapted – it is important to better understand how stakeholders in the Global South view their prospects and what concerns they have. This study can make an important contribution in this regard. The interviews were prepared, conducted and analysed by a trilateral research team. The three institutional partners were the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes in Argentina, Universidad de la República in Uruguay and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Senior researchers from Universidad Nacional de Quilmes and IDOS led the project, and the core research team comprised junior researchers from the partner institutions. The partners jointly designed the research project, arranged and conducted the interviews, and evaluated the findings and developed policy recommendations. Globally, hydrogen demand is rising, yet the ramp-up of LEH2 remains slow. Only 1% of global hydrogen is currently low-emission, and “the overall proportion of projects with final investment decision reached not more than 7%” of the expected production volumes by 2023. Persistently high producer prices and complex regulations (mainly at the level of the European Union) are seen as major obstacles to accelerating the roll-out of the hydrogen economy. This could change as a result of new technologies and regulatory reforms, but it is still unclear whether and when this will happen. Both Argentina and Uruguay therefore face a shifting environment: uncertain international markets, evolving certification rules and volatile investment conditions.<br>Argentina possesses substantial natural resources and industrial capabilities – excellent wind and solar resources for green hydrogen, major gas reserves for blue hydrogen and an established nuclear sector that could support pink hydrogen production. Its 2023 National Hydrogen Strategy envisioned integrated value chains, export markets and up to 82,000 jobs by 2050. However, the political shift in 2023 introduced institutional instability. The new government prioritises deregulation and an investment regime that offers incentives “without conditionality” and removes local content requirements. Stakeholders highlighted macro-economic volatility, grid bottlenecks and social and environmental concerns – especially water scarcity and community acceptance in Patagonia – as major barriers.&nbsp;<br>Uruguay, by contrast, benefits from long-term political consensus and a highly successful renewable energy transition, with renewables accounting for 98% of electricity generation. Its Green Hydrogen Roadmap (2022) outlines phased development towards 2040, supported by pilot projects such as H24U and Kahirós. Uruguay’s competitive advantages include strong institutions, highly complementary wind and solar resources and port access. Yet large-scale projects face increasing scrutiny: Environmental authorities have delayed major proposals (e.g. Enertrag’s Tambores project) due to concerns over water use, biodiversity and social licence. In both countries, stakeholders saw export demand – especially from Europe and Asia – as the primary driver of low-emission hydrogen development. Domestic markets remain small but relevant for learning and early deployment. Opportunities for local value creation exist in engineering services; renewable energy infrastructure; carbon capture, utilisation and storage; and niche eletrolyser development, but require targeted industrial policy and investment in research and development. The report concludes that the slowdown in global hydrogen development demands realistic, “no-regret” strategies: strengthening research cooperation, developing small-scale pilot projects for domestic markets, improving environmental governance and enhancing regional collaboration (e.g. through CertHiLAC, the Clean Hydrogen and Low Emissions Certification System in Latin America and the Caribbean, the emerging Latin American certification scheme). Transparent communication, early community engagement and co-benefits for local populations are essential to avoid stranded assets and secure social legitimacy for the hydrogen transition. While this conclusion is valid for many interventions supporting the sustainability transition, it is particularly relevant to the scale-up of hydrogen production, as unrealistically high expectations have long been promoted, including by Germany as a potential buyer in its engagement with potential exporters such as Argentina and Uruguay.</p><p><strong>Verónica Robert</strong> is a senior researcher at CONICET and a professor at the National University of San Martín (UNSAM) in Buenos Aires, Argentina.<br><strong>Paula Prados</strong> is a professor and senior researcher at the National University of San Martín, and a specialist in Knowledge and Innovation Economy.<br><strong>Guido Bambini</strong> and <strong>Guido Perrone</strong> are researchers at the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina. Fernanda Muniz is affiliated with the Universidad de la República, Uruguay.<br><strong>Aaron Haas</strong>, <strong>Rebecca Rohe</strong> and <strong>Paulina Wende</strong> were postgraduate research fellows in the 59th Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation at IDOS.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Studies</category><author>Stamm, Andreas / Rita Strohmaier / Verónica Robert / Paula Prados / Guido Bambini / Aaron Haas / Fernanda Muniz / Guido Perrone / Rebecca Rohe / Paulina Wende</author><pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 13:11:00 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/studies/article/low-emission-hydrogen-in-uruguay-and-argentina-policy-making-under-conditions-of-high-technological-and-systemic-uncertainty/</guid></item><item><title>The OECD Development Assistance Committee at 70: whose mutual interest will prevail?</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/the-oecd-development-assistance-committee-at-70-whose-mutual-interest-will-prevail/</link><description>Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel look at the concept of &#039;mutual interest&#039; and its potential evolution in the donors club, the OECD-DAC as it approaches its 70th anniversary.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The home of traditional donors is OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and it has its 70th anniversary in 2031. All is not well. The core instrument of the DAC, official development assistance (ODA) fell by almost a quarter in 2025 alone, the largest fall on record. The OECD projects a further fall in 2026. The recent retrenchment owes much to the United States, which accounted three-quarters of the 2025 fall. However, all major donors were cutting aid before and continue to do so. Most DAC members reduced aid in 2025.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Externe Publikationen</category><author>Sumner, Andy / Stephan Klingebiel</author><pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 08:42:37 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/the-oecd-development-assistance-committee-at-70-whose-mutual-interest-will-prevail/</guid></item><item><title>Wenn Anpassung an Grenzen stößt, muss soziale Sicherung bereitstehen</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/die-aktuelle-kolumne/article/wenn-anpassung-an-grenzen-stoesst-muss-soziale-sicherung-bereitstehen/</link><description>Soziale Sicherungssysteme berücksichtigen noch nicht systematisch die Grenzen der Anpassung, langfristige Klimaprognosen oder komplexe sozial-ökologische Dynamiken</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Soziale Sicherung wird in der Klimapolitik immer wichtiger. Doch sie muss nicht nur Schocks abfedern, sondern Menschen bei der langfristigen Anpassung helfen – und dort einspringen, wo Anpassung an Grenzen stößt.</strong></p><p>Bonn, 16. November 2026. Während die COP31 in Antalya, Türkei, stattfindet, richten sich alle Augen auf die Klimaverhandlungen. Im Fokus steht vor allem die Klimafinanzierung. Zudem wollen die Delegierten beim „globalen Anpassungsziel“ (GGA) vorankommen und die 59 auf der COP30 in Belém vereinbarten „Indikatoren“ umsetzen. Weniger sichtbar, aber dennoch entscheidend ist die wachsende Rolle sozialer Sicherung, die Maßnahmen wie Geldtransfers und öffentliche Arbeitsprogramme umfasst.</p><p>Diese Rolle wird von COP zu COP deutlicher. In der&nbsp;<a href="https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/documents/cop30-belem_declaration_eng-final.pdf/@@download/file" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Belém-Erklärung zu Hunger, Armut und menschenzentriertem Klimaschutz</a> wurde die Verpflichtung eingegangen, den sozialen Schutz zur „Grundlage für Resilienz“ zu machen. Zwei der drei GGA-Indikatoren zu Armut und Lebensgrundlagen konzentrieren sich ebenfalls auf den Sozialschutz. Und im Rahmen der vom BMZ einberufenen und von der GIZ unterstützten Taskforce für adaptiven Sozialschutz und Klimafinanzierung veröffentlichten die multilateralen Klimafonds einen gemeinsamen Bericht zum Thema „<a href="https://www.adaptationcommunity.net/publications/scaling-social-protection-for-climate-action-insights-from-and-for-multilateral-climate-funds/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Ausweitung des Sozialschutzes für den Klimaschutz“</a>.</p><p>Der Sozialschutz wird somit global immer stärker in Klimapolitik, Programmplanung und Finanzierung berücksichtigt. Auch auf nationaler Ebene gibt es Fortschritte, wie Analysen der national festgelegten Beiträge (NDCs) zeigen: Laut&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ilo.org/publications/mapping-just-transition-ndc-30-global-trends-across-123-countries" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">einer ersten Überprüfung der NDCs 3.0</a> stiegen die Verweise auf soziale Sicherung seit der Einreichung der letzten NDC-Runde von 15 % auf 64 %.</p><h2><span><strong>Soziale Sicherung im Wandel und Grenzen der Anpassung</strong></span></h2><p>Jüngst brachten Workshops von&nbsp;<a href="https://www.idos-research.de/veranstaltungen/details/how-does-social-protection-promote-climate-change-mitigation-and-adaptation/" target="_blank">IDOS</a> und&nbsp;<a href="https://www.fao.org/social-protection/news-and-events/news/news-detail/african-countries-advance-to-integrate-social-protection-into-climate-action/en" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">FAO</a> Politik und Forschung zusammen, um soziale Sicherung stärker in die nationale Klimapolitik (einschließlich Anpassung, Eindämmung sowie Verluste und Schäden) einzubinden. Kerngedanke: Soziale Sicherung soll sich nicht auf die Bewältigung von Klimaschocks beschränken,&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2024.100660" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">worauf sich die anfänglichen Anstrengungen auf Länderebene oft konzentrierten</a>. Sie soll auch längerfristige Klimaresilienz sowie Anpassungsfähigkeit fördern, arme und gefährdete Bevölkerungsgruppen vor negativen Folgen von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen schützen und einen gerechten Übergang unterstützen. Dafür reichen einzelne Anpassungen nicht; nötig sind systematisch verzahnte Strategien und Programme. Zudem sollte Soziale Sicherung eine zentrale Rolle im entstehenden politischen und finanziellen Rahmen für klimabedingte Verluste und Schäden spielen.</p><p>Diese längerfristige Rolle birgt jedoch neue Herausforderungen. Eine&nbsp;<a href="https://openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/cd9601en" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">aktuelle FAO-Studie</a> wertete den Wissensstand zu sozialer Sicherung und Grenzen der Klimaanpassung aus, einem Thema, das im&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar6/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">IPCC</a> und in den Verhandlungen über Verluste und Schäden an Gewicht gewinnt. Zwar können soziale Sicherungssysteme inklusive und resiliente Klimaanpassung entscheidend fördern, doch mit fortschreitender Erwärmung stößt Anpassung an Grenzen. Diese berücksichtigen die Programme noch nicht systematisch, ebenso wenig langfristige Klimaprognosen oder komplexe sozial-ökologische Dynamiken. So drohen sie, Menschen noch stärker an Lebensgrundlagen zu binden, die zunehmend unsicher, unproduktiv oder sogar maladaptiv werden könnten.</p><h2><span><strong>Der Weg nach vorn</strong></span></h2><p>Erstens darf diese Agenda auf der COP31 und darüber hinaus nicht von scheinbar dringlicheren Themen verdrängt werden. Die zunehmenden Folgen von El Niño für Ernährungssicherheit und ländliche Lebensgrundlagen zeigen, wie wichtig Vorsorge- und Frühwarnsysteme sind – ebenso wie koordinierte, langfristige Anpassungsmaßnahmen, die weit über akute Krisenreaktionen hinausgehen.</p><p>Zweitens bedeutet eine langfristige Perspektive, Grenzen der Anpassung besser zu erörtern und in nationale Pläne sowie internationale Abkommen einzubeziehen. Entscheidend ist, sich auf eine Zeit vorzubereiten, in der die Anpassung bestehende Lebensgrundlagen nicht mehr aufrechterhalten kann, insbesondere wenn das 1,5-Grad-Ziel überschritten wird. Soziale Sicherung muss Klimarisiken und -auswirkungen vorwegnehmen und Menschen den Weg zu tragfähigen Lebensgrundlagen ebnen, statt sie an zunehmend unsichere oder unproduktive Tätigkeiten oder Orte zu binden. Migration etwa sollte stärker als Anpassungsstrategie gelten: Soziale Sicherung muss eine sichere und würdige Migration sowie geplante Umsiedlungen unterstützen, Migrant*innen und Aufnahmegemeinschaften helfen und jene schützen, die bleiben – freiwillig oder mangels Mitteln für einen Wegzug. Dies steht auch im Zusammenhang mit Verlusten und Schäden.</p><p>Die Ergebnisse der COP31, die einen ausdrücklichen Schwerpunkt auf Umsetzung und Maßnahmen legen, werden uns hoffentlich in die richtige Richtung führen. Die politische Anerkennung der Rolle der sozialen Sicherung muss in Programmplanung, Finanzierung und Umsetzung münden, die die Ärmsten erreicht. Dies kann durch konzertiertes Handeln der Vertragsparteien, multilateraler Klimafonds und Entwicklungsbanken sowie der vielfältigen Akteure im Rahmen der Global Climate Action Agenda erreicht werden. Letztendlich müssen die Systeme der sozialen Sicherung gestärkt werden, um den Menschen zu helfen, die Schocks von heute zu bewältigen und sich gleichzeitig auf die Realitäten von morgen vorzubereiten.</p><hr><p><strong>Daniele Malerba </strong>ist Ökonom und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in der Forschungsabteilung "Transformation der Wirtschafts- und Sozialsysteme" des IDOS.</p><p><strong>Matthew Walsham</strong> ist Fachkraft für soziale Sicherung bei der Ernährungs- und Landwirtschaftsorganisation der Vereinten Nationen (FAO) und Co-Vorsitzender der Arbeitsgruppe „Sozialschutz und Klimawandel“ im Rahmen der Initiative „Universal Social Protection 2030“ (USP2030).</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Die aktuelle Kolumne</category><author>Malerba, Daniele / Matthew Walsham </author><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 12:25:27 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/die-aktuelle-kolumne/article/wenn-anpassung-an-grenzen-stoesst-muss-soziale-sicherung-bereitstehen/</guid></item><item><title>The case for protecting democracies through the EU’s trade policy</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/the-case-for-protecting-democracies-through-the-eus-trade-policy/</link><description>Stakeholders working to protect democracy should shift their focus from democratic conditionality in bilateral trade agreements to rules governing the private sector. Private-sector regulations are more politically viable than withdrawing preferential status from a partner government and are likely to have less geopolitical impact on the EU’s relations with the country concerned.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Amid geopolitical competition, the EU should not abandon its commitment to democracy in its trade policy. It may shift from democratic conditionality suspensions that target partner governments to private-sector regulations.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Externe Publikationen</category><author>Sinanoglu, Semuhi / Niels Keijzer</author><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 11:57:32 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/the-case-for-protecting-democracies-through-the-eus-trade-policy/</guid></item><item><title>Scientific policy advice: tasks, requirements and tensions</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/policy-brief/article/scientific-policy-advice-tasks-requirements-and-tension/</link><description>This policy brief examines the interplay between science, politics, and the public, in which actors from different (target) systems have mutual expectations. The paper reflects on the context and requirements of scientific policy advice as well as the tensions involved.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Science, politics and the public engage in dialogue on agenda-setting and problem-solving. This poses particular challenges for everyone involved, including scientific advisers. They are confronted with expectations and different role models and operate in different systems. In addition to this inherently tense relationship, there have been further challenges in recent years, with increasing hostility to science and disregard for evidence. Times of upheaval, in which uncertainties and complexities increase, on the one hand require scientific assessment and contextualisation, but on the other hand also necessitate reflection on the roles, demands and tensions involved in providing scientific advice.&nbsp;<br>The reciprocal relationship between science and politics is frequently viewed critically by the public and also by decision-makers themselves. It is, of course, also the subject of discussion in science itself. This policy brief considers policy advice in the context of political decision-making processes from the perspective of international political and social research as an applied science, based not least on the experience of the German Institute of Develop¬ment and Sustainability (IDOS), which closely integrates research, advice and training. Key statements are:</p><ul><li data-list-item-id="e89ab593fd92f7db5413b2ab5e4353876">Maintaining critical distance, despite the necessary degree of proximity, requires agreement on the role and purpose of policy advice.</li><li data-list-item-id="e712ca7affa5ffce1e97e8d1ddd11a884">For science, the principles of critical questioning and non-partisanship apply. However, researchers are never “neutral”, but represent positions based, among other things, on internal scientific discussions on the weighting of findings.</li><li data-list-item-id="e3731c83900f62c1fdc19a22fc3c32e4a">There are areas of tension between science and politics with regard to complex issues and scientific uncertainties, not least with regard to future-oriented questions, which are faced with expectations for simple, quickly implementable solutions. In addition, science and politics have very different time horizons.</li><li data-list-item-id="ec1ab53ea5b23dfabb2229cdb9c95c96d">Advisory institutions specialise in particular areas of expertise. Their expertise must be grounded in sound scientific research (beyond institutional knowledge) in order to create confidence in their reliability.</li><li data-list-item-id="eb05c2c620f820e0bd42fce2622d4287e">Ultimately, scientific knowledge must also be communicated to the society that supports it financially and as “knowledge as a common good”, as a form of public advice that con-tributes to society's ongoing process of reflection and self-understanding.</li></ul>]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Grimm, Sven</author><pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 10:21:59 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/policy-brief/article/scientific-policy-advice-tasks-requirements-and-tension/</guid></item><item><title>Firm behavior, structure, and constraints in Egyptian manufacturing: introducing the Egyptian industrial firm behavior survey through an adapted structure–conduct–performance framework</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/firm-behavior-structure-and-constraints-in-egyptian-manufacturing/</link><description>What shapes firm behaviour and performance in Egyptian manufacturing? This paper introduces a special issue drawing on the Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey of 2,383 manufacturers. It develops an adapted Structure–Conduct–Performance framework that places institutions and firm behaviour at the centre of analysis, providing a common foundation for eight studies exploring firms’ performance, development and constraints.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This paper introduces the Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey (EIFBS) 2020/21 and develops the conceptual framework guiding the accompanying special issue. Drawing on data covering 2,383 manufacturing firms, it adapts the Structure–Conduct–Performance framework to place firm behavior and institutions at the center of analysis and to allow for feedbacks between firm conduct and performance. It then provides a descriptive sectoral diagnostic of market concentration, employment generation, technological upgrading, firm-size transitions, and institutional constraints. The observed patterns suggest differences between concentrated, capital- and policy-intensive sectors, which exhibit greater technological upgrading but limited employment generation, and more competitive, labor-intensive sectors, which absorb more firms and workers but display lower upgrading and firm-size mobility. These patterns are descriptive and do not establish causal relationships. Together, the eight accompanying papers use the EIFBS to examine productivity, firm growth, digitalization and innovation, institutional constraints, exporting, spatial agglomeration, labor demand, and firms’ adjustment to COVID-19.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Externe Publikationen</category><author>El-Haddad, Amirah/Chahir Zaki</author><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 18:09:55 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/firm-behavior-structure-and-constraints-in-egyptian-manufacturing/</guid></item><item><title>Entwicklungspolitik: (K)ein Thema in Zeiten der Rückkehr der Geopolitik?</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/entwicklungspolitik-kein-thema-in-zeiten-der-rueckkehr-der-geopolitik/</link><description>Geopolitik ist als dominantes Muster in den internationalen Beziehungen zurückgekehrt, angetrieben durch Chinas Aufstieg, Russlands Angriff auf die Ukraine und die multilateralismusfeindliche Politik insbesondere der zweiten Trump-Administration.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Geopolitik ist als dominantes Muster in den internationalen Beziehungen zurückgekehrt, angetrieben durch Chinas Aufstieg, Russlands Angriff auf die Ukraine und die multilateralismusfeindliche Politik insbesondere der zweiten Trump-Administration. Der Beitrag argumentiert, dass sich diese Rückkehr der Geopolitik und die Entwicklungspolitik wechselseitig bedingen und diskutiert dazu sechs Thesen, u. a. von der geopolitischen Genese des Politikfelds. Akteure des Globalen Südens, allen voran China, Indien, Brasilien und Südafrika, treten zunehmend als Mitgestalter internationaler Normen auf, statt wie in früheren Phasen primär Objekt geopolitischer Auseinandersetzungen zu sein. Während europäische Akteure die gegenwärtigen Verschiebungen überwiegend als Krise wahrnehmen, deutet der Globale Süden sie oft als Chance zur Reform unfairer global governanceStrukturen. Für die Entwicklungspolitik bedeutet dies einen Bruch: Die klassische Legitimation über Wirksamkeit für Partnerländer weicht zunehmend einem Narrativ des gegenseitigen Nutzens.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Externe Publikationen</category><author>Klingebiel, Stephan / Andy Sumner</author><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 10:56:28 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/entwicklungspolitik-kein-thema-in-zeiten-der-rueckkehr-der-geopolitik/</guid></item><item><title>International aid in transitional Syria: traps donors must avoid</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/policy-brief/article/international-aid-in-transitional-syria-traps-donors-must-avoid/</link><description>The end of the Assad regime removed the political and territorial barriers that fragmented the international response to Syria&#039;s crisis. This policy brief identifies traps awaiting donors, and outlines lessons learned in northwest Syria that can provide a foundation for the country&#039;s recovery. </description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 transformed the operating environment for international aid in Syria. Frontlines disappeared, previously in­access­ible areas became accessible and donors began shifting from humanitarian relief towards early recovery, reconstruction and support for refugee return. Yet greater access has not produced a corresponding increase in aid volume. Instead, the transition has co­incided with shrinking humanitarian funding, per­sistent banking constraints, institutional re-central­isa­tion and pressure to redirect resources across the country. The experience of north-west Syria (NWS) offers lessons for navigating this transition. This policy brief connects that experience to national challenges rela­ting to funding, the geographical redistribution of aid and institutional capacity. For more than a decade, the UN- and NGO-led humanitarian response across the Türkiye–Syria border developed localised systems for service delivery, procure­ment, financial transfers and remote account­ability under exceptionally difficult conditions, operating alongside de facto governance structures dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its Syrian Salvation Government. The rapid integration of this system into a Damascus-centred “Whole of Syria” response risks dismantling capacities that remain essential to effective aid delivery. This policy brief identifies four traps that donors should avoid in Syria:</p><ul style="margin-left:-21px;"><li data-list-item-id="ea67cc0d5c5d11d5d48ee32cfae41b15a"><span><strong>A premature transition</strong> that combines shrinking humanitarian funding with a rapid shift towards early&nbsp;recovery, reconstruction and support for refugee return before basic needs are met and essential services have improved.</span></li><li data-list-item-id="edc28030f44e16ad536cbb4345e5f066e"><span><strong>Sanctions relief on paper without functioning financial channels</strong>: removing formal restrictions while the correspondent banking system and the domestic financial system remain unable to transmit aid and investment reliably.</span></li><li data-list-item-id="e5fa2a25f7b30d63cbc224806b15903af"><span><strong>Zero-sum geographical redistribution</strong>: extend­ing aid to newly accessible areas by reducing support to still-vulnerable communities, particularly in NWS.</span></li><li data-list-item-id="ed33f3538ae9d49dc20a34f75ef6fc5ef"><span><strong>Re-centralisation and de-localisation</strong>: relocating international operations to Damascus while weak­en­ing Syrian non-governmental organisa­tions (NGOs) and subnational institutions and eroding the expertise developed through the cross-border response.</span></li></ul><p>Donors should support humanitarian relief, early re­covery and reconstruction simultaneously according to conditions on the ground. Donors and their partners should protect essential humanitarian services; estab­lish functional financial channels; strengthen local and subnational delivery capacity; allocate scarce resources transparently according to need across all governorates; and support the return of refugees and internally displaced people only where independent protection and technical assessments confirm that conditions are suitable for return. The central challenge is to ensure that international engagement strengthens rather than dismantles the institutions and operational capacities on which effective recovery depends.</p><p><strong>Fateh Shaban&nbsp;</strong>is a Research Fellow in the Geopolitics of the Middle East at the School of Economics, Politics and Inter­national Relations, University of Kent, United Kingdom.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Policy Brief</category><author>Shaban, Fateh</author><pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 09:37:36 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/policy-brief/article/international-aid-in-transitional-syria-traps-donors-must-avoid/</guid></item><item><title>Democracy promotion with ‘Chinese Characteristics’: how the Chinese Communist Party diffuses narratives on democracy</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/democracy-promotion-with-chinese-characteristics-how-the-chinese-communist-party-diffuses-narratives-on-democracy/</link><description></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since around 2020, China has increasingly promoted strategic narratives that frame its political system as a distinct form of democracy and position its visions for global politics as an alternative to the western-led liberal international order. This article analyses one institutional mechanism through which China diffuses these narratives internationally: the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party. We show how this body has become more assertive in contesting and diffusing China's narratives on democracy and how it strategically adapts its approach to different audiences, targeting particularly actors in the global South. The article bridges comparative politics, International Relations and China studies by conceptualizing China's democracy narratives as a form of narrative contestation. More broadly, the article demonstrates how struggles over democracy in world politics have become battles over legitimacy and narrative authority.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Externe Publikationen</category><author>Bader, Julia / Christine Hackenesch </author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 14:19:00 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/democracy-promotion-with-chinese-characteristics-how-the-chinese-communist-party-diffuses-narratives-on-democracy/</guid></item><item><title>New trends in international investment agreements: tracing the emergence of investment facilitation</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/discussion-paper/article/new-trends-in-international-investment-agreements-tracing-the-emergence-of-investment-facilitation/</link><description>Only 102 of 4,037 international investment agreements explicitly address investment facilitation. While momentum is growing, legal enforceability still lags behind. Our new study maps provisions, compares frameworks, and examines legalisation levels. </description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The focus of investment treaty-making has shifted from protecting foreign investors towards investment facilitation. Investment facilitation refers to policies that ease investment without granting investors special rights or legal protection. This study provides a comprehensive mapping and comparison of investment facilitation provisions across international investment agreements (IIAs), and evaluates their level of legalisation using the Investment Facilitation Index (IFI). Of the 4,037 IIAs with available texts as of August 2026, 102 explicitly reference “investment facilitation”. A few agreements, such as the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA), the EU–Angola Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement (SIFA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Common Investment Code (CIC), the Brazilian cooperation and facilitation investment agreements (CFIAs) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Investment Protocol, stand out due to the breadth of measures they incorporate; these could serve as blueprints for future treaties. The data also suggest that although “normative” commitments are relatively well reflected in IIAs, notably on transparency and responsible business conduct, “functional” dimensions such as electronic governance and streamlined application processes remain under-represented. There is also a trade-off between breadth and bindingness: while, on average, almost 57 per cent of covered provisions are framed in mandatory terms, the most comprehensive treaties rely heavily on hortatory language, whereas narrower agreements often achieve higher levels of legalisation. Geopolitical tensions and rising economic security screening, however, limit multilateral buy-in and may constrain the effectiveness of investment facilitation. These findings could be helpful to policymakers and investment promotion agencies, who can gain an overview of existing investment facilitation measures and their bindingness in order to design treaties and reforms of national investment frameworks that turn commitments into effective outcomes.</p><p><strong>Dr Rodrigo Polanco</strong> is a Titular Professor at the World Trade Institute (WTI), University of Bern and a legal adviser at the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Discussion Paper</category><author>Polanco, Rodrigo / Zoryana Olekseyuk / Axel Berger</author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 12:30:04 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/discussion-paper/article/new-trends-in-international-investment-agreements-tracing-the-emergence-of-investment-facilitation/</guid></item><item><title>The EU’s budget talks raise serious questions for the UN</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/the-eus-budget-talks-raise-serious-questions-for-the-un/</link><description>Europe’s current geopolitical agenda and calls for increasing the use of European organizations in delivering its international cooperation agenda suggest that the UN needs to prepare for a potentially major drop in its funding from the continent after 2027, so the UN’s time to react is now.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Europe’s current geopolitical agenda and calls for increasing the use of European organizations in delivering its international cooperation agenda suggest that the UN needs to prepare for a potentially major drop in its funding from the continent after 2027, so the UN’s time to react is now.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Externe Publikationen</category><author>Keijzer, Niels / Ronny Patz</author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 12:26:00 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/the-eus-budget-talks-raise-serious-questions-for-the-un/</guid></item><item><title>Scaling a cost-efficient green building industry in Rwanda</title><link>https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/scaling-a-cost-efficient-green-building-industry-in-rwanda/</link><description>This policy brief provides research results and seven key recommendations how to scale cost-efficient green buildings in Rwanda.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rwanda needs about 150,000 new housing units every year through 2050. At the same time, the country has committed to carbon neutrality by 2050 and, under its Nationally Determined Contribution 3.0, to cutting greenhouse gas emissions by up to 53% below business as usual by 2035. Construction sits at the centre of both goals. It also has to create decent jobs for a young and growing workforce.A new policy brief by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), the University of Rwanda and Equilibria Ltd looks at how construction firms in Rwanda can become both greener and more productive. It draws on surveys of 546 firms in Kigali (2023 to 2025) and 308 firms in Kicukiro and Kamonyi (2026), 88 interviews, and focus group discussions with masons and electricians. The brief sets out seven recommendations for government, the private sector and development partners. They are to align green criteria across instruments, set clear steps for applying them, open green finance to small firms, invest in testing and demonstration of local materials, use public procurement to create steady demand, link large contractors with smaller firms, and close priority skills gaps as part of a wider support package.</p>]]></content:encoded><category>Externe Publikationen</category><author>Dutta, Mala / Peter Katanisa / Babette Never / Alexander Stoecker / Aime Tsinda / Mycline Umuhoza</author><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 09:48:15 +0100</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.idos-research.dehttps://www.idos-research.de/externe-publikationen/article/scaling-a-cost-efficient-green-building-industry-in-rwanda/</guid></item></channel></rss>
