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Innovations in Governance

Evaluations and research studies on
electoral accountability, corruption and
multidimensional peacekeeping

Melody Garcia

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Development and Applications of Evaluation Methods and
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Abstract

This paper provides an overview of current research and practice of governance evaluation covering three topics: electoral accountability, corruption, and multidimensional peacekeeping. It illustrates how previous evaluation challenges have been tackled using state-of-the-art methodologies, and how these methods are recently being used to explore causal mechanisms. This paper argues that evaluating interventions is necessary in order to advance our knowledge of governance, but that studies that test theories and assumptions, explain causes and consequences, and tackle measurement problems are equally important, especially for donor programming. By reviewing a range of ongoing and published evaluation and research studies, this paper extracts lessons for governance policy and for practice of governance evaluation.

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Abbreviations

3ie	International Initiative for Impact Evaluation
AUSAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung / Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CDD	Community-Driven Development
CDR	Community Driven Reconstruction Programme
CIDA/GESP	Canadian International Development Agency / Gender Equity Support Project
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DDR	disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development , UK
DID	Difference-In-Differences
DIME	Development Impact Evaluation, World Bank
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EGAP	Experiments in Governance and Politics
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GOVNET	Governance and Development Network
GSDRC	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
IFC	International Finance Corporation
JPAL	The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab
IV	Instrumental Variable
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MP	Multidimensional Peacekeeping
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation/Development Assistance Committee

PREM	Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, World Bank
PSM	Propensity Score Matching
PROGRESA	Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación
RCT	Randomized Control Trial
RDD	Regression Discontinuity Design
SIDA	Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
SIEF	Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund, World Bank
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIFEM	The United Nations Development Fund for Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

1 Introduction

Governance is widely considered to be crucial for development. However, election irregularities such as ballot fraud, violence and vote-buying plague new democracies, instances of corruption in public sectors occur almost daily, and the incidence of civil war and conflicts continues to afflict the poorest countries.

A broad spectrum of development actors is interested in promoting ‘good governance’. Many multilateral and bilateral agencies send international observers as election day approaches and provide democracy assistance beyond elections. For instance, between 2001 and 2011, the Department for International Development (DFID) through United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided £ 140 million in support of education campaigns for voters, training for political parties and media, beyond designing electoral systems and improving voter registration (ICAI 2012). Many non-governmental organisations act as corruption watchdogs for local and global public actors. Not least, about 70 public sector reform projects are financed by the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) and implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) to combat corruption in public administration (BMZ 2011). And lastly, several donor countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), along with the United Nations (UN), strongly engage in peace- and state-building efforts.

Recently, there has been a growing awareness that evaluating the impact of governance support should be incorporated in donor programming. Indeed, in the past five years there has been a dramatic increase in impact evaluation studies in development co-operation more generally, partly motivated by commitments to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. Most of these evaluations have been conducted for the purpose of upward accountability and learning (Naudet / Delarue / Bernard 2012).

However, the importance of evaluation as a learning tool has recently been subject to debates. This is due to the disagreement on whether impact evaluations can answer the *why* and the *how* questions. Even with a large number of project evaluations, it is unlikely to find out how, for example, the poor can escape poverty, unless the analysis provides evidence on *why* the projects work, rather than *whether* they work. Some researchers argue that answering the *why* and the *how* can be achieved by evaluating not only projects, but also the theoretical assumptions underlying a specific intervention (Deaton 2010 / Ludwig / Kling / Mullainathan 2011).

An important distinction should be made between evaluations that aim to test theories, and those that aim to test the effectiveness of a project (or policy). Unfortunately, conventional evaluations first and foremost test the effectiveness of a project alone. But a new wave of evaluations, especially those conducted through experimentation, has started testing different theories and causal mechanisms that underlie a project (for instance, Duflo / Hanna / Ryan 2010; Giné / Karlan / Zinman 2010). In this approach, the implicit theory of change is further questioned.

In this paper, evaluation studies refer to those that examine the impact of a deliberate “intervention”, whereas research studies go beyond that – for instance testing causalities, such as the impact of violence on political participation; confirming theories from

economic and behavioural sciences; or improving techniques and measurement. The difference between evaluations and research studies could be gradual: micro research studies can still be evaluations. But rather than focusing on “no intervention” as a counterfactual, it explores a different intervention, testing a different theory of change. This paper, therefore, examines the potential of utilising both types of studies to enhance our understanding of complex governance issues.

Despite the importance of qualitative work and country analysis, this paper will exclusively focus on a subset of evaluation and research studies that make use of experimental and quasi-experimental designs at the micro-level. By focusing at the micro-level, this paper should complement and support countrywide and cross-country governance studies (see for example, Grävingholt / Leininger / von Haldenwang 2012; Hickson 2010; NORAD 2011).

This paper presents an overview of evaluation and research studies on electoral accountability, corruption and multidimensional peacekeeping. 50 evaluation and micro research studies (14 on corruption, 18 on elections and 18 on peacekeeping) have been selected and examined based on information provided at donor websites¹, presentations from conferences, as well as recent reviews of the academic literature².

This paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the quantitative methods that are commonly used for impact evaluations. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 present the evaluation and micro research studies on electoral accountability, corruption and multidimensional peacebuilding, respectively. In each chapter, results from several evaluations are compiled to give a general overview of whether specific interventions work. Several examples of micro research studies complement the evaluations. On electoral accountability, this paper provides examples on causal linkage (clientelism and voter turnout) and measurement. On corruption, the analysis will focus on whether it exists and its channels; while on peacekeeping, the paper will examine the consequences of civil wars and conflict. Chapter 6 discusses general lessons and implications for donors. Chapter 7 discusses how research studies that complement evaluations can be systematically integrated into donor programming for the purpose of informing policy. Chapter 8 presents the conclusions.

1 The following websites of donor agencies and web portals have been consulted (May 2011): UK DFID, ITAD, USAID, World Bank PREM, World Bank DIME, European Commission, 3ie, BMZ, DANIDA, OECD DAC, CIDA/GESP, AUSAID, SIDA, MCC’s Threshold Program, GOVNET, UNIFEM, Democratic Governance Support Program, EGAP, JPAL and GSDRC.

2 Note, however, that some donors, such as the UK DFID, have channeled their support on impact evaluation through 3ie or the World Bank’s SIEF. Thus, the source where the information was gathered does not necessarily reflect that the evaluation is initiated by a single organisation. Many of the academic papers published on this topic originated from projects commissioned or supported by donors.

2 Impact evaluation

2.1 Definition

Impact evaluation analyses the impact of an intervention on welfare outcomes. Interventions may take the form of policies, programmes or projects. In reality, changes in outcome may be only partly due to the intervention, and sometimes not at all. Thus, the fundamental problem with evaluation is how to establish attribution, i.e. to determine that the outcome is the result of the intervention and not of any other factors. It raises the issue of the counterfactual, *“the comparison of what actually happened and what would have happened in the absence of intervention”* (White 2006).

Formally, impact is the difference in outcome Y , with Y_1 denoting the outcome if a person is exposed to the intervention, and Y_0 is the outcome if he/she is not.

$$\text{impact} = Y_1 - Y_0 \quad (1)$$

At any given point in time, it is only possible to observe the outcome when the person is exposed to treatment, but not the outcome when not exposed. In other words, the impossibility to observe both states at the same time poses a dilemma for Equation 1.

To resolve this dilemma, researchers compare the outcome “before-and-after” or find a comparison group that did not receive the intervention. However, changes in outcome before-and-after rarely represent the effect of the intervention, as many events or developments can occur in between those points that can inflate or deflate the real impact. Examples include disasters, weather conditions and national information campaigns. Further, data from a programme with a comparison group that allows a “with-versus-without” comparison can also give biased results if the reasons for participating in the programme are due to many factors, both observed and unobserved. To give an example, if at the outset the treatment group is more motivated than the comparison group, then the increase in impact is probably not (completely) caused by the treatment, but rather by the fact that the treatment group is better at the start (this is often called selection bias).

2.2 Methods

Researchers have developed several techniques to overcome the problems associated with the before-and-after and with-versus-without comparisons mentioned above. This is done by searching for a valid counterfactual or a “what would have happened without the intervention” situation.

An increasingly popular method in evaluation research is a randomised experiment where individuals are randomly assigned to the project. This concept is in fact not new. Doctors conduct randomised trials most times when they test the efficacy of new drugs, where they randomly assign patients into either the test or placebo group. Randomly assigning generates two groups of participants, the treatment and the control group. As the size of the treatment and control groups increase, the difference between the two groups in terms of extraneous factors should even out and the only remaining difference should be the intervention. Thus, impact is calculated by comparing the averages of those who received treatment and those who did not.

Randomised trials may not be suitable in cases where projects are aimed to reach specific groups. Ethical, political and logistical considerations can also make random allocation inappropriate. In these cases, a range of quasi-experiments resembling an experimental situation is an alternative. Quasi-experiments ensure that the participants who took part in the programme are, in terms of their characteristics, as close as possible to those who did not. The procedures ensure that the selection bias is addressed in the analysis. However, quasi-experiments often require a large number of observations to achieve robust results, as well as assumptions regarding the nature of the data that may not be directly testable. Nevertheless, if designed properly, many researchers have successfully applied quasi-experiments in teasing out the impact of a policy intervention. Garcia (2011) provides a more comprehensive explanation of micro-approaches in evaluating governance interventions. See Box 1 for a summary of experimental and quasi-experimental designs.

Box 1: Impact evaluation techniques

Impact is calculated as the difference in outcome with and without an intervention. But since it is not possible to collect data from a single individual or subject in both circumstances – in the presence and absence of intervention – various techniques can be applied to circumvent the problem of missing data, and to arrive at an unbiased estimate of the impact. The application of these techniques largely depends on how the intervention has been or will be implemented, and on the design of the experiment in general.

Randomisation (Randomised control trial - RCT): This approach requires that participants be randomly assigned to treatment. The random assignment generates two groups of participants, the control group and the treatment group. As the number of sample participants increases, the difference between the two groups in terms of extraneous factors should even out, until the only remaining difference is the intervention.

Instrumental variable (IV): In simple terms, this approach involves identifying a special variable that affects outcome and intervention, but without the two having any causality. An IV approach is called for if the causal relationship between intervention and outcome runs in the opposite direction. Such a scenario occurs when (i) the intervention has been deliberately targeted or (ii) participants have joined the programme for specific reasons. This implies that potentially unobserved characteristics or omitted variables have not been taken into account.

Difference-in-differences (DID): This approach calculates impact by utilising information before and after the intervention and calculating the change in outcome over the two periods separately for the control and treatment groups. Changes experienced by both groups are then compared in order to identify the “real” effect of the intervention.

Propensity score matching (PSM): To minimise confounding factors due to the non-random assignment of the intervention, matching requires finding a comparison group that matches the characteristics of the treatment group. The observable characteristics are used to generate a propensity score, which is the probability of participation. Each treated individual is matched to a non-participant on the basis of this propensity score.

Regression discontinuity design (RDD): RDD require a specific eligibility rule (for instance, an income threshold) when targeting participants for the programme. The degree to which the intervention changes the outcome for the treatment group compared to non-participants near the eligibility cut-off is the impact.

Natural experiments: The treatment assignment is one that is controlled not by evaluators, but by a natural phenomenon or by the occurrence of an event. Similar to other approaches, assignment will generate two groups of participants – the treatment group that is affected by nature or the event, and the control group that is not.

Source: Garcia (2011)

2.3 Impact evaluation in development cooperation

Driven by results and motivated by commitments to the MDGs, the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, many donors are now increasingly undertaking rigorous impact evaluation of development programmes. In traditional sectors, such as health, education and labour, a strong body of evidence has been produced in recent years, measuring the impact of a wide range of interventions, and evaluations in governance have been steadily increasing in number.

Apart from the gains in efficiency to be obtained from allocating scarce resources to interventions that work, conducting rigorous impact evaluation in governance is very important, given the unintended, yet potentially damaging consequences of an inappropriate governance intervention. Development co-operation in such fields as democracy, transparency and human rights is too important, to base our knowledge purely on anecdotal evidence. Proponents believe that, by understanding the impact of a specific intervention – what works and why – the elusive macroeconomic effects of development assistance can eventually be identified.

There is, however, scepticism about the ability of impact evaluations to address the *why* and *how* questions. Even with a large number of project evaluations, it might still be doubtful that they would deliver generalisable results. In his article in the *Journal of Economic Literature*, Deaton (2010) made a case in favour of experimenting with theories rather than projects: “*RCTs, even when done without error or contamination, are unlikely to be helpful for policy, or to move beyond the local, unless they tell us something about why the program worked, something to which they are often neither targeted nor well-suited.*” Beyond RCTs, this observation applies to the entire debate on impact evaluation. Regardless whether the method applied is RCT or quasi-experimental, it is important to not only examine interventions, but also the theoretical assumptions built into them. This would help shed light on many questions pertaining to *why* and *under what conditions* the intervention works.

But up to what extent should the evaluation of projects shift towards the evaluation of theories? Following some suggestions from Ludwig / Kling / Mullainathan (2011), evaluation of theories and assumptions underlying the intervention can be beneficial if:

information to support planning, implementation and improvement of future programmes are needed more than information for auditing purposes;

if programme managers are less certain, which programmes or policies would suit best and would like to rule out potentially ill-suited programmes; and

if they are keen to validate and strengthen the causal mechanism behind the intervention.

In many cases, evaluation is seen more as an accountability rather than as a learning tool (Jones et al 2009; Naudet / Delarue / Bernard 2012). But without knowing why interventions work, donors cannot take appropriate corrective action. Eventually, a delicate balance between these two objectives must be established, and donors have to decide on the spectrum within which they identify themselves.

Table 1 presents the properties of studies considered in this paper against the vast literature on evaluation and causal research. This paper will provide an overview and will

Table 1: Properties of evaluation and research studies defined in this paper			
Topic	Evaluation Studies		Empirical Micro Research
	Conventional Approach	Novel Approach	
Main purpose	To inform policy	To inform policy and contribute to building knowledge	To inform policy and contribute to building knowledge
Relevance	Validating the effectiveness of an intervention	Validate assumptions about a given intervention, in addition to validating its effectiveness	Establish causes and consequences, test theories and assumptions, and improve measurement
Object of analysis	Intervention	Intervention Mechanism between intervention I and outcome Y Multiple intervention arm/ Different intervention as counterfactual	Causal relationship between independent variable X and outcome Y. Mechanism behind independent variable X and outcome Y
Types of questions addressed	What type of interventions work? Which ones do not?	Why does intervention I work? Under what circumstances does the intervention work?	What are the causes and consequences of Y? What is the mechanism behind the relationship?
Methods	Randomised control trials Quasi-experimental design	Randomised control trials Quasi-experimental design	Randomised control trials Quasi-experimental design
Type of data	Large n	Large n	Large n
Level of analysis	Micro	Micro	Micro
Main recipients	Donors, Governments	Donors, Governments, Academia	Donors, Governments, Academia
Source: Authors's representation			

focus only on a subset of evaluation and research work, notwithstanding the importance of other qualitative and countrywide studies. Both evaluation and micro empirical research presented here aimed at informing policy-making using experimental and quasi-experimental methods. The studies considered require large observations at the micro-level of individuals, communities and villages.

Where the two fields of study in this paper differ is in the object of analysis. Evaluation studies analyse the impact of a deliberate “intervention”, whereas micro research studies pertain to general causalities (the study of the impact of violence on political participation), root causes (why rebellion exists), testing new theories and developing new measures (capturing clientelism). But note that the distinction between the novel approach to evaluation and causal micro research is very slight.

The next three chapters will present new evidence and current donor initiatives on electoral accountability, corruption and multidimensional peacekeeping. The lessons learned from donor interventions are discussed in the first part of each chapter as evaluation studies and in the second part, micro empirical studies are presented to further our understanding of the issues. The complementarities of both fields of study will also be discussed.

3 Electoral accountability

Voter behaviour continues to be one of the most controversial issues in comparative politics. In many established democracies, a significant proportion of citizens does not vote and absenteeism is on the rise, particularly among the poorer sectors of society (Niemi / Weisberg 2001). There are a multitude of factors that have been documented to explain voter behaviour, ranging from the voters' rational choice, their asymmetric information, the transaction costs of voting, competition between candidates, to political conditions and the voters' socio-economic characteristics (Aldrich 1993; Ashenfelter / Kelley 1975; Cebula / Meads 2007; Edlin / Gelman / Kaplan 2007; Fowler 2006).

In the context of developing economies, the decision to vote and the reasons for variations across countries become very different given that elections are marred by violence, ballot fraud and clientelism. Election irregularities distort the process of accountability and undermine the democratic process. Vote-buying reverses the role of voters and politicians: It is the politicians who hold the voters accountable for their vote in exchange for material benefits (Stokes 2005). Candidates who are able to resort to ballot fraud can hardly be made responsible for their performance. Violence and intimidation cause citizens to shun running for office or to refrain from voting.

The way in which elections are conducted and held reflects the level of democratic consolidation. In the principal-agent models of democratic delegation, the voter (as principal) has the ultimate power to elect holders of public office (as agents), entrusting them with the task of delivering public services, and holding them accountable for their actions. Thus, elections should be considered a key element of political accountability.

Numerous strategies and policy reforms on a global scale have been pursued to promote electoral accountability. One of the main challenges in evaluating the effects of these interventions is attribution. Suppose we want to study the effect of a voter education campaign. One cannot say for certain that the change in outcome is due to the campaign, rather than to other factors. The individual heterogeneity stemming from the beneficiaries self-selection to the programme can only be captured if the education campaign is randomly allocated. (Random allocation of treatment is not the same as random sampling in surveys.)

The second main challenge is observational equivalence. Consider for example studies that explore the role of institutions, both formal and informal, on electoral accountability. Although descriptive and national statistics may suggest that institutions play a role with regard to electoral accountability, such evidence cannot demonstrate a *causal* relationship. Institutions may be the cause, but they can also be the product of electoral accountability.

The third main challenge is measurement error. Electoral abnormalities are difficult to establish as a result of underreporting. For instance, respondents tend not to report their participation in vote-buying, since it is illegal in many countries (De La O 2011) and socially objectionable (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2010). Similarly, electoral intimidation and violence are quite sensitive and threatening in nature, so that voters may opt for secrecy and anonymity, rather than divulging their experience. Hence, vote-buying and related electoral problems cannot be accurately captured due to poor measurement.

Confronted by these challenges and by the need to improve our understanding of not only what works but also why and how, a new generation of studies in evaluation and research focus on causal explanations, innovative measures and causal mechanisms. Section 3.1 provides lessons learned from evaluations promoting electoral accountability. Section 3.2 provides examples of mechanism studies that explain the causal relationship between clientelism and voter turnout.

3.1 Evaluation studies

This study identifies three broad types of election strategies, with outcomes that can affect the behaviour of voters or politicians and the results of elections. More concretely, the interventions identified are election monitoring, social cash transfers and civic education campaigns. These interventions aim to change the behaviour of both politicians and voters by persuading voters to refrain from selling their votes and discouraging politicians from buying votes. These interventions may also have an impact on electoral outcomes, either directly or indirectly. Table 2 provides a list of evaluation studies using quantitative techniques.

Election monitoring

One of the internationally recognised strategies to promote electoral accountability is the deployment of international observers during election periods. Despite the intrusiveness of this intervention and the seemingly irrational behaviour of nondemocratic incumbents, invitations to international observers have increased considerably over the past decade, almost becoming an “international norm”. Hyde (2011) argues that the “*decision to invite observers is closely tied to the availability of international benefits for countries perceived as democracies*” (ibid., 209).

Cross-country statistics on elections held between 1990 and 2006 suggest that incumbent leaders are more likely to lose an election if international observers are present (Hyde 2011). Although the statistics are suggestive, the challenge to establish the presence of international observers as first order cause relies on the assumption that there are no pre-existing differences between those incumbent leaders who invite observers and those who do not.

Recognising this challenge, Hyde (2007; 2010; 2011) took advantage of a natural experiment in Armenia and conducted a field experiment in Indonesia to assess the impact of international observers on election outcomes. By comparing two different election environments – Armenia’s overt Election Day fraud in 2003 and Indonesia’s relatively democratic presidential election in 2004 – she found that election monitoring reduces the

share of the vote of the fraudulent candidate (Armenia's incumbent government). In contrast, the Indonesian incumbent not accused of fraud increased his share of the votes, albeit still losing the election. Hyde argues that international observers made it difficult and costly to steal elections in Armenia and that polling officials in Indonesia tended to follow election regulations more strictly when being watched.

Another type of election monitoring strategy that appears to have a significant effect on election outcome is the use of technology. Callen / Long (2011) tested the effectiveness of digital cameras in the 2010 parliamentary elections in Afghanistan. Randomly selected polling stations received a letter informing them that posted results will be photographed and compared to the official vote count at headquarters. The researchers' aim was to compare reports from stations that were warned of the election audit with stations that received no warning. They found a 25 percent reduction in votes for fraudulent candidates and 60 percent reduction in stolen election materials. The increased transparency through the use of technology constrained government or polling officials from manipulating votes on behalf of the candidates through vote-selling or improper counting of votes.

Social cash transfers

In countries where vote-buying is rampant, social benefits may be allocated at the discretion of the ruling party as part of their campaign strategy. Beneficiaries are targeted based on a combination of observable and unobservable factors that leave a lot of room for political manipulation. Before 1997, the Mexican regime is an example where "*social programs were designed to grant ample discretion to the government, which in turn used social transfers to reward partisan supporter and mobilize voters in elections*" (Diaz-Cayeros / Estevez / Magaloni 2009).

The creation of the Mexican conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme called Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA) (now Oportunidades) in 1997 has reduced the discretionary powers of political leaders³. First, the eligibility to enrol in the programme is based on objective criteria such as poverty indices, demography and socio-economic indicators. Second, once beneficiaries are enrolled, they cannot be withdrawn if they fulfil the required set of conditions – investments in health, education and nutrition. Finally, the benefits are randomly assigned.

The challenge in analysing the effect of vote-buying on individual voting behaviour is identifying what is cause and what is effect. People vote for the politicians because of the social benefits, but it can also be that politicians allocate the benefits because the people voted for them. The random assignment of programme benefits and the overall set-up of the Mexican ProgresA programme allow researchers to address the challenge of causal inference.

3 For more information, see Levy (2006).

Table 2: Election interventions					
Title	Intervention	Country	Status	Method	Author/Source/Donor
The pseudo-democrat's dilemma	International observers	Indonesia/ Armenia	completed	Natural expt'l/ RCT	Hyde (2011)
Institutional corruption and election fraud: Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan	Digital camera/ election monitoring	Afghanistan	completed	RCT	Callen and Long (2011)
Do informed voters make better choices? Experimental evidence from urban India	Information campaign	India	completed	RCT	Banerjee et al. (2010)
Do conditional cash transfers affect electoral behaviour? Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial in Mexico	CCT	Mexico	completed	RCT	De la O (2008)
Essays on the political economy of fiscal policy in developing countries	CCT	Mexico	completed	RDD	Green (2006)
Welfare benefits, canvassing, and campaign handouts	CCT	Mexico	completed	PSM	Diaz-Cayeros / Estevez / Magaloni (2009)
Can voters be primed to choose better legislators? Evidence from two field experiments in rural India	Campaign strategies	India	completed	RCT	Banerjee et al. (2010)
Is information power? Using cell phones during an Election in Mozambique	Voter education and mobile phone hotline	Mozambique	completed	RCT and DID	Aker / Collier / Vicente (2011)
Votes and violence: Experimental evidence from a Nigerian election	Anti-violence grassroots campaign	Nigeria	completed	RCT	Collier / Vicente (2010)
Information dissemination and local governments' electoral returns: Evidence from a field experiment in Mexico	Information campaign	Mexico	completed	RCT	Chong et al. (2010) / JPAL
Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes	Information campaign	Brazil	completed	RCT	Ferraz / Finan (2008)
Can informed public deliberation overcome clientelism? Experimental evidence from Benin	Campaign strategies	Benin	completed	RCT	Wantchekon (2009)

continue table 2: Election interventions					
Clientelism and voting behaviour: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin	Campaign strategies	Benin	Completed	RCT	Wantchekon (2003)
An impact evaluation of information disclosure on elected representatives' performance: Evidence from rural and urban India	Information campaign	India	ongoing	RCT	Pande et al. / 3ie (2012)
The right to vote right: Testing voter education campaigns in India	Voter education	India	ongoing	RCT	IDEA/USAID (2012)
Source: Author's representation					

In the context of the 2000 and 2006 Mexican elections, the effect of CCT on voting behaviour was mixed. Utilising the randomisation component of Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA) and the delay in programme roll out in the localities, De la O (2008) finds that CCT has led to a significant increase in turnout and share of the votes for incumbent leaders in the 2000 presidential election. In contrast, using the regression discontinuity approach and different area coverage, Green (2006) finds that PROGRESA has no impact on voter turnout and has no effect on helping the incumbent to win. Using national exit poll data and propensity score matching to analyse voting behaviour in the 2006 presidential election, Diaz-Cayeros / Estevez / Magaloni (2009) find that programme beneficiaries, who would otherwise vote for the opposition, voted for the incumbent because of the CCT programme.

Although the three studies have used the appropriate methods to address the problem of causality, the results presented above are not robust, owing to differences in selection strategy and how the treatment variable is operationalised. One can also argue that the experimental set-up is superior to quasi-randomisation. Although this paper does not favour one method over another, there is notable merit in applying randomised trials over quasi-experiments, but they also suffer from several practical problems⁴. Nevertheless, more studies regarding the impact of social transfers on voting behaviour are expected to be published in the near future, given the programmes currently implemented in many developing countries. This will hopefully shed more light on these conflicting results.

Information and civic education campaigns

Anti-vote-buying campaigns through civic education are by far the most widespread strategy that seeks to change the incentives of voters to participate in elections. The idea is that an informed electorate enhances political accountability. However, surveys and anecdotal evidence show that campaigns are ineffective in reducing vote-buying in the Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan, and have sometimes even encouraged the very behaviour they were supposed to eradicate (Schaffer 2007).

4 However, such discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. See Deaton (2010) and Humphreys / Weinstein (2009) for more detailed discussion regarding this debate.

Although such studies have greatly increased our understanding of vote-buying, surveys and anecdotal evidence is limited by its inability to capture attribution – that the change in voter behaviour is due to the civic education campaign and not to individual socioeconomic characteristics or to some unobservable criteria correlated with their voting choices. The use of experiments and quasi-experiments paved the way to solving this issue.

Evaluation studies suggest that civic education campaigns can be effective in improving voter turnout and vote share of incumbents, but the effect can vary depending on the campaign message. Banerjee et al. (2010) conducted a door-to-door campaign to randomly selected slum dwellers in India, as well as a newspaper campaign that contained information about incumbents' performance. Their study shows that information increases voter turnout and increases the vote share of incumbents who devote more funds to the slums and attended committee meetings. In a similar vein, Aker / Collier / Vicente (2011) found in Mozambique that the door-to-door distribution of information about voting, newspaper coverage containing election messages and the creation of an electoral hotline are all successful in increasing voter turnout. Anti-violence grassroots campaigns can also have a positive impact on improving turnout. In Nigeria, Collier / Vicente (2010) showed that town meetings, street theatres and the distribution of campaign materials helped combat voter intimidation and consequently increased voter turnout by decreasing perceived threats to individual voters.

However, the evidence suggests that the *content* of the campaign messages can also have an effect on turnout and vote share. Chong et al. (2010) found that information distributed via flyers about 'excessive corruption' reduced voter participation and vote share of incumbents in Mexico. Similarly, Ferraz / Finan (2008) report on the effects of media exposure of corrupt politicians in Brazil and found that citizens used the information when voting – the incumbent's likelihood to be re-elected was reduced when reports of corruption associated with the municipalities were disclosed. In addition, an election mobilisation campaign that "*primed voters to not to vote on ethnic lines*" increased voter turnout, specially with men, but not campaigns that urged "*voters to not vote for corrupt politicians*" (Banerjee et al. 2010, 3). Wantchekon's (2009) preliminary findings in the 2006 Benin election suggest that campaign strategies based on "*informed empirical research*" (rather than clientelistic messages) have a positive effect on turnout and electoral support. Wantchekon (2003) investigated the effect of a clientelistic versus a "broad, nationally-oriented" message to randomly selected villages during the 2001 Benin election. His experiment showed that clientelism increased voting probability for regional and incumbent candidates, but was less popular for women, who were more attracted to the public-policy type of campaigning.

Two further impact evaluation studies regarding the effect of information disclosure and voter education on voter turnout and political participation are currently being carried out by JPAL and 3ie in Mexico and India, respectively.

Box 2: Impacts on voter participation and electoral outcomes		
Intervention	Voter participation	Electoral support
International observers	positive	negative for fraudulent candidate
Digital cameras		reduced vote count for fraudulent candidate
Social cash transfer	mixed	mixed
Civic information campaigns	generally positive, but depends on campaign message	depends on campaign message
Source: Author's representation		

The evaluation studies are motivated by addressing different views that explain electoral accountability. Some of these are: institutions, development and information (Pande 2012). Institutions and political systems affect vote-buying through poor legislation, inadequate monitoring, weak parties and elite capture (Hicken 2011). The level of development influences vote-buying because poorer voters are more vulnerable to offers of a material nature than richer voters (Brusco / Nazareno / Stokes 2004). Information allows voters to make informed decisions about politicians and to make them accountable during elections. Of the three views, the bulk of empirical work identified in this study has focused on the impact of information through voter education campaigns.

This section has uncovered two important implications for electoral accountability. First, more rigorous evidence is needed in terms of understanding the influence of institutions on political accountability. One of the reasons behind the lack of evidence is the difficulty of evaluating institutional or developmental reforms using the methods mentioned above. Institutional reforms, such as passing new legislation or establishing an autonomous election commission, often cover the entire population, where the possibility of collecting control group data is quite limited.

Second, most research on electoral accountability identified in this study has explored the role of information and civic information campaigns. However, greater validity of the results can only be accomplished through replication and longer-term evaluations. Civic education may have an impact on voter turnout and election outcomes today, but it is still unclear whether it would eventually weed out bad politicians or improve public policy in the long run. Analysing long-term impacts is clearly an important area for future research.

3.2 Empirical micro research

Evaluation studies are often based on implicit assumptions regarding the causal relationships between specific actions or institutions on the one hand, and voter behaviour or electoral outcomes, on the other. The assumptions tend to reflect the conceptual groundwork of the interventions under review. This groundwork, however, is often far from being empirically tested.

In our example, the evaluation studies implicitly assume that vote-buying, clientelism, ballot fraud and violence *influence* electoral behaviour. Although cross-country studies and qualitative work provided important insights regarding the causal relationship between these factors, the (negative or positive) relationship is still far from established.

Specifically, consider the relationship between clientelism and voter turnout. The main challenge in analysing this relationship is again observational equivalence: Citizens vote because they received a gift *or* they receive the gift because they voted. Identifying the initial mover is very important, but quite problematic given repeated interactions in a clientelist environment. Experiments and quasi-experimental designs can help solve this issue by controlling for treatment assignment. It ensures that the citizens who received the gifts have more or less similar characteristics as those who did not.

In this example, instead of testing a specific intervention that fosters electoral accountability, we could test an assumption – that clientelism affects voting behaviour. Another idea is testing various hypotheses on why such causation exists. Consider two competing hypotheses regarding clientelism and voter turnout. On the one hand, clientelism increases voter turnout if the clientelist parties are powerful enough to convince not only their core supporters, but also swing voters to vote; if the citizens know that the parties can monitor their compliance; and if it encourages poor voters to participate in elections *since it reflects the parties' concern for the poor*. On the other hand, clientelism decreases voter turnout if voters who receive clientelist gifts will opt not to vote as a sign of defection; and if voters feel disillusioned about the political system and therefore prefer not to vote. Hence clientelism can have both positive and negative effects on voter turnout.

Testing theories

To test the assumption that vote-buying is a strategy that signals the parties' concern for the poor (see above in italics), Kramon (2011) employed an experimental design in Kenya. He assigned individuals into vote-buying condition and control group. Individuals in both groups were asked to listen to a typical radio discussion about a campaign event held by a candidate. The only difference between them was that the vote-buying group heard a 10 second discussion about the 100 Kenyan shillings given out to those who attended the campaign event. He then asked questions about the likelihood of supporting the hypothetical candidate and grouped them according to the socio-economic status of the respondents. His initial results show that vote-buying is particularly effective with the poorer voters *“because it conveys information about the future provision of small private goods and patronage. In short, vote buying builds a politician's credibility as a patron for the poor and can therefore be effective despite ballot secrecy”* (ibid., 25). His results also rejected the theoretical assumption that vote-buying signifies candidates' competence and that they can ultimately provide better public goods and services.

Measurement

To provide an explanation for the clientelism-turnout causality, one has to first address the issue of measurement. As mentioned earlier, clientelism and vote-buying is difficult to measure because it is generally underreported. Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2010) aimed to unravel this measurement problem with an experiment in Nicaragua⁵. Instead of using traditional surveys where respondents were directly asked whether they had received any

5 In this context, I consider vote-buying as a subset of clientelism following Hicken (2011), and have used the term interchangeably. The experiment by Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2010) focused only on the concept of vote-buying.

benefits – gifts or money – in exchange for votes, respondents were shown a card with response options and asked to indicate *how many* activities were carried out by the candidates, rather than telling which ones. This method is called a *list experiment*. Like all experiments, the survey sample is randomly split into treatment and control groups. The respondents in the treatment group were given an additional response category, which was whether the candidate had given the respondent a gift or did him/her a favour. The difference in the average responses of the two groups is the reported vote-buying activity. Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. found that vote-buying activities are underreported because respondents shy away from revealing illegal behaviour, and that empirical work should take this non-random measurement error into account. Hence, experimentation has helped to confirm the suspicion that vote-buying is underreported. To uncover the channel on which vote-buying operates, they have tested the monitoring and compliance hypothesis as mentioned above. They find that parties tend to target people they can monitor or people whom they believe they can convince that their vote can be monitored. This confirms that the channel from which vote-buying operates is related to the monitoring ability of parties.

Testing causality

Moving away from clientelism, consider another example regarding the effect of violence on political participation. Here, instead of evaluating anti-violence campaigns, the study evaluates the impact of violence on political participation using natural experiments. The results are unexpected: While violence can be a factor that hinders the populace to vote, such a traumatic experience can also be the driving force for participating in elections and running for office. Exploiting the near exogenous variation in rebel recruitment, Blattman (2009) found that victims of violence have a higher probability of participating in elections and becoming candidates, possibly due to the mobilising impact of political violence. This finding pointed out that psychological factors may be associated with political participation. Such a finding is especially useful when designing donor interventions. The intervention should not only be based on a general context, but also on personal experience and the characteristics of the target population.

These examples convey two broad messages: First, testing whether the assumptions hold or not, and ruling out alternative channels of impact, can significantly help in understanding why and how the intervention works. Second, studies that focus on appropriately measuring difficult-to-measure governance phenomena are very important in verifying claims that have potential ramifications on the applicability of certain donor programmes. These examples are merely subset of many studies in the literature on clientelism and other election irregularities. What is important to stress is that experimentation and rigorous quantitative analysis can help provide compelling evidence to explain the origins of the causality.

4 Corruption

Corruption is generally defined as the abuse of public office for private gains (Bardhan 1997; Shleifer / Vishny 1993; Svensson 2005). Corruption diverts resources from their productive use, consequently affecting innocent lives. It results in a lower provision of public goods, particularly to the poor and most affected, while filling the pockets of the

few (Eigen 2005). There is much fertile soil for corruption, and thus the potential costs to development are high (Klitgaard 1991; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Shleifer / Vishny 1993).

Some field experiments and quantitative studies attest to this: For example, Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) find that corrupt countries in Latin America are associated with inefficient firms, requiring more labour than necessary for a given level of output. A field experiment in India suggests that while corruption speeds up the application process for drivers' licences, it also allows for unqualified individuals to obtain a license, which can be socially harmful (Bertrand et al 2007). In Pakistan, the rents associated with preferential lending to companies with political connections are estimated to be 0.3 to 1.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) every year (Khwaja / Mian 2005).

A considerable amount of theoretical literature in political science and economics has been produced in studying the underlying causes of corruption (Becker / Stigler 1974; Besley 2006; Shleifer / Vishny 1993; Tullock 1980). These studies employ agency models as well as a cost-benefit analysis to explain the mechanism behind corruption and rent-seeking. Becker / Stigler (1974) produced a seminal theory of corruption by applying the principal-agent model. The model examines the relationship between the principal (citizens) and the agent (public official), a potential violator, who takes bribes from private citizens seeking to obtain a government good. Their key insight is that high wages coupled with a non-zero probability of discovery will induce public officials to behave honestly. This would solve both problems of moral hazard, which arises from a lack of monitoring, and adverse selection, which stems from the inability to identify honest from dishonest agents. Beyond thinking of corruption in the usual principal-agent framework, some studies have explored the role of competition between corrupt agents (Rose-Ackerman 1978) and internal organisations, where bureaucrats violate the task assigned to them (Banerjee / Hanna / Mullainathan 2011).

Many anti-corruption programmes exist – most rely on institutional strengthening through capacity building and the provision of equipment to improve efficiency. In the past few years, new strategies such as increasing citizens' political awareness, enhancing transparency through media, and citizen-led monitoring have also entered the current policy debate.

Empirically, there are important challenges that still need to be addressed in the study of corruption. The first is the inherent difficulty in its measurement. Corruption is by nature a transaction that is illicit, covert and socially objectionable. Therefore, actors involved in corruption are unwilling to disclose their knowledge or participation. Moreover, corruption cross-country indices are normally based on respondents' perceptions and expert opinions with diverging views on corrupt practices. Lastly, corruption estimates can be underreported if agents adjust their behaviour while there is an anti-corruption intervention in place (Banerjee / Hanna / Mullainathan 2011).

The second challenge is establishing causation by linking anti-corruption strategies to development outcomes. For instance, past research has documented the role of press freedom in eliminating corruption, but the analysis is made difficult by the fact that access to information depends on other institutional factors that also explain the level of corruption. If governments determine the level of media exposure, are changes in corruption the result of press freedom or bureaucratic standards? Further, cross-national

statistics taken from the Press Freedom World Wide Index and corruption indices only suggest correlation, but do not provide strong evidence of causal links.

4.1 Evaluation studies

Anti-corruption strategies seek to reduce corruption and improve service delivery. If the aim of these strategies is to simply reduce corruption, then one could design a contract for a bureaucrat such that it eliminates corrupt activities. However, such a transaction may not actually cause an improvement in welfare. Banerjee / Hanna / Mullainathan (2011) illustrate this with an example in hospitals. Supposing, there are free hospital beds for the poor. If demand for beds were to exceed supply, the situation would become a breeding ground for corruption, because bureaucrats may allocate beds to those who are willing to pay more. Thus there is a chance that the beds are allocated not to the people who are intended to benefit from them. One way to reduce corruption, according to the researchers, is through audits, or penalties for improper allocation. A much easier way would be for the government to “*sell the beds to the bureaucrat and allow him to set any prices he wishes*” (ibid., 2). Selling the beds to the bureaucrat will reduce corruption but it will not solve the allocation problem – that the beds are intended for the *poor*. Hence, anti-corruption strategies should ensure that not only corruption is reduced, but also that the overall welfare of the intended beneficiaries is not adversely affected. Another lesson is that although corruption may be reduced in one area, it can create distortions in another, or be channelled into a different form.

Evaluations of anti-corruption strategies seek to establish the causal link between these strategies and the reduction or increase of corrupt practices. In many cases, these evaluations have also pioneered measurement by using more objective measures of corruption based on independent sources, official records or surveys (see Olken 2007; Reinikka / Svensson 2004).

Four main types of anti-corruption interventions are identified in this paper (see Table 3). These interventions are (i) audits, (ii) monitoring, (iii) information campaigns and (iv) an increase in salaries for public officials. These interventions seek to deter corrupt behaviour by exposing corrupt practices, changing the incentives for corrupt behaviour and creating public awareness so that public officials can be held accountable. The strategies outlined below have been widely advocated by donors in the past, but evaluation has mostly taken the form of desk reviews, field visits or anecdotal evidence. The available micro-empirical evidence, however, shows some intriguing results, as will be revealed below.

Audits

There are controversies regarding the effectiveness of audits as an anti-corruption strategy: Governments have greater competence in countering police corruption, because as an insider they have more information. They have the ability to detect fraud from within and understand complex rules and regulations. However, auditors in many developing countries are poorly paid, lack independence and do not have the necessary expertise to detect and sanction illicit behaviour. Regarding internal auditing, the argument has been brought forward that the person or office that is supposed to conduct the audit may also be corrupt.

Results from evaluation studies suggest otherwise. A strong audit helps rein in corruption. In the context of road projects in Indonesia, increasing the probability of top-down audits to 100 percent reduced ‘missing expenditures’ (Olken 2007). Francken / Minten / Swinnen (2009) also note that a top-down audit played a vital role in preventing the capture of educational funds in Madagascar. Di Tella / Schargrodsky (2003) find that offering higher wages to procurement officers in public hospitals in Buenos Aires can reduce corruption, if the level of audit intensity is medium.

Monitoring

Citizens have incentives to be vigilant and to monitor officials, because they are the direct beneficiaries of public services. However, monitoring public officials entails costs – effort, transaction costs and opportunity costs in the form of time invested. Since reduced corruption is a public good where everybody benefits regardless of their contribution, individuals have an incentive to free-ride. Where effort is driven by market forces, individuals bear the cost today in the hope that it will give them a competitive advantage tomorrow. If this is not the case, the optimal move is not to engage in monitoring at all. Whether or not citizen monitoring can work has been explored by the evaluation studies below.

The findings from citizen enforcement through village ‘accountability’ meetings are mixed: These meetings take the form of a complaint and monitoring mechanism, where problems are discussed and brought to the attention of the appropriate public officials. While some researchers found community-based monitoring helpful in the context of primary health care in Uganda by making local health care providers accountable (Bjorkman / Svensson 2009), in the context of road projects in Indonesia, others found that it has little impact on reducing the capture of public funds (Olken 2007).

Information campaigns

In the traditional agency problem, the principals (the people) and the agents (the bureaucrats) have different interest structures. The agent may exert less effort, shirk from his/her responsibilities and partake in undue risks. To prevent this, the principal aims to hire good agents and to ensure that they deliver the services according to the contract. Because information is not perfect, the principal does not have prior knowledge regarding agent character (good or bad) and he/she cannot monitor the agent’s effort perfectly. In order to align the incentives of the agent and the principal, various compensation schemes are available, such as efficiency, profit sharing, output-based contracts, etc. The problem is that in many cases none of these schemes is applicable to a typical bureaucrat. Wages in developing countries tend to be far lower than in the private sector, profit cannot be shared and contracts are usually provided long-term regardless of performance.

One of the plausible schemes whereby people can monitor bureaucrats is public disclosure of information. This intervention and its variants have received a lot of attention recently and is perhaps the most evaluated intervention, not only in the literature on corruption, but also for the governance sector more generally. Evaluation studies on this intervention show some promise.

Public disclosure of information through local media plays a significant role in reducing the capture of public funds. Media in the form of audit reports, scorecards, newspapers, local radio and television help to make governments and politicians accountable. Humphreys and Weinstein's (2010) preliminary results in Uganda show that a scorecard that provides information about Parliament activities can be an effective political accountability mechanism. Also in Uganda, Reinikka / Svensson (2005) document the impact of a newspaper campaign in minimising the capture of school grants for local schools. However, Hubbard (2007) describes some scepticism over Reinikka and Svensson's results. He argues that the government's resolve to reduce leakage of funds should also be taken into account, rather than attributing the "huge" reduction in leakage only to the newspaper campaign. Francken / Minten / Swinnen (2009) suggest that media reduces capture of public funds in Madagascar, but that its impact depends on the local literacy rate. That is, if there is widespread illiteracy, local television and radio are more important as an anti-corruption instrument than newspaper and poster campaigns.

The results from audits, monitoring and information interventions are consistent with the systematic review conducted by Hanna et al. (2011). Of the 14 studies included in their analysis, they found that monitoring and incentive mechanisms have the potential to reduce corruption in the short run. Furthermore, according to their result, decentralisation also has the potential to reduce corruption, but its longer-term effect remains to be seen. A 3ie briefing paper points to both information and voter mobilisation campaigns as successful examples of anti-corruption interventions (Mishra / Menon 2011).

Increased salaries for public officials

This is one of the most common anti-corruption policies that donors and governments repeatedly endorse in developing countries, a policy recommendation that goes back to the results of Becker / Stigler (1974). To date, there appears to be only one completed quasi-experiment by Di Tella / Schargrodsky (2003) and one ongoing RCT from JPAL that addresses the impact of bureaucrats' salaries on corruption⁶.

Di Tella / Schargrodsky (2003) support Becker and Stigler's theory by exploiting an exogenous audit probability in the public hospitals in Buenos Aires. They find that increasing public officials' salaries can only be effective if used in conjunction with auditing. This finding is related to the theoretical framework discussed by Besley / McLaren (1993) in the context of tax collection. They emphasise that increasing wages would only be effective if there is strong monitoring and if there is a high number of dishonest agents.

It would be interesting to test empirically the sole effect of higher salaries and the combined effect of higher salaries and surveillance. Khan / Khwaja / Olken (2012) are currently working on such an evaluation. They are looking at the impact of a salary increase, with and without auditing, on the behaviour of tax inspectors in the Punjab, Pakistan. The evaluation is ongoing and no results are available yet. However, apart from conducting studies of internal revenue systems or tax collectors, other promising

6 The relationship between corruption and the salaries of public officials has been studied using cross-country regressions and has provided results that are ambiguous. See Svensson (2005); van Rijckeghem / Weder (1997); Rauch / Evans (2000) and Treisman (2000).

Table 3: Anti-corruption interventions					
Title	Intervention	Region/ Country	Status	Method	Author / Source/Donor
Monitoring corruption: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia	Audit, village meetings, surveys	Indonesia	completed	RCT	Olken (2007) / World Bank and DFID
Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audits of local governments	Audit	Brazil	completed	RCT	Ferraz / Finan (2009)/3ie
The returns from reducing corruption: Evidence from education in Uganda	Audit	Uganda	completed	RCT	Reinikka / Svensson (2007)
The Power of information: Evidence from a newspaper campaign to reduce capture	Information campaign	Uganda	completed	RCT, IV	Reinikka / Svensson (2004)
Power to the people: Evidence from a randomised field experiment of community-based monitoring in Uganda	Village meetings	Uganda	completed	RCT	Björkman / Svensson (2009) / SIDA and World Bank
Curbing corruption through social welfare reform? The effects of Mexico's conditional cash transfer programme on good governance	CCT	Mexico	completed	RCT	Grimes / Wängnerud (2010)
Obtaining a driver's license in India: An experimental approach to studying corruption	Financial bonus, driving lessons	India	completed	RCT	Bertrand et al. (2007)
Information for accountability, citizens' report cards - Poverty Reduction Support Credit (I)	Report cards	Rwanda	ongoing	RCT	World Bank (DIME)
Property tax experiment in the Punjab, Pakistan: Testing the role of wages, incentives and audits on tax inspectors' behaviour	Salary increase and audits	Pakistan	ongoing	RCT	Khan / Khwaja / Olken (2012)
Policing politicians: Citizen empowerment and political accountability in Uganda	Score cards	Uganda	ongoing	RCT	Humphreys / Weinstein (2010)
The role of salaries and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in Buenos Aires	Audit	Argentina	completed	Non-experiment	Di Tella / Schargrodsky (2003)
Media, monitoring and the capture of public funds: Evidence from Madagascar	Audits and media	Madagascar	completed	Non-experiment	Francken / Minten / Swinnen (2009)
Source: Author's representation					

areas where higher salaries and intensive monitoring might be useful in a developing country context are in the public transportation sector (e.g. license allocation for privatised buses) and traffic enforcement (e.g. citizens offering bribes or policemen accepting/requesting bribes).

Punishment or reward?

In reality, governments pursue a mix of strategies in curbing corruption – punishment, reward or both. However, more work is needed to understand what determines the particular mix of strategies. The punishment scenario for example is one where (i) a public official is sanctioned if caught in the act of bribery or extortion; the reward scenario is one where (ii) a public official receives an award – monetary, ‘in kind’, or a recognition – for revealing corrupt practices or refusing to accept bribes; and the combination of the punishment and reward scenario is one where (iii) a public official is punished for not fulfilling certain pre-determined objectives, but receives an award if he does. To give a simple example, consider the Philippine Attrition Law of 2005, where revenue officials who fall short of their collection targets are removed from service, while good performers receive a monetary bonus. This policy is designed to reduce corruption by implicitly discouraging officials from overlooking tax evaders and to improve the incentives for good performance. Can punishment act as a substitute for incentives or would it destroy the intrinsic motivation to perform better?

Studying the effectiveness of policies that directly punish misbehaving officials is of interest to governments, especially those that do not have the capacity to increase salaries across the board. Studies that focus on the role of punishment have been limited to a laboratory setting with students acting as the subjects of experiments (see Abbink / Ihrenbusch / Renner (2002); Schulze / Frank (2003); Schildberg-Hörisch / Strassmair (2010) for related literature). While lab experiments reduce many methodological problems compared to field data, in most cases they do not often mirror real life corruption scenarios. Lab experiments, however, do not have ethical issues to contend with.

Box 3: Impact on combating corruption	
Intervention	Combating corruption
Community monitoring	mixed
Information campaigns	positive
Social cash transfer	positive
Salary increase	positive if used in conjunction with auditing
Source: Author’s representation	

There is still much to be done in building consensus and in prescribing the best way to reduce corruption. Other important areas for evaluation could include analysing the effect of financial support to legal and financial institutions, interventions that address political nepotism, extortion and graft. Apart from these issues, it could also be interesting to study the subtle types of corruption that often occur in public office. For example, public officials may abuse power (i) by increasing official travel, encouraged by the receipt of per diems and greater opportunities to travel abroad, or (ii) by creating ghost projects and payrolls.

The micro evidence provided by this quantitative research— both through experimentation or other quantitative methods – partly confirms that corruption can be objectively measured, that causality can be clearly established and that central auditing and information campaigns as anti-corruption strategies have a potential to succeed under specific circumstances. However, despite the proliferation of anti-corruption strategies, evidence of their effectiveness remains scarce. Compared to the wide range of anti-corruption strategies, a handful of impact evaluation studies on corruption, though very useful, may not be sufficient to provide programme managers and politicians with concrete policy prescriptions. They represent a narrow focus against the range of anti-corruption interventions in developing countries. Hence, there is a great need of anti-corruption research and impact evaluations.

4.2 Empirical micro research

Rather than focusing on combating corruption, some research studies seek to understand corruption – why it exists and through which channels it proliferates. The evaluations have mostly centred on incentives and their impact on corrupt practices. Some researchers have already moved beyond this point by emphasising the need to “*map different manifestations of corruption to different underlying environments*” (Bannerjee / Hanna / Mullainathan 2011).

There are a number of micro-quantitative studies – experiments and quasi-experiments – that identify impediments to anti-corruption efforts and explain complex mechanisms to help us understand why and how corruption happens. These three examples will focus on the role of cultural norms, political connections and market distortions.

Testing theories

Fisman / Miguel (2007) believed that social norms and legal enforcements are important factors in explaining corruption. However, it is very difficult to “disentangle” the effects of one from the other, because “*societies with weak anti-corruption social norms may simultaneously have less legal enforcement*” (ibid., 1021). The stationing of thousands of diplomats from around the world in New York City can act as a natural experiment. These diplomats have diplomatic immunity, which means that though they may receive tickets for parking violations, they cannot be legally penalised for not paying the fines (zero legal enforcement). They come from different countries allowing the researchers to examine the specific role of cultural norms. Using parking violations of UN diplomats living in New York, they found that diplomats from high corruption countries tend to accumulate more parking violations than diplomats from low corruption countries. Furthermore, legal punishment appears to be effective in curbing corruption since parking violations by diplomats substantially dropped with the enforcement of the Clinton-Schumer Amendment. It allows towing diplomatic cars, revoking the offender’s UN parking permits and a deduction in the US government aid given to the offender’s country.

Olken / Barron (2009) examine the price differentials of bribes and extortion money paid by truck drivers to police and soldiers in Aceh. The researchers accompanied Indonesian truck drivers and have witnessed 6,000 illegal payments. Since surveys on trucks cannot be conducted randomly given that the behaviour of the police will change once they knew

about the research, Olken and Barron utilised the exogenous change in the number of checkpoints after the withdrawal of the military as part of a peace agreement with the local rebel group. They find that the reduction in checkpoints increased the amount of bribes paid by truck drivers, which is consistent with traditional pricing theories (inverse relationship between price and quantity). They find that corrupt officials impose complex pricing schemes and that market structure plays an important role. Specifically, a higher bribe is charged (i) if there is high willingness to pay, (ii) if there are fewer checkpoints and (iii) if the point of collection is closest to the driver's destination.

Measurement

As another example, Fisman (2001) studied the role of political connectedness on the share price of companies in Indonesia. Their analysis was based on some claims that especially in Southeast Asia a company's value does not depend on productivity, but rather on how politically connected it is. But verifying these claims empirically is very difficult: The first problem is how to capture political connectedness – which means knowing all of the company's political associations at various government levels as well as knowing the value of such connections to the company; the second problem is the sensitivity of the topic. While gathering data, political connections cannot be easily discussed within companies and among public officials. To be able to understand the impact of political connections, Fisman looked at the relationship between negative rumours regarding Suharto's health and the profitability of politically dependent companies– those associated with Suharto's children or allies. His findings suggest that politically dependent companies suffered more when the financial market was hit by Suharto's failing health.

In sum, the examples presented above suggest that anti-corruption efforts may not work, not because the intervention is flawed, but rather due to differences in local conditions and context, social norms, politics and market structure. Research on mechanisms plays an important role and provides surprising avenues in explaining corruption.

5 Multidimensional peacekeeping

Civil wars have accounted for 16.2 million deaths in 73 countries since 1945 (Fearon / Laitin 2003). Research suggests that these conflicts resulted in destruction of lives and properties, displacement, social exclusion and trauma. The microeconomic literature finds a growing negative impact of war. In Uganda, forced adolescent rebel recruits tend to be less well-educated, which negatively affects their wages or salaries as adults (Blattman / Annan 2010a). In Burundi and Zimbabwe, children who lived in areas affected by war display a lower height-for-age (Alderman / Hoddinott / Kinsey 2006; Bundervoet / Verwimp / Akresh 2009). But apart from showing the negative consequences of war, these types of studies help shed light to the extent and persistence of its effect, identify its victims and the cost associated with its occurrence (Blattman 2010).

Donor programmes should adapt according to the adverse impact of wars on the target population. Nowadays, there is a grey line dividing peacekeeping and peace building efforts. Multidimensional peacekeeping (MP) integrates many of the non-military peace building efforts, very similar to post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. Indeed, some of its

non-military aspects include interventions that seek to demobilise and reintegrate ex-rebel combatants. But the interventions do not stop there. Building on the arguments regarding the causes and consequences of civil war, elements of MP also include efforts that aim to revitalise the economy and encourage civic participation in public affairs.

But do these efforts actually work as intended? Identifying the effects of multidimensional peacekeeping is difficult at the macro level, given many intervening forces, not to mention complementary development programmes in the country under consideration (Humphreys / Weinstein 2007). Anecdotal evidence shows that peacekeeping efforts that claim a positive effect at the macro level do not necessarily reflect success at the micro level. For instance, the experience in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Haiti shows that despite improvements in the overall security conditions in the country, there are still deep pockets of violence at the local level and *“in some cases the situation even worsened than before the arrival of peacekeepers”* (Mvukiyehe / Samii 2010).

There are four key challenges in evaluating MP programmes. The first one is the inherent complexity of the intervention. These programmes cover a wide range of issues, hence demonstrating their efficacy can be challenging if the interventions are not carefully documented and if there is huge variation in implementation. The second challenge is data collection in highly volatile situations, and more seriously, the challenge of obtaining control group data. MP programmes are characterised as “emergency” interventions at the height of conflicts or civil wars – meaning that assistance will be universal in nature and the possibility of conducting random assignment is very small. Similarly, the possibility of conducting quasi-experiments hinges on the availability of control group data that might not be available in the first place. The third challenge is spillover effects – that is programme benefits that trickle over to control groups. If, for example, nonparticipants benefited from the programme, and their incomes increased due to unintended circumstances, then the difference in incomes between treatment and control group may not be as large as it would otherwise be. Impact would then be underestimated. Spillovers are especially problematic from an analytical standpoint because of high levels of migration and displacements during conflicts and civil wars. People tend to move from one place to another when faced with security threats. If that is the case, programme beneficiaries in treatment community X may become part of non-programme beneficiaries in control community Y unless intensive monitoring is in place (which can be very costly) that can account for such mobility. And lastly, as in the strategies for administrative corruption and electoral accountability, analysing the impact of MP programmes suffers from self-selection and measurement.

5.1 Evaluation studies

Evaluation studies look at various components of multidimensional peacekeeping programmes at the micro level. Because rigorous quantitative evidence in this area remains sketchy, this paper broadly looks into projects and studies conducted in conflict and post-conflict settings within the framework of peacekeeping, peace building, state-building or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) – see table 4.

There are ongoing efforts to review evaluation studies on multidimensional peacekeeping. Specifically, Samii / Brown (2012) presented a comprehensive review of impact evaluations stabilisation interventions where experiments and the quasi-experimental approach

had been used in the analysis. Grävingholt / Leiniger / von Haldenwang (2012) review state-building evaluations and research studies, and provides key lessons based on in-depth country case studies.

Table 4: Multidimensional peacekeeping					
Title	Intervention	Country	Status	Method	Author/Source /Donor
Staff Recruitment and Retention in post-Conflict Uganda	Work incentives	Uganda	ongoing	RCT	Lubanga / Ssewanyanya / Muwonge (2012a)
Reducing Intergroup prejudice and Conflict using the Media: A field experiment in Rwanda	Radio soap opera	Rwanda	completed	RCT	Paluck (2009)
Information radio in southern Sudan	Media	Sudan	ongoing	RCT	Paluck / Blair / Vexler (2012)
Community-Based Reintegration in Aceh: Assessing the impacts of BRA-KDP	Reintegration & assistance to conflict-affected groups	Indonesia	completed	PSM	Barron et al. (2009) Donor: World Bank
The Subtle Micro-Effects of Peacekeeping: Evidence from Liberia	Peacekeeping mission	Liberia	completed	Matching	Mvukiyehe / Samii (2010)
Reintegrating Rebels into Civilian Life: Quasi-experimental evidence from Burundi	Reintegration programme	Burundi	completed	Matching	Gilligan / Mvukiyehe / Samii (2012) Donor: Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden and United States Institute of Peace
Peace from the Bottom Up: A randomised trial with UN peacekeepers	Village security committees, education	Liberia & Cote d'Ivoire	ongoing	RCT	Mvukiyehe / Samii (2011)
Deference, Dissent and Dispute Resolution: An experimental intervention using mass media to change norms and behaviours in Rwanda	Media	Rwanda	completed	RCT	Paluck / Green (2009)
Community-Driven Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Baseline report)	Village governance committees	DRC	ongoing	RCT	Humphreys (2008)

continue table 4: Multidimensional peacekeeping					
Peace in the Eyes of Israeli and Palestinian youths: Effects of collective narratives and peace education programmes	Education	Israel/ Palestine	completed	DID	Biton / Solomon (2006)
Can we Teach Peace and Conflict Resolution? Results from a randomised evaluation of the Community Empowerment Programme in Liberia: A programme to build peace, human rights and civic participation	Education, dialogues, community mobilisation	Liberia	completed	RCT	Blattman / Hartman / Blair (2011)
Reintegrating and Employing High Risk Youth in Liberia: Lessons from a randomised evaluation of a Landmine Action and agricultural training programme for ex-combatants	Education, training programmes	Liberia	completed	RCT	Blattman / Annan (2010)
Employment Generation in Rural Africa: Mid-term results from an experimental evaluation of the <i>Youth Opportunities Programme</i> in northern Uganda	Cash transfer to pay for tuition fees and materials for crafts	Uganda	Midterm completed. Long-term results in 2012	RCT	Blattman / Fiala / Martinez (2011)
Enterprises for ultra-Poor Women after War - the Women's Income Generating Support (WINGS) programme	Small grants	Uganda	ongoing	RCT	Annan et al. (2012)
Randomised Impact Evaluation of Phase II of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme: Estimates of interim programme impact from first follow-up survey	Grants and creation of community development councils	Afghanistan	ongoing	RCT	Beath et al. (2010)
Long-term Effects of Peace Workshops in Protracted Conflicts	Peace workshop	Sri Lanka	completed		Malhotra / Linayage (2005)
Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a field experiment in post-conflict Liberia	Community development committee	Liberia	completed	RCT	Fearon / Humphreys / Weinstein (2009) / DFID

continue table 4: Multidimensional peacekeeping					
Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on external aid and local collective action	Community development committee, grants, facilitation	Sierra Leone	completed	RCT	Casey / Glennerster / Miguel (2011) Donors: GoBifo Project, IRCBP, World Bank Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) Initiative, etc.
Source: Author's representation					

The evaluation studies seek to resolve some of the challenges in evaluating MP programmes. With regard to complex interventions, most studies looked only at particular components of the programme at the micro level. The advantage of this approach is that it allows policymakers to know which component of the programme works and which does not. The disadvantage of course is the lack of information regarding the interaction of these components. There are cases where some projects have used a factorial design, allowing for a mixture of interventions and hierarchical designs, thus permitting an analysis for major and minor interventions (Biton / Solomon 2006 / Mvukiyehe / Samii 2011). Data collection in volatile regions is always problematic. But as some of these evaluations show, great efforts from the international community are underway in producing good quality data for rigorous analysis, which has never been possible before. There are completed and ongoing evaluations for countries with volatile conditions such as Afghanistan, northern Liberia, the DRC and Burundi, to name a few. Spillover may be difficult to control especially if the treatment is assigned ex-ante in a non-random way. In most cases, spillover cannot be fully eliminated, but can somehow be minimised or tested for: One can either ensure that treatment and control groups are geographically far apart, or one can also test ex-post the extent to which spillover has affected the analysis. It can be the case that civil wars or violent conflicts have devastated so much of the transport infrastructure that people are constrained from moving freely; hence assuring that the effect of spillover is minimal.

Education and training programmes

These are dialogues and education programmes that intend to encourage peace, resolve conflicts and reduce security threats by appealing to the improved behaviour of the beneficiaries. In some cases the interventions are a mixture of training and monetary incentives that build on human capital to improve the livelihoods of the people affected by conflict and to help them become productive members of society. In many cases, they also aim to change the norms and behaviour of rebels, children and adult members of the community, in order to improve social cohesion by drawing out conflicting narratives, and develop empathy for both sides.

A previous review of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of training and peace education programmes shows that there are very few studies that were carried out in the context of actual conflict where randomisation or quasi-experiments had been utilised (Salomon 2004; 2006). Due to the nature of these efforts, previous studies have not sufficiently dealt with the problem of self-selection. For example, some ex-rebel combatants may choose to enrol in the programme, others may not. Those who participated in the programme may be systematically different from those who did not. Hence, it will be difficult to infer that the estimated impact has been due to the programme if those who participated in the programme were initially better (or worse). These studies do not provide definitive answers regarding the effects of programmes. Recent evaluation studies offer new insights on the effectiveness of education and training programmes in the context of peace building.

Biton / Solomon (2006) find that a one-year peace education programme among Israeli and Palestinian students aged 15 to 16 years old has significantly changed their views about peace. Rather than viewing peace as the “absence of violence”, programme participants perceived peace as a “positive entity” linked to co-operation and friendship, and are less likely to support “war”. Furthermore, a brief but intensive peace workshop appears to also have a positive impact. Malhotra / Liyanage (2005) evaluated the impact of a four-day intergroup “contact intervention” between Tamil and Sinhalese students in Sri Lanka one year after the programme and found that participants have more empathy towards members of the other ethnic group than nonparticipants, and the participants have also donated more money to poor children of the other ethnicity.

An agricultural training programme for ex-combatants and high risk youths in Liberia, known as Action on Armed Violence, shows that participants of the programme have an increased likelihood of engaging in agricultural activity as a source of income and spend less time involved in illicit activities, although the rate of participation in these activities remains the same (Blattman / Annan 2010b). The study found out, however, that the programme did not increase income in the short term and demonstrated small improvements on social integration.

Still in Liberia, Blattman / Hartman / Blair (2011b) studied the impact of the Community Empowerment Program, which is one of the largest peace building programmes in the country that mainly seeks to assess the impact of education campaigns on community and individual participation, attitudes to human rights and patterns of conflict. The result shows that the programme had little impact on participation and only contributed modestly to attitudinal changes towards equity and human rights, but it played a significant role in conflict resolution.

In many emergency and reintegration programmes, randomisation or programme roll-out are not feasible. In Burundi, Gilligan / Mvukiyehe / Samii (2012) exploited the delay in programme implementation due to contractual disputes to obtain a control group comparison. The incentive package allows adult ex-rebel combatants to choose from the following: a secondary or university education, a vocational training programme or “*nonfinancial start-up materials to begin income-generating activities*” (ibid., 13). Because the programme was not randomly assigned to ex-combatants, the authors matched the characteristics of ex-combatants who received the package to those who have been affected by the delay. They found that the package increased livelihood income, but not political integration. But because the data were gathered only nine months after receipt

of the package, a longer-term evaluation may come to a different result– one would imagine that political integration is a slow process that takes time to mature.

Institution-building at the local level

At the core of community-driven reconstruction programmes⁷ (CDR) is the establishment of local development committees in post-conflict communities. The idea is that these committees, formed by electing leaders, should pave the way for social reconciliation, more co-operation and inclusiveness in the local decision-making process. Can community-driven reconstruction programmes promoted by external donors improve well-being and create lasting peace?

Community-driven reconstruction programmes⁸ show short-term promise in building social cohesion and aiding the provision of public goods. Fearon / Humphreys / Weinstein (2009) tested the impact of a DFID funded CDR programme on social co-operation in northern Liberia. To avoid survey desirability bias, the authors conducted a public goods game, where participants were provided cash and were asked to choose, anonymously, the amount they will retain for themselves and the amount they will contribute to the community. The authors find that exposure to CDR programmes increased the individuals' contribution to a public good, compared to individuals who were not exposed to the programme. Similarly, Casey / Glennerster / Miguel (2011) find that a community-driven development programme in post-conflict Sierra Leone increased "*the stock of local public goods, but did not lead to any lasting changes in village institutions, local collective action capacity, social norms and attitudes, or the nature of de facto political power*" (ibid., 32).

Preliminary findings from the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan show that the creation of community development councils and the selection of projects shows intermediate improvements in (i) village governance where decision-making is transferred from village elders to the councils, (ii) citizens' attitude towards government officials and (iii) citizens' assessment of their economic well-being (Beath / Christia / Kabuli 2010). There are two other ongoing evaluations, one is a CDR programme in eastern Congo (Humphreys 2008), and the other in Liberia. The Liberian evaluation employed a special type of intervention, much more suited to peacekeeping. Their main intervention creates village committees to improve communication on security-related issues between the local communities and peacekeeping missions. Some of their outcomes of interest include security, local governance, collective action and civic participation.

Social cash transfers

Cash transfer programmes within the multidimensional peacekeeping framework mainly seek to improve (i) economic well-being and (ii) social co-operation. Opportunities to work and make a living can be a challenge in the aftermath of violent conflicts or civil wars. To discourage re-recruitment into rebel groups and to enhance reintegration into civilian life, cash transfer programmes aim to eliminate credit constraints among the

7 Also Community-Driven Development (CDD) programs in post-conflict areas.

affected by providing regular cash payments to small groups or to vulnerable members of the community. In so doing, it can provide means to start a business, improve livelihoods and establish a good working relationship within the community. Due to the paucity of empirical evidence on the impact of cash transfers in post-conflict situations, solid conclusions are at this stage difficult to come to. However, some evaluation studies are underway to provide some answers.

Cash transfer programmes seem to have a robust impact on livelihood or personal well-being, but a weak effect on social cohesion. Blattman / Fiala / Martinez (2011) evaluated the impact of the Youth Opportunities Program (YOP) in northern Uganda, which provides unconditional cash transfers to groups of young men and women to start a business, aimed at increasing incomes and improving community reconciliation. By design, the cash is transferred to groups without or with very little monitoring after disbursement. The researchers find evidence of increased levels of investment, increased social cohesion and a reduction in aggressive behaviour (at least among men). Focusing on highly vulnerable women, Annan et al. (2012) examine the impact of a small grant transfer coupled with intensive monitoring and training in northern Uganda.

In Aceh, Indonesia, Barron et al. (2009) evaluated the impact of Community-based Reintegration Assistance for Conflict Victims, a programme that is financially supported by the Government of Indonesia and the World Bank. The programme provides block grant assistance to communities who deliberate on how the funds will be spent. While the programme reported improved perceptions on well-being, it has an imperceptible effect on social cohesion or in terms of improved citizen-state relations. As with many programmes where members of the communities were offered a choice on how to spend the funds, the impact may be confounded by factors related to the decision-making process that took place. That is, it is unclear whether the outcomes are the result of the programme alone, or of the way the community arrived at their choice (for example, discussions that were highly participatory may induce more co-operation and ownership in participants, hence better outcomes than discussions that were authoritative).

Peacekeeping mission

One of the motivations behind peacekeeping deployments is the creation of a “security bubble”: citizens should feel more secure in areas where there are peacekeeping operations (Mvukiyehe / Samii 2010). Because citizens feel secure, this should stimulate economic investments and social activities.

Mvukiyehe / Samii (2010) studied the effects of United Nations peacekeeping bases on security and economic outcomes in Liberia. The United Nations Missions in Liberia is tasked to support the peace process and to revitalise the economic and social infrastructures. Their preliminary results proved to be contrary to the security bubble hypothesis. They find that fear and the experience of victimisation, and in-migration rate are higher in communities where there are *no* UN bases, consistent with the security bubble hypothesis. Despite surprising negative impact on social participation in base communities, the good news is that base communities exhibit a vibrant labour market and demonstrate higher incomes.

Media and information campaigns

As a traditional marketing technique, the media has been used to raise awareness and to ultimately change the behaviour and attitude of the target audience. Examples of such campaigns in conflict and post-conflict scenarios are mass media, newspapers, posters or billboard announcements, soap operas, SMS text messaging and internet campaigns. The main advantage of using mass media under conflict environments is that it is typically easier to administer and can be relatively cheaper than other interventions. The problem, however, is the need to ensure that there is a working communications infrastructure to support such an endeavour. Furthermore the content and the modes of delivery should be carefully designed to avoid unintended messages.

“For example, in the DRC, a billboard campaign featured graphic pictures of gangs and men and their victims either just before or just after rape. The words on the billboards typically said, “Stop Rape” but the image communicates the idea that “Rape is common. This happens in our community. This is normal.”(Paluck / Ball 2010, 42)

In their research in Rwanda, Paluck (2007; 2009) and Paluck / Green (2009) showed evidence that a radio soap opera played for one year has improved social cooperation, trauma healing, empathy, trust, and participant’s expression of dissent (rather than being blind followers). Despite these changes, the researchers claim that the radio programme did not change much the personal beliefs of the listeners. Before broadcasting the reconciliation programme, 14 communities consisting of 40 randomly selected participants have been identified to be part of the evaluation. Participants in the treatment communities listened to a reconciliation radio programme and participants in the control communities listened to a health radio programme. The assignment of programme was random. To ensure that the participants did indeed listen to the programme, Rwandan research assistants came to the communities with their portable radios to have the programme heard in the communities’ gathering area. Then they took note of attendance and discussions after the participants have left. The problem with their approach is that it is possible that some participants in the control communities have also listened to the reconciliation programme. The researchers tried avoiding this problem by providing incentives for not listening to the programme: participants in the control groups were promised to be given a portable stereo and 14 cassette tapes of all reconciliation episodes at the end of the study. There is also ongoing related work on these issues in southern Sudan (Paluck / Blair / Vexler 2012).

Staff recruitment

The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) is currently funding an ongoing three-year evaluation of a staff recruitment programme being implemented by the Ugandan government. In conflict and post-conflict areas, the delivery of public services is almost non-existent at the local level. One part of the reason for this is that employees in key government posts tend to resign or transfer to another area. To boost staff recruitment and retention in health care and education institutions, the government offers a *“special incentive package”* to encourage government employees to relocate to conflict-afflicted areas in northern Uganda (Lubanga / Ssewanyanya / Muwonge 2012b).

Box 4: Impact on behavioural and economic outcomes		
Intervention	Behavioural outcomes	Economic (or institutional) outcomes
Education and training programme	positive impact on students, but weak effect on ex-combatants	mixed
Community-driven reconstruction	positive on public goods contribution	weak impact on institutions
Social cash transfer	weak	positive
Media	positive	
Source: Author's representation		

The selected evaluations on multidimensional peacekeeping provide us with three key lessons. First, there are a number of evaluations that provide results that are quite unexpected – either because these results challenge our previous formal theoretical assumptions, or because these results confront the conventional logic on which we have based our programming. Similarly problematic, there are cases where the underlying logic that underpins intervention-outcome relationship is not explicit – that is, there are various competing theories in the literature and no priors are available for empirical prediction. Second, although there is a tacit consensus that in fragile environments the observed short-term impact can differ substantially in the long-run, there is a clear message that we do not know much about the long-term effects – what type of outcomes we are likely to observe, how these outcomes came about, and so forth. Third, despite security threats and logistical difficulties, the increasing number of evaluations in this field conveys the impression that there are researchers who have managed to conduct quantitative evaluations in very challenging environments. Besides facilitating the collection of better data, this can impart critical lessons about peacekeeping and state-building interventions.

5.2 Empirical micro research

The evaluation studies discussed focus on the impact of multidimensional peacekeeping on living conditions and social cohesion *in the aftermath of a conflict or civil war*. It does not provide programme managers, diplomats and politicians with information on how to prevent future violent conflict or how to resolve ongoing civil wars.

In the hope of addressing this need, some research studies attempt to answer the questions why people rebel, why conflict occurs and what its consequences are. In other words, what are the factors that increase the risk of rebellion? And what are the consequences of civil war? Although researchers argue that the current studies on the *causes* of war will not help in resolving conflicts, nevertheless, it can be useful for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.

Cross-country studies on internal war find that past wars, poverty, poor growth and a large population are main factors for civil war (see Hoeffler 2011 for a short survey of the literature). However, these studies must be interpreted with caution: Most of these variables, such as poverty and growth are endogenous to civil war. Poverty causes civil wars, but civil wars destroy life and livelihoods. Hence the regressions should employ credible econometric methods to address causality.

Some research studies below examine the causes of rebellion and civil wars with the use of experiments and micro-econometric techniques at the level of armed groups, communities and individuals. Analysis at this level would also help resolve many aggregation problems associated with macro level studies.

Testing theories

Why rebel? There are various competing theories on why civilians participate in armed conflict, naming material incentives, greed and grievances, geography and abduction as one of the crucial factors. Humphreys / Weinstein (2008) set out to test three theories using attitudes and behaviours of ex-combatants and non-combatants in the context of Sierra Leone's civil war. They find that joining armed conflict is associated with an individual's poverty, lack of education and the offer of private goods by the rebels. Their results suggest that theories on grievances, selective incentives and social sanctions coexist, contrary to traditional beliefs that they are rivals. In addition, their results show that involuntary participation such as abduction and coercion plays a crucial role in recruitment. This has been ignored in past debates.

Testing causality

Identifying the appropriate intervention also requires an understanding of how conflict affects the population. In other words, what are the consequences of war? For instance, Blattman (2009) and Blattman / Annan (2010a) studied the impact of child soldiering in Uganda. They find that the victims became psychologically resilient as a result of their experience, gained acceptance in their community and have become more politically active. However, their findings show that participation in conflict has negative consequences for their income and level of education. In Sierra Leone, Bellows / Miguel (2009) also find that individuals that directly experience war and violence become more engaged politically than non-victims. In contrast to the previous study, they do not observe a negative socioeconomic legacy two to three years after the war. These two studies used data gathered at the individual level and suggest that the mechanism between violence and social outcomes is inherent to the individual. Because of war, individuals participate more. Gilligan / Pasquale / Samii (2011) argues that the mechanism can also operate through the community. Their findings show that individuals in communities with higher exposure to civil war in Nepal exhibit greater trust and contribute more to a public good, than those individuals in unaffected communities. This is because communities affected by war must develop new norms and institutions to withstand violence.

Studies on the consequences of civil wars and conflict can help to illuminate donor programming. In the Ugandan context, it is more crucial to provide assistance in education and livelihood than social reintegration, which is the focus of most current programmes (see also Annan et al. 2010). If conflict and civil war have had more of an impact on the economic and educational potential of ex-combatants, rather than their reintegration into society, then multidimensional peacekeeping programmes should react flexibly to this fact and attach more importance to economic or educational assistance. In Sierra Leone, the experience of war makes individuals more politically active, which casts doubt on programmes that aim to promote such behaviour, given that it is already endorsed by the citizens. The evidence from Nepal shows that community-based strategies and institution-building should not be neglected in donor programming.

Understanding the consequences of armed conflict and violence within a country can help local programmers align their interventions towards what is actually needed by the target population, rather than purely relying on hunches, first impressions, or anecdotal evidence. Evaluation and research on causal mechanisms can provide hard evidence to inform the design of peacekeeping interventions.

6 Some lessons

Some lessons for the practice of governance can be extracted based on common patterns that emerged from the previous chapters:

1. *Issues on generalisability.* Looking at the list of evaluations, it is too early to make any generalisations about which interventions work best. Most of the evaluations are from isolated and one-off interventions that highly are context-specific. Furthermore, most evaluations have very short-term horizons –that is, inter-temporal impacts have rarely been addressed.

Some researchers advise the replication of similar evaluations in different contexts, while others promote testing interventions that have not yet undergone rigorous evaluation. Beyond understanding the trade-off between depth and breadth (replicating similar interventions in different setting versus testing new interventions), there still is disagreement about the ‘summative’ ability of impact evaluations and their usefulness for donors as an tool for accountability (Naudet / Delarue / Bernard 2012).

2. *Improving donor coordination.* Impact evaluation has flourished recently and that momentum must be maintained. However, this should be done in a more coordinated manner. Since some impact evaluation methods – especially RCT – require large investments, donors should coordinate to maximise the return from such evaluations. Part of this endeavour is to create or support a database of impact evaluations where ongoing and completed evaluations are logged and shared amongst each other and the public. Apart from showcasing the results of the evaluation, the database should provide information describing (i) the challenges in conducting the evaluation, (ii) the questions left unanswered and (iii) what evaluators should do to improve the execution of such evaluations in the future. In due course, this database should provide a foundation for discussions among donors, specifically on the thematic gap and lessons learned.
3. *Engineer an iterative cycle of learning and adaptation.* Donor agencies should have the capacity to absorb lessons learned from rigorous evaluations and to become more critical of traditionally-designed interventions (or getting rid of path-dependency). Donors that view impact evaluations as a learning tool should adapt the results to their daily operations in the field and when designing new programmes. But because there are still relatively few rigorous evaluations, donors may have to undergo an iterative cycle of learning and adaptation.
4. *Strengthen local ownership.* The evaluations reviewed in this paper were largely donor driven and most of the analytics were done in developed countries (mostly at US universities). Unfortunately, the role of researchers and universities in developing coun-

tries is mostly limited to data collection⁹. To ensure country ownership and use of evaluations for policy-making, the international community has to a greater extent to involve local actors in the various aspects of the evaluation.

5. *Measurement as a key challenge.* There clearly is a demand for more conceptualisation and construction of better indicators reflecting the outcome that we want to measure as closely as possible. Furthermore, there is a shortage of micro-databases to conduct in-depth empirical work. There is great potential in integrating the data collection process between evaluation and research on mechanisms. In some cases, mechanism studies can be integrated with baseline data collection. This would ease important funding issues, while at the same time deriving reliable information about the target population.
6. *Evaluate theories and systematically integrate them in donor programming.* Apart from evaluations, donors should diversify their product mix, ranging from rigorous impact evaluations to research and mechanism studies. Results from the evaluation of theories are geared not only to academic researchers but also to donors, providing information about why the interventions work. Furthermore, the need to, whenever feasible, employ rigorous quantitative methods to present evidence should be further emphasised.


7 Integrating evaluation and research studies that test assumptions and validate mechanisms into donor programming: a two-pronged approach

Donors vary in their approaches toward governance support. But they all have one serious problem: The problem of taking context into account when designing interventions (O'Neil / Foresti / Hudson 2007). There is to this day no unified strategy on how to go about this problem. Although it is widely acknowledged that incentives and constraints that shape the behaviour of the target population can be important factors in the success or failure of certain interventions, little attention in development policy has been paid to research studies and evaluations that test the assumptions behind an intervention.

The two-pronged approach proposed in this paper means systematically combining both research and evaluation studies to inform policy. Why is there a need for both approaches? Evaluation provides information about the effectiveness of certain programmes and policies advocated by donors and governments in practice, but it is still weak in providing information about causes and consequences, as well as the underlying mechanisms that determine why outcomes occur or not, especially if it does not test for a different intervention and a different theory of change. With this in mind, information derived from testing both mechanism and intervention studies should “complement” each other in donor programming, rather than acting as “substitutes” (Ludwig / Kling / Mullainathan 2011).

In a highly simplified framework, the current trend in donor programming, represented by the top arrow in Diagram 1, is to design and implement a programme once a problem is

9 From the start, the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) had been pushing for more involvement of researchers from developing countries in evaluation. Further, last year, they established a new funding scheme, where the government agencies themselves identify the interventions they want evaluated, and researchers then propose an evaluation design.



perceived. Evaluation is then conducted to learn about the effect of the programme, to satisfy donor requirements and to inform policies.

The problem with such an approach is that the perceived problems are often unverified – they can be based on anecdotal evidence or personal impressions. In many cases, feasibility studies are conducted before roll-out to confirm various claims. However, these studies are often not carried out systematically, or if they are, they lack the necessary empirical rigour.

Conducting research to test theories and mechanisms using rigorous quantitative methods should be systematically incorporated in programming (horizontal arrows in the middle of Diagram 1). The idea is that once a perceived problem is identified, mechanism studies are conducted to (i) provide the causes/consequence of the problem or (ii) to test competing theories on the causality between intervention and outcome. The result should guide the design and implementation of the intervention. The effectiveness of the intervention is then examined through standard impact evaluation. Finally, results from both impact evaluation and research studies should be used for policymaking. In case the target population already exhibits the behaviour that the potential intervention aims to promote, the results can be used directly to make informed decisions (bottom arrow).

Whenever feasible, donors should conduct research on theories and mechanisms that supports the causal chain. Although it might be more difficult to justify the financing of mechanism studies than conventional evaluation studies, there are various channels that can be considered to conduct them:

- In case data is already available, use funds to conduct quantitative analysis.
- In some cases, studies already exist in exactly the context programme managers need. In that case, programme managers only need to become aware of such work by commissioning a scoping study.
- Alternatively, baseline studies coupled with appropriate quantitative analysis can also provide information about the most suitable intervention. The idea is not only to collect data to monitor future outcomes, but also information on causes and consequences, and perhaps underlying mechanisms that can guide programming.

- If no data is available, fund field surveys, providing the extraordinary opportunity to understand local conditions.

8 Conclusion

This paper presented recent evidence about the effectiveness of governance interventions in improving electoral participation, combating corruption and promoting peace and stability. Notwithstanding the paucity of evidence and the issues on generalisability that this raises, the outline found the following: On electoral accountability, international observers and the use of technology constrain vote manipulation; social cash transfer have a mixed effect on voter turnout and vote share; and civic information campaigns have a positive impact on electoral participation and the vote share of the incumbent, but the effect can vary depending on the campaign message. On administrative corruption, social cash transfer and information campaigns help to combat corruption. Increases in salaries can be effective if coupled with auditing, while results from community monitoring are mixed. With regard to multidimensional peacekeeping, peace education programmes have a positive impact on students, but a weak effect of ex-combatants; community-driven reconstruction programmes improve provision of public goods, but the effect on institution-building is weak. Social cash transfers have a strong effect on well-being, but a weak effect on social cohesion. Media in the form of soap operas are found to have positive impacts on many behavioural outcomes, except on personal beliefs.

Although the evaluations provided important information on *whether* the programme or policies work or not, answering *why* they work remains a significant gap. It is also often neglected that sometimes a good counterfactual is not necessarily “no intervention”, but a different intervention that tests a different theory of change. Evaluating policies or programmes “*cannot be automatically extrapolated outside the context in which they were obtained*” (Deaton 2010, 449). What is needed is to also evaluate the theories and assumptions behind the intervention. Without the ability to address the why question, it is unlikely that donors can take the appropriate corrective action.

This paper further explored the potential of combining evaluation studies and empirical micro research to explain the mechanism that impede electoral participation, the channels of corruption and the incentives that encourage rebellion. The idea is to close the knowledge gap left open by evaluations of projects and policies at this point, and to identify avenues how both can be used to the benefit of programme managers. In sum, rigorous testing of both, projects and theories, can help make the most of policy-relevant information in the long-run.

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