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The Development Policy System under Pressure

Acknowledging Limitations, Sourcing Advantages
and Moving towards a Broader Perspective

Victoria Gonsior
Stephan Klingebiel

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Bonn, May 2019

Victoria Gonsior, Stephan Klingebiel

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Abbreviations

BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
DCD	Development Cooperation Directorate
DCF	Development Cooperation Forum
DDD	Doing Development Differently
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DIE	German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik
EU	European Union
FDI	foreign direct investment
G20	Group of Twenty
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GCSD	global cooperation for sustainable development
GNI	gross national income
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
GPGs	global public goods
HLM	High-level Meeting
IDA	International Development Association
LDC	least-developed country
LIC	low-income country
MAPs	multi-actor partnerships
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIC	middle-income country
NAO	National Audit Office (United Kingdom)
NGOs	non-governmental organisations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCSD	Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development
PDIA	Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation
RCTs	randomised controlled trials
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SSC	South-South cooperation
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

US United States

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WTO World Trade Organization

Executive summary

For the last couple of years, the development policy system has found itself in an environment within which opportunities to address solutions for global sustainable development with joint approaches are eroding and where competition among providers of development cooperation is emphasised. More specifically, these challenges provide an environment within which the 2030 Agenda's transformative power and its demand for universality and reciprocity are forced into the background; and within which development policy – as one of the few policy fields aimed explicitly at global sustainable development – is becoming more and more part of a tool box for competition.

This paper uses the development policy system as an entry point. The term “development policy system” should be understood as a complex system based on rules that underpin, govern and structure development policy and on a set of incentive systems that ideally steer behaviour and decision-making processes in the desired direction.

In order to conceptualise the changes that have taken place within the development policy system, we present the system in its three dimensions. Each dimension addresses either the “why”, “how” or “what” of the development policy system.

- The “why” dimension poses the question of why the development policy system is responding and presents narratives, concepts and theories from within and outside the development policy system. One such example that is presented in more detail in this paper is a narrative that emerged outside the development policy system and that relates to the fact that sustainable development challenges today span national borders, while collective action has been reduced and countries are increasingly inward-looking. Thereby, especially in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), we find that migration is much more dominant in overall political debates and, as a result, also in the narrative for the development policy system. While the migration narrative has become more important and has influenced the development policy system from the outside, one narrative that has lost momentum in the inside is the aid-effectiveness debate.
- The “how” dimension poses the question of how changes in the development policy system occur and addresses changes within the system from strategic perspectives and institutional settings. Within this dimension, we discuss new demand and supply structures and their impact on the development policy system. In particular, development success in many developing countries and regions demands a response about how cooperation with more advanced countries can be strategically organised – a question that needs to be discussed within, and even beyond, the development policy system.
- The “what” dimension asks what these changes translate into and presents the respective instruments, modalities and tools as well as operational activities. We illustrate the changes within this dimension by using one particular example: innovations, including frontier technology. Frontier technology – such as drones, artificial intelligence and blockchain – and its potential contribution to development cooperation is being avidly discussed in many fora. Interests, ideas and project innovations in development cooperation applying frontier technology are vast. Here frontier technology is not only being used to design systems and processes in a more efficient manner but also to solve

a particular problem at hand or even to spur on the transformation of how industry functions.

Overall, the changes within the development policy system over the last decade have been manifold. Migration, for instance, has affected the development policy system in a way, which turned out to be a “game changer”: development cooperation now promotes its work as a means to reducing migration pressures. However, what do these changes imply when one looks at the three dimensions from a bird’s-eye view? Do these changes go hand-in-hand, and ultimately build on, re-inform and influence each other? Or are we observing fairly isolated changes within each dimension? For example: Is the migration aspect of the current development policy system narrative having tangible consequences for the strategic and operational dimensions?

In addressing these questions, we argue that just focusing on one dimension would be too narrow and would not address academics and practitioners “rethinking development (cooperation)” alike. More specifically, we argue that we see disconnections between the dimensions. While one might argue that the aspect of disconnections within a policy system in itself is not new, we argue that – based on the information gathered and in light of the changes throughout the past decade, or roughly since 2010 – the effect of persisting and potentially amplifying disconnections is increasing.

Based on the analysis of the three dimensions and their (dis-)connections, we draw six overall conclusions:

First, the changes discussed along the three dimensions are not only diverse but also dynamic. They range from new narratives translated to the development policy context, such as the migration narrative, to strategic considerations of, for instance, Official Development Assistance (ODA) graduation implications; new instruments, in the form of development finance at the interface with the private sector; and concepts for project implementation, including frontier technology. However, changes in a narrative do not directly lead to changes in strategies and operations, and vice versa.

Second, the main actors within the development policy system (such as government departments and implementing agencies) tend to “zoom in” on their own policy field, thereby limiting their own vision. As such, the political economy of the system increases some actors’ perception that they are part of a “dying system” or at least of a system with diminishing influence. We see the reemphasised focus on poverty reduction in debates as a reflection of such a traditional and narrow development policy perspective. Although reduction of extreme poverty remains a valid and significant rationale for the development policy system, it implies a shrinking “market” (What are the key tasks for the development policy system in the future?) and a “running out of a business model” for the future (What are the main needs for cross-border cooperation in the coming decades?).

Third, actors in development policy need to acknowledge their limitations. This is rooted in the universality of the 2030 Agenda and the creation of a vanishing point outside the development policy system. As such, there are, of course, significant implications of the presented disconnections well beyond the Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) agenda and even more generally beyond the development policy system per se.

Questions such as how foreign, trade, security and national health policies as well as other policy areas should be adjusted accordingly are gaining importance. Within that sense, re-determining system boundaries, redefining interfaces to other policy areas, as well as the consideration of an institutional setting at the meta level are crucial aspects for such a new understanding of the development policy system in the context of global sustainable development.

Fourth, against this background, and in light of the present disconnections, we propose to focus on potential contributions, comparative advantages and the limitations of the development policy system. In other words, neither the self-preservation of the development policy field, nor questioning the overall rationale of development policy is at the centre of attention. Rather, development policy – and more specifically the development policy system – has been chosen as an entry point to provide a basis for further discussion. The development policy system is composed of a vast number of transnational platforms, networks and institutions that support coordination beyond national borders and across a wide-range of themes and stakeholders. Furthermore, it has the capacity to implement a “project” anywhere in the world under a number of different circumstances.

Fifth, resources allocated to the development policy system, especially ODA, can function as an innovation hub, a catalyst, or even as a last resort. Development actors already sometimes label activities and strategies as “innovations”. However, this innovative role is more of a niche role that development policy has been playing so far.

Sixth and last, we assume a strong need to upscale transnational cooperation in support of global sustainable development. A wider concept for global cooperation in respect to sustainable development should not just be about development policy – it should go well beyond the development policy field.

1 Introduction

By the end of October 2018, Federica Mogherini¹ and Bill Gates each held a speech at the public debate “Innovation in Development: The Future of European Union (EU) International Cooperation”² in the European Parliament. While Mogherini mainly emphasised the importance of the migration narrative for development cooperation and the EU’s partnership with Africa, Bill Gates focused on technological innovation within projects in the health sector to address global health challenges.

These two contributions highlight just two of several key changes that we can observe within the development policy system. The former input presents a narrative focusing strongly on migration with continuously reduced space for collective action, in spite of a much more demanding global agenda. The latter emphasises innovative technological advances within the operational dimension often spurred on through the engagements of new actors becoming more and more active in the development policy system. From our perspective, both inputs are both connected (different types of innovations within different dimensions are taking place in parallel) and disconnected (speeches addressing very different dimensions of development policy challenges) at the same time. However, they point to an important observation: disconnections in the development policy system continue to persist and are potentially increasing.

What, from a bird’s-eye view, are the implications and effects of continuing and potentially growing disconnections to the wider development policy system itself? Do changes in the migration narrative, for example, lead to changes in operational approaches for migration; or do technological health advances inform and support the creation of new narratives around innovation? Or are we actually observing a disconnect between the narratives that frame the engagement of actors in development policy, their strategies for delivery and operational approaches in partner countries?

While one might argue that the aspect of disconnections within a policy system by itself is not a new one, we maintain that the importance of such disconnections has increased in the recent past. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent a more complex and multi-faceted goal system³ and this paper assumes that serving such a complex goal system requires addressing the relationship between the different dimensions of the system to a greater extent. In particular, the persistence of disconnections in the development policy system can be more problematic vis-à-vis the availability of a universal agenda and the need to upscale delivery to achieve the SDGs.

1 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission.

2 For further information on the content of the speech and the event refer to https://eas.europa.eu/topics/economic-relations-connectivity-innovation/52329/innovation-development-future-eu-international-cooperation-speech-hrvp-mogherini-public-debate_en.

3 For further information, refer to Janus, Klingebiel, and Paulo (2015).

Purpose of this paper

The changes addressed within the development policy system started roughly in 2010. This time frame has only been chosen loosely and is not applied consistently throughout the three dimensions of the development policy system. While it is not justified in a strict academic sense, we argue that a number of narratives, concepts and theories, especially from outside the development policy system, have influenced the political discourse during this period not only in development policy but also in other policy fields.⁴

The main purpose of this paper is to present and discuss the changes that have taken place along three dimensions of the development policy system:

- Narratives, concepts and theories (why?),
- strategies and institutional set-up (how?), and
- instruments, modalities, tools and activities (what?).⁵

Using the information gathered, it examines the relationship between the dimensions and, in particular, the continuing and potentially growing disconnections between the “why”, “how” and “what” of the development policy system.

Based on the examination of these changes, the much discussed questions in and beyond the development policy field are addressed: How might future cooperation among countries be organised? How could cooperation between countries at different stages of development be arranged in order to contribute jointly to the provision of global public goods (GPGs), for instance on global health issues? Who are the actors that need to be addressed when considering these questions? Are actors beyond the field of development policy responsive to such potential needs for cooperation that span borders? And if so, would these actors have the appropriate resources and professional capacities (for instance, planning and implementing operational activities in conflicts elsewhere and even in fragile settings) for this type of cross-border cooperation?

When posing such questions – and thereby directly and indirectly questioning the role and functioning of development policy – many inevitably think of breakthrough ideas, no one has thought of before, that either initiate an overarching system reform or invent a new system in its entirety (an example might be a new “whole-of-government” approach of governments and international institutions supporting global sustainable development). But, in this paper, this is not what we are primarily aiming at.

Instead, the purpose of presenting and discussing the changes that have occurred along the three dimensions, and of examining the relationships between them, lies in pointing to the fact that disconnections still persist and are potentially even increasing, in spite of a universal agenda. Linkages are thereby made between academic debates and practical experiences in development policy decision-making as well as implementation of

4 Section 2 provides an elaboration of the chosen time frame.

5 The interrogatives “why”, “how” and “what” point to more detailed questions for each of the three dimensions. We are aware that – depending on the phrasing of the questions – each of the respective interrogatives is applicable to any of the three dimensions. Hence, we point out that we are using the interrogatives as abbreviations for the three dimensions to make the arguments clearer.

development policy. By building bridges between theory and practice, we can gain insights into aspects that fundamentally question the way the development policy system is set up, as well as its potential for optimisation.

As a result, the paper develops a set of more general results providing inputs for further academic and policy debates beyond simply informing on changes within the development policy system.

Sources and methodology

The overall study spanned a period from August 2018 to Mai 2019. The information used in our paper – not least in the figures introduced in Section 3 – has been gleaned from a review of the respective literature, expert interviews, and group discussions. The literature consulted addresses discourses on global challenges and global solutions, pressures from within and outside the development policy system, coupled with ideas on “rethinking” and transforming development (cooperation). These topics that can be found within three broad strands of debates: i) global governance and global development; ii) fundamental reflections and critiques on development cooperation; and iii) debates on how to optimise development cooperation.⁶

The backbone of this paper is formed by a qualitative research design, which added to the outcomes and findings of the literature consulted. A qualitative research design was chosen to explore the topic “rethinking development (cooperation)” within the context of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors and to take account of its complexity. During the study period, 22 explorative expert interviews and a number of focal group discussions and brainstorming sessions complemented the literature review. Explorative expert interviews were held with employees in managerial or strategic functions of bilateral development agencies, representatives from various different directorates at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and several academic stakeholders.⁷ Hence, this paper adds value to the debate by linking up the voices, thoughts and ideas of academics and practitioners.

Giving a comprehensive overview of all current debates, trends and reactions is beyond the scope of the paper. The paper is presented mainly from the perspective of OECD DAC donors. Such a bias clearly influences the presentation of academic debates and experiences as it reflects – at least to some extent – the point of view from this group of actors and possibly the underlying narrative in which they are embedded. However, even though the three dimensions, presented later in detail, may not capture all changes and advances and include a bias towards OECD DAC donors, the presentation of a variety of responses at different levels by diverse actors in the field is also informed by main global and Southern debates on development cooperation and global sustainable development.

6 For further information on the literature consulted, refer to Annex 1.

7 See Annex 2 with a list of interview partners, focal groups and brainstorming discussions.

2 Conceptualising the development policy system

2.1 Definitions

In this paper, the term “development policy system”⁸ refers to a complex system which is based on rules that underpin, govern and structure development policy and on a set of incentive systems that ideally steer behaviour and decision-making processes in the desired direction.

Development policy comes into play at three levels: i) the level of partner countries (improving local living conditions through development cooperation); ii) the international level (involvement in shaping global framework conditions and international regulations in line with development goals); iii) the domestic level in donor countries (improving policy coherence for sustainable development, as well as providing information and delivering education on development and development cooperation) (Ashoff & Klingebiel, 2014, p. 1). For further information on the terminology “development cooperation”, please refer to Box 1.

Neither group, nor development approach is entirely fixed or stable (see, for instance, Esteves & Klingebiel, 2018). On the contrary, the development policy system in its entirety is a decentralised policy area, which intertwines different principles and practices. For example, the DAC of the OECD includes the Republic of Korea – a country formerly of the Global South.⁹ A low-income country like Rwanda is increasingly profiling itself as a partner in sharing its own development experiences as a provider of South-South cooperation (SSC) while different understandings of development cooperation are contested in international development debates.¹⁰ The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), managed jointly by the OECD and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is intended to be the main platform for actors on development effectiveness topics, but it is not a global platform since major actors such as Brazil, China and India do not participate.

8 We understand the term “system” as “a set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or an interconnecting network; a complex whole”, as well as “a set of principles or procedures according to which something is done; an organized scheme or method”; definitions retrieved from <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/system>.

9 Korea signed the Convention founding the OECD on 12 December 1996. For further information, see <https://www.oecd.org/korea/korea-and-the-oecd.htm>.

10 See Klingebiel (2019) for further information.

Box 1: The main branches of development cooperation today

Development cooperation is only one part of the development policy system. Development cooperation “aims explicitly at supporting national or international development priorities, [...] is not driven by profit, discriminates in favour of developing countries, and is based on cooperative relationships that seek to enhance developing country ownership” (Alonso & Glennie, 2016). In our understanding, we distinguish this form of cooperation along three main branches: i) Official Development Assistance (ODA); ii) South-South cooperation (SSC); and iii) triangular cooperation.¹¹

The first one is the long-time dominating concept originating from the OECD DAC: Official Development Assistance. According to the OECD, ODA represents the resource flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients and to multilateral development institutions that are, for example, provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, by their executive agencies or through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]/DAC [Development Assistance Committee], 2018). Also, resource flows that are concessional (that is, grants and soft loans) and administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective are considered as ODA. In 2012, the DAC began working to modernise its statistical system in order to improve its approach, while taking into account the changes in the development sector, such as the growing importance of non-DAC countries and philanthropic donors, the diversification of financial instruments for development, and the increasing interfaces to other policy areas such as migration and security. At the time of writing, the concept was still under discussion.

South-South cooperation is only organised and defined to a limited extent. For SSC, the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, South Africa), a club governance format, provided a definition in mid-2018 which might serve as a general definition. While emphasising the principles of “respect for national sovereignty; national ownership and independence; equality; non-conditionality; non-interference in domestic affairs; and mutual benefit”, IBSA partners claim that the “SSC is completely different from the North-South/donor-donee cooperation, and that ODA templates are not a good basis for SSC” (IBSA [India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum], 2018). Nevertheless, a clearly defined group of SSC providers and a jointly shared approach, for example mechanisms of delivery and/or the transfer of resources, are not yet available.¹² For example, Rwanda’s support for the Presidency of Benin is not covered by the current SSC mainstream discourse of SCC providers coming from middle-income countries (MICs).

Triangular cooperation also forms a part of development cooperation. It is also being discussed widely and only recently has its definition started to reach beyond traditional trilateral approaches, whereby a bilateral development partner from the group of OECD countries cooperates with a SSC provider from the Global South in support of a developing country. Today the OECD defines triangular cooperation as a broader approach where various different actors join to “share knowledge and implement projects that support the common goal of reducing poverty and promoting development” (OECD/DAC, n.d.-c).

2.2 Three system dimensions: why, how and what

Neither in academic debates nor in practice have the changes of the past decade been upscaled conceptually. This paper conceptualises changes within the development policy system. It takes a bird’s-eye perspective through a presentation and discussion of these changes along three dimensions. Just focussing on one dimension (such as the narrative or operational activities) would be too narrow and would not address academics and

11 See RIS (Research and Information System for Developing Countries) (2018) for further information.

12 For further information on SSC and its definition refer, among others, to United Nations publications in the reference list (UN General Assembly, 2018a; UN General Assembly, 2018b). The Second High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation (Buenos Aires, 20 to 22 March 2019) did not come up with a clearer definition.

practitioners alike “rethinking development (cooperation)”. Typically, academic and policy-oriented debates focus on just one dimension or on just a few aspects of the development policy system. This is one of the reasons why, for example, publications and events (conferences, and so on) are often limited to a specific aspect. Both practitioners and academics often address questions focusing on, let’s say, the contribution of technological innovations to new types of development projects and the influence of the migration challenge for the development narrative in isolation. Consequently, they might fail to create connections between the dimensions.


We use the development policy system as an entry point assuming that changes can be observed in its three system dimensions. Each dimension addresses either the why, how or what of the development policy system.

- The “why” dimension poses the question of why the development policy system is now taking action and presents **narratives, concepts and theories from within and outside the development policy system**.
- The “how” dimension poses the question of how changes in the development policy system occur and addresses the system’s changes from **strategical perspectives and the institutional setting**.
- The “what” dimension asks what these changes translate into and presents the appropriate **instruments, modalities and tools as well as operational activities**.

The three dimensions were derived on the basis of the information gathered through the literature consulted, expert interviews as well as brainstorming and focal group discussions. Figure 1 presents the three dimensions, their corresponding questions and translations, as well as their sub-clusters and aggregated themes within these. The “why” dimension portrays narratives, concepts and theories and is subdivided into changes occurring both within and outside the development policy system. The second dimension, “how”, presents changes aimed at institutional reform and managing resources as well as the creation of interface modi between various policy fields. The “what” dimension groups changes either within the instruments, modalities and tools or within the activities cluster.

A full elaboration of each of the items listed in the figure and the ones that follow is beyond the scope of the paper. The effort presented here is only a snapshot of a variety of changes that have been taking place in the development policy system and its system environment throughout the last decade. The three dimensions, together with the subclusters, structure the observed changes in the development policy system and thereby facilitate the analysis.

Figure 1: The why, how and what of the development policy system



Notes: DC: development cooperation; MDGs: Millennium Development Goals; SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals

Source: Authors, based on the information gathered through expert interviews, focal group and/or brainstorming discussions and the literature consulted

2.3 The importance of continuing and potentially growing disconnections since 2010

A conceptualisation of the development policy system along three dimensions provides the basis for assessing whether observed changes build on and re-inform each other to create synergies to overcome continuing disconnections. While one might argue that the aspect of disconnections within a policy system by itself is not a new one, we argue that the significance of such disconnections has been increasing, especially over the last decade, or roughly since 2010, as it is hindering transnational cooperation and global cooperation in deriving sustainable solutions.

The SDGs have moved the political agenda from a simple to a complex goal system.¹³ They emerged from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). While significant progress in achieving the MDGs was made, a wide variety of challenges remained and within the prevailing framework of the MDGs “development and sustainability aspirations were largely approached disjointly” (Kharas & Rogerson, 2017, p. 18). Kharas and Rogerson (2017) list, for example, the underdeveloped role of non-state and private actors, the inadequate concern for peace and institutions and the strong emphasis on goals that were relatively easy to measure. The SDGs aim at addressing these shortcomings and introduce a narrative to the development policy system which is wider in scope and which attempts to account for development in both “developing” and “developed” countries alike (Fukuda-Parr, 2017; Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2019; TWI2050 – The World in 2050, 2018).

At the same time, and especially throughout the most recent years, the growing pressure from these global (and sometimes regional) challenges has been coupled with the reduced readiness and willingness of several main actors to engage in collective action. The announced withdrawal of the US administration from the Paris Climate Agreement (of 2015) in 2017 and the threat of its withdrawal from other multilateral mechanisms, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), is but one example of the shrinking willingness towards collective action of several main actors.

Other trends have further contributed to profound structural changes. The growing role of rising (super-) powers, especially China and India, and various other dynamic countries (such as Turkey and Indonesia) has had a strong impact on global governance structures.¹⁴ The rise of the Group of Twenty (G20) is a reflection of this trend. Acharya (2017) provides an in-depth analysis of several key aspects related to a “multiplex world” which goes well beyond multipolarity and is a world of “multiple modernities, where Western liberal modernity (and its preferred pathways to economic development and governance) is only a part of what is on offer” (Acharya, 2017, p. 277).

These developments, that can largely be associated with the last decade, provide the time horizon that is framing the changes under consideration in this paper. Since 2010 roughly, these developments have provided an environment within which opportunities to address solutions for global sustainable development with joint approaches are eroding and where competition among states is gaining more emphasis. More specifically, these challenges provide an environment within which the 2030 Agenda’s transformative power and its

13 For further information, refer to Janus et al. (2015).

14 See, for example, the debate on “shifting wealth” (OECD, 2018c).

demand for universality and reciprocity have been pushed aside; and within which development policy as one of the few policy fields aimed explicitly at global sustainable development is more often becoming part of a tool box for competition instead of cooperation on a global scale (see, for instance, debates on development policy as a dimension of soft power; see also Morris (2018)).

Hence, this paper assumes that catering for such a complex goal system despite reduced collective action requires addressing the relationship between the different dimensions of the system to a greater extent. In particular, the persistence of, and potentially growing disconnections between the dimensions of the development policy system can prove more problematic in the face of a universal agenda and the need to upscale cooperation to achieve sustainable solutions.

3 Changes and disconnections in the development policy system

Generally, changes within the development policy system that have occurred throughout the last decade are manifold. The present cutting edge advances we identified during our study period point partly to the system's strength to adjust and we assume that, ideally, changes within each dimension are intertwined with and re-inform changes within other dimensions in the presence of a universal agenda and the need to upscale delivery to achieve the SDGs.

The objective of this chapter is to present and submerge ourselves into each of the three dimensions while simultaneously moving across the dimensions as a continuum of perspectives with a bird's-eye view to examine their relationship. We do so by first presenting the dimension under consideration. For each dimension, we selected and present one particular example, which we then elaborate on in more detail and examine not only within one but also across all three dimensions. Thereafter, overarching conclusions of the changes within the various different dimensions of the development policy system are drawn, shedding light on continuing and potentially growing (dis-)connections.


3.1 Narratives, concepts and theories

The first dimension asks “why” changes in the development policy system are occurring and presents the landscape within which the development policy system is embedded. Generally, answers to this question can be attributed to wider narratives, concepts and theories both within and outside the development policy system. Narratives, concepts and theories are informed by and refer to ideas¹⁵ that take into account connected events and define the landscape within which the development policy system is embedded.

Figure 2 presents the main narratives, concepts and theories that have changed within and outside the development policy system. It divides the narratives into narratives from outside and inside the development policy system. The narratives from outside the development policy system mirror the increasing importance of continuing and potentially growing disconnections, the period that defines our approach and that has been addressed in the

15 For a more general debate on “ideas” in international relations, see for example Acharya (2012) and Williams (2004).

previous chapter. In most cases, they were taken up by or interpreted for the development policy system. However, within the development policy system, we also observe debates that have not been extended beyond the policy field itself.



What do these changes imply when looking at the development policy system with the three dimensions from a bird’s-eye view? Do changes in narratives, concepts and theories go hand-in-hand and ultimately build on, re-inform and influence each other? Or are we instead observing isolated changes within each dimension? In order to shed light on these questions the topic of migration will be discussed in more detail. Migration, as well as the transparent inclusion of national self-interests, influence the development policy system in a way which turns out to be a major game changer.

3.1.1 Why? – The migration narrative

From outside the development policy system, a narrative that clearly prompted change within the system addresses the fact that today sustainable development challenges are extending beyond national borders at the same time that collective action has been reduced and countries are becoming more inward-looking. A main trigger for a changing narrative, especially in the EU and the US, lies in the much more pronounced dominance of migration as part of overall political debates and thereby as a highly relevant feature of the development narrative. A new demand to include “national interests” transparently on the board of development policy considerations for OECD countries is one indication in this regard (Barber, 2018; Hulme, 2016; Keijzer & Lundsgaarde, 2018; Mawdsley, Murray, Overton, Scheyvens, & Banks, 2018). Today, motives and priorities in development policy also address, for instance, Brexit-related objectives for the United Kingdom,¹⁶ migration-related

16 For further information, see Abrahams (2019) and the speech by the International Development Secretary, the Rt. Hon. Penny Mordaunt MP, at CDC in London on 9 October 2018, see <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-future-of-uk-aid-post-brexit>.

goals for the US administration under the administration of President Trump and (in a different way) for European donors (EU institutions and member states), to mention just few examples. Thus, the migration narrative is of increasing concern to many actors both outside and within the development policy system and it significantly influences policy dialogues and decision-makers.¹⁷

At the same time, a narrative emphasising new donor interests in development cooperation has largely replaced the former aid- and development-effectiveness discourse pushed and supported by OECD DAC donors. As such, managing migration is one driving force for increasing ODA budgets and for revisiting development cooperation justifications. Hence, the OECD approach of ODA is in a situation of high relevance and visibility (for example, dealing with the migration challenges from an EU perspective and the consequences of challenges for the African continent to the EU).

3.1.2 (Dis-)connections to the other system dimensions: how and what

With the aid-effectiveness agenda pushed aside and the increase in ODA budgets in several OECD DAC countries in response to the growing importance of the migration narrative, we examine to which extent actors in the development policy system have also responded along the two other dimensions – “how” and “what”. Within the strategic dimension, the migration narrative touches questions of allocation priorities (in terms of country selection and priority sectors/activities) for funds being spent. Bilateral development cooperation actors aim at channelling their funds to transit countries and countries of origin; based on the argument of addressing the “root causes” of displacement and reintegrating migrants in their countries of origin. Within the operational dimension, the allocation aspirations are finding traction within some special funding vehicles and concepts, such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa¹⁸ and the EU Migration Partnership Framework (Castijello, 2017). Programmes and activities aim at the creation of jobs within countries of origin as well as at reintegration.¹⁹ However, many scholars (for example, Schraven et al. (2017)) argue that migration is multifaceted and requires approaches that lead to cooperation with partner countries. Furthermore, academic debates emphasise that improved living conditions (supported by development cooperation) do not lead to less pressure to migrate. In actual fact, there is evidence that a higher level of “development” may even facilitate migration movements. Hence, development cooperation partners need to balance narrow short-term interests that might be appealing due to support from the wider public against long-term interests aimed at addressing overall global sustainable development. Gulrajani and Calleja (2019) have only recently published their paper on the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Principled Aid Index, which sheds light on motivations for 29 bilateral development cooperation partners.

17 For more information on migration and development, refer to Clemens (2017); Schraven, Angenendt, and Martin-Shields (2017); for a discussion on the migration-development-security nexus, see Castles (2010).

18 For further information on the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, refer to https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/homepage_en.

19 One such example is the BMZ-funded programme “Perspektive Heimat”. See <https://www.returningfromgermany.de/en/programmes/perspektive-heimat>.

3.1.3 Discussion

With an eroding momentum for aid effectiveness (Lundsgaarde & Keijzer, 2016),²⁰ and a lack of political interest in the SDGs within the wider public, actors in development policy tend to focus on short-term challenges, such as the current migration narrative, instead of on high-level debates for a long-term vision for development policy. Even though the importance of the SDGs is widely acknowledged, the 2030 Agenda does not seem to find a similar political traction for domestic debates in OECD countries outside development policy, as compared to the migration narrative.²¹ These fundamental shifts have resulted in widespread discussions regarding the need for a fundamental reflection on the development policy system. Such a need is increasingly reflected in voices on “rethinking” or “transforming” development cooperation which are becoming numerous and are being discussed prominently among practitioners (see, for instance, OECD/DAC, 2017a, p. 2) and academics.²²

Embedding these responses and advances within one framework points to the fact that there is no “aggregated referee” evaluating the practices of main actors in the development policy system and thereby possibly even objectively questioning the system itself. More specifically, there is no institutional set-up or platform at the meta level which can take off the “development policy system lenses” and embed it within its wider system environment and within a broader concept for global sustainable development. The OECD’s DAC – which could be an innovation force in this regard – does play a role as a fairly rational development policy actor but has little appetite for fundamental reflections.²³ In addition, while the OECD represents a large number of countries, it still only represents a specific country group. The United Nations (UN) fora and entities (such as the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (DCF)) for their part deal with development cooperation topics and have a global mandate, but they are not effective in providing a platform for innovative discussions or in setting effective rules for development cooperation. On the other hand, development policy as a system persists (in the sense of all bureaucracy persistence; see also Walton (2005)); thus, it would be naive to expect that fundamental changes would come from within the system itself.

20 For further information on the development of the aid effectiveness agenda, refer to Ashoff and Klingebiel (2014).

21 For the time being, evidence for this particular assumption cannot be found in writing and one might argue that comparing the SDGs to the migration narrative comes close to comparing “apples to oranges” in that the SDGs cover a vast range of aspects while the migration narrative is a strong, single-focused agenda. Nonetheless, the experience we have gathered throughout the research process supports such an observation, especially outside development policy.


22 Refer, for instance, to the DIE-Exceed conference Rethinking Development Cooperation in Bonn, Germany from 9 to 10 September 2018 as well as to the Development Research Conference 2018 Rethinking Development from 22 to 23 August 2018 in Göteborg, Sweden.

23 The DAC and the Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD) of the OECD are playing a crucial role in many ways. This is true, for example, with regard to the high relevance of the DAC peer reviews (Ashoff, 2013). At the same time the OECD system was not in a position to provide more fundamental reflections and innovations over the last decades.

3.2 Strategies and institutional set-up

While the first dimension represents why the development policy system is changing through a presentation of narratives, concepts and theories, the second dimension addresses how changes in the development policy system occur. We intend to show “how” changes occur from a **strategic and institutional perspective**. One strategy typically involves the development of a long-range plan to achieve broader objectives, as identified in debates on narratives, concepts and theories (“why”). Similarly, the development of such long-range plans and corresponding institutional adjustments could also emerge as a response to changing singular operational activities (“what”) in an attempt to structure, merge or upscale them.

A number of changes within the strategic dimension have occurred (see Figure 3). These range from allocation models for financial and non-financial resources to corresponding institutional structures for the aforementioned operationalisation and include – but are not limited to – debates on multi-actor partnerships (MAPs) and forms of “orchestration”. Figure 3 presents these changes in two sub-clusters: institutional reform and managing resources; and interface modi between various policy fields.



Again, conceptualising changes along three main dimensions could conceivably lead to the perception that each of these dimensions exists within its own silo. However, systems typically are at work. Ideally, their dimensions re-inform each other and they interact,

creating overlaps and interconnections. While it would be possible to consider many potential paths to explore those overlaps and interconnections, we choose to analyse them on the basis of one example, namely cooperation with middle-income countries (MICs). As global dynamics have moved the world order beyond a North/South dichotomy, success in development success in many developing countries and regions is demanding a response to how cooperation with more advanced countries may be strategically organised. Within this context, one aspect that is of particular interest is the topic “graduation”: the fact that the number of ODA-eligible countries is decreasing leads to a fundamental questioning of the relevance of ODA and the strategic and institutional positioning for cooperation with partner countries experiencing significant economic development success (this might lead to a phasing out of aid per se, and so on).

3.2.1 How? – Cooperation with MICs

From the strategic and institutional perspective, graduation would seem to be only a technical aspect: after all it implies, most importantly, an increase in a country’s gross national income (GNI) and hence an increase in prosperity which in turn reflects success in development. However, if graduation thresholds are upheld, graduation brings with it a number of questions that yet remain to be answered. These questions focus, for example, on ongoing cooperation activities that are in place at the time of graduation: Will cooperation activities be continued after graduation using funds from ODA actors or will they be continued using alternative sources of funds? Alternatively: Will they be restructured after graduation addressing the likely different demands of a more prosperous country. Or will they simply be phased out or stopped, the moment a country graduates?

Even more broadly: for development cooperation, graduation implies a significant reduction in partner countries, not least of some of the most important ones (for instance, in terms of population size). While this does not automatically imply a cut-off to all international relations, it does involve a reflection on how cooperation in general could be organised between OECD countries and multilateral institutions on the one hand and graduated developing countries on the other hand in order to contribute jointly to the provision of global public goods, for instance on global health issues. When funds spent in these countries cannot be declared as ODA anymore, does this automatically imply that actors beyond the field of development policy take over? Moreover, if so, do these actors (already) have the appropriate resources and professional capacities for this type of cross-border cooperation?

In this context, the main actors in development policy are not only searching for potential new forms of cooperation but are also discussing adjustments to eligibility criteria; the use of other resources beyond ODA; a handing over or link to other policy fields; as well as exit options at the strategic/institutional level. The elaboration of the strategic dimension is crucial in creating a link that is currently missing and as such in fully exploring the possibilities for cooperation with MICs within and beyond the development policy system. For example, in their cooperation with India, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “take on a central role as hubs for expertise, knowledge and partnership building” (Paulo, 2018). The OECD Development Centre, on the other hand, discusses the concept of “graduation” whereby development is understood as a continuum of not just the income

category but of a number of multiple categories identifying well-being multi-dimensionally (ECLAC [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean]/OECD, 2018).

3.2.2 (Dis-)connections to the other system dimensions: why and what

Within the “why” dimension, cooperation with MICs – or more specifically with rising powers – is amongst the main topics that have already been discussed within as well as outside the development policy system for years. At the same time, development institutions and think tanks are not very conclusive on the topic for the policy field. For example, some argue that the poverty narrative of development cooperation remains valid and should lead to a clear focus on low-income countries (LICs). Other debates emphasise global challenges on the other hand as a crucial perspective for the development policy system and the important role that MICs are playing in the provision of GPGs.

The “why” for doing development only in the Global South has long been questioned (Horner, 2017b). From outside the development policy system, the world is moving beyond the geographical binary North/South divide with economic, human and environmental issues being relevant to countries irrespective of their state of income (Horner, 2017a). Even if the phase of global economic convergence is slowing down for several countries, the period since the beginning of the 2000s has especially been characterised by a phase of “shifting wealth” (OECD, 2018c). In the past, development cooperation within the development policy system was guided by a geo-economic typology of the world: “developed countries (North), with the responsibility to offer aid; and developing countries (South), with the right to receive it” (Bracho, 2015, p. 1).²⁴ Today, though, it is acknowledged that developing countries cannot simply be clustered as a homogeneous group anymore and that the differentiation of the “Global South” has become highly complex. Hence, developing countries are increasingly dissimilar – and this has led to discussions of whether there is the need to replace the term and the concept of “developing countries”.²⁵

In the realm of development cooperation, the differentiation of partner countries because of global shifts in income and poverty has reduced the relative importance of ODA in some countries and is posing adaptation pressures on the existing systems. Some countries prosper from a dynamic economy and have graduated or are graduating to the status of MICs²⁶ while others have remained at lower income levels.

The list of ODA recipients provided by the DAC and the history of ODA recipients indicate a significant graduation trend over the past decades. As currently classified, only a limited number of countries – mostly LICs and fragile states – will be relying on development cooperation in the future.²⁷ As of January 2018, Chile, together with the Seychelles and

24 Bracho (2015) provides a historical presentation of the North-South and South-South cooperation traditions and discusses its development with a special focus on emerging donors.

25 See on this debate, for example, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/should-we-continue-use-term-developing-world>.

26 For further information on the origin and development of MICs and their role for development cooperation, see, for example, Paulo and Klingebiel (2016) and Klingebiel (2018).

27 For an overview on the history of DAC lists of aid recipient countries refer to <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/historyofdaclistsofaidrecipientcountries.htm>.

Uruguay, graduated out of the list of ODA-eligible countries.²⁸ Sedemund (2014) projects that “over the period until 2030, 28 developing countries with a total population of 2 billion are projected to exceed the income threshold for ODA eligibility”.²⁹ Thereby, graduation first of all simply means that a country’s GNI per capita surpasses the current threshold for ODA eligibility.³⁰ As a result, development policy programmes and projects in support of those countries cannot be reported as ODA expenditures any longer. Similar graduation challenges exist, for example, when it comes to the World Bank’s soft lending window International Development Association (IDA).³¹

Although many MICs are becoming increasingly wealthy in economic terms, significant challenges remain and the report “Emerging Challenges and Shifting Paradigms” by ECLAC/OECD (2018) highlights the limitations of per capita income as a measurement. The majority of the world’s poor reside in these countries. As Sumner (2011) stated, inequality and poverty continue to be relevant within this group of countries as well as economic challenges related to rapid growth trajectories (Alonso, Glennie, & Sumner, 2014). Besides the aspect of poverty reduction and wealth distribution, researchers also frequently address the importance of the role of MICs for global public goods.³² As a result, MICs play a dual role in the field of development cooperation by being “recipients” as well as “contributors” (Alonso et al., 2014). LICs could even potentially act as development cooperation providers, as presently explored by Rwanda (Klingebiel, 2019).

At the operational level (the “what” dimension) with a changing narrative and context, actors in development policy are increasingly considering MAPs and the incorporation of southern approaches to development policy including, but not limited to, SSC and triangular cooperation instruments that do not only cover trilateral formats to cooperate with MICs. As a result, a variety of projects have emerged, displayed within the OECD trilateral cooperation project repository.³³ These go further than the past common understanding of the inclusion of a provider of SSC, a beneficiary partner, and a provider of North-South

28 Further information at <http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/historyofdaclistsofdaidrecipientcountries.htm>.

29 The DAC List of ODA recipients shows all countries and territories eligible to receive official development assistance. These consist of all low- and middle-income countries based on gross national income (GNI) per capita as published by the World Bank, with the exception of G8 members, EU members, and countries with a firm date for entry into the European Union. The list also includes all of the least-developed countries (LDCs) as defined by the United Nations (UN) (OECD/DAC, n.d.-a).

30 In a similar vein, the topic of graduation out of the group of LDCs is finding at least some traction among academics and scholars. Throughout the years 2019 to 2024, twelve LDCs are expected to graduate (Bhattacharya, 2018) and the topic is of increasing interest to academics and practitioners. For example, in his most recent book, “Bangladesh’s Graduation from the Least Developed Countries Group” (2018), Bhattacharya edited a number of articles identifying promises and pitfalls for Bangladesh’s graduation over the next years. These range, for instance, from positive branding of a non-LDC emerging economy and improvements in credit ratings to rising costs for development finance and a potential loss of cooperation partners favouring LDCs.

31 See also <https://developmentfinance.un.org/country-allocation-levels-of-concessional-ity-and-graduation-issues>, and World Bank (2018b).

32 For further information on the origin and development of MICs and their role for GPGs, refer to Alonso et al. (2014) and to Klingebiel (2018).

33 For further information, see <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/triangular-co-operation-repository.htm>.

cooperation (OECD/DAC, n. d.-b, p. 1). Today, triangular cooperation instruments focus on the creation, dissemination and exchange of knowledge and often are based on MAPs whereby “international organization[s], civil society, [the] private sector, private philanthropy and others work together in groups of three or more, to concrete flexible, cost-effective and innovative solutions for reaching the SDGs” (OECD/DAC, n.d.-b, p. 1).

Within the “how” dimension, discussions on ODA and IDA (International Development Association) graduation trends and potential forms of future collaboration and cooperation with MICs “beyond aid” have only trickled down from narratives to strategic discussions and corresponding implications for the operational level to a limited extent. In addition, operational activities, such as triangular cooperation approaches, have only partially been taken to the strategic level and institutionalised. Generally speaking, development actors such as the OECD-DAC, UN fora (especially the DCF) and bilateral cooperation partners are aware of the graduation trend,³⁴ but there is a need for more profound reflections on the implications of country graduation along all three dimensions.

3.2.3 Discussion

The analysis of the example shows that disconnections along the three dimensions exist. The identification of these is not only crucial for a deeper embedment of themes within the system, it is also important for identifying aspects that *potentially create artificial boundaries hampering cooperation*. The development policy system operates under its corset of rules and regulations for ODA, which does not provide incentives beyond existing North-South cooperation. In terms of a focused approach and the credibility of the ODA system, this can be regarded as a strong point. At the same time, though, it does not trigger other forms of cross-border cooperation in support of global sustainable development (such as those cases where non-ODA-eligible countries would benefit).

Further, the analysis shows a number of aspects do not only span different dimensions but they also extend beyond the development policy system forming interfaces with other policy fields that arise, for instance, when aiming to deliver the SDGs. The COP24³⁵ is a good example for the creation of interfaces to other policy fields beyond the development policy system to address global issues, such as climate change, scientific cooperation, security issues or global health. In a similar way, the annual Munich Security Conference has broadened its agenda over the years from a narrowly defined security approach to an understanding of security which is much more complex and related to topics like public health. Another example is the declining percentage of ODA that bilateral development cooperation institutions manage. In the UK, the National Audit Office (NAO) expects the proportion of UK ODA spent by DFID to drop from 80.5 per cent in 2015 to 70 per cent in 2020 (NAO [United Kingdom National Audit Office], 2017). In Germany, the share of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in overall German ODA fell from 73 per cent in 1995 to 33 per cent in 2016 (Bohnet, Klingebiel, & Marschall, 2018).

34 For an example of discussions on graduation, see Koch (2015) for implications for EU development policy.

35 COP24 is the 24th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). More than 22,000 representatives from politics and civil society participated (UNFCCC, 2018). For further information refer to <http://www.bmz.de/en/service/feature/cop24/start/index.html>, accessed 04.12.2018.


Overlaps that exist not only among the dimensions of the development policy system, but rather beyond this policy field, raise important aspects concerning the roles and responsibilities and the operationalisation for addressing today's most pressing challenges. Traditional actors in the development policy system typically employ geographic strategies (allocation of resources, etc.) with a rigid developing-country focus. However, regarding the pressing challenges of issues extending beyond national borders one has to question whether such an approach is still appropriate and whether an incentive system which should (at least to a large extent) be issue-based might be more suitable. The recent trend for several donors to allocate their resources in accordance with global issues ("thematic allocation") and to use vertical funds is an indication in this regard (Keijzer, Klingebiel, Örnemark, & Scholtes, 2018; Paulo, Janus, & Holzapfel, 2017; Thalwitz, 2016).

3.3 Instruments, modalities, tools and activities

After all, strategic responses to a changing narrative also need to be translated into tangible action. The third dimension, hence, addresses the question "what" these changes translate into, focusing not only on instruments, modalities and tools but also on the resulting operational activities and projects. Figure 4 presents an overview of main changes over the last decade in terms of instruments, modalities, tools and activities that can be observed within the development policy system.

These are presented in two categories: i) instruments, modalities, tools and ii) activities. Instruments, modalities and tools range from using ODA differently in terms of results- and performance-based approaches and new forms of policy-based lending, non-financial transfers, such as knowledge and technology to the creation of interfaces with the private sector. Activities, on the other hand, focus much more on project implementation and group new concepts on the basis of locally driven solutions, the application of frontier technology, or the use of evidence, in form of, for instance, randomised control trials (RCTs).

Figure 4: Instruments, modalities, tools and activities within the development policy system



When examining the changes presented in Figure 4, the question again arises as to whether they have occurred in isolation or whether they have been translated into changes within the other dimensions. While each of the aspects in the table would be well worth exploring and debating in more detail, this goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, one particularly striking example that emerged from the interviews is the term coined “innovation”.

Outside the development policy system, innovation has become a buzzword and social entrepreneurship around the world has especially gained increased attention in and beyond the development policy system. Social entrepreneurs develop business solutions to address a particular problem. Examples of social entrepreneurship can be observed all over the world and can range from the charitable shoe production of private individuals (such as TOMS in California, United States) to new recycling methods addressing respective shortcomings in public service delivery (Wecyclers in Lagos, Nigeria).³⁶ However, actors in the development policy system have also picked up the term. Thereby, a whole cosmos of expertise around the new design of development interventions has influenced a lot of pioneer research and pioneer activities; those approaches are mainly driven by the idea of making use of local knowledge, taking into account the local context and the application of frontier technology. This example seems to be a significant (in that it extends beyond an impact on merely a small sub-group of the development community) and dynamic illustration of real changes and their impacts on the other dimensions within only a couple years.

36 For further information, see <https://www.toms.com/> and <http://wecyclers.com/>.

3.3.1 What? – Innovations at the operational level

Within the “what” dimension, innovation at the local level is rooted within local voices and often operates closer to self-reliance due to private sector cooperation and demand-driven feedback loops. These demand-driven feedback loops are important to strengthen ownership and trust and reduce the chance that efforts not be taken up or that they even be sabotaged. As such, innovation can be a central element for development as it rooted in the local context and thus “establishes a bridge between the territory, social and political contexts, and economic activities” (Cassiolato, Pessoa de Matos, & Lastres, 2014).

In the development policy system, debates on “locally driven solutions” can be found within concepts such as Doing Development Differently (DDD)³⁷ or Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). DDD and PDIA approaches build on locally identified and selected problems and are designed adaptively in order to inform project development and maximise impact (Andrews, Pritchett, & Woolcock, 2013). Development initiatives thereby incorporate rapid cycles of planning, action, reflection and revision that stimulate experimentation to maximise the impact for the beneficiaries. In doing so, both approaches and their related debates explicitly aim at informing the design and implementation of projects and/or operational activities

Moreover, applying frontier technologies for development cooperation interventions is a “game changer” in many respects as it adds a universe of activities with a fundamentally new design. Actors in development policy increasingly apply frontier technology within their implemented projects and operational activities. The UNDP report “Moon Shots and Puddle Jumps” presents a variety of diverse examples based on innovative locally driven ideas ranging from frontier technology to development finance that are embedded within development cooperation projects (UNDP [United Nations Development Programme], 2018). Frontier technology, such as drones, artificial intelligence, blockchain and their potential contributions to development cooperation are being avidly discussed. Interests, ideas and project innovations in development cooperation applying frontier technology are vast. Frontier technology is then not only being used to design systems and processes more efficiently but rather to solve particular problems at hand or even to spur the transformation of how industry functions. Blockchain, for example, could potentially increase transparency and traceability through the secure transfer of value and data directly between parties (OECD, 2018a, p. 3).³⁸ Currently, it is mainly being applied and tested within a number of projects such as the one in Serbia where blockchain technology supports transfer of remittances (UNDP, 2018, p. 86). However, experience with project implementation, upscaling and embedding lessons-learned within a wider narrative for innovation remains limited. As a result, development cooperation actors are not only discussing implementation, upscaling and narratives but also the accompanied array of challenges that need to be considered when embedding frontier technologies into development policy activities (OECD, 2018b).

Actors in development cooperation are increasingly acknowledging innovation as an important field and are also addressing it – if only recently – from an instrumental perspective. From such a perspective, finance for innovation, such as the “Grand Challenges

37 For further information refer to <http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.com/>.

38 For further information on the blockchain technology, refer among others to OECD (2018a).

Program”, “InnovationXChange” or “Global Innovation Exchange”, provide opportunities for social entrepreneurs not only to pitch their ideas but also to scale outreach through the provision of additional financing streams.³⁹

3.3.2 (Dis-)connections to the other system dimensions: why and how

Incorporation of innovation at the “how” dimension remains limited, however. USAID, for example, integrated their appetite for evolution organisationally in the form of the establishment of the US Global Development Lab. The lab functions as an innovation hub and comprises a portfolio of more than 1,000 projects, in cooperation with a variety of actors ranging from academic and private partners to NGOs. Projects are assessed and identified for potential upscaling. It is divided into four areas of innovation: i) operational: covering aspects such as human resources, procurement, legal; ii) communication: whereby a focus is placed on adjustments to communication channels with engaging partners; iii) directed innovation: that assesses innovative practices in different sectors, and iv) open innovation: that considers approaches and topics which lie outside the typical focus, such as deaths resulting from car accidents. Crosscutting aspects for each of those divisions relate to the intensified use of business intelligence. The lab aims at agile work streams, the inclusion of a variety of partners, and pay for performance.

Another example for embedding a culture for innovation, experimentation and creativity strategically can be found within Global Affairs Canada (GAC). From a strategic perspective, employees are asked to approach between one and two per cent of development cooperation programming experimentally. At the same time, GAC has created and introduced a collaboration space with modern technology in order to facilitate creative exchange and interactive engagement within its own sphere.

Besides organisational and strategic adjustments among bilateral cooperation partners, the debate on “innovation” as a broader theme has found traction through the creation of the International Donor Innovation Alliance⁴⁰ and the uptake of the topic within the DAC. In 2017, DAC members gathered together to discuss the topic “development innovation for the Agenda 2030” (OECD/DAC, 2017b) and it received further attention as part of the latest DAC High-level Meeting (HLM) Communiqué (OECD/DAC, 2017a, p. 2).

A bridge to the third dimension, “why” and its corresponding narratives, concepts and theories does not also exist fully yet (OECD/DAC, 2017b). Some scholars address innovation from a technological perspective (see, as examples, Brook, MacMaster, and Singer (2014)), however, the establishment of a collective narrative going beyond technology is crucial to form the missing link and, as such, to fully embed innovation within the development policy system. Such a narrative, concept or theory is not straightforward and clearly extends beyond technology as a megatrend. Such a narrative could be rooted, for example, in the idea of demand-driven development and the movement away from beneficiaries towards customers of aid and including a more proactive organisational innovation culture.

39 Further information can be found at <https://www.usaid.gov/grandchallenges>, <https://ixc.dfat.gov.au/blogs/> and <https://www.globalinnovationexchange.org/>.

40 See also <https://www.idiainnovation.org/role-of-dev-agencies/>.

3.3.3 Discussion

The analysis of the innovation examples shows that even though *changes within the three identified dimensions are taking place, they are still not being applied holistically throughout the three dimensions, and disconnections exist.* Even more importantly, several changes, which are already taking place, are initiated by “development policy frontrunners”. Thus, change is quite often taking place in the form of pilots (such as debates on technological innovations in development) or in niches which do not reflect the mainstream development discourse or actions of development institutions. Innovation is an example of highly relevant changes on the operational level with quite limited implications on strategies and especially on development narratives. Often, responses during our interview, focal group and brainstorming discussions appear to be one-dimensional, answering either only the “what”, the “how” or the “why”. Rarely is the story told consistently throughout the entire system by spanning links between all dimensions, from the narratives to the activities. The example, innovation in development cooperation, shows the existence of a disconnection regarding the broader narrative, related concepts and theories. The dimensions inform each other, and developing holistic lines of thinking is key to identifying, implementing and firmly embedding reforms within the system and potentially even beyond. As such, we argue that change needs to take place in several regards. A narrative needs to be based on a plausible strategy and feasible solutions and techniques as well. Appropriate techniques need to contribute to the rise of new narratives and the adjustment of old ones.

4 Conclusions: towards global cooperation for sustainable development?

This paper used the development policy system as an entry point and structured it along three main dimensions: i) narratives (why?); ii) strategies (how?); and iii) operational approaches (what?). Based on the analysis presented in the previous sections, we now draw six overall conclusions and aspects for further discussion:

First, the changes discussed are largely disconnected in the development policy system.

The changes identified are diverse ranging from new narratives which are translated to the development policy context (such as the migration narrative) to strategic considerations (such as the implications of graduation), new instruments (in the form of development finance at the interface with the private sector) and concepts for project implementation (including frontier technology). However, often changes in terms of a narrative do not lead to related changes in terms of strategies and operations, and vice versa: technological innovations on the operational level do not always lead to consistent shifts in the strategic and narrative dimension. Furthermore, neither academic debates nor policy-oriented discussions reflect on this disconnect.

Although disconnections and their underlying reasons may not be new as such, their importance has increased remarkably with the emergence of a much more demanding universal agenda and the complex set of goals that the SDGs envision. Within this context, addressing the persisting and potentially amplifying disconnections within the development policy system also involves a critical reflection of the functioning of and resulting consequences for the system itself.

Second, within the development policy system the main actors (namely government departments, implementing agencies, and so on) tend to zoom in on their own policy field, limiting their own vision. As such, the system's political economy increases the perception of some actors that they are part of a "dying system" or of a system whose influence is diminishing. We see the reemphasised focus on poverty reduction (which needs to remain one main aspect of development policy) in some international development cooperation debates as a reflection of such a traditional and narrow development policy perspective. Although reduction of extreme poverty remains a valid and significant rationale for the development policy system, it implies a shrinking "market" (What are main tasks for development cooperation in the future?) and a "running out of a business model" for the future (What are main needs for cross-border cooperation in the coming decades?).

Third, actors in development policy need to acknowledge their limitations, which are rooted in the universality of the 2030 Agenda and the creation of a vanishing point outside the development policy system. As such, there are, of course, significant implications of the presented disconnections well beyond the Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) agenda and even more generally beyond the development policy system.⁴¹ How should foreign, trade, security and national health policies as well as other policy areas be adjusted accordingly? Within that sense, re-determining system boundaries, redefining interfaces to other policy areas, as well as the consideration of an institutional setting at the meta level are crucial aspects for such a new understanding of the development policy system within the context of global sustainable development.

Fourth, against this background and in light of the present disconnections, we propose that the focus is set on potential contributions, comparative advantages and the limitations of the development policy system. Thereby, there is neither self-preservation for the development policy field, nor a questioning of the overall framing of development policy as such. Rather, development policy – and more specifically the development policy system – is chosen as an entry point to provide a platform for further discussion. For example, the development policy system is composed of a vast number of transnational platforms, networks and institutions that support coordination beyond national borders and across a wide-range of themes and stakeholders.

In addition, the main actors in the field have acquired a substantial amount of knowledge, especially with regard to operational aspects. Knowledge on implementing and delivering projects abroad and establishing cross-cultural and cross-sectorial networks of partners for cooperation form indistinguishable comparative advantages of the system – none of which are readily available within other policy fields for the time being.

Fifth, resources allocated to the development policy system, especially ODA, can function as an innovation hub, a catalyst or even a last resort. Quite often development actors already label activities and strategies as "innovations". However, this tends rather to be a niche role that development policy is playing so far. Other policy fields do not offer similar resources, which could serve such a purpose. Hence, the main actors can continuously engage in cutting-edge advances spurring the most promising developments for sustainable development.

41 For an overview of the current PCSD debate, see OECD (2018d).

Sixth, we see a strong need to upscale transnational cooperation in support of global sustainable development. From our understanding, such an overarching concept for cooperation – which would extend well beyond development cooperation and policy – does not yet exist. We would label such a wider concept “global cooperation for sustainable development” (GCSD).

In our understanding, GCSD includes manifold actions focusing on norms (norm generation, setting or diffusion) or operational activities. These actions and activities are (at least partly) intended to contribute to sustainable development by bringing together (at least) two actors who cooperate across borders. Actors involved in GCSD might come from a variety of backgrounds; they might include, among others, governmental and legislative actors, civil society organisations, private sector actors, think tanks, and other academia institutions. Simple forms of GCSD might be based on governmental representatives coming from two countries. More complex forms of GCSD would, for example, include multi-actor constellations with a need for “orchestration”. GCSD focuses more generally on the achievement of a fairly universal set of goals. Such a set of universal goals orients itself along today’s most pressing challenges. These challenges extend beyond national borders and affect not only today’s and tomorrow’s generation but also all countries irrespective of their stage of development. As such, they are often characterised in terms of the nature of GPGs, ranging from topics such as the control of communicable diseases and international financial stability to global climate change (Kaul, 2013, p. 7). In particular the 2030 Agenda, its SDGs and the Paris Climate Agreement are a prominent composition of sustainable development goals. Further, GCSD is intended to serve as a concept with universal coverage. Thus, geographies and country groupings as a defining characteristic are primarily irrelevant.

GCSD is not just about development policy – it goes well beyond the development policy field, as it does not just focus on cooperation with developing regions. Within the development policy system, the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Climate Agreement have a transformative character and shift the focus from “development in developing countries” to “global sustainable development”. GCSD addresses a variety of actors, including non-state and private actors, and acknowledges the interconnected and interdependent global goals. Furthermore, the understanding of development policy also emphasises the support of sustainable development on a global scale, while still also focusing on cooperation with developing regions. This means that, although development policy may facilitate sustainable development within developing countries, it also includes the provision of GPGs, and therefore spreads the benefits well beyond a specific country context (for instance, by reducing CO² emissions or the risk of cross-border diseases).

With increasing pressure not only from within but also outside, the development policy system needs to find its place within such a broader concept of GCSD, and thereby address its opportunities and limitations. Each of these aspects and their implications involve heated debates and discussions. Generally, a broader perspective on cross-border cooperation in support of global sustainable development would need to focus on the necessary adjustments to be made by traditional development actors, in other words, changes to a policy field would touch on institutional mandates and resources. In particular, aspects dealing with technical implications and practicalities are highly context-specific and need

to be analysed in much more detail within a specific country context.⁴² The main actors in development policy need to move along the various system dimensions and simultaneously beyond their isolated world to address these disconnections to deliver on the SDGs, address these topics openly, and inform critically on a role for the development policy system for sustainable development vis-à-vis a changed system environment.

This seems to us one of the main challenges for the years to come for actors in the field of development policy: the identification of the role of the development policy system within a new concept of global cooperation for sustainable development (GCSD).

42 In his paper, Kloke-Lesch (1998) presents a view on the functional perspective of development policy with a particular focus on the German development cooperation system.

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Annex 1 – Consulted literature

The focus of this policy-oriented paper goes beyond typical debates in academic literature. The purpose of this annex is to provide a structured overview of the literature consulted throughout the study period. These debates are taken as supplementary starting points and complement the qualitative information gathered from the expert interviews and focal group discussions. The paper intends to contribute to each of those debates by combining insights from academia and practice and thereby creating synergies and overlaps between those three strands of discussions.

Discourses on global challenges and global solutions, pressures from within and outside the development policy system coupled with ideas on “rethinking” and transforming development (cooperation) can be found within three broad strands of debates: i) global governance and global development, ii) fundamental reflections and critiques on development cooperation, and iii) debates on how to optimise development cooperation. Each of them is highly complex and will be presented only briefly in the following paragraphs.

The first strand considers the literature on the concepts and notions of **global governance and global development**. Within this context, scholars address common goods and/or transnational problems as well as framing ideas on development research. The term “global governance” points to the exercise of authority across national borders. Zürn (2018a, 2018b) suggests that world politics are now embedded in a normative and institutional structure dominated by hierarchies and power inequalities and therefore inherently create contestation, resistance, and distributional struggles.

Debates on global governance are controversial (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2018). The term might be understood as a normative concept for the search of more collective cross-border solutions. The main focus might also be from the perspective of analysing structures and regulations supporting collective approaches beyond power politics hegemonic dominance. Other scholars, such as Acharya (2016) disentangle the concept of global governance in relation to identified issue areas, areas within which intensified globalisation and the proliferation of collective action problems are central. We consider the debate on “bottom up” approaches in support of “global solutions” and “multi-stakeholder partnerships”, as well as debates on “orchestration” as important innovations and rather new aspects of the global governance discourse (Abbott & Bernstein, 2015; Abbott & Hale, 2014; Beisheim & Liese, 2014; Paulo & Klingebiel, 2016).

While Acharya (2016) and Zürn (2018a, 2018b) address the concept of global governance more broadly, a number of other scholars focus on aspects related to a global or universal understanding of development. Horner (2017b); Horner and Hulme (2017) argue that the term global development is more suitable as it represents a better fit with current opportunities and challenges in development, such as the fading North-South binary situation, increasing global interconnectedness and the challenge of sustainability. Scholte and Söderbaum (2017), on the other hand, present three perspectives on development as it is becoming more global: classical, global development and post-development approaches. Empirical studies on “shifting wealth” have also informed many debates on global development and development strategies (OECD, 2018). These contributions are also more generally part of and feed into

the discussion of the study of development (e.g. Sumner (2011) and Mönks, Carbonnier, Mellet, and de Haan (2017)).

Over the past twenty years approximately, various attempts have been made to shift the discussion on the diverse nature of collective goods to the transnational level. Kaul, Blondin, and Nahtigal (2016) define GPGs as commodities, which enjoy global application in terms of use, cost or both aspects. GPG, as a concept, was and is influential when it comes to political-economy considerations of how collective action might be addressed on a transnational level.

The literature presented is coupled with questions on cooperation and on the forms of governance that need to be established to overcome collective action problems. Hale, Held, and Young (2013) explore in their first book, “Gridlock – Why Global Cooperation is Failing”, when it is needed the most and add with their second one, “Beyond Gridlock” (2017), a comparative analysis of the challenges of global governance aiming at answering the question of “what works why and where at the global level”. Fukuda-Parr (2017) addresses questions on the rationale of quantitative targets as an instrument of global governance.

There is vast literature on cooperation per se and cooperation in the field of international relations. Messner, Guarin, and Haun (2013) develop a cooperation hexagon and discuss its implications for international cooperation through a combination with Ostrom’s work on behavioural economics (e.g. Ostrom, 1997; Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010). The work of Messner and Weinlich (2016) complements the discussion through the consideration of the humanity factor based in a variety of disciplines. Moreover, several other authors, such as Paulo (2014), contribute to the discussion on global cooperation by, for example, presenting a framework linking global and domestic action.

The second strand of literature can broadly be referred to as one **questioning development cooperation fundamentally**. This strand encompasses ideas on a fundamentally different concept of development cooperation or a structural shift of development approaches. Critiques or reasons for questioning development cooperation are diverse. The strand includes debates about the (fundamental) failure of development cooperation or misleading resp. biased concepts (e.g. Eurocentric development (cooperation)). Examples for the former debate are Easterly (2008); Easterly (2014); Moyo (2009); Severino and Ray (2009) and, examples for the later debate around postcolonial and post-development are Escobar (1995) and Ziai (2017).

The third strand of literature (with some overlaps to the second strand) is mainly focusing on incremental changes and reforms. Those critiques might be fundamental as well; however, the analytical context and conclusions build to a larger extent on current conditions and structures. We label this strand as **optimising development cooperation**.

Prominent examples are the publications from Kharas and Rogerson (2012) as well as the recently published edited volume of Desai, Kato, Kharas, and McArthur (2018). Kharas and Rogerson (2012) identified “destructors” within the global arena and analysed their implications for the development cooperation sector in general. Based on their analysis, the authors developed concrete policy actions for development cooperation agencies. With a vastly changing global arena they have also updated their publication disentangling “destructors” into “meteors” and “snowballs” to provide better policy advice (Kharas & Rogerson, 2017). Desai et al. (2018) make an effort to advance the implementation of the

Agenda 2030 based on an analysis of the UN goals through three lenses: new approaches to capturing value; new approaches to targeting places; and updating governance.

Gavas, Gulrajani, and Hart (2015), as well as Bennett (2015) address the topic of the future development cooperation agency while focussing on organisational and structural and strategic aspects. In the same vein, Gavvas, Hart, Mustapha, and Rogerson (2017) developed a donor resilience index, addressing the question to which degree development cooperation agencies are well equipped to address future challenges. Along with organisational aspects, this strand of literature also relates to the aspects of the allocation of funds of development cooperation actors. Strawson and Lonsdale (2016) discuss strategic ODA allocation decisions while Gulrajani (2016) analyses bi- and multilateral contributions. Also, authors, such as Faure, Long, and Prizzon (2015), debate organisational and political models for development cooperation agencies while Lundsgaarde and Fejerskov (2017) add to the discussions limitations to changes in development cooperation management based on the sociology of organisations.

Other aspects of this body of literature focus on the role of development cooperation, functioning as a catalyst. Kharas, Makino, and Jung (2011) discuss the topic more broadly whereas “The Reality of Aid” (2012) and Wehrmann (2018) discuss, for example, the cooperation with the private sector in development which is increasingly a topic addressed in many debates. Publications, such as Langendorf, Piefer, Knodt, Müller and Lázaro (2012), (OECD/DAC, n.d.-b), Greijn, Hauck, Land and Ubels (Eds.) (2015) and Mueller and Martinez (2014) add to the debate the concept of triangular cooperation by providing practical orientation beyond typical trilateral approaches, as well as capacity development beyond aid and knowledge sharing practices. Yuangas (2018), also, describes a rather distinct approach, described by him as “one that acknowledges aid as being about struggle, about taking sides, and about politics”.

Janus et al. (2015) define the concept “beyond aid” in terms of four dimensions: actors, finance, regulation and knowledge. Outlining changes within these four dimensions to reflect the dynamic global context and the linkage with learning concepts allows the question on the perspective of development and its resulting goal dimension to be addressed. Often the concept of “beyond aid” is also linked to the first strand of literature. For example, Scholte and Söderbaum (2017) complement their views on the three perspectives with an analysis of the changing substance of development related to actors, issues and policies.

One aspect of the “beyond aid” concept – the emergence of new actors and, in that sense, more specifically emerging economies – is extensively being addressed by a number of scholars. Bracho (2015), for example, expresses the need for a new narrative for cooperation with MICs and Sumner and Mallett (2012) present ideas for new forms of cooperation between development partners and MICs coined under the term “Aid 2.0”. Similarly, Walz and Ramachandran (2011) review the changing nature of development cooperation and related implications of emerging new donors, the role of the DAC, as well as development cooperation structures. Paulo and Klingebiel (2016) add to the debate by proposing the concept of orchestration as a means of implementation to address collective action problems and advance ideas for new approaches to cooperation with MICs.

The third strand of literature (with some overlaps to the second strand) is complemented with literature produced by practitioners in the field guiding decision-making and strategic

positioning. The literature includes, for example, strategic policy documents from bi-lateral development cooperation partners, such as the BMZ [Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung] (2018a, 2018b) or Hervé (2018), the latest OECD/DAC Peer Reviews (OECD 2012, 2018g, 2018h, 2018i, 2018j), recent OECD flagship publications (e.g. OECD 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018l, 2018n), publications from other multilateral institutions, such as Alonso and Glennie (2016); Glennie and Hurley (2014); Nallari, Yusuf, Griffith, and Bhattacharya (2011); UN DESA [United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs], (2017); World Bank (2018a) as well as blog posts from relevant actors in the field of development policy, for example Gavas (2018); Horner (2017a); Klingebiel (2017); Lundsgaarde (2017); Xiaoyun (2017), and newspaper articles, e.g. Palitza (2018).

Annex 2 – Overview of expert, brainstorming and focal group discussions

Expert discussions					
Name	Institution	Division	Location	Position	Date
Sebastian Paulo	Observer Research Foundation, Delhi/India		Skype	Fellow	23.08.2018
Adolf Kloke-Lesch	SDSN (Sustainable Development Solutions Network) Germany		Bonn	Executive Director SDSN Germany	17.09.2018
Michael Krempin and Ulrich Müller	GIZ	Strategy and Networks and Knowledge Sharing	Frankfurt	Head of Unit; Senior Advisor	04.10.2018
J. Oh	Ewha Womans University		Bonn	Professor	05.10.2018
Rory Horner	University of Manchester	Global Development Institute/School of Environment, Education and Development	Skype	Senior Lecturer	08.10.2018
Alexis Bonnell	USAID	Applied Innovation and Acceleration, US Global Development Lab	Skype	Chief Innovation Officer	10.10.2018
Nadine Piefer	OECD	Foresight, Outreach and Policy Reform	Paris	Policy Analyst	11.10.2018
Johannes Jütting	OECD	Paris 21	Paris	Manager	18.10.2018
Jens Sedemund	OECD	Environment and Climate Change	Paris	Executive Advisor	18.10.2018
Mario Pezzini, Rita Da Costa, Sebastian Nieto Parra and Jason Gagnon	OECD	Development Center	Paris	Director and Special Advisor to the OECD Secretary-General on Development; Policy Advisor; Deputy Head Latin America and the Caribbean; Economist and PGD coordinator	18.10.2018
Haje Schütte and Olivier Cattaneo	OECD	Financing Sustainable Development	Paris	Head of Division; Head of Unit	19.10.2018

Ida McDonnell	OECD	REDI – Development Cooperation Report	Paris	Senior Policy Analyst & Team Lead	19.10.2018
Ana Fernandes and Piero Fontolan	OECD	Foresight, Outreach and Policy Reform	Paris	Head of Unit; Policy Analyst	19.10.2018
Inge Kaul	Hertie School of Governance		Berlin	Adjunct professor and independent advisor	23.10.2018
Ioanna Sahas Martin	GAC (Global Affairs Canada)	International Assistance Research and Knowledge, Strategic Policy Bureau	Skype	Director	25.10.2018
Michaela Zintl and Peter Krahl	BMZ	Evaluation and development research, German Institute for Development Evaluation, German Development Institute	Bonn	Head of Division; Senior Policy Officer	29.10.2018
Owen Bader Ian Mitchell	Centre for Global Development Europe (CGD)		London	Vice President, Director of CGD Europe, and Senior Fellow; Deputy Director for CGD Europe and Senior Policy Fellow	13.11.2018
Andrew Rogerson	Overseas Development Institute (ODI)	Development Strategy and Finance	London	Senior Research Associate	13.11.2018
Jennifer Smith, Nicholas Leader	DFID	Multilateral Effectiveness	London	Head of Multilateral Effectiveness; Governance Advisor	13.11.2018
Thomas Böhler	OECD	Global Partnerships and Policies	Skype	Policy & Secretariat Lead	
Imme Scholz	DIE		Bonn	Acting Director	19.11.2018
Michael Tröster	BMZ	Policy issues of bilateral development cooperation	London	Deputy Head of Division	09.01.2019

Focal group and brainstorming discussions				
Meeting title	Institution	Participants (if available)	Location	Date
Exceed conference: Rethinking Development Cooperation	Exceed/DIE		Bonn	18. and 19.10.2018
Brown Bag Lunch Presentation @ OECD	OECD/DIE	OECD DAC and Paris21	Paris	18.10.2018
Jour Fix Presentation and Discussion	DIE	Niels Keijzer, Lennart Kaplan, Hannes Öhler, Paul Marschall, Julian Bergmann, Mark Furness, Max Baumann	Bonn	28.11.2018
In-house seminar DIE/JICA	DIE/JICA	Participants from JICA: Hiroaki Shiga, Yasutami Shimomura and Izumi Ohno (Director)	Bonn	12.11.2018
Focal Group Brainstorming Session I	DIE	Adolf Kloke-Lesch, Heiner Janus, Silke Weinlich, Niels Keijzer, Imme Scholz	Bonn	10.01.2019
Focal Group Brainstorming Session II	DIE	Silke Weinlich, Niels Keijzer, Paul Marschall, Hannes Öhler, Andreas Stamm	Bonn	28.01.2019

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- 28/2018 Funk, Evelyn, Lisa Groß, Julia Leininger, & Armin von Schiller. *Lessons learnt from impact-oriented accompanying research: Potentials and limitations to rigorously assessing the impact of governance programmes* (34 pp.). ISBN 978-3-96021-085-6. DOI:10.23661/dp28.2018.
- 27/2018 Nowack, Daniel. *Cultural values, attitudes, and democracy promotion in Malawi: How values mediate the effectiveness of donor support for the reform of presidential term limits and family law* (52 pp.). ISBN 978-3-96021-084-9. DOI: 10.23661/dp27.2018.
- 26/2018 Hulse, Merran. *Cultural values, popular attitudes and democracy promotion: How values mediate the effectiveness of donor support for term limits and LGBT+ rights in Uganda* (45 pp.). ISBN 978-3-96021-082-5. DOI: 10.23661/dp26.2018.
- 25/2018 El-Haddad, Amirah. *Exporting for growth: Identifying leading sectors for Egypt and Tunisia using the Product Space Methodology* (49 pp.). ISBN 978-3-96021-075-7. DOI: 10.23661/dp25.2018.

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