

58 Interfaces between Development and Security: Converging the Role of Development Policy and Security Policy?

Stephan Klingebiel and Katja Roehder

58.1 Introduction

'No development without security' is proving more and more to be a development-policy paradigm, one that calls for new approaches in the field of development policy. The discernible distance between development and military actors and their tasks of the past, has in recent years rapidly diminished. This applies to Germany, but also to most other bilateral donors and multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (Tschirgi 2004, 2006; Griffin 2003). Thus far, however, too little reflection and discussion has been devoted to its consequences.

The relationship between development and security is not a fundamentally new conceptual issue (see chapter by Uvin above). This applies also to the practical interfaces between various outward-oriented policies – above all development, foreign, and security policies. In the past, an aspect which has at least implicitly played an essential role has been the stable and peaceful environment that has to exist if development is to be possible. Earlier debates saw this relationship primarily as abstract interdependence.¹ The current debates since the early 2000's have focused more directly on convergence in conceptual and practical policy terms.

The present debate extends beyond practical relevance due to important changes in the concept of security. The state-centred security concept has given way to an entirely new concept. Security has fundamentally evolved in the international debate from a

concept which focused on the stability of the state to a protective approach related to the individual (Duffield 2006; Thakur 2006). Basic changes have been brought about by the debates in the United Nations (ICISS 2001; UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004; UN Secretary-General 2005). Although policy conclusions have not always been drawn, there is evidence of attempts in this direction. A clear example is the transformation of the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) that has explicitly abandoned the principle of non-interference (Klingebiel 2006). The United Nations' decision in December 2005 to establish a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which will above all seek improved coordination among the various actors and integrated strategies in post-conflict situations, may also serve as a guide for the future (see the chapter by von Einsiedel/Nitzschke/Chhabra in this volume).

The present text looks at development – security interfaces from the angle of a wider concept of security that includes the definition and goal of human security.² To distinguish the overall goal of human security (a concept that is used in a number of different policy fields including development policy) from 'applied security' manifested in traditional military and security institutions, the terms 'security policy' and 'military (actors)' are used. 'Development' in the present text equally refers to the respective policy field and its actors.³ When talking about 'security' at the development-security interface, the physical integ-

1 The practical aspects of the civil-military relationship in the area of humanitarian aid have long been under discussion. This is true of the military side in two respects: it sometimes takes on logistical tasks (transport of aid supplies), and it is involved in the security situation in areas receiving aid. Both tasks have led to a long debate on the relationship between humanitarian aid and mili-

2 Human Security means "the security of people against personal threats to safety and life" (Thakur 2006: 2), building on different types of freedom: "freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf" (CHS 2003: 1); at: <<http://www.humansecurity.chs.org/finalreport/Outlines/out->

urity of the individual and freedom from direct violence in crisis situations is at the heart of the debate.

Afghanistan, the Balkans, Liberia, and - for some donors - Iraq are topical examples for the growing closeness between development and security policy. The World Bank analysis *Breaking the Conflict Trap* (Collier/Elliott/Hegre/Hoeffler/Reynal-Quero/Sambanis 2003) documents the close mutual relationship between development policy and military engagement. The report assumes that development policy is in a position to provide help in lessening risks in post-conflict situations that could be sufficient to permit reductions in military presence.

The boundaries defining development-military cooperation are not always clearly drawn among the group of bilateral development actors. Traditionally, for members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC 2001) one of their top 'no-go areas' in terms of assistance was direct support for operational capacities of military actors. Furthermore, areas that are not officially classified as eligible for ODA (Official Development Assistance) are often exempted. The lack of clarity whether activities related to security-sector reform are eligible for ODA support highlights the reluctance by some development actors to fully embrace the new development-military 'closeness'.

There are several reasons why the changing relationship between development policy and the military has entered the focus of public attention.

First, a significant number of so-called 'protracted crises' are characterized de facto by trusteeship rule - and therefore involve functions that extend beyond purely military tasks (e.g. Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq). These situations are often marked by efforts to stabilize fragile security, to restore effective statehood, and to embark on a course of economic and social recon-

struction (Ferdowsi/Matthies 2003; Debiel 2002a). Nation-building tasks, already a major element of peace missions, are taking on a growing role in this context.⁴

Second, development policy is increasingly interested in gaining more constructive influence in post-conflict situations, and in some cases even expects contributions from the field of security policy and advocates or calls for military intervention to end violent conflicts. In April 2004, the German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development called for peacekeeping troops to be sent to Darfur/Sudan⁵; and, in a 2003 appeal, international non-governmental organizations active in Afghanistan called for an expansion of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mandate there.⁶

Third, other policy fields, above all foreign and security policies, are coming more and more to expect, and call for, an active involvement of development policy in post-conflict situations. Experiences made with past military missions are cited as reasons: As the *European Security Strategy* (ESS), prepared by the High Representative of the EU *Common Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP) and approved by the European Council in December 2003, puts it, "In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos."⁷

Finally, the growing number of overseas missions directly involving the German *Bundeswehr*⁸ have

3 'Development' in this context best refers to 'human development' as defined by the Human Development Report: "Human development ... is about building human capabilities. ... The most basic capabilities for human development are leading a long and healthy life, being educated and having adequate resources for a decent standard of living. Other capabilities include social and political participation in society" (UNDP 2005: 18-19). Human development is intrinsically linked with human security. Three 'mega-projects' are on the agenda of present-day international development policy: (1) The Millennium Development Goals and poverty reduction, (2) the security agenda and (3) the Rio-Agenda with its focus on sustainability and global challenges (Faust/Messner 2005: 149).

4 King's College 2003: 14: "Peace operations in their growing complexity have increasingly included state-building functions."

5 "UN Blue Berets should monitor cease-fire in Western Sudan. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul and Gerhart Baum call for lasting peace solution for Darfur region", in: *BMZ press release*, 29 April 2004: 1.

6 International Rescue Committee 2003: "Afghanistan: A Call for Security", at: <http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/06172003_afghanistan.pdf>, 10 July 2006.

7 Council of the European Union 2003: 12. Also for the operations of other countries like the US, a serious lack of civilian capacity in peace and stability operations is identified and proposals are made to strengthen civilian functions; see e.g. United States Institute of Peace 2004.

8 Currently some 6,700 *Bundeswehr* soldiers are directly involved in missions abroad, including ISAF (International Security Assistance Force); KFOR (Kosovo Force), EUFOR (European Union Force) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUFOR RD CONGO (European Union Force République démocratique du Congo) (at: <<http://www.bundeswehr.de>>, 10 July 2006). The costs for these missions have increased more than tenfold between 1995 and 2003 (Klingebiel/Roehder 2004: 3).

served to move the overall spectrum of German policies and their potential scopes of action into public attention.

Germany thus provides a useful case study to explore the changing relationship between military and development actors and policies.

The relationship between civil and military actors includes civil actors, e.g. from foreign and development policy, and various instruments such as democratization and equipment aid, dispatch of civil peace personnel, humanitarian aid, police aid provided by civilian actors, or support for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc. Looking at the case of the development-military relationship, we find that interest in the civil component tends to focus on development-policy actors and instruments. 'Relationship' refers to all forms of interaction between the two groups of actors. That is, the term may encompass targeted cooperation strategies, a deliberately complementary approach, or unintended sequences of actions carried out by actors linked by a relationship structure. The present text thus sees the terms 'interface' and 'linkage' as synonymous.

This chapter discusses current challenges this new relationship poses for development policy. A number of examples, with special focus on Germany, serve to illustrate some ongoing changes (58.2). The chapter provides an overview of the different relations between development policy and military actors (58.3) as well as security policy and categorizes development-military interfaces (58.4) with a detailed discussion (58.5). Finally, it outlines some initial strategic reference models for development policy in its relationship to military actors and other externally oriented policy fields (58.6), and draws some conclusions (58.7).

58.2 Legitimacy of Military Missions as a Precondition for Development Policy in Post-conflict Situations

The mandates, and thus the legitimacy, of military missions play an important role in the development-military relationship in the debate on post-conflict situations. This applies to the engagement of some donors in Iraq as well as for the debate in Germany on the character of the German reconstruction efforts in the Kunduz Region of Afghanistan. The need for mandated military missions has today found widespread acceptance.⁹ Pre-emptive interventions, however, and other military activities without an adequate mandate, and thus without sufficient legitimacy under

international law, have attracted considerable controversy and are widely rejected.¹⁰ In general practice three categories of military operations may be distinguished, each based on a different type of mandate (based on Bothe 2003: 24f.):

1. Use of autonomous, unilateral state power (e.g. 2003 military intervention in Iraq).
2. Military operations led by parties other than the UN, covered by a UN Security Council mandate.¹¹
3. Original UN peace missions with classic monitoring, buffering, and aid mandates geared to restoring deficient state power.

Furthermore, in connection with UN peace operations (categories 2 and 3) we speak of different types of peace missions which are legitimized either under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter (based on a functional differentiation) (Kühne 2003: 716ff.; Debiel 2002b: 462ff.):

- *Traditional peacekeeping*, which is based on consensus and neutrality and provides only for self-defence measures (e.g. Sinai in 1950's; Cyprus in mid-1960's).
- *Multidimensional peacekeeping*, which is geared to the dynamics of processes and provides for an expansion of non-military functions (e.g. Namibia in 1989/90; Cambodia in 1992/93).
- *Robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement*, which also provides for a possible use of military force (e.g. in Somalia).
- *Peace support and governance operations*, where the assumption of political and administrative functions plays an additional important role (e.g. in Kosovo; East Timor).

Accordingly, international military peace missions are increasingly assigned nation-building functions. The concrete shape given to UN peace operations may vary considerably in this context. This applies as well for the profile defined for non-military and civil activ-

9 For a discussion from the view of development policy, see e.g. Collier/Elliott/Hegre/Hoeffler/Reynal-Querol/Sambanis 2003: 163ff.

10 See e.g. Center for Defense Information: "The U.S. National Security Strategy: A View from Europe" (Washington: CDI, 9 October 2002), at: www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1905, 10 July 2006.

11 These would include *Operation Enduring Freedom*, which was legitimized by the UN Security Council under Resolution 1368 on combating all forms of international terrorism.

ities (including reconstruction) and the extent to which a mandate covers protection of the civilian population (ICISS 2001). Apart from the mandate, though, this also depends on the capacities available to a mission, as we have seen in cases of missions that have proven problematic (Kühne 2003; Debiel 2002b). The 2000 Report of the Brahimi Commission, which was written on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, goes in detail into the experiences made by UN peace missions and calls on the UN to give greater weight to the civil component of peace missions (Brahimi-Report 2000).

The type of military engagement is also a highly relevant factor for development policy decisions. Thus, there should be no doubts as to a military mission's legitimacy and mandate under international law before development policy considers getting involved in reconstruction efforts (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2004: 10f.).

58.3 Perspectives of Different Actors Involved

The development-military relationship is influenced by national factors such as the closeness, or distance, between development policy and foreign policy, the share that humanitarian aid and emergency relief account for in the work done by development co-operation, and national traditions and experiences made with military interventions (table 58.1).

Viewed from the *perspective of development policy*, closer convergence and/or cooperation with the military involves a number of risks and chances (Picciotto 2004: 1–3). It may be assumed that improved mutual understanding leads to greater coherence in reconstruction efforts in post-conflict countries. Development policy could contribute more of its specific strengths and competences for purposes of decision-making in the fields of military and foreign policy. It could tap the know-how of military actors for its own work, e.g. in the field of security-sector reform. Furthermore, a military presence could provide for a more stable security situation on the ground that would benefit development policy.

But there are also risks involved due to the possibility of military dominance and a diminished influence of development-related concepts in connection with short-term political or military missions. It is argued that development policy could share responsibility for a military strategy in cases in which such a strategy lacks sufficient legitimacy or acceptance. Develop-

ment policy actors might in this case also be faced with the risk of becoming targets of armed attacks (soft-target debate).¹²

In the framework of the new peace missions, like those in the Balkans and Afghanistan, the military is becoming increasingly involved in carrying out genuinely civil tasks. In the framework of the concept 'Civil-Military Cooperation' (CIMIC) both the Bundeswehr and NATO routinely conduct strategically conceived civil reconstruction projects (in the sense of 'force protection') that impact on development policy. While increasing the acceptance of military presence in conflict areas, military actors nevertheless see the risk of a watering down of their military mandate (so-called *mission creep*) (Braunstein 2001: 37–46; Hardegger 2003; Heinemann-Grüder/Pietz/Lipp 2003).

Development and humanitarian NGOs, taking up the debate underway in the field of humanitarian aid, have engaged in an intensive discussion over the complexities involved in the military-civil relationship. European NGOs in particular, pointing to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, largely reject cooperation with military actors and voice criticism of any blurring of the boundaries between military and civil aspects (VENRO 2003; Barry/Jefferys 2002).

In international comparison, the situation among donors varies. German development policy has had a tradition marked by a relatively distanced relationship to security policy and military actors, while in the United States (US), for instance, the examples of Afghanistan and Iraq are illustrations of the way in which development policy may assume a role immediately supportive of strategic military goals. Any clear-cut separation of the tasks of development policy and the military is difficult (Fitz-Gerald 2004: 17). The United Kingdom (UK) has been innovative in inter-ministerial action where development policy has retained, or indeed even enlarged its self-assured role. This also applies to the new mechanism of joint conflict prevention pools (DFID/FCO/MOD 2003, 2004).

58.4 Development-Military Interfaces

In recent years the interfaces and overlaps between development policy and the military or security policy

12 In recent years an increasing number of development actors (NGOs, etc.) became targets of violent actions. Staff is sometimes kidnapped or killed. Security risks are an issue for development policy.

Table 58.1: Chances and risks of development–military cooperation from the perspective of the different actors involved. **Source:** authors.

Actor	Chances	Risks
Development policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security and stability as the <i>sine qua non</i> for the development of the country affected - Security as a condition required for the engagement of development policy - Constructive influence on security strategies - Influence on approaches adopted by military actors in areas relevant to development policy - Coherence of overall policy, including consideration of aspects relevant to development policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Risk that development policy may find itself subordinated to a military strategy as well as to short-term political considerations - Security risk in that development policy may find itself in the position of a target of attacks - The possibility that involvement of development policy may serve to legitimize and support military interventions - Risk of public criticism along the lines: 'Development policy providing military assistance' - Resources may be diverted from the 'core business' of development policy (i.e. long-term tasks) - Resources used for non-civil tasks are not eligible for recognition as ODA - Regional reorientation of development policy - Possible inability to adhere to principles of development policy
Military	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Greater acceptance on the part of the local population due to better planning of civil activities - Access to additional (development policy) resources (financial, advisory, implementation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Possibility of mission creep when the military takes on a growing number of civil tasks on the ground - Demands for more transparency/disclosure of military strategy vis-à-vis third parties - Parallel command structures and, possibly, restriction of powers of discretion on the military side
NGO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Complementary and effective approach in acute crises based on purely subsidiary aid provided by the military - Depending on the concrete case, a more secure setting for the implementation of projects and programmes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Loss of impartiality and neutrality - Security risk (NGOs as a soft target) - Diversion of funds to countries in which military missions are underway.

have grown dramatically. They can be classified in four categories.

1. Security and Stability as framework conditions: Security and stability are essential conditions for development policy. In most post-conflict situations these framework conditions, needed by development actors for their reconstruction work, rely on the stability and security provided by military measures. Ongoing conflicts are marked by the following additional aspect: as representatives of international engagement, aid organizations are increasingly becoming direct soft targets for local conflict parties. In Afghanistan and Iraq, this situation has become dramatic

because the international conflict parties are blurring the lines between military and civil activities.¹³

2. Strategic planning and conception: A second field deals with strategic planning and conception, including general concepts, individual country and regional policies. In Germany these interfaces are concerned with information-sharing and development of joint strategies.

13 See e.g.: Humanitarian Practice Network: "Iraq and the crisis of humanitarian action", at: <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2616>, 10 July 2006; Stapleton 2003.

- *Inter-ministerial cooperation and mechanisms* serve the purpose of information-sharing and development of joint strategies in and among the various policy fields concerned. In this inter-ministerial cooperation the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has been able to bring its influence to bear on cross-cutting government concepts and the formulation of country strategies. The BMZ has played a role in shaping the structure of the German reconstruction teams currently deployed in Kunduz and Feyzabad (Afghanistan), as well as on the formulation of the mandate for the military component involved. The mechanisms of cooperation include, among others, the Federal Security Council, ministerial consultations, and in particular inter-ministerial cooperation, e.g. coordination of the German contribution to the G8 Africa Action Plan (GAA).
 - *Deliberate integration and subordination of development policy in short-term political and military strategies* would include in particular the extensive use of instruments of development policy, but also of humanitarian aid, in the framework of military approaches, e.g. in US Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.
3. *Funding*: This is concerned with various situations involved in funding for non-civil measures and missions as well as civil activities conducted by the military.
- *Development policy funding for non-civil measures and missions*: There are several current examples which can be viewed as a shift of the boundaries defining the traditional practices of development policy. For instance, €5 million of un-disbursed funds were made available from the *European Development Fund* (EDF) to support the *Economic Organization of West African States* (ECOWAS) peace mission in Liberia (Klingebiel/Roehder 2004: 15). In November 2003 the decision was taken to set up a Peace Facility for Africa (an initial €250 million) that is to be financed from the EDF and used to fund non-civil peace missions in Africa.¹⁴
 - *Development-policy funding for civil activities conducted by the military*: One example is the BMZ's funding of CIMIC measures conducted by the *Bundeswehr*.
 - *Military competition for development funds*: To conduct CIMIC measures, the military competes with the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ) or NGOs for funds in humanitarian aid and development assistance.
4. *Operational approach*: This last field covers a variety of different operational approaches.
- *Interministerial projects*: The German support for the *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre* (KAIPTC) in Accra/Ghana is seen as a pilot project for the development of a coherent and inter-ministerial concept involving the German Foreign Office (AA), the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), and the BMZ.
 - *Military conduct of typical development co-operation measures*: This may be observed above all in the framework of CIMIC (e.g. in the field of vocational training).
 - *Military provision of concrete protection functions for development policy actors and measures and benefits of an improved security situation*: Apart from the general role played by the military in the field of security, concrete forms of cooperation may also develop on the ground.
 - *Cooperation in training and capacity-building*: In various contexts military and development policy actors are involved, on a reciprocal basis, in training and capacity-building functions as well as in dialogue forums, e.g. in the framework of the *German Federal College for Security Policy* (BAKS), the *Bundeswehr Command and Staff College* (*Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr*), or the course on 'Civil-Military Cooperation Abroad' (ZMZA) offered by the *German Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Defence* (AKNZ).

58.5 Debate on Development-Military Interfaces

There are several examples of current relevance representing closer cooperation between civil and military actors.

14 Details at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0648en01.pdf, 10 July 2006.

58.5.1 Military and Development Actors in Afghanistan

The strategy of using reconstruction teams to stabilize the security situation and accelerate reconstruction in Afghanistan is an important precedent. The PRTs of the US are an example of integrated civil-military 'units' used directly to integrate reconstruction activities within the US military strategy. In its reconstruction team in Kunduz, Germany is relying on a three-pillar concept consisting of independent but coordinated sectors (development policy, foreign policy, defence) to deliberately distinguish its approach from that pursued by the US (Klingebiel/Roehder 2004: 23ff.).

58.5.2 Proactive Inter-ministerial Cooperation in the UK

The UK has been working with a proactive cooperation model which provides for strategic cooperation between development policy and the military within the *Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department* (CHAD) of the *Department for International Development* (DFID) and by developing an inter-ministerial strategy and funding instrument (so-called Conflict Prevention Pools) for the government's conflict-related work abroad (Fitz-Gerald 2004: 13ff.; Klingebiel/Roehder 2004: 29ff.).

58.5.3 Intensive EU Development-Military Cooperation

The rapid pace of developments at the European level is of importance for future development-military interfaces. In the European Union there are a number of approaches that - building on the 'Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts' (Gothenburg 2001) - are aimed at expanding the EU's civil and military capacities and - in particular - their combined use (Brauch 2003f: 257-258). The task facing the *Common Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP) and the *European Security and Defence Policy* (ESDP) is to systematically integrate the whole of the EU's external relations (see chapters by Mosca Moschini; Hintermeier, Katseli in this volume), including development policy (Child 2003). One element of great importance to the EU's overall external relations is the *European Security Strategy* (ESS) adopted by the Council in December 2003. Given the new threats analysed in the document, one of its main concerns is civil-military cooperation. The Union, it states, "could add par-

ticular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities" (Council of the European Union 2003: 13).

58.5.4 Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana was set up in 1998 as a regional training centre with the aim to tap Ghana's experience in peace missions and make it available to other African countries. The training programme includes e.g. courses on military-police tasks as well as preparatory training for military observers. Germany is using various instruments to support the development of the KAIPTC in the framework of its G8 Plan for Africa:

- Development of a course model on the use of civil forces for peacekeeping; the project is being funded by the BMZ and implemented by the *Berlin Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze* (ZIF), the Centre for International Peace Missions; the GTZ is responsible for handling and implementing the project.
- The German Foreign Office funds are being used to construct and equip the Centre; the Federal Ministry of Defence is responsible for implementing the measures.
- Support for training operations is provided by a German *Bundeswehr* instructor specialized in the field of civil-military cooperation. In Germany, African training personnel are trained by the Federal Ministry of Defence and the German Foreign Office.

58.6 Defining the Position of Development Policy

58.6.1 Development Policy Engagement in Post-conflict Situations: Interest in Coherent Approaches

Due to its limited options for external actors, development policy has important and useful means to potentially contribute to addressing challenges that typify the security challenges of fragile states. It can help restore effective statehood and embark on the process of post-conflict economic and social reconstruction. This is the case given the fact that peace missions have grown increasingly complex in nature.

Against this background, development policy has a fundamental and strategic interest in shaping its interfaces with other external policy fields, including security policy. A crucial task facing development policy is to define its position on the character and shape which should and can be given to this process. This is not to rule out the possibility of tensions and occasional differences in perception regarding individual regions or countries.

Development policy not only has a fundamental interest of its own in comprehensively shaping its interfaces with foreign and security policy. Outside pressure aimed at inducing development policy to 'fall into line' and show more 'flexibility' has grown dramatically. This is clearly illustrated by the crucial cases of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and funding for military peace missions from development funds (e.g. in Liberia). But there are a number of possibilities for development policy by engaging in more intensive cooperation with other externally-oriented policy fields to exercise constructive influence in terms of coherence with development goals.

58.6.2 Sensitive Areas

Not all development-military interfaces are fundamentally problematic in nature. But it is possible to identify four sensitive areas from the perspective of development policy that must be taken into consideration in efforts to shape these interfaces:

1. *Subordination of development policy to a military logic:* Any subordination of development policy to military contexts or short-term action constraints that deprive development policy of its say on the 'whether' and 'how' of policy is highly problematic (examples: the embedded role of development policy in the PRTs conceived and set up by the US; the extremely narrow options of development policy after the war in Iraq in 2003).
2. *Implementation by the military of measures with a development character:* In this area development policy actors find fundamental reasons for operational criticism and call for the principle of 'subsidiarity' to continue playing a central role. As far as the field of humanitarian aid is concerned, the relevant actors have defined clearly outlined exceptions in which the military may be allowed to assume certain tasks (Barry/Jefferys 2002: 15ff.). For the spectrum of functions of develop-

ment policy there appear to be no such reasonable exceptions for the military.

3. *Development policy as a source of funding for military missions:* Taking into consideration the imbalance between development and military budgets, development policy will have to refrain from funding military missions (by partner countries and organizations) both in principle and in the individual case. While on the one hand there are legitimate funding needs in the field, and these needs are evidently - one need think here only of the EDF-Liberia debates¹⁵ - not covered by specific and suitable budget lines (above all in the framework of CFSP/ESDP), development policy on the other hand will not be able to fill this gap since this is beyond its scope.¹⁶
4. *Development policy as a source of funding for civil activities conducted by the military:* Since civil activities of the military are generally geared to achieving higher-level goals (force protection, that have little to do with the goals of development measures, development policy does not seem to be the appropriate source of funding.¹⁷

A number of problems faced by development policy in post-conflict reconstruction - e.g. the question of whether or not it is possible to enforce development policy principles in such situations - are primarily due not to the presence of military but to difficult starting conditions encountered in the countries affected.

58.6.3 Principles of Development Policy

Any more pronounced linkage with military components may have direct implications for fundamental principles of development policy. Two sets of principles may be distinguished: (1) general principles (civil character of development policy and 'do no harm') and (2) development policy principles with impacts at the operational level (sustainability, long-term character, partner orientation and ownership). Closer con-

15 In 2003 a sum of €5 million was used from the 8th European Development Fund for support of the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) military mission in Liberia.

16 The imbalance between development and military budgets is reflected in numbers: "Aid still uses only seven percent of the resources absorbed by the military worldwide (\$56 vs. \$794 billion)" (Picciotto 2004: 2).

17 This is not to say that civil measures conducted by military actors may not be legitimate or appropriate and useful in view of concrete situations on the ground.

contact between development and military actors need not necessarily mean any curtailment of these principles; but in this case three fundamental conditions must be given:

- Acceptance of the military by both the local population and conflict parties.
- Independence of development policy activities from military actors.
- Clearly outlined cooperation based on division of functions and limit in time.

58.6.4 Strategic Reference Models

There are three strategic models that are conceivable for development policy to position itself *vis-à-vis* security policy and military actors:

1. *Distance Strategy*: The aim of a distance strategy is to retain the historically and socially conditioned distance between development policy and security policy and military actors. The expected advantage would be a relatively large ministerial autonomy for decisions taken largely based on development policy considerations, i.e. involving the possibility to reach decisions without having to focus unduly on foreign policy and short-term political constraints. Development policy would be free to concentrate on longer-term tasks, including the realization of the Millennium Development Goals.

The potential risks of such a strategy would include the possibility that, given the important political challenges involved in central conflicts (e.g. Afghanistan), any pronounced distance strategy might cast doubt on the relevance of development policy. In this case development policy would lose its ability to constructively shape elementary framework conditions (security) and some of its influence on security and foreign policy strategies concerning such countries.

2. *Cooperation Strategy*: Based on far closer coordination and joint approaches with foreign and security policy actors, a cooperation strategy would seek to give more weight than in the past to the concept of 'development through security'. The expected advantage would be a strategy fully coherent with overall policy where development policy would contribute its interest and concerns to bear on security-related military thinking and approaches.

The potential risks of such a strategy would include the possibility that development policy would have to make many compromises and concessions on principles as well as on concrete approaches due to short-term and military considerations. Development policy would share greater responsibility for military

actions, and it would have to reconcile the risk that other actors might seek its cooperation not least with an eye to existing financial resources, and that these resources would thus no longer be available for the current long-term development policy.

3. *Complementary Strategy*: A complementary strategy would aim for goal conformity and, in strategically selected fields, a complementary approach involving security and foreign policy actors. This would be an interrelated and thus mutually complementary approach that would not entail any overlaps between both fields. The military would define its tasks to ensure that they do not include any development policy measures; and development would ensure that it does not take on or fund any non-civil tasks. The advantage would be an approach which, compared with a distance strategy, would be more coherent and effective without blurring the lines between different tasks and spheres of responsibility.

One potential risk of this strategy would be the possibility that development policy might find itself harnessed to overriding considerations of other policies (e.g. security and/or foreign policy) and see at least some of its interests and concerns sidelined.

The advantages and significance of these three reference models depend on the interface in question. They could seek orientation along the following lines:

- *Complementarity* for the interface 'Security and stability as framework conditions for development policy': In this area close coordination is appropriate, indeed essential in many cases, although it should focus primarily on information-sharing. One essential principle here is a clear division of tasks. Cooperation, on the other hand, would entail an overlapping approach of the kind involved in direct military protection (e.g. escorts).
- *Complementarity to cooperation* for the interface 'Strategic planning and conception': Many situations call for a complementary or even a joint strategic approach.
- *Complementarity* for the interface 'funding': A prudent approach to the funding of non-civil measures and missions as well as for the civil activities of military actors involves complementarity, but not overlapping. Approaches or individual activities can and should be planned jointly, although funding should be based on the specific tasks and areas of responsibility of the policy fields involved.
- *Case dependence* for the interface 'operational approach': Here the benefits derived from joint interfaces concerned with operational matters will

depend in very large measure on the individual case. Accordingly, action strategies should be chosen on an individual basis.

58.7 Conclusion

Development policy and military actors and/or security policy share an increasing number of indirect and direct points of contact as well as fields of possible cooperation. In the past some of these points of contact hardly even entered the minds of the actors involved. These interfaces and overlaps have grown dramatically in recent years. Development policy is on its way to defining for itself a responsibility for overall policy that goes far beyond its present tasks and competences.

While there is reason to welcome many of these points of contact, serving as they do to enhance the overall coherence of given policies, we can at the same time pinpoint some sensitive areas that pose an inherent risk of instrumentalizing development policy and blurring lines of competence.

For development policy actors, these results reflect the general predicament in the current agenda of security and development, characterized by two opposite trends: On the one hand the widening of the security concept across the disciplines to encompass all aspects of human security; on the other hand the tendency of a 'securitization' of development issues. While, for example, the discussion on backgrounds of certain crisis situations includes the whole range of social, political or economic factors, the debate on what action should be taken is dominated for the most part by rather narrow security and military aspects.

The future concern of development policy must be to define its position on shaping the interfaces with other externally-oriented policy fields. This process should accord greater weight to development policy considerations in areas of concern for security policy. As far as reconstruction efforts are concerned, legitimacy of military missions must always be a precondition when development policy engagement is considered.

Facilitating more effective action entails overcoming the gulf previously existing between development and security policy, and civil and military activities. Often fragmented approaches present a serious obstacle to more effective contributions. This applies equally to governments and international organizations both with broad mandates (relationship be-

tween UN development organizations and DPKO [Department of Peacekeeping Operations]), or comparatively 'narrow' ones (NATO in defence policy).

However, it should be noted that greater alignment and cooperation between development policy and the armed forces does not automatically lead to a resolution of potential conflicts of interests in the goals set or prevent diverging perspectives. The allocation of ODA resources varies (by country and region) depending on whether the assistance is targeting the Millennium Development Goals (poverty reduction, absorption capacity, performance, etc.) or the reduction of threats to security and stability (actions of those in power, fragility of the state, or limited monopoly on the use of force, etc.).