The Current Column

Beijing benefits

How China can exploit the disruption of international order

Haug, Sebastian
The Current Column (2026)

Bonn: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), The Current Column of 9 March 2026

Bonn, 9 March 2026. Current upheaval in world politics is expanding China’s room for manoeuvre – and calls for a more in-depth engagement with the People’s Republic.

It is not all plain sailing for the People’s Republic of China. The crisis in the country’s real estate market shows no sign of abating, domestic demand is faltering, and a rapidly ageing population is causing concern for Beijing. Internationally, tensions with the U.S. government are creating challenges for the Chinese economy. Despite holding several trump cards — notably rare earths — export-reliant sectors would have much to lose in an escalating trade war. At the National People's Congress, the Chinese government has just announced the lowest growth target of the past 30 years.

With regard to world politics, however, things could hardly be going better for the People’s Republic. While global attention is focused on Russia’s war against Ukraine or U.S. airstrikes against Iran, China is emphasising the key role of the United Nations (UN) in ensuring stable international cooperation. Compared with Donald Trump’s or Vladimir Putin’s campaigns against core principles of the post-war order, Xi Jinping’s China appears as a staunch defender of multilateralism. For many, China’s close ties to Moscow are no reason to reproach the country. While Western states have only recently begun debating the potential loss of the United States as a security guarantor, China has long been criticising the hegemonic role of the U.S. government. For the People’s Republic, reform of the international order primarily means one thing: less dependence on Washington and hence a greater alignment with Beijing’s interests.

International cooperation with Chinese characteristics

China stresses that it does not seek hegemonic control itself – not least because enforcing such hegemony would tie up too many resources. For the Chinese government, survival of its own regime in the one-party state is of paramount importance. Instead of taking over from the United States as the alleged world police, Beijing hopes to achieve greater – and indeed China-dominated – global connectivity. A key lever in this effort is China’s position as primus inter pares in the heterogeneous group of “developing countries”, which account for the majority of the world’s population. Economic interdependence, development cooperation, and rhetorical support for the concerns of the Global South are key instruments in China’s toolbox.

At the multilateral level, Chinese reform proposals are geared not only towards shifts in power but also towards changes in procedural and normative logics. The UN as China envisions it would be characterised less by multilateral bureaucracy and more by intergovernmental decisions. In some respects, this overlaps with preferences in Moscow and Washington. Normatively, China positions itself in opposition to much of the liberal agenda. Rather than promoting the civil and political rights of individuals, China is attempting to place the collectively conceived Right to Development at the heart of global human rights discourse. Instead of a Responsibility to Protect on the part of the international community, Beijing sees non-interference in internal affairs as the guiding principle of multilateral cooperation. From protesters in Hong Kong to “reunification” with Taiwan, there are a range of matters on which the People’s Republic seeks a free hand.

China as a complex counterpart

Overall, the disruption of an international order long dominated by the United States is widening the scope for China’s preferences and reform proposals. Regardless of all discrepancies, this has increased the longer-term relevance of the People’s Republic – including for Europe. At the end of February, the German federal statistical office reported that Germany’s trade volume with the United States had decreased by 5 percent in 2025 and that China had once again become Germany’s most important trading partner.

Despite the in many ways understandable tendency of European governments to view Beijing as a systemic rival, the contours of China as a potential partner — as recently seen during Friedrich Merz’s trip to China — are likely to come back to the fore. This calls for a nuanced approach that combines detailed knowledge with strategic astuteness. The much-invoked “China competence”, which often leaves much to be desired, is not only about learning the Chinese language. It also requires a broader societal engagement with China as a country and with the Chinese government as a global actor.

Against this backdrop, the traditional focus on political, economic, and cultural engagement with the United States urgently needs to be expanded. Germany and other countries that still regard themselves as part of the West currently seem united by a broad consensus that international relations need to be recalibrated. As a complex counterpart, China should take centre stage in this process. This will entail expanding dialogue formats, including atypical ones, pooling expertise in research and public administration, and already devoting sufficient attention to China in school curricula. It also means interacting with Chinese people to gain an understanding of the diversity of Chinese realities that could offer starting points for critical engagement – beyond unequal trade relations and the one-party state.