The Current Column

Four Years on from the Zeitenwende

The New Significance of (South-)Eastern Europe in German Development Policy

Bergmann, Julian
The Current Column (2026)

Bonn: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), The Current Column of 23 February 2026

Bonn, 23 February 2026. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has resulted in (South-)Eastern Europe acquiring greater geopolitical significance. Taking a more strategic approach to development policy also means stepping up cooperation with the region.

“In Southeast and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, it is also a matter of counterbalancing Russian influence“. This is not a quote from the famous “Zeitenwende” speech delivered by the then German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the German Bundestag on 27 February 2022. Remarkably, this sentence is taken from “Shaping the Future Together Globally”, the BMZ’s reform plan published in mid-January 2026.

The main reason why this sentence is remarkable is that it underlines the fact that German development policy with the countries referred to by the BMZ as “transformation partners” – Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine – also follows a geopolitical logic. The BMZ already adopted a new Strategy for development cooperation with transformation partners in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe and the

Southern Caucasus back at the end of 2023, emphasising these countries’ greater importance in German development policy.

Zeitenwende – a watershed moment in development policy too?

In response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the German government has realigned its defence policy, primarily gearing it to national and NATO defence again, and has invested hugely in equipping Germany’s armed forces. The historic turning point can be seen in Germany’s energy policy too, notably in a significant reduction of the country’s dependence on Russian gas. So what about development policy?

In the field of development policy, the new era is most clearly reflected in Germany’s policy on Ukraine. While the country was ranked 17th on the list of bilateral recipients of Germany’s official development assistance (ODA) in 2021, Ukraine has been the largest recipient of bilateral ODA from Germany since 2022. According to figures from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Germany has provided US$3.8 billion in bilateral ODA since 2022, in addition to the funding provided through its contributions to multilateral institutions and the European Union (EU). The latter accounts for the largest share of financial assistance to Ukraine. Without the civilian support of its international partners, the Ukrainian government would not have been able to withstand four years of Russian aggression.

Development policy as geopolitics?

At the same time, Ukraine and (South-)Eastern Europe as a whole are not at the centre of development policy debates in Germany – either because the benefit of development cooperation with the countries is not considered to be significant or because the geopolitical focus of development policy is regarded with scepticism. This sceptical stance is particularly evident from the different reactions to the BMZ’s reform plan. While some commentators are concerned that development cooperation might become a geopolitical and economic instrument and are critical of the regional focus on Europe’s neighbours in the field of peace and security, others simply forget that the reform plan explicitly includes (South-)Eastern Europe and the Caucasus here – and not just the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, North Africa and the Middle East.

Yet if development policy is to take on a more strategic and geopolitical focus and be understood as a soft-power instrument, it is only logical that it should also be used to counterbalance a revisionist and imperial power that threatens Europe’s security. And strengthening development cooperation that generates positive impacts in terms of security policy is not tantamount to the “securitisation” of development policy – a nightmare scenario for large sections of the German development policy community.

A greater focus on (South-)Eastern Europe

In specific terms, stepping up development cooperation with South-Eastern and Eastern Europe could mean increasing efforts to promote democracy and to fight disinformation particularly in those countries in which democratic institutions are currently facing huge pressure, such as Serbia, Georgia, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here in particular, the impacts of the termination of USAID programmes to promote democracy and societal resilience are clearly felt.

Greater investment in economic cooperation could contribute to addressing key challenges in the region: in Kosovo, for example, where youth unemployment has averaged almost 50 per cent in recent years; or in Serbia, where one of the challenges facing Europe will be to organise the planned mining of critical minerals such as lithium so that it creates jobs and added value at local level without reinforcing autocratisation trends by violating rule of law standards.

A key stabilisation factor in the region is the EU enlargement process. Yet the countries are moving towards accession to the EU at different speeds. The accession processes will only be successful if they help achieve a tangible improvement in socio-economic conditions. Development cooperation measures can play a decisive role in this context. The BMZ should also be granted more powers at EU level to shape relations with our Eastern neighbours.

A greater focus on these Eastern neighbours, underpinned by the necessary financial resources, would be a logical contribution to gearing German development policy more heavily towards the challenges of the new era.