The Current Column

Between Crisis and Reform

The Stakes Involved in the WTO Ministerial Conference

Berger, Axel / Clara Brandi
The Current Column (2026)

Bonn: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), The Current Column of 23 March 2026

Bonn, 23 March 2026. The structural crisis of the WTO will dominate the 14th Ministerial Conference. Failure to achieve progress in Yaoundé would reinforce the impression that the WTO is continuing to lose its capacity to act.

Much is at stake when the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) takes place in Yaoundé at the end of March. The structural crisis in the WTO is all too well known: geopolitical rivalries dominate trade policy, the members are deeply divided when it comes to reform, and the disruptive U.S. tariff policy is undermining the multilateral rules. Reform of the WTO is crucial, yet substantial progress is not to be expected in Yaoundé. Whether or not the MC14 can be deemed to be a success will primarily depend on whether it delivers results in two specific areas.

Firstly, the e-commerce moratorium is on the agenda. WTO members have refrained from imposing tariffs on digital products such as software and music since 1998. This moratorium has to be extended at regular intervals in order to prevent a patchwork solution for digital trade. Some countries see this as a loss of revenue and are increasingly questioning whether the moratorium should be extended or are using it as leverage to obtain concessions in other areas. Continuation of the moratorium would be an important success for free trade in digital products – even if this was only a temporary solution again.

Secondly, the MC14 will need to address the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement, which was signed by more than two-thirds of the WTO members. The agreement is designed to make investment procedures more transparent and more efficient and could bring advantages for low- and middle-income countries in particular. Even though it is a “plurilateral” agreement that has not been signed and implemented by all members, the approval of all members is required for it to be integrated into the WTO system. Only then will the agreement become legally valid and binding. Integration of the IFD Agreement is still hanging in the balance, as a few members, notably India, have opposed it to date.

More than merely technical details
Even though these topics may appear to be technical ones, they are politically significant. If progress is not achieved in both areas in Yaoundé, this would further reinforce the impression that the WTO now has very little capacity to act, even on relatively limited initiatives. Those people who have branded the multilateral trade system as dysfunctional would no doubt feel validated. 

This leads to a strategic question for the European Union (EU). If it wants to strengthen the WTO, it must credibly advocate for the rules on which the multilateral trade system is based. In an age in which fundamental rules are being broken, that is more important than ever. This makes it all the more problematic that Commission President von der Leyen recently gave the impression that the EU no longer sees itself as the guardian of a rules-based order. The EU’s questioning of the key “most-favoured nation“ (MFN) principle is also a disastrous signal. The MFN principle prevents unequal treatment of trade partners and is the foundation of a fair, rules-based trade system.

If the MC14 fails to deliver a convincing vision for the future of the WTO, there is a risk of further fragmentation into blocs. The EU is not naive in this respect, but has planned ahead, namely by initiating more than 40 free trade agreements with almost 80 countries and sectoral partnerships. Agreements of this kind can help to liberalise trade and refine rules – but they cannot replace the WTO, whose rules are still used to conduct more than 70 per cent of global trade. Negotiations on bilateral and regional free trade agreements should therefore always contain a clear commitment by the parties to multilateral reforms too.

Moreover, Europe should also pursue another strategic option in parallel: closer “plurilateral” cooperation with like-minded nations. Middle powers such as Canada, Japan, Australia, Brazil and South Africa have a strong interest in stable and predictable trade rules. Together, they could drive reform initiatives or – if the WTO continues to be blocked permanently – at least maintain partial structures of a viable rules-based system. One example is the EU’s attempt to cooperate with the 12 countries of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) is another example. A total of 58 countries have now joined it – including the EU, China and Brazil – thus creating an alternative to the WTO Appellate Body blocked by the United States.

Strength through rules
The WTO will not be reinvented in Yaoundé. Yet the Ministerial Conference will have to show whether its members are still prepared to give their political support to the multilateral trade system. As far as the EU is concerned, it is clear that it can only secure its influence in the long term in a functioning rules-based trade system. For that very reason, it should do all it can to strengthen the WTO and forge new coalitions for its reform.