Mitarbeiter sonstige

Download

The future of democracy promotion

in: Mark Furness / Niels Keijzer (eds.), International development cooperation and the emerging global order, Bonn: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), 43-46

ISBN: 978-3-96021-288-1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.23661/idp4.2026

Democracy promotion is coming under attack from within traditional donor countries. Driven by nationalism and security considerations, governments are deprioritising development aid, including democracy aid. The dissolution of USAID in 2025 – the largest democracy-promotion donor – marks a watershed moment, but it is not an outlier in this global trend, as there have been considerable funding cuts in the United Kingdom and other donor countries. It is not only the level of democracy-aid disbursements, like that of development aid more broadly, that has notably decreased, but also the patterns of these disbursements that have shifted with the changing global order. With geopolitical interests in mind, donors routinely look the other way when strategic partners commit autocratic abuses and human rights violations, thereby giving a persistent advantage to autocrats. One major implication of these attacks from within is the weakening of institutionalised international cooperation for democracy promotion. With the erosion of multilateralism and geopolitical shifts, issue-oriented club governance is becoming more prevalent. As states withdraw from regional organisations with democracy clauses (e.g. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS) or from traditional democracy-promoting organisations (such as the withdrawal of the United States from UNDEF), democracy promotion becomes increasingly decoupled from organisational membership. The consequence is that democracy promotion loses not just its funding but also its institutional infrastructure. This trend makes it structurally more difficult to track and advocate for democracy within the emerging architecture of international cooperation. Democracy promotion also faces growing external threats. Authoritarian powers are increasingly disrupting domestic political processes in other countries through cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns on social media, as well as with transnational repression targeting their opponents. They co-opt international organisations, build cross-regional networks and alliances, and support other autocracies materially and diplomatically. They also shape the broader international environment by competing ideologically, presenting their regimes as viable alternatives to democracy (Dukalskis, 2021). The implications of this external pressure for democracy promotion are severe, and they compound the damage caused by the internal retreat. Authoritarian interference increases scepticism towards the West and deepens cynicism about its motives in other countries. In turn, this provides autocratising incumbents further justification to crack down on civil society, weaken linkages with Western democracies, fuel conspiracism and strengthen nativist support bases, making cooperation for democracy promotion difficult (Coskun & Dueck, 2025).