The Current Column

Rebuilding Syria

A mixed record one year after the fall of the Assad regime

Zintl, Tina
The Current Column (2025)

Bonn: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), The Current Column of 8 December 2025

Bonn, 8 December 2025. Exactly a year ago to the day, the long-standing Syrian despot Bashar al-Assad fled the country. Ahmed al-Sharaa, the controversial leader of the HTS militia, took over power. Syria’s political leadership and its international image have undergone a radical change, yet the economy is still on its knees and the humanitarian situation for the population remains disastrous. Despite all the uncertainties ahead, Germany and the EU should make a stronger commitment to a fair recovery and economic participation for all.

With great (perhaps too great?) hope and expectations, Syrians across the globe followed the transition of power on 8 December 2024 and celebrated the release of tens of thousands of political prisoners. One year on, however, the new Syrian government’s record is mixed: although it has initiated important political processes – a transitional constitution, a transitional government, indirect parliamentary elections – these have been strongly criticised as lacking transparency and being undemocratic. The Syrian army has been overhauled and militia formerly loyal to the regime have been disarmed, but the security situation remains tense and the role of Islamist factions within the army is unclear: the media have reported on attacks on minorities, for example in the coastal region and in Suwayda; abductions are becoming more frequent and the number of civilian deaths is actually higher than in the year before, while the perpetrators are rarely brought to justice.

At the same time, President al-Sharaa is enjoying huge success on the foreign policy stage: he has been hosted by leaders from the Gulf States, Turkey, France, Russia and the United States and gave a speech to the UN General Assembly – the first Syrian head of state to do so for almost 60 years. Yet in terms of regional policy, Syria is weak and its sovereignty is restricted by Turkey in the north and by Israel in the south.

The disastrous economic situation is having a particularly serious impact and it is here that the omissions and misguided decisions by al-Sharaa’s government are becoming apparent: the only success has been the successive lifting of most of the sanctions – though over-compliance by the banks and uncertainty about what rules apply have diminished the effects. There are no comprehensive reconstruction plans or economic policy road maps. Decisions are taken behind closed doors, often by the transitional president himself or close associates. The focus is on cutting costs through privatisation and on acquiring large-scale investments, yet the origin and modalities of these investments, most of which have as yet only been announced but not yet delivered, are often questionable. In addition, they mainly relate to prestigious projects in the capital, such as a new airport and a metro line, which have little relevance for less prosperous Syrians or those living in rural areas. This is not the way to achieve an economically sustainable recovery based on local value chains.

The destitute population is currently still waiting in vain for a ‘peace dividend’ – in other words for the power transition to have a direct positive impact on their lives. Two thirds are still living in poverty and the majority of people depend on aid. Worse still, in view of the tight public budget, the reforms implemented often have negative effects on the population: dismissals and job insecurity in the public sector, the abolition of subsidies and a significant increase in electricity prices despite the high cost of living are affecting large sections of the population. Moreover, there are indications of land speculation and renewed cases of expropriation. Protests are increasing. Syria has not yet managed to create a new system based on dignity that engages the entire population in joint efforts to rebuild the country.

Syrians need a clear timeline of when basic services will be restored and Syrian businesses need to be able to plan ahead. Germany and the EU should work to achieve greater donor coordination and a nuanced recovery plan with binding targets. A transparent reconstruction coordination platform for public investments – similar to Ukraine’s DREAM platform – could build trust among investors and promote local participation. Moreover, a reconstruction council comprising representatives from Germany or Europe and Syria, including from civil society and local authorities, would generate key momentum.

In view of its large Syrian diaspora community, Germany in particular should play a greater role in rebuilding the country and should not get mired down in unsettling and short-sighted debates about Syrians returning to their home country. Although Germany is providing assistance in important areas such as health and education, it has not been leveraging its unique access and strategic advantage so far. In the absence of targeted funding programmes and investment guarantees, German businesses are leaving the way clear for less risk-averse competitors. Yet these pioneers, primarily from Turkey and the Gulf States, are shaping Syria’s new economic order to benefit their own interests. A far-sighted policy on Syria needs to refocus on long-term exchange and on attracting and keeping skilled workers – not only to promote inclusive recovery in Syria, but also to improve the social cohesion between Germans with and without Syrian roots here in Germany.