2 superpowers, 1 playbook: Why Chinese and US bureaucrats think and act alike
Esser, Daniel / Heiner Janus / Theisen, Mark / Tim Hailer-RöthelExterne Publikationen (2025)
published on theconversation.com, 16.12.2025
DOI: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.64628/AAI.sjunpp3ed
Volltext/Full text
Despite strategic rivalry, bureaucratic behavior in China and the United States follows strikingly similar logics. Drawing on comparative research across foreign aid, environmental governance, and pandemic response, we show that Chinese and U.S. bureaucrats are often driven by strikingly similar incentives. Career pressures, blame avoidance, political signaling, and risk aversion shape day-to-day decision-making on both sides — frequently producing comparable outcomes, despite very different political systems. Understanding these shared bureaucratic dynamics helps explain why the two superpowers can appear deeply polarized politically, yet are surprisingly predictable in practice. Beneath geopolitical rivalry, common administrative logics continue to anchor state action.
Further IDOS experts
-
Baumann, Max-Otto
Political Science
-
Baydag, Melis
Political Science
-
Berger, Axel
Political Science
-
Bergmann, Julian
Political Science
-
Dang, Vy
Political Science
-
Erforth, Benedikt
Political Science
-
Furness, Mark
Political Science
-
Goedeking, Nicholas
Comparative Political Economy
-
Grimm, Sven
Political Science
-
Hackenesch, Christine
Political Science
-
Haug, Sebastian
Political Science
-
Kachelmann, Matthias
Political Science
-
Keijzer, Niels
Social Science
-
Klingebiel, Stephan
Political Science
-
Koch, Svea
Social Science
-
Li, Hangwei
Political Science
-
Löpelt, Sarah
International relations and Sustainability policy
-
Novoselova, Anna
Political Science
-
Nowack, Daniel
Political Science
-
Olekseyuk, Zoryana
Economy
-
Pegels, Anna
Economist
-
Reiners, Wulf
Political Science
-
Stewart, Benjamin
Social Science
-
Volz, Ulrich
Economist
-
von Haaren, Paula
Development Economics
-
Wingens, Christopher
Political Science